The Sahel Region Is Less Secure Than Ever: Foreign Forces Just Add To The Cycle Of Violence

French soldiers on patrol in Diabaly, Mali, 2013. Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images

BY NINA LILEN

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

LUND UNIVERSITY

Several of Mali’s major cities experienced coordinated attacks in April by a new coalition of jihadists and separatist groups.

As the coalition took over the town of Kidal in the north of Mali, images of Russian troops being escorted out of the town after negotiations were cabled out across global media.

Russia, now in the shape of Africa Corps and previously the Wagner Group, has been the Malian military’s external security partner since the beginning of 2022. It replaced French and European troops from the counter-terrorism operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. France had deployed a force of 5,000 troops from 2014 to 2022. European special forces numbered 1,000 between 2020 and 2022. Both missions were forced to leave as relations between France and the Malian junta grew tense.

The strategic realignment, from western and multilateral forces to Russian troops, expanded in the region. In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the French troops were expelled at the start of 2023, as 200 Russian troops moved in.

In the summer of 2023, the Malian authorities also kicked out the decade-old 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Niger’s junta, which took power the same year, followed suit and expelled the EU’s operations in the country six months later, before accepting a few hundred Russian troops.

During the past decade I have researched external security interventions in the Sahel and analysed their justifications, development on the ground, and consequences for political and security environments.

I conclude from my research that the external interventions have not stabilised the region. More than a decade after the first major interventions, the Sahel is more fragmented, militarised and violent than before.

Yet the persistence of insecurity also serves political purposes.

For military juntas, the jihadist threat justifies continued rule and repression. For Russia, the region has become a showcase for anti-western influence and security partnerships in Africa. For western actors, jihadist expansion, migration concerns and fears of regional instability are used as reasons for security engagement despite repeated failures.

The complex interactions between these actors have resulted in a continuous, strategic circle of violence, where civilians are the first victims.

On the ground

On the ground, interventions have often evolved in unpredictable ways through ad hoc decisions and informal interactions between local and external actors.

For example, they have shared logistical and medical assistance and intelligence.

More broadly, the external interventions strengthened militaries as political actors, reinforcing an already biased civil-military balance across the region.

“Security in the Sahel” became the moniker that framed the western and multilateral interventions in the region from 2013 onwards. Improving the capacities, capabilities and professionalism of the national security forces became the official objectives of these interventions, closely linked to the broader aim of defeating the jihadist insurgencies.

Framing the intersecting crises in the Sahel as a security issue also meant that security actors had the task of resolving it. The importance, status and budgets of the national militaries thus increased as the security situation deteriorated. A heavily tilted civil-military imbalance was the result.

As military officers took over power through coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a strategic realignment towards Russia began, to maintain military rule.

The Russian Wagner group allowed the newly installed juntas to entrench their power, while “deprofessionalising” the forces through harassment, attacks and massacres of civilians.

Research shows for example that civilian targeting accounted for 71% of the Wagner Group’s involvement in political violence in Mali between December 2021 and July 2022. This strategy of attacking civilians has made recruitment easier for jihadist groups. They could increase their ranks by exploiting grievances.

The latest attacks in Mali in April 2026 demonstrate the military junta’s failure, together with its Russian security partners, to contain the jihadist groups’ expansion.

They also reveal that Russia is in the country mainly to keep the military junta in power. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, reconfirmed the partnership with Russia after the attacks in spite of their failure on the battlefield.

The military leader needs regime maintenance more than ever, and the Russians need to be in the country for continued geopolitical influence on the African continent.

Conclusion

The result is that while all external actors claim to fight instability, the current regional order depends on continuing insecurity.

Stabilisation risks becoming less about resolving conflict than about managing insecurity in ways that sustain regimes, partnerships and geopolitical influence.

Foreign interventions, in combination with national actors’ ambitions, have helped to transform the region into a space of militarised regime survival, jihadist expansion and geopolitical competition between Russia and western democracies.

As military approaches have repeatedly proven insufficient to solve the intersecting crises in the Sahel, pressured military juntas may now be forced to negotiate with jihadist groups. That is likely to result in new, hybrid spaces of power and governance.

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Militarising The Sahel Will Not Defeat Terrorism

BY AYODELE S. OWOLABI

ASSOCIATE LECTURER  IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS, AT LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES

UNIVERSITY

After launching what he called “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS [ISIL] terrorist scum” in northwest Nigeria on December 25, United States President Donald Trump promised “many more”, reaffirming his stance that the US “will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to prosper”. The strikes occurred less than a week after the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) commissioned a joint military force comprising a 5,000-strong contingent, presented as a symbol of collective self-reliance and security autonomy, in a concerted effort to combat terrorist groups in its member states. They also followed moves by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish an ambitious plan announced in August 2025 to activate a 260,000-strong joint counterterrorism force, backed by a proposed $2.5bn annual budget for logistics and front-line support.

While these developments may be presented by their proponents as decisive steps against terrorism, there is little evidence that militarised escalation alone can defeat armed groups in the Sahel. Instead, they signal an accelerating militarisation of the region. Not only does this fuel emerging geopolitical tensions in West Africa, but it also, more importantly, edges the Sahel towards interstate armed conflict, posing far graver risks to regional peace and stability.

A friendship turned sour

Until 2021, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel were governed by a loosely coordinated, non-hierarchical security architecture built around diplomatic and military collaboration among regional and extra-regional actors. This architecture brought together ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, external powers such as the US and France, as well as regional powers such as Algeria and Nigeria, with ECOWAS playing a central coordinating role.

A typical example was the 2013 African-led International Support Mission to Mali, organised by ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU, UN and France to confront Tuareg rebels and allied armed groups in northern Mali. More prominent was the EU-financed G5 Sahel counterterrorism force, which brought together African and European troops and operated between 2017 and 2023. While these arrangements were often marked by tension, competition and uneven outcomes, they functioned within a shared security framework that limited direct confrontation between states.

