Showing posts with label John Campbell. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Campbell. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 10, 2020

How To Understand The Dethronement Of An Islamic Ruler In Nigeria

Muhammad Lamido Sanusi II

BY JOHN CAMPBELL

On March 9, Governor Abdullahi Ganduje of Kano state, through a unanimous vote of the Kano state executive council, dethroned Emir of Kano Lamido Sanusi. Soon after the vote, Sanusi was removed from his palace and escorted under tight security to nearby Nassarawa state. Shortly after Sanusi’s dethronement, the state government announced Aminu Ado Bayero, the son of the previous emir who died in office in 2014, as the new emir. Sanusi, in a video message after his dethronement, called on people to be calm and support the new emir.

Ganduje is in many ways a conventional Nigerian politician. A septuagenarian, he has moved back and forth among the two leading parties and has held multiple offices. As with many or most of Nigeria’s politicians, he is suspected of corruption. He has been feuding with Sanusi, whom he accuses of supporting his political opponents. In 2019, Ganduje moved to reduce the size of the emir’s domains by reducing its size and appointing additional emirs at the same level as the Emir of Kano. Now, the governor claims that Sanusi is guilty of insubordination and his removal is necessary to preserve the prestige of the office. Many Nigerians, however, feel that the governor moved out of resentment over Sanusi’s charges of corruption.

Before being turbaned, Sanusi was a governor of the central bank and had a highly favorable international reputation. He has also been a whistleblower with respect to state corruption, embarrassing the government of President Goodluck Jonathan with a $20 billion fraud allegation.

The Nigerian sate was created by the British during the colonial era and by the post-independence military. While ostensibly a democracy, state authority tends to be top-down, rather than bottom-up. For example, the military wrote the constitution, it has never been subject to popular ratification, and elections are manipulated by the rival cartels that have largely captured the state. This formal state is declining, buffeted by Boko Haram in the north, a low-level insurgency in the oil patch, and quarrels over land and water use that fall along ethnic and religious lines in the country’s middle belt. In addition, there is a nationwide crime wave. The state is disproportionately dependent on revenue from oil, whose declining price is putting stress on the budget and the complex network by which oil-based wealth is divided among the ruling elites. As the authority of the federal government has declined, that of the governors has increased.

However, federal and state governments have little relevance for many Nigerians, especially those living in the predominately Islamic north. Here, Nigerians turn to traditional rulers for justice and resolution of disputes. These traditional rulers have little formal, legal recognition by the Nigerian state, and they in theory are subject to the authority of governors, who can remove them from office. This has happened only rarely, most notably when the military ruler Sani Abacha removed an earlier emir of Kano. Nevertheless, at least up to now, the popular prestige of the Sultan of Sokoto, the Shehu of Borno, and the Emir of Kano appears to have been much greater than that of governors.

For the time being, Sanusi has accepted his removal as “the will of God.” It remains to be seen what the consequences will be of the governor’s action. If he “gets away with it,” and there is no widespread popular reaction, it will be a sign that governors are, indeed, in many ways now the predominate power-brokers in Nigerian governance, even to the point of displacing traditional rulers that enjoy popular support. However, it may take some time before the consequences of Sanusi’s removal become clear. Abacha’s removal of an earlier emir of Kano destabilized traditional authorities in the north in ways that were hard to see at the time but with hindsight contributed to the erosion of the authority of the military regime.


SOURCE: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Wednesday, April 24, 2019

Declining African Confidence In Ballot Secrecy And Political Rights

A woman carries a child as she casts her vote during presidential election, at a polling station in Medina neighborhood, in Dakar, Senegal, on February 24, 2019. Sylvain Cherkaoui/Reuters via Council on Foreign Relations

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

In Africa and among Africa’s foreign friends, elections are the lodestone of democratic progress. Hence the intense focus on the mechanics of elections, rather than other aspects of democracy, such as the extent to which an African voter is actually independent rather than subject to myriad forms of coercion by “big men” or others. Afrobarometer, Africa’s widely-respected polling organization, found [PDF] that 68 percent of Africans doubt the secrecy of their ballot. In other words, a majority of Africans are skeptical about what they think is a key element in elections. As Afrobarometer points out, that skepticism is surprisingly high in relatively established democracies, such as Senegal (89 percent), Kenya (80 percent), and South Africa (68 percent).