This balance was disrupted after the 2023 coup in Niger. By threatening the use of force to restore constitutional order, ECOWAS crossed a political threshold that transformed its role from intermediary to perceived adversary in the eyes of the Nigerien junta. That threat was widely interpreted as an act of aggression, and it proved catalytic. In response, Niger’s military rulers, alongside their counterparts in Mali and Burkina Faso, moved to establish the Alliance of Sahel States as a deliberate effort to reclaim security autonomy, dismantle the existing multilateral security regime and sever ties with longstanding partners including ECOWAS, the EU, the US and France.

Notably, the AES institutionalises a mutual defence pact that codifies this break with the previous multilateral security order by explicitly framing ECOWAS and its Western partners as threats to the sovereignty and national security of its member states. Beyond deepening the rift between former allies, this posture signals a dangerous shift towards the securitisation of neighbouring states, raising the spectre of interstate conflict in West Africa, a phenomenon largely absent since the 1990s.

Emerging geopolitical tensions

In severing security ties with the West, the AES have pivoted towards Russia as a principal security partner to counterbalance decades of US and European influence in West Africa, signalling a deepening but still evolving security partnership with Moscow. While these strategic choices reflect an emerging self-help posture with new preferences for non-conventional allies, they are also intensifying geopolitical tensions across the region.

Nigeria’s military role in countering an attempted coup in neighbouring Benin was praised as a major win for ECOWAS. But when a Nigerian Air Force C-130 aircraft made an emergency landing in Burkina Faso two days later, the AES interpreted this as a violation of its airspace and sovereignty, authorising its air force to neutralise any aircraft involved in further violations. Tensions were heightened by reports that France had provided Nigeria with surveillance and intelligence support during the Benin intervention, fuelling apprehension about France’s potential re-entry into the AES security landscape. With Nigeria now willing to extend security cooperation with the US following the Christmas Day strikes, the stakes have risen further for the AES. Although aimed at militants operating in northwest Nigeria, the strikes appear calculated to bolster US strategic legitimacy as a counterterrorism actor in the region, potentially opening the door to further operations in Nigeria’s northeast, where ISWAP and Boko Haram remain active.

Given Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS, this emerging security partnership with the US is likely to shape the operational capacity of the proposed 260,000-strong ECOWAS force. This does not bode well for the AES, which is intent on insulating its member states from Western security influence in the name of sovereignty. Because ECOWAS forces would be deployed in member states at the epicentre of terrorist violence, many combat engagements would take place in locations adjacent to AES territories. With AES troops also operating in these areas, military clashes between the two sides become increasingly likely, particularly given the region’s porous borders and fluid combat environments. Given that the Christmas Day strikes reportedly hit unintended targets, the risk that future air strikes by a US-backed ECOWAS could spill into AES territory cannot be dismissed. For deterrence, the AES may seek to leverage Russia’s military backing, evoking echoes of Cold War-era security brinkmanship.

Implications for regional stability

Without reconciliation between the AES and ECOWAS, two major risks loom for regional peace and stability. First, rising geopolitical tensions could draw AES and ECOWAS member states into direct interstate military confrontations, potentially plunging West Africa into a regional war. Such a conflict would serve neither side’s counterterrorism objectives. Beyond devastating the region, it would create space for armed groups to expand their operations amid fractured and distracted security responses. Second, the standoff risks turning West Africa into a new theatre for global power rivalry, with a Russia-backed AES on one side and a US and France-backed ECOWAS on the other. In the context of an emerging New Cold War, the use of veto power by these global actors at the UN Security Council could further complicate conflict resolution, with profoundly destabilising consequences for the region.

The AES and ECOWAS now face a stark choice: to revive Cold War-style bloc politics in West Africa while the region slides towards chaos, or to negotiate a security sub-coalition that prioritises human security alongside national sovereignty. Regardless of how the AES views ECOWAS, the burden lies with the latter to manage the unintended consequences of escalating tensions. While there are few indications that the AES is willing to cooperate directly with a West-backed ECOWAS on counterterrorism, ECOWAS could pursue diplomatic engagement to negotiate a concept of operations that guarantees respect for AES sovereignty. As Africa’s most experienced regional security organisation, ECOWAS possesses the diplomatic capacity to do so. For progress to be made, Francophone ECOWAS member states should take the lead in these efforts, while Nigeria exercises its influence more discreetly. Whether ECOWAS can reclaim ownership of its security agenda and define the terms of external engagement will shape not only West Africa’s future, but that of the continent as a whole.

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The US’ West Africa And Sahel Challenge

 

BY LIAM KARR

Washington needs to counter Russian propaganda in the region, and highlight that a US partnership is a win-win for the Sahel and West Africa.

The Trump administration’s push for greater US engagement with West Africa is a smart move. The region is a focal point for geopolitical competition with China and Russia, counterterrorism efforts that bolster US security, and business potential for American investors.

However, the United States will face obstacles from within and without as it works to grow partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea, which lies along Africa’s western coast, and the Sahel, which includes neighboring landlocked countries in the lower reaches of the Sahara Desert. American officials should develop a framework that balances competing US priorities on defense, democracy, human rights, and immigration with the needs of regional partners.

To address counterterrorism interests, US officials have traveled to the Sahel to re-engage with the Alliance of Sahel States, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this region, defense is a top priority, as the United States and African partners seek to degrade rapidly strengthening Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. American military officials describe the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warn that these groups could develop the ability to attack the US homeland.

The military juntas that control the three countries distanced themselves from the West after taking power and turned to Russia for support. Niger’s junta kicked out 1,000 US troops who were helping fight the terror groups and assumed control over a $110 million US-built drone base in 2024. Russian private military corporation Wagner Group has troops in all three countries.

Russia’s failures have left these countries in need, but the military regimes’ poor democratic and human rights track records limit possible US assistance. US law restricts most foreign and military aid to coup governments until a democratically elected government retakes office. US law also prohibits government assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross human rights violations. These laws exist to align US aid with American strategic interests by avoiding American support for abusive security forces that can create anti-American sentiment and agitate insurgencies.

To bridge this gap, US officials should encourage their Sahelian counterparts to take credible steps to address these issues, thereby qualifying for waivers that would enable greater US aid. This will be a challenge, as Burkinabe and Malian security forces have perpetrated several atrocities that violate US laws, and all three junta leaders have repeatedly extended their stay in power.

How American officials frame the issue will be critical. US officials should focus on discussing human rights abuses as a shared security concern, given their counterproductive nature, instead of overemphasizing US values. Until then, US officials should focus on providing non-lethal assistance and intelligence sharing as legally allowed. This cooperation will facilitate more effective counterinsurgency operations, save lives, and rebuild trust with these partners.

Greater cooperation could unlock future opportunities for critical mineral access, although this is highly unlikely in the short term. While gold, lithium, and uranium deposits can be found across the Sahel, US companies are highly unlikely to invest given the precarious security situation. This authoritarian shift has also created a hostile business environment, further limiting US private investment.

Counterterrorism is also on the agenda in the Gulf of Guinea. Countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have sought to grow defense ties with the United States to help confront insurgents. They are seeking to distance themselves from France, and the United States can help ensure Russia does not further fill the void. All three countries receive funding from America’s Global Fragility Act and are becoming increasingly important US defense partners. Congress and the administration should ensure this trajectory continues.

Through strengthened ties, the United States can also open economic opportunities. The Togolese port of Lomé—partially owned by a multinational shipping company with US stakeholders—is poised to become a regional shipping hub and gateway. Côte d’Ivoire ranks among the top ten countries on the continent in terms of GDP and GDP growth, and can serve as a conduit for American investment across the region.

A clear approach is key to preventing Russia, which is playing a zero-sum game and seeks to lock the United States out, from playing spoiler. The Kremlin views its Sahel alliance as a strategic project to help strengthen Russian influence on the continent. Russia’s position in Libya and the Sahel creates a suite of opportunities—ranging from conventional threats to irregular tools, such as weaponizing migration—for Russia to destabilize Europe. The Kremlin’s growing inroads into coastal West Africa threaten US partnerships and strengthen Russia’s ability to project power into the Atlantic, posing a long-term risk for NATO and ultimately the United States.

Moscow’s favored strategy is to use pro-Russian politicians, civil society actors, and media to falsely portray America as an exploitative power—a tactic that consistent messaging and engagement from the United States can stymie. The Trump administration is well-positioned to speak the sovereigntist, “Africa First” language prevalent in West Africa, and capitalize on it by highlighting how a US partnership is a win-win for all involved. This framing can make clear—to African officials and the public—that any anti-US Russian activities are for Moscow’s benefit, not the region’s gain.

The United States will have to balance its immigration priorities as it works with these countries, having already restricted the entry of Nigerien and Togolese citizens due to high visa overstay rates. Benin, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire could also face a travel ban—a move that has recently drawn backlash from African leaders.

The opportunities for the Trump administration in West Africa are numerous and go beyond efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel to include Trump’s summit with leaders of five other coastal West African countries in early July. However, the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel are unique, and US officials must be prepared to deftly navigate internal obstacles while standing strong against Russia to make serious headway.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Why Burkina Faso's Junta Leader Has Captured Hearts And Minds Around The World

BY FAROUK CHOTHIA

A charismatic 37-year-old, Burkina Faso's military ruler Capt Ibrahim Traoré has skilfully built the persona of a pan-Africanist leader determined to free his nation from what he regards as the clutches of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism.

His message has resonated across Africa and beyond, with his admirers seeing him as following in the footsteps of African heroes like Burkina Faso's very own Thomas Sankara - a Marxist revolutionary who is sometimes referred to as "Africa's Che Guevara".

"Traoré's impact is huge. I have even heard politicians and authors in countries like Kenya [in East Africa] say: 'This is it. He is the man'," Beverly Ochieng, a senior researcher at global consultancy firm Control Risks, told the BBC.

"His messages reflect the age we are living in, when many Africans are questioning the relationship with the West, and why there is still so much poverty in such a resource-rich continent," she said.

After seizing power in a coup in 2022, Traoré's regime ditched former colonial power France in favour of a strong alliance with Russia, that has included the deployment of a Russian paramilitary brigade, and adopted left-wing economic policies.

This included setting up a state-owned mining company, requiring foreign firms to give it a 15% stake in their local operations and to transfer skills to Burkinabé people.

The rule also applied to Russian miner Nordgold, which was given a licence in late April for its latest investment in Burkina Faso's gold industry.

As part of what Traoré calls a "revolution" to ensure Burkina Faso benefits from its mineral wealth, the junta is also building a gold refinery and establishing national gold reserves for the first time in the nation's history.

However, Western-owned firms appear to be facing a tough time, with Australia-headquartered Sarama Resources launching arbitration proceedings against Burkina Faso in late 2024 following the withdrawal of an exploration licence.

The junta has also nationalised two gold mines previously owned by a London-listed firm, and said last month that it planned to take control of more foreign-owned mines.

Enoch Randy Aikins, a researcher at South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, told the BBC that Traoré's radical reforms had increased his popularity in Africa.

"He is now arguably Africa's most popular, if not favourite, president," Mr Aikins said.

His popularity has been fuelled through social media, including many misleading posts intended to bolster his revolutionary image.

AI-generated videos of music stars like R Kelly, Rihanna, Justin Bieber and Beyoncé are seen immortalising him through song - though they have done nothing of the sort.

Ms Ochieng said that Traoré first caught the attention of Africans when he spoke at the Russia-Africa summit in 2023, telling African leaders to "stop behaving like puppets who dance every time the imperialists pull the strings".

This speech was heavily publicised by Russian media, which has become a major player in promoting Traoré's pan-Africanist image.

Thanks to his rhetoric and pushed by a slick social media campaign, his appeal has spread around the world, including among African-Americans and Black Britons, Ms Ochieng noted.

"Everyone who has experienced racism, colonialism and slavery can relate to his messages," Ms Ochieng said, pointing out that African-American rapper Meek Mill had posted about him on X late last year, saying how much he liked his "energy and heart" - though he was ridiculed for mixing up names by referring to Traoré as Burkina Faso and later deleted the post.