These poll results seem to reflect accurately the reality, at least as relayed by anecdotes. All over Africa, there are numerous ways for those who wish to do so to find out how an individual or a community voted. The big exception is South Africa, where the quality of elections is high and where voter secrecy is generally maintained. The Afrobarometer data on South Africa likely reflects general feelings of marginalization in the townships and in rural areas rather than a specific election experience.

The distinguished South African newspaper, Mail and Guardian, puts these poll results in the right context: Africans believe that “the space for civil and political rights in Africa is shrinking.” The newspaper notes that other polling data shows that 67 percent of polled Africans, a 7 percent decline from the 2012/13 survey, think they are “somewhat” or “completely” free to say what they think. Such polling is a cautionary note to the international optimism about developments in Algeria and Sudan, which may be premature, given the negative examples of Egypt and Zimbabwe.

Friday, November 16, 2018

Protecting Nigeria's Elections From Its Political Class

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari congratulates new Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Chairman Mahmoud Yakubu shortly after his swearing in, in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 9, 2015. Reuters


(COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATION)--Nigerians will go to the polls for elections in February and March 2019. In line with its mandate, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has reminded candidates that they are prohibited by law from campaigning before November 18, which marks ninety days before election day for federal offices, which is scheduled for February 16. Elections for state-level positions will take place on March 1 and campaigns will begin on December 2. The campaign period is a very delicate time and is often characterized by violence, abuse of power, hate speech, and corruption.

For the 2019 general elections at the federal level, Nigerians will elect a president and vice president, 109 Senators, and 360 members of the House of Representatives. In state level elections two weeks later, they will elect 29 state governors and 991 members of states’ Houses of Assembly. For the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), 62 Councilors and 6 Area Council Chairpersons will be elected.

The elections come with huge logistical and operational challenges, but the greatest challenge facing election officials in Nigeria is the enforcement of rules, and by extension, securing the cooperation of the political class. The Electoral Reform Committee of 2008, or the Uwais Committee, was set up following the 2007 general elections. Local and international observers determined them to be the worst elections since the return to democracy in 1999. The Uwais Report [PDF], which is still the most comprehensive review of Nigeria’s electoral process, identified the weakness of the enforcement regime and the attitude of the political class as the two primary problems facing credible elections in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the political class has continued to find ways to undermine elections and enforcement remains weak.

Under Section 150 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) [PDF], INEC is granted the authority to prosecute electoral offences. However, INEC lacks the actual capacity and resources to fulfill this mandate. Despite its best efforts, INEC has only been able to prosecute successfully a handful of cases since 2015. The police are responsible for investigating crime, including that related to elections. But, INEC has no operational control over the police to ensure the investigation of allegations of electoral fraud. The ministries of justice at the state and federal level, which exercise a complimentary role in crime prosecution, have typically shown little interest in electoral accountability. Prior to the 2015 elections in Nigeria, the National Human Rights Commission documented a list of individuals indicted for electoral malpractices in the course of election tribunal proceedings. They submitted that list to the Attorney General of the Federation, but no further action was taken.

The structures of accountability and law enforcement in Nigeria are often under the control of politicians who exercise undue influence on the actions of those agencies. This makes any form of accountability difficult. Politicians understand that they are unlikely to face consequences for tampering with the electoral process, thereby undermining the elections’ legitimacy and fairness. Furthermore, electoral impunity is a major trigger for violence and instability in the region. Election-related violence led to the deaths of over eight hundred people in 2011, according to Human Rights Watch, and in the 2015 elections more than fifty Nigerians were killed in the run up to the election, according to the National Human Rights Commission.

Given the weakness of Nigeria’s electoral and judicial institutions, the political class has little incentive to play by the rules. Therefore, the success of Nigeria’s elections will hinge partly on tough love from international election observers and foreign governments. The United States in particular can help avert a crisis by supporting a framework for electoral accountability that encourages respect for the rule of law. This framework must include punitive measures. Within this context, the United States should consider targeted sanctions and travel bans against individuals who abuse their office or who undermine the electoral process through their supporters. In instances were such actions trigger mass violence, the observer missions and foreign governments should demand accountability. Observers and international NGOs will also need to support local civil society as they document infractions in the electoral process, support community mandate protection initiatives, and provide technical and political support to INEC to allow it to hold the political class accountable.


Udo Jude Ilo is the Nigeria country representative for the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Yemi Adamolekun is the executive director for Enough is Enough Nigeria (EiE).

Tuesday, October 09, 2018

The Stage Is Set for Nigeria's February 2019 Presidential Election

Current PDP presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar speaks with current President Muhammadu Buhari of the APC in Lagos on December 11, 2014, when both were contesting for the APC presidential nomination. Akintunde Akinleye/Reuters


BY JOHN CAMPBELL

ABUJA (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS)
--Nigeria’s presidential election is scheduled for February 16, 2019. The two largest parties, the incumbent All Progressives Congress (APC) and the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) completed their primaries last weekend. The APC unanimously selected President Muhammadu Buhari as its candidate, while the PDP picked former Vice President Atiku Abubakar by a large margin from a crowded field. In addition, three other prominent Nigerians have declared for the presidency as the candidate of minor parties: Oby Ezekwesili for the Allied Congress Party; Donald Duke for the Social Democratic Party; and Kingsley Moghalu for the Young Progressives Party (YPP).

Nigerian politics is dominated by the APC and the PDP, one “slightly to the left” (APC) and the other “slightly to the right” (PDP). Parties aside, politics is dominated by personality, not by issues, and politicians frequently and easily shift from one party to the other. For example, Atiku Abubakar was a member of the PDP when he was vice president and until 2014, at which point he left the PDP and joined the APC to challenge Buhari for that party's presidential nomination, which Buhari ultimately one. He then left the Buhari-led APC in late 2017 and will now challenge him again, this time as the PDP's presidential candidate. Minor party candidates can add ginger to the political debate, as Ezekwesili, Duke, and Moghalu are likely to do; unlike those of the two dominant parties, their campaigns are issue-oriented. But candidates from minor parties are highly unlikely to win the presidency.

All five candidates are viscerally pro-American, and all have strong connections there. Buhari earned a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Atiku Abubakar was deeply influenced by U.S. Peace Corps teachers and founded an American-style university, the American University of Nigeria, in his home town of Yola. Oby Ezekwesili earned a master of public administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Moghalu earned a master’s degree at Tufts University in Boston and later was a professor there. Finally, Duke has a degree in admiralty law from the University of Pennsylvania.

All five have impressive backgrounds. Buhari was military chief of state in the 1980s known for his “war against indiscipline” and anticorruption drive. In 2015, he was the first opposition candidate to be elected president in Nigeria’s history. Atiku Abubakar was vice president of Nigeria for eight years under President Olusegun Obasanjo, was a senior official in the customs service, and is currently a major entrepreneur. Ezekwesili was a minister of education and mobilized the Nigerian public after Boko Haram kidnapped more than two hundred school girls with #BringBackOurGirls. She is a founder of the anticorruption watchdog Transparency International. She was vice president for Africa at the World Bank from 2007 to 2012. Like Duke and Moghalu, she is a vociferous critic of Nigerian politics. Duke was a notably successful governor of Cross Rivers State, and Moghalu served as a deputy governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

There is an unwritten rule between the two major parties that the presidency should alternate every eight years between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south. It currently is the north’s turn, and the candidates of both major parties are therefore northern Muslims. The three minor party candidates are all southern Christians, but minor parties are not bound by this practice. It is too early to say whether the Nigerian political establishment will converge around Buhari or Abubakar—the principal presidential candidates—or if it will converge at all. Conventional wisdom was that the incumbent always enjoyed a significant advantage over challengers, but Buhari upended that trope with his victory in 2015.

Tuesday, September 18, 2018

Corruption Denies Millions Access To Quality Education In Nigeria

A student stands on a bench to write on the board at a floating school in the Makoko fishing community on the Lagos Lagoon, Nigeria February 29, 2016. In Makoko is a sprawling slum of Nigeria's megacity Lagos, and the school provides free educatio. Akintunde Akinleye/Reuters


BY JOHN CAMPBELL
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Education in Nigeria is in dire straits, and many Nigerians are acutely aware and concerned. At present, Nigeria has the highest percentage in the world of children not enrolled in school, and it is much higher in the north of the country than in the south. Overall, the UN Human Development Index ranks Nigeria 152nd out of 188 countries. In the north, up to 12 million are enrolled in madrassas which do not prepare them to participate in a modern economy and are generally outside of government oversight.