But France's president is not a fan, describing Traoré as part of a "baroque alliance between self-proclaimed pan-Africans and neo-imperialists".

Emmanuel Macron was also referring to Russia and China whom he accused, in a 2023 speech, of provoking coups in Africa's former French colonies, and hypocritically stirring up old arguments over sovereignty and colonial exploitation.

Traoré's popularity comes despite the fact that he has failed to fulfil his pledge to quell a 10-year Islamist insurgency that has fuelled ethnic divisions and has now spread to once-peaceful neighbours like Benin.

His junta has also cracked down on dissent, including the opposition, media and civil society groups and punished critics, among them medics and magistrates, by sending them to the front-lines of the war against the jihadists.

For Rinaldo Depagne, the Africa deputy director of the International Crisis Group think-tank, Traoré commands such support because "he is young in a country with a young population" - the median age is 17.7 years.

"He is media-savvy, and uses the past to build his popularity as a reincarnation of Sankara," he told the BBC.

"And he knows the art of politics - how to make a nation completely traumatised by war feel there is a better future. He is really good at that game."

Sankara rose to power in a coup in 1983 at the age of 33, rallied the nation under the motto "Fatherland or death, we will win!", and was killed four years later in another coup that put Burkina Faso back in France's political orbit until Traoré's seizure of power.

Ghanaian security analyst Prof Kwesi Aning, who previously worked at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, said the popularity of the military leader reflected a political shift taking place on the continent, especially in West Africa.

A 2024 survey in 39 countries by Afrobarometer showed a drop in support for democracy, although it remained the most popular form of government.

"Democracy has failed to give hope to the youth. It has not delivered jobs or better education and health," Prof Aning told the BBC.

He said Traoré was "offering an alternative, and re-capturing the spirit of two historic epochs":

The post-independence era, when there were leaders like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia


And a later era with Sankara and Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, whose coup in 1979 "was also very popular at the time".


It was Traoré who stole the show at the inauguration of Ghana's President John Mahama in January, when he arrived wearing battle fatigues with a pistol in his holster.

"There were already 21 heads of state there, but when Traoré walked in, the place lit up. Even my president's bodyguards were running after him," Prof Aning said.

Traoré offered a sharply contrasting image to some of the continent's other leaders, who struggled to walk but clung to power by rigging elections, he said.

"Traoré is stylish and confident, with a very open face and a small smile. He is also a powerful orator, and presents himself as a man of the people."

In a sign that his Russian-allied junta has made some progress on the economic front, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have given a generally upbeat assessment.

In a statement in early April, the IMF said that despite a "challenging humanitarian and security" environment, the economy was expected to remain "robust" in 2025, and the regime had made "commendable progress" in raising domestic revenue, containing the public wage bill, and increasing spending on education, health and social protection.

As for the World Bank, it said that inflation had surged from 0.7% in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024, but the extreme poverty rate, which refers to people living on less than $2.15 [£1.61] a day, had fallen by almost two percentage points to 24.9% because of "robust growth" in the agriculture and services sectors.

Despite these reports from US-based financial institutions, relations with both France and America have been frosty.

A recent example being the claim by the head of the US Africa Command, Gen Michael Langley, that Traoré was using Burkina Faso's gold reserves for his junta's protection rather than the nation's benefit.

This appeared to be a reference to the long-standing view of the US, and some of its African allies, that Russian forces were propping up Traoré in exchange for a stake in Burkina Faso's gold industry - undermining the military ruler's image as a leader who expelled French troops in 2023 to reclaim the country's sovereignty.

Gen Langley's comments, made in early April during a US Senate committee hearing, triggered an uproar among the captain's supporters, who felt their hero was being smeared.

This was further inflamed when shortly afterwards, the Burkinabé junta said it had foiled a coup plot, alleging the plotters were based in neighbouring Ivory Coast - where Gen Langley then made a visit.


Ivory Coast denied being involved in any plot, while the US Africa Command said Gen Langley's visit had focused on addressing "common security challenges" - including "violent extremism".

But the junta took the opportunity to organise one of its biggest rallies in Burkina Faso's capital over fears that "imperialists" and their "lackeys" were trying to depose the captain.

"Because Colin Powell lied, Iraq was destroyed. Barack Obama lied, Gaddafi was killed. But this time, their lies won't affect us," one protester, musician Ocibi Johann, told the Associated Press news agency.

Rallies in solidarity with Traoré were also held abroad, including in London, on the same day.

He took to social media afterwards, posting in French and English, to express his gratitude to them for sharing his vision "for a new Burkina Faso and a new Africa", adding: "Together, in solidarity, we will defeat imperialism and neo-colonialism for a free, dignified and sovereign Africa."

It is impossible to say how things will end for the young captain, but he - along with military leaders in Mali and Niger - have certainly shaken up West Africa, and other states have followed their example by ordering French forces to leave.

The three military-ruled neighbours have also pulled out of the regional trade and security grouping Ecowas, formed their own alliance, and have ended free trade in the region by announcing the imposition of a 0.5% tariff on goods coming into their countries.

Mr Aikins said Traoré could learn from others, pointing out that when Rawlings took power in Ghana at the age of 32, he was known as "Junior Jesus" but after 19 years he left a mixed legacy - he had been unable to stem corruption despite helping to create an "enduring" democracy.

For a "lasting legacy", Mr Aikins said, Traoré should focus on achieving peace and building strong state institutions to bring about good governance rather than "personalising" power and cracking down on dissent.

.........BBC AFRICA

Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré Is Making Waves In West Africa. Who Is He?

BY DANIEL EIZENGA

RESEARCH FELLOW, AFRICA

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Captain Ibrahim Traoré is the interim leader of Burkina Faso, having taken over the position following a coup which he led against Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba in September 2022. The 37-year-old captain had supported Damiba, his commanding officer, in a putsch earlier that year against former president Roch Marc Kaboré.