Public education is chronically underfunded. For countries seeking to develop rapidly, a UN agency recommends countries spend 25 percent of their national budget on education, as they do in Ethiopia; for Nigeria, the 2018 figure is 7.1 percent. During his visit in March, Bill Gates chided officials for underinvestment in human capital. But, education expansion and reform is not easy. The education function is divided between federal, state, and local governments. As with other aspects of national life, corruption is said to be ubiquitous. Teachers often go for long periods without being paid, and strikes, especially at the university level, are frequent.

At independence and shortly thereafter, the Nigerian educational system was among the strongest in Africa. As with so many other elements of national life, the long period of military rule—from 1967 to 1998, with a brief civilian interregnum—blighted education. Military governments viewed educators, especially at universities, as potential opposition. As in other developing countries, the popular demand for education is strong. Accordingly, successive military governments expanded the number of universities while never providing sufficient funding. This process continued after the restoration of civilian government in 1999, where states established universities, usually with inadequate funding. At the primary and secondary level, education had largely been in the hands of missionaries. But, in the aftermath of the civil war, the military government closed church schools (and hospitals) and “nationalized” them, to the detriment of their quality.

The civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 permitted the establishment of private universities under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Since then, seventy-four have been established that were open as of 2017. Most have church affiliations of some sort, and most are in the southern part of the country. However, the American University of Nigeria is secular and is located in Adamawa state in the north. (I am on the board of the American University of Nigeria.) The quality of many of the private universities is high, but there are tuition charges, while the public universities are largely free. There are now many private primary and secondary schools, and they educate the majority of students in Lagos state.

As with other aspects of Nigerian life, traditional state functions, such as education, are becoming privatized. There is a clear hierarchy. Wealthy Nigerians send their children abroad to Ghana or elsewhere, less wealthy ones send them to private schools through the university level, while the poor—the overwhelming majority of the population—are dependent on state facilities.

Thursday, April 26, 2018

Press Freedom Varies Considerably Across Africa





An empty studio of the NTV channel, which was shutdown by the Kenyan government because of their coverage of opposition leader Raila Odinga's symbolic presidential inauguration in February, in Nairobi, Kenya, February 1, 2018. Baz Ratner/Reuters. Image via CFR


AFRICA (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS)--Each year, Reporters Without Borders (RWB) publishes a list of 180 countries rank-ordered according to the degree of freedom the media enjoys. RWB uses objective criteria, which it outlines on its website. It cautions that it is measuring media freedom, not media quality.

Its list is divided into five bands, from best to worst.

The top band consists of seventeen countries, mostly in Europe but none from the African continent. The second band consists of thirty countries, five of which are African. For comparison’s sake, it includes countries like Canada (no. 18), France (33), the United Kingdom (40), and the United States (45). The African countries are as follows: Ghana (23), Namibia (26), South Africa (28), Cape Verde (29), and Burkina Faso (41). In these African countries, freedom of the media is roughly equivalent to that of the United States and big NATO allies. In fact, they all actually rank higher than the United States and, with the exception of Burkina Faso, the United Kingdom.

The third band runs from Botswana (48) to Bolivia (110). There are twenty-one African countries, including Senegal (50), Liberia (89), and Kenya (96). Others in this band include Hong Kong (70), Mongolia (71), and Israel (87).

The fourth band runs from Bulgaria (111) to Kazakhstan (158). This band includes seventeen African countries, including most of the large ones: Uganda (117), Nigeria (119), Angola (121), Ethiopia (150), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (154). This band also includes India (138), Russia (148), and Turkey (157).

The fifth and final band, representing the countries with the worst media freedom, runs from Burundi (159) to North Korea (180). It includes five African countries in addition to Burundi: Somalia (168), Equatorial Guinea (171), Djibouti (173), Sudan (174), and Eritrea (179). This band also includes Cuba (172), China (176), and Syria (177).

The bad news is that the twenty-eight African countries in the bottom half of the list outnumber the twenty-one in the top half. Further, Africa’s largest states by population are in the bottom half: Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The good news is that the top half includes almost all of the states of the southern cone (Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho), Ghana, and several francophone states around the continent, such as Senegal, Madagascar, Niger, and Ivory Coast. Other good news is that the five African states comparable in media freedom to the United States include two large, important ones: Ghana and South Africa.

The RWB index provides a useful tool for comparing media freedom around the continent. It also provides yet another example of the diversity of the African continent. With respect to media freedom, Ghana and South Africa, for example, are far removed from Sudan and Eritrea.

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

Can Land Expropriation Address South Africa’s Continued Racial Disparities?




Jan Christians sits outside his home in the Richtersveld area, where locals live as they await the outcome of a lands claim action, North Western Cape Province, South Africa, March 2005 (AP photo by Mujahid Safodien).



In late February, South Africa’s parliament overwhelmingly passed a motion seeking to change the constitution in order to allow the government to expropriate land without compensation. The motion came after the ruling African National Congress formally adopted the principle of land expropriation at its party conference in December. South Africa’s new president and the head of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, has since voiced his opposition to the recent spate of unilateral land grabs across the country, or what critics call “illegal land invasions.” In an email interview, John Campbell, the Ralph Bunche senior fellow of African policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, discusses racial disparities in land ownership in South Africa and why land reform remains so contentious despite the end of apartheid.

WPR: Why is the Ramaphosa government considering amending the constitution to allow land expropriations without compensation?
John Campbell: During the colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, white South Africans seized about 87 percent of the surface area of the country. Many black South Africans regard this seizure of land as theft and the root cause of their poverty. The governing African National Congress, or ANC, has long advocated the transfer of land to the black South African majority. This policy also has the support of most other political parties, but progress has been slow. For example, white South Africans, who make up just 9 percent of the population, are estimated to still own over 70 percent of all land.

At its December 2017 party convention, the ANC adopted—for the first time in its history as a political party—the general principle of expropriation of land without compensation in order to speed up land redistribution. This policy shift was part of the political struggle between the supporters of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for party leadership. Dlamini-Zuma was the more populist of the two and advocated, vaguely, for the redistribution of wealth. Ramaphosa and his supporters advocated addressing poverty through much higher rates of economic growth within a liberal, capitalist framework. In effect, the multimillionaire Ramaphosa, who won the leadership race in the ANC and became president of South Africa in February after Jacob Zuma resigned, accepted the principle of expropriation to pry away some of Dlamini-Zuma’s supporters and establish his populist credentials.

More broadly, expropriation of land and mines has long been advocated by liberation movements in southern Africa and has resonance in South African townships. It has become a signature issue for the Economic Freedom Fighters, or EFF, which is now the second largest opposition party in parliament, though they still only received about 6 percent of the vote in the last elections. Concern about being outflanked on the left by the EFF contributed to the ANC’s new support for the principle of land expropriation without compensation.

But South Africa’s constitution recognizes private property as a fundamental human right, and constitutional experts are divided as to whether it offers a provision for expropriation without compensation to promote the public good. To that end, the Ramaphosa government has established a commission to consider whether the constitution should be amended.

WPR: How has land reform been carried out since the end of apartheid?

Campbell: The ANC was founded in part in response to the Native Land Act of 1913, which provided for the expropriation of land without compensation by the apartheid government. After the end of apartheid in 1994, the ANC supported land reform with compensation given to current owners based on the principle of “willing seller, willing buyer.” This approach is still supported by the opposition Democratic Alliance and other free market advocates. Some land has, in fact, been sold by whites to blacks, but evidence is anecdotal as land transfer data does not make note of race. By and large, however, land redistribution is regarded as a failure; the share of farmland owned by white South Africans has fallen from just over 80 percent to just over 70 percent since the end of apartheid. A parliament-appointed panel found that just 5.5 percent of commercial agricultural land had been redistributed.

Since it came to power, the ANC has included funds in its annual government budget for land redistribution. These funds peaked in 2009 but have declined steadily since then to less than half that in 2017. Even at its peak in 2009, the funds registered less than half a percent of the government’s national budget. This is in part because the ANC’s geographic priorities have been more urban than rural. Rather than devoting a larger part of the state’s revenue to buying land for redistribution, the ANC built more than 3 million houses and brought water and electricity to the townships.