Since Traoré has been in power, Burkina Faso has played a key role in the withdrawal of three west African states from the regional body Ecowas. Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have formed an alternative, the Alliance of Sahel States. The Conversation Africa asked researcher Daniel Eizenga where the country was headed under Traoré’s leadership.

Who is Ibrahim Traoré?

Traoré was born in 1988 in Bondokuy, a small town on the route connecting Burkina Faso’s second city – Bobo Dioulasso – and its fourth largest, Ouahigouya. He completed secondary school in Bobo Dioulasso, then moved to the nation’s capital, where he studied at the University of Ouagadougou.

After completing his undergraduate education, Traoré joined the army in 2010 at the age of 22. He undertook his officer training in Pô at the Georges Namoano Military Academy, an officer school for the Burkinabe armed forces. He graduated as a second lieutenant in 2012 and served as a peacekeeper in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission to Mali (Minusma) after being promoted to lieutenant in 2014.

After his stint with Minusma, Traoré took part in missions in northern Burkina Faso as part of a special counterterrorism unit. He was promoted to captain in 2020 at the age of 32.

Damiba led a coup against Kaboré in January 2022. He then assigned Traoré as chief of an artillery regiment in the North Central region of Burkina Faso.

As it became clear that Damiba was losing popularity within the junta, Traoré and a group of junior officers organised a coup. They seized on public and military outrage around an ambush that left 11 soldiers and dozens of civilians dead.

What has been the response to his rule in Burkina Faso?

Some media reports suggest that the young captain and his junta enjoy popular support throughout the country. Some have even drawn comparisons between Traoré and Burkina Faso’s earlier leftist revolutionary military leader, Captain Thomas Sankara. It’s true that the two captains did take power at the age of 34. But the comparisons end at their rank and age.

During the 1980s and nearing the end of the cold war, Sankara came to power as ideological division split the Burkinabe armed forces. Officers supporting Sankara led a coup in 1983. Viewed as a Marxist revolutionary, Sankara attempted to enact political reforms. They included policies to boost public political participation, empower women, address environmental degradataion and reduce inequalities.

Traoré’s position is much more precarious. Most military officers did not participate in either his coup or the one led by Damiba, underscoring the fragmented state of Burkina Faso’s armed forces. Traoré’s junta has claimed there have been multiple attempts at destabilisation or coups. This highlights the arbitrary means by which power has changed hands and the inherent instability present under junta rule.

To shore up his position, Traoré has launched a restructuring drive. This has included redirecting revenues from taxes, the mining sector, and other sources of public revenues into defence coffers. He has also mobilised volunteers to fight violent extremists as part of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland, a junta-sponsored civilian militia. There are reports that forced conscription has been used to send “volunteers” to the front lines of battle. The conflict data indicate that the strategy is not working.

Traoré may not be as popular among ordinary people as he is often portrayed. This is inferred from the violent repression of critics, multiple alleged coup attempts as well as the ongoing violence and humanitarian crisis. He has cracked down hard on independent voices. Journalists, civil society leaders, political party leaders and even judges have been targeted by the junta with its forced conscription tactics and other forms of violent repression.

What about external players?

The September 2022 coup d’état got the attention of Russian foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns. The campaigns were linked to the shadowy Russian mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group. Other Russian information campaigns employed fake social media accounts that pose as Africans with a genuine interest in Burkina Faso. These accounts promote divisive rhetoric that places blame on France and other western countries for local grievances such as ongoing insecurity.

Aiming to boost support for himself immediately following the coup, Traoré trained his sights on capturing the anti-French sentiment. He blamed the French for many of the country’s woes and cast Damiba as a close French ally. Within a few months, Traoré demanded the French withdraw its security presence from Burkina Faso altogether.

Since the French withdrawal, Russian mercenaries have been seen providing protection for Traoré and reportedly supporting operations near the border with Mali. However, only some 100-300 Russian forces have gone to Burkina Faso. This suggests that the focus is on regime security for Traoré and his junta.

What does the future hold?

Traoré’s actions have not improved the security situation in the country. There have been at least 3,059 violent events linked to militant Islamist groups since he came to power in October 2022. This is a 20% increase in comparison to two years preceding the coup. The number of fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence nearly doubled from 3,621 in 2022 to 6,389 in 2024.

The violence has also spread throughout the country to affect nearly every region and increased along Burkina Faso’s southern border. It’s likely that the data is under-reported.

The junta has claimed to have foiled several coup plots since Traoré’s power grab. A foiled plot came in September 2024 only a few weeks after the deadliest massacre the country has ever suffered. Violent extremists killed hundreds of civilians outside the town of Barsalogho. Civilian fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups have increased from 721 in 2022 to 1,151 deaths in 2024.

Perhaps more worrying are the civilian fatalities linked to the military or its sponsored militia.

The violence in Burkina Faso presents an alarming outlook in which the collapse of the country cannot be ruled out. The military has reemerged as the principal political actor. By some counts the military has been directly or indirectly in power for 45 of the 65 years since Burkina Faso became independent.

All the while, the militant Islamist insurgency embroils more and more of the countryside at great human cost. Some estimates place the number of people displaced by violence as high as 3 million, though the junta will not provide an official figure. That is more than 10% of the population of some 24 million people. Another million or more students may not be in school due to conflict and ongoing insecurity.

Despite the effort to present Traoré as a bold reformer and saviour, the political, security and economic ramifications from his junta rule will reverberate through Burkina Faso for decades to come.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Africans Demand A Bigger Share Of Their Natural Resources Wealth

BY JUSTICE MALALA

MALI, WEST AFRICA (BLOOMBERG) - If you thought the detention and subsequent release of Resolute Mining’s chief executive by the government of Mali last month was a one-off, you would have been wrong.

And as Resolute later paid the second, $50 million tranche (the first was $80 million) of a $160 million settlement to the west African country’s military junta, Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold announced that four of its employees in the country had also been detained. Mali claimed Barrick owed $500 million in back taxes while the company said it had already made an $85 million payment of an undisclosed sum. (Mali had demanded $380 million from Resolute in new tax assessments.)