The Land Restitution Act of 1994 provides a mechanism to compensate people whose land was expropriated by the apartheid government after 1913. But in more than 90 percent of the cases brought under the law, recipients have chosen monetary compensation rather than the land itself. Where land redistribution has taken place, 90 percent of farms are fallow because the new owners lack the capital to begin farming, and government support has been constrained by a lack of funds. The parliament-appointed panel’s report estimates that it will take 35 years to resolve all land claims filed before the initial 1998 deadline of the Land Restitution Act, not to mention those filed during repeated extensions of the deadline.

WPR: What are the implications or risks of the new land reform measure, if it passes?
Campbell: With its juxtaposition of history, emotion, race, poverty and economics, land is perhaps the most difficult issue South Africa’s post-apartheid government must face. Luckily, land issues remain firmly within the purview of the law, the courts and parliamentary politics, rather than something akin to former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s “revolutionary justice,” which amounted to armed occupation of land and the intimidation and even murder of landowners.

Ramaphosa’s support for expropriation without compensation, now the ANC’s stated policy, is heavily caveated. He argues that expropriation must be done legally and in accordance with the constitution. He also argues that South Africa’s agricultural sector, Africa’s most advanced, must be preserved. Ramaphosa is seeking to boost foreign investment across the board, a goal that land expropriation would likely hurt. Ramaphosa fully understands the link between the rule of law and the confidence of businesses. He has directed the police to move against any land invasions, and none of significance has occurred since the ANC’s December convention. Ramaphosa must also balance the popularity of land reform as a concept with the likely strong opposition of tribal chiefs, who currently exercise enormous influence over land distribution in tribal trust areas. Up to now, they have been an important ANC constituency.

Finally, South Africa is urbanizing rapidly, with 60 percent of the population now living in cities. But there is a shortage of land available for migrants from rural areas, sometimes resulting in informal settlements of squatters, often without water or electricity. Ramaphosa may find this to be a more pressing issue than changing the racial percentages of the owners of South African land.

It is too soon to say whether or how the constitution might be amended, especially given that many legal scholars believe it already provides for expropriation without compensation for the public good. But, given South Africa’s strong institutions and respect for the rule of law, the likelihood that South Africa would follow the example of Zimbabwe is remote. However, were the process to proceed, it might be difficult to limit its scope to land issues alone, and the constitution’s ironclad protection of human rights could become vulnerable.

Tuesday, March 06, 2018

Low Expectations For Secretary Tillerson’s Trip To Africa



U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson arrives for a joint news conference in the East Room of the White House in Washington, U.S., February 23, 2018. Jonathan Ernst/Reuters


AFRICAN UNION (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS) -- Rex Tillerson will make his first trip to Africa as Secretary of State between March 6 and March 13. He will visit five of Africa’s fifty-four countries—Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. The trip hardly appears to be a “reset” by the Trump administration in its approach to Africa. The State Department spokesperson, Heather Nauert, when announcing the trip, said that its purpose was “to further our partnerships with the governments and people of Africa.” She also said that the Secretary would be discussing how the United States “can work with our partners to counter terrorism, advance peace and security, promote good governance, and spur mutually beneficial trade and investment.” This rhetoric implies little change in the U.S. agenda in Africa since the end of the cold war and may reflect apparent White House disengagement and disinterest in the world’s second largest continent.

The selection of countries the secretary will visit indicates a strong emphasis on security issues. Djibouti is the site of the only U.S. base in Africa. Nigeria and Chad are deeply involved in the struggle against the Islamist, anti-western Boko Haram, which involves limited U.S. military training and equipment sales. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti are also involved in the struggle against al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization centered in Somalia, where the U.S. military also has assumed a limited support role.

Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia are backsliding with respect to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Kenya faces unresolved issues related to its recent contested presidential elections. Ethiopia’s strong-man prime minister abruptly resigned in February, resulting in a care-taker government that is set to elect a new prime minister soon. Nigeria, the giant of Africa, has established itself as a credible democracy, but goes into a 2019 election cycle that could be violent. Secretary Tillerson’s itinerary does not include what is in many ways the most successful African state, South Africa. It has the continent’s largest economy and is a functioning “non-racial” democracy. Its new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, provides the possibility of a reset in the bilateral relationship, which at present is no more than “cordial” and “correct.”

The secretary’s trip is unlikely to advance the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa in any meaningful way. The focus is on security, not economic development, trade and investment, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Further, the Trump administration has yet to articulate a distinctive policy toward Africa. U.S. engagement, limited though it is, appears to be more military than diplomatic, reflecting the Trump administrations security preoccupations. There is still no assistant secretary of state for Africa, no U.S. ambassador to South Africa, and numerous other Africa-related positions remain unfilled. Certain authoritarian African leaders, like Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, have made positive statements about President Trump. Democratic leaders on the other hand, notably Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari and South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, were deeply critical of the president’s public denigration of Africa and Haiti.

With the U.S. recessional from Africa, save for security issues, African states are turning to other partners, notably China, France, and the EU. In a thoughtful article, John Stremlau, an American visiting professor at Johannesburg’s prestigious University of the Witswatersrand, suggests that, for the time being, growing the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa may rest more with the legislative branch than with the executive branch and the secretary of state. He points out that since the 1990s Congress has consistently supported closer economic and political partnerships with Africa, reflecting the big American business, philanthropy, and civil society constituency for Africa.

Tuesday, October 24, 2017

There Is A Difference: Nigeria And Niger

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS



Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou (L) and Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari at a news conference after the presentation of the communique of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in Abuja, Nigeria. Afolabi Sotunde/Reuters



With the increased media attention to the Sahel in the aftermath of the killing of four U.S. soldiers in western Niger, U.S. commentators (especially on radio) sometimes confuse Nigeria with Niger. For example, some commentators linked the notorious kidnapping of the Chibok school girls in northern Nigeria to the Niger killings, episodes perhaps a thousand miles apart by road. This apparent confusion is understandable. Both countries are fighting jihadist insurrections and movements in the Sahel, the region that borders the Sahara on the south. The two countries share a long border, and Niger and northern Nigeria are predominately Muslim. The Niger-Nigeria border is artificial; it was drawn in the colonial period by London and Paris, a process driven in part by the desire to check German expansion in West Africa rather than recognition of ethnicities or other indigenous factors. Border crossings are also impossible to control, as a practical matter. In many ways, Niger and northern Nigeria have much in common culturally and the lingua franca of both regions is Hausa. Reflecting their respective colonial experiences, however, elites in Niger are Francophone, while those of Nigeria are Anglophone.

Nevertheless, the contrast between Nigeria and Niger is, in more ways than not, stark. While Niger is geographically larger than Nigeria, 80 percent of its land area is covered by the Sahara desert. Its population, at a World Bank-estimated 20.67 million, is perhaps one tenth the size of Nigeria’s. Niger’s people are very poor, and the country consistently is ranked either last or next to last by the United Nations Human Development Index. Elected in 2011, President Mahamadou Issoufou presides over Niger’s weak governance and limited bureaucratic capacity. Though both Niger and Nigeria have a long history of military coups, in the case of the former, military intervention has been much more recent.

Nigeria is the giant of Africa, with an estimated population of more than 200 million. One out of every four or five sub-Saharan Africans is a Nigerian. It also trades places with South Africa as sub-Saharan Africa’s first or second largest economy and it is usually Africa’s largest producer of oil and gas (depending on theft and vandalism). While the country is mired in corruption and most of its citizens are poor, Nigeria is on a positive governance trajectory. In 2015, for the first time in its democratic history, the leader of the opposition became head of state through credible elections, in which the defeated incumbent conceded. U.S.-Nigeria bilateral ties are close, with traditional cooperation on a host of regional issues of mutual concern. For Washington, as for most other world capitals, Nigeria is much more important than Niger.

With respect to jihadi movements, those operating in Niger appear to have close links with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with a heavy overlay of criminality associated with narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and kidnapping. While they enjoy some domestic support, jihadi movements in Niger tend to be largely influenced from abroad. In Nigeria, by contrast, Boko Haram is much more indigenous, and its persistence indicates greater domestic support. Boko Haram operates in Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, but primarily in areas that are ethnically linked to northern Nigeria. For members of these militant groups, as for most people, the Niger-Nigeria border is largely irrelevant.