However deplorable Mali’s actions may seem, companies should expect this kind of pressure in other parts of the African continent over the next few years as the philosophy that underpins what happened in Mali spreads. After decades of largely being sidelined while profits from their mineral resources accrued to foreign firms and kleptocratic local leaders, Africa’s new leaders, both democratic and autocratic, want a greater slice of the pie. Some want to achieve this at the negotiating table while others employ much rougher methods.

The age of super-profits for global companies operating in Africa’s resource sector is coming to an end. Multinational companies should hurry to find sustainable ways in which they can share risk and revenue with governments, as they do in jurisdictions like Norway (where taxes are as high as 78%) and the United Arab Emirates.

Animating Kenya’s anti-tax government shutdown this year, concepts of "decoloniality” now drive youth protests, inspire coup leaders such as those in Mali and drive some policy making in democratic states. It is particularly influential in countries where large oil, gas and mineral finds have been made, from Namibia to Mozambique and South Africa. Its influence has seen old and new mining contracts in Botswana, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and elsewhere being renegotiated.

Whether one wants to call it decoloniality or "resource nationalism,” as it was termed in the past, this movement is worth paying attention to. South Africa’s international relations minister Ronald Lamola told the United Nations in September that SA’s priorities during its Group of 20 presidency would include dealing with "issues of predatory mining by some countries and corporations, especially in the quest for Africa’s raw materials and critical minerals.”

Mali is a military dictatorship, but it’s not just the "coup belt” countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger that are demanding a bigger stake in the shareholding, profits or taxes from their mineral resources. Stable, longstanding democracies like Botswana, Senegal, Zambia and new ones such as the DRC, have all renegotiated mining deals with foreign firms in recent years.

The latest events in Mali serve as a warning of what to expect. The country’s eight years of democracy were brought to an end in August 2020 when Colonel Assimi Goita overthrew the president and installed a new leader. In May 2021, Goita deposed the president and declared himself the new leader. He has extended military rule to 2027.

Now Goita is in a terrible bind. The coups have triggered sanctions and the country, the continent’s No. 3 gold producer, needs cash as it battles rebel groups linked to al-Qaida and ISIL. In 2023, Goita signed into law a new mining code enabling the state and local investors to take stakes of up to 35% in new mining projects compared with 20% previously. The Mali government has consistently refused to comment, but the detention of mining executives is regarded by analysts as a tactic that's part of the government's efforts to shore up its finances.

Other coup belt countries are demanding the same, with Guinea’s military junta demanding increased participation of local citizens in the mining value chain. Niger, also led by a military junta, has revoked the mining licenses of several foreign companies.

And mining agreements are being redrafted elsewhere. In his first speech following his election on Oct. 30, Botswana’s President Duma Boko said he would pursue the renegotiated but stalled diamond deal with De Beers. In July 2023 De Beers and Botswana announced that under a new deal, the country would immediately receive a 30% share of the rough stones extracted from the Debswana joint venture, up from 25%, and that share would increase to 50% within a decade. The deal was never signed, but the two sides are now talking again.

In August, Senegal set up a commission to review oil and gas contracts signed with foreign firms. Last month, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s party won an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections, giving him a powerful mandate to forge ahead with the popular review initiative and other changes.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, which holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, has renegotiated billion-dollar infrastructure-for-minerals deals signed in 2008 between Chinese miners and the country’s former president to achieve better terms. Zambia, which has over the past four years renegotiated mining contracts with China, says it plans to establish an investment company that will control at least 30% of critical minerals production from future mines. Following offshore discoveries of oil and gas by TotalEnergies and Shell, Namibia has introduced a draft National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy to ensure citizens and companies benefit from the new finds.

Are these jurisdictions worried about backlash and investor skittishness? Resource nationalism may work only when commodity markets are booming — and that’s not the case today.

Ironically, Botswana’s new president and his deputy (Harvard Law School and Wharton Business School alumni, respectively) want exactly the same thing as Mali’s military leaders. Botswana’s leaders and De Beers executives are currently renegotiating the decades-old diamond deal with cordiality and a recognition of what’s at stake as partners. Their interactions are an example to governments and businesses across the globe of an attempt to solve the growing crisis around mineral resource exploitation on the continent.

The alternative to what De Beers and Botswana are doing is Mali’s way. That’s the road to nowhere.

Military Leaders Of Niger, Mali And Burkina Faso Rule Out Returning To The Regional Block ECOWAS

FILE - An unidentified representative of the junta waves from a military vehicle as Malians supporting the recent overthrow of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita gathers to celebrate in the capital Bamako, Mali, on Aug. 21, 2020. The coup-hit nations of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso were meeting on Saturday, July 6, 2024 in their first regional summit that officially sets them apart from the West Africa regional bloc after earlier announcing they were leaving the bloc. (AP Photo/File)

BY CHINEDU ASADU

NIAMEY, NIGER (AP) — The coup-hit nations of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso on Saturday ruled out returning to the West Africa regional bloc whose division could further jeopardize regional efforts to revert coups and curb the violence spreading across the region.

Military junta leaders of the three countries announced that during their first summit in Niamey, the capital of Niger, after their withdrawal from the West Africa bloc known as ECOWAS in January.

They also accused the bloc of failing its mandate and pledged to consolidate their union – the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — created last year amid fractured relations with neighbors.

The nearly 50-year-old ECOWAS has become “a threat to our states,” Niger’s military leader Gen Abdourahmane Tchiani said. “We are going to create an AES of the peoples, instead of an ECOWAS whose directives and instructions are dictated to it by powers that are foreign to Africa,” Tchiani said.

The meeting of the three countries that border one another comes a day before an ECOWAS summit in Nigeria where other heads of state in the region are to meet. Analysts say the two meetings show the deep division in ECOWAS, which has emerged as the top political authority for its 15 member states before the unprecedented decision of the three countries to withdraw their membership.

Despite efforts by ECOWAS to keep its house united, the alliance between the three military junta-led countries will most likely remain outside the regional bloc as tensions continue to grow, said Karim Manuel, an analyst for the Middle East and Africa with the Economist Intelligence Unit.