The United States partners with Niger in the fight against terrorism, and there are perhaps eight hundred U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the country. A large percentage, however, are support personnel rather than boots-on-the-ground. U.S. military personnel in Niger are almost entirely involved in the training of the Niger military and the maintenance of drone bases for surveillance purposes. Hence, U.S. forces in Niger are small in number and do not have a combat role. The military-to-military relationship between the United States and Nigeria is less developed. There are fewer U.S. military personnel stationed in Nigeria than in Niger. The Trump administration is in the process of selling sophisticated military aircraft (A-29 Super Tucanos) to the Nigerian military. That transaction, however, is cash-and-carry. It is not a form of military assistance. Historically, the Nigerian military has been stand-offish about a closer relationship with the United States.

Friday, October 13, 2017

Powerful Rhetoric Gives Insight Into Biafran Independence Narratives




Uboha Damia, a 75-year-old veteran of Nigeria’s 1967 civil war, holds a flag of the separatist Biafra movement during an event in Umuahia, Nigeria on May 28, 2017. (Lekan Oyekanmi/AP)



BIAFRA NIGERIA WORLD (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS) -- The still unknown whereabouts of Namdi Kanu, a leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), has led to public exchanges that provide insight into the mindset of at least some of Biafra's supporters. The IPOB is one of a number of organizations that are calling for the secession from Nigeria of the predominately Igbo and Christian states in southeast Nigeria, and the federal government has labeled it a terrorist organization. Following a security service raid on his house, Kanu has gone missing, either into hiding or, as his lawyer speculates, he has been killed by the security services. He is due in court to face treason charges on October 17. As he is a British subject as well as a Nigerian citizen, the British government has asked the Buhari administration for Kanu’s whereabouts, but it denied any knowledge of them.

Former Abia state governor Orji Kalu is claiming that Kanu fled to the United Kingdom via Malaysia, but this is strenuously denied by IPOB spokespersons. Mr. Emma Powerful, the IPOB’s media and publicity secretary, characterized the United Kingdom as being better organized and less corrupt than Nigeria. Further, it is “an island nation surrounded by water and it is near impossible to enter without being documented.” Accordingly, Mr. Powerful continued, the British government would know whether Kanu was in the country. The fact that the British government is asking the Nigerian government for Kanu’s where about is “proof” that he is not in Britain.

Perhaps more central to the IPOB’s outlook are Emma Powerful‘s comments about the threat posed by the “Fulani caliphate.” He accuses Kalu and other Igbo political figures who criticize Kanu as “Hausa-Fulani errand boys.” Among the Igbo errand boys, there is “an ongoing battle as to who will emerge the anointed son of the Fulani caliphate.” Fear of northern, Muslim domination of Nigeria is a long-standing theme in Igboland and other parts of the south. Some current Biafra supporters characterize the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war as a struggle between Christians and Muslims, in which the latter were victorious because of the “betrayal” of Yorubaland (a western, religiously mixed region of Nigeria), which allied with the Muslims of the north to destroy Biafra. The fact that the current president, Muhammadu Buhari, is a Fulani Muslim encourages this way of thinking. If fear of Fulani domination is one of Emma Powerful’s themes, another is bad governance. He states, “Our leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu before his abduction by Nigerian Army has brought an end to the era of cash and carry politics of subservience to Hausa-Fulani to the detriment of Biafra.”

Other pro-Biafra organizations are expressing support for Kanu. Uchenna Madu, the leader of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), issued a statement that Kanu is a “true hero of Biafra either dead or alive.” Madu’s statement also raises the northern specter, if perhaps with more subtlety than Mr. Powerful: “This artificial entity called Nigeria will never be united or exist as one nation as long as these [sic] established mentality of a section of the country seeing themselves as the lords of Nigeria.” His statement denounced a military operation underway in the southeast called Operation Python Dance II, as well as government opposition to the fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian state. He criticized the “acceptance of deadly Fulani herdsmen as common criminals" by the Buhari administration, arguing that, in total, these actions have prompted the “eastern, western, and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria towards self-determination for survival.”

It is to be hoped that the Nigerian federal government will respond to the upsurge of Biafra sentiment with subtlety and political skill. Southeastern leaders are in fact meeting with Buhari today, reportedly to discuss the “alleged marginalization” of the region. It is also to be hoped that Kanu is alive and well. Were he to be made a martyr, it could very well lead to further unrest and the possibility of violence.

KNOCK, KNOCK

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