“Attempts at mediation will likely continue nonetheless, notably led by Senegal’s new administration, but it will not be fruitful anytime soon,” said Manuel.

Formed in September last year, the Alliance of Sahel States has been touted by the three countries as a tool to also seek new partnerships in countries like Russia and cement their independence from former colonial ruler France who they accused of interfering with ECOWAS.

At the meeting in Niamey, Burkina Faso’s leader Capt Ibrahim Traoré reaffirmed those concerns and accused foreign countries of exploiting Africa.

“Westerners consider that we belong to them and our wealth also belongs to them. They think that they are the ones who must continue to tell us what is good for our states. This era is gone forever; our resources will remain for us and our populations,” Traoré said.

“The attack on one of us will be an attack on all the other members,” Mali’s leader Col. Assimi Goïta also said.

At a meeting of regional ministers on Thursday, Omar Alieu Touray, the president of the ECOWAS Commission, said the bloc has not received “the right signals” about any possible return of the three states despite lifting coup-related sanctions that they blamed for leaving.

But it is not only the three countries that are angry at ECOWAS, observers say. The bloc has lost goodwill and support from West African citizens so much that some were celebrating the recent spate of coups in the region where citizens have complained of not benefitting from rich natural resources in their countries.

For the most part, ECOWAS is seen as representing only the interests of the leaders and not that of the masses, according to Oge Onubogu, director of the Africa Program at the Washington-based Wilson Center think tank.

Asadu reported from Abuja, Nigeria.

Burkina Faso Junta Extends Its Transition Term By 5 years

 Burkina Faso coup leader Capt. Ibrahim Traore participates in a ceremony in Ouagadougou, Oct. 15, 2022. Traore, the military leader of Burkina Faso, will remain in office for another five years following the signing of a new charter after national consultations in the capital, Saturday, May 25, 2024. (AP Photo/Kilaye Bationo, File)

BY MARK BANCHEREAU

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — The military leader of Burkina Faso will remain in office for another five years following the signing of a new charter after national consultations in the capital on Saturday.

Civil society representatives, the security and defense forces and lawmakers in the transitional assembly participated in the talks in Ouagadougou, which most political parties boycotted.

“The duration of the transition is fixed at 60 months from July 2, 2024,” said Col. Moussa Diallo, the chairman of the organizing committee of the national dialogue process, in a speech after the talks.

Burkina Faso is one of a growing list of West African countries where the military has taken power, accusing the elected governments of failing to keep their promises. The current junta seized power in September 2022 by ousting the military regime of Lt. Col. Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba about eight months after it staged a coup to remove democratically elected President Roch Marc Kaboré.

The transitional government has been running Burkina Faso under a constitution approved by a national assembly that included army officers, civil society groups and traditional and religious leaders. The junta had set a goal of conducting elections to return the country to democratic rule by July 2024.

Capt. Ibrahim Traore was named the transitional president. However, since its inception, the junta has struggled to end Burkina Faso’s security challenges — the very reason that it said prompted it to take over power in September 2022. Around half of Burkina Faso’s territory remains outside of government control.

The West African country has been ravaged by growing attacks by Muslim extremists linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group. The violence has killed thousands, displaced more than 2 million people and pushed tens of thousands to the brink of starvation.

Frustrated with a lack of progress over years of Western military assistance, the junta has severed military ties with former colonial ruler France and turned to Russia instead for security support.

Traore will be able to run in elections at the end of the five-year transition period, according to the new charter. However, the charter also retains the possibility of holding elections before the end of the transition period.

Burkina Faso’s Army Massacred Over 200 Civilians In A Village Raid, Human Rights Watch Says

FILE - A mural is seen, March 1, 2023, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Military forces in Burkina Faso killed 223 civilians, including babies and many children, in attacks on two villages accused of cooperating with militants, Human Rights Watch said in a report published Thursday, April 24, 2024. (AP Photo, File)

BY JESSICA DONATI

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Military forces in Burkina Faso killed 223 civilians, including babies and many children, in attacks on two villages accused of cooperating with militants, Human Rights Watch said in a report published Thursday.

The mass killings took place on Feb. 25 in the country’s northern villages of Nondin and Soro, and some 56 children were among the dead, according to the report. The human rights organization called on the United Nations and the African Union to provide investigators and to support local efforts to bring those responsible to justice.

“The massacres in Nondin and Soro villages are just the latest mass killings of civilians by the Burkina Faso military in their counterinsurgency operations,” Human Rights Watch Executive Director Tirana Hassan said in a statement. “International assistance is critical to support a credible investigation into possible crimes against humanity.”

The once-peaceful nation has been ravaged by violence that has pitted jihadis linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group against state-backed forces. Both sides have targeted civilians caught in the middle, displacing more than 2 million people, of which over half are children. Most attacks go unpunished and unreported in a nation run by a repressive leadership that silences perceived dissidents.

The HRW report provided a rare firsthand account of the killings by survivors amid a stark increase in civilian casualties by Burkina Faso’s security forces as the junta struggles to beat back a growing jihadi insurgency and attacks residents under the guise of counterterrorism.

Earlier in April, The Associated Press verified accounts of a Nov. 5 army attack on another village that killed at least 70 people. The details were similar — the army blamed the villagers for cooperating with militants and massacred them, even babies.

Witnesses and survivors told HRW that the Feb. 25 killings were believed to have been carried out in retaliation for an attack by Islamist fighters on a military camp near the provincial capital Ouahigouya, about 25 kilometers (15 miles) away.

The toll of civilian deaths was higher than first described by local officials. A public prosecutor previously said that his office was investigating the reported deaths of 170 people in attacks carried out on those villages.

A Burkina Faso government spokesperson didn’t respond to requests for comment about the Feb. 25 attack. Officials previously denied killing civilians and said jihadi fighters often disguise themselves as soldiers.

More than 20,000 people have been killed in Burkina Faso since jihadi violence linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group first hit the West African nation nine years ago, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a United States-based nonprofit.

Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022. Since seizing power in September 2022, the junta led by Capt. Ibrahim Traoré has promised to beat back militants but violence has only worsened, analysts say. Around half of Burkina Faso’s territory remains outside of government control.

Frustrated with a lack of progress over years of Western military assistance, the junta has severed military ties with former colonial ruler France and turned to Russian instead for security support.

Follow AP’s Africa coverage at: https://apnews.com/hub/africa

ECOWAS And The Three Rebels

BY OLUSEGUN ADENIYI

On Sunday, the coup leaders in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced the withdrawal of their countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In a joint statement, the three military heads of states said it was a “sovereign decision” to leave ECOWAS “without delay,” because of the “inhumane” sanctions imposed against their countries. They also accused ECOWAS of having “moved away from the ideals of its founding fathers and Pan-Africanism”; claiming that the bloc is now “under the influence of foreign powers.” ECOWAS, according to the military leaders, “notably failed to assist these states in their existential fight against terrorism and insecurity.”

First, we must understand the desperation that pushed the trio of Captain Ibrahim Traore, General Abdourahmane Tchiani and Colonel Assimi Goita to take the action they did. Their three landlocked countries have been under tremendous domestic pressure since being suspended from ECOWAS: Mali in 2020, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger last July. The military rulers signed a defence pact, Alliance of Sahel States founded on the Mafia code of ‘one for all and all for one’ and severed military and cooperation ties with France, their former colonial power. They have now turned to Russia, long seeking a foothold on the continent.

Before I deal with the Russian angle, let me state that this is a problem for us in Nigeria only to the extent that we are seen as leader of the sub-region. President Bola Tinubu is also the current ECOWAS Chairman. Yes, there is a lot to say about a whimsical approach to serious problems becoming emblematic of the current Tinubu administration. And I am aware of the enormous economic and security challenges that plague our country. But Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three countries that collectively account for 8% of the $702 billion ECOWAS Gross Domestic Product (GDP), are not being helped by their military adventurers on this issue.

Not many people remember but ECOWAS was founded by 16 members comprising former British, French, and Portuguese colonies within the subregion. In 2000, Mauritania withdrew its membership in preference for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which it had joined, even when there was nothing stopping the country from belonging to two regional bodies. It did not take long before Mauritanians begun expressing regrets. Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghef, a former Prime Minister (2008-2009), has deemed his country’s withdrawal from ECOWAS ‘a big mistake.’ Of the 54 African countries, according to Waghef, 27 are members of two regional groupings, 18 belong to three groupings and one country is a member of four groupings hence “we have the right to belong simultaneously to two sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS and AMU).” With that opportunity lost, Mauritania is back today in ECOWAS but as an associate member.

Meanwhile, the main ECOWAS challenge for Nigeria is in Niger where President Tinubu is walking a tightrope. Last November, the Northern Senators Forum (NSF) issued a communique indicating quite clearly that there is no consensus in Nigeria as to how to deal with the Niger coup. “The Northern Senators Forum asks ECOWAS to lift restrictions on Niger Republic in the interest of business at our border communities. It is important that Nigeriens should not suffer as a result of coup in their country just as we are seeing what is happening in Gaza,” said NSF Chairman, Abdul Ningi, who read the statement after their meeting. “We call on Niger and Nigeria that we remain brothers, we remain partners and we remain Africans.”

There are other complexities and sensitivities the president must understand. The Nigeria-Niger border is 1,608 kilometres long and traverses seven states: Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Jigawa, Yobe, Katsina and Borno. People in these states engage in open trade across borders and their livelihood is dependent on transactions that are now hampered. Tinubu’s immediate predecessor, President Muhammadu Buhari, we must also remember, admitted openly that Niger is a second home for him. So, already there is domestic pressure that relations be normalised with Niger. General Abdourahmane Tchiani understands these dynamics strengthen his hand and perhaps explains why he is playing hard ball. That’s also why President Tinubu (and by implication, the ECOWAS he chairs) cannot afford to be rigid. At some point, there will have to be a compromise. And whatever goes for Niger must go for Mali and Burkina Faso.

Now to the Russian angle. In an interview with ARISE NEWS on Monday, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, argued that Russia may be “emboldening these three countries to break up ECOWAS as part of the attempt to weaken what one will call the western influence in this part of the world.” Yet, according to Akinyemi, “Russia has not shown that it has the capability to help these three countries to combat the jihadists, the Tuaregs, the ISIS who are running wild in the Sahel.” To the respected diplomat, Nigeria and the regional bloc now contend with a crisis, essentially “because these three countries, in terms of landmass, that’s about half of ECOWAS. So, we’re not dealing with just a little hiccup on our hands.”

Regarding allegations by the three countries that ECOWAS is being teleguided by foreign powers, Akinyemi said it was clear what they mean. “You know the power that they are referring to, and presumably, the fact that our president is in France at the moment kind of reinforces this fear in their minds that the ECOWAS policies are actually French policies,” said Akinyemi. “We’re going to need some clever steps, diplomatically on this matter, and I think that ECOWAS needs some fast thinking to make sure that this situation does not get out of hand.”

I am aware that Russia is investing considerable resources (mostly non-financial apart from wheat donations) to gain a stronger foothold in a number of African countries. Russia has been deploying two vehicles: Military through the Wagner mercenary group and media propaganda, especially against France. In practically all the French speaking countries on the continent, local social media influencers are being contracted to spread pro-Russia (and anti-France) propaganda. “I manage the cyberwar, the media war… and (the late Wagner leader, Yevgeny) Prigozhin conducts military activities,” Luc Michel, who heads the media machine told BBC two years ago. “I think that Russia must replace the French in all of Africa.” So, obviously, there is no altruism in the Russian intervention in these countries.

After almost 50 years, ECOWAS has become part of the political and economic lifeblood of the subregion. To that extent, Nigeria’s very strategic importance and political stability are tied to the survival of the regional bloc. The leadership role we play makes the threat to its existence a serious matter. Therefore, the challenge of the moment requires deft diplomatic leadership that is inclusive and multicultural. That is the best way to neutralize the departure of France from the affected countries. As for the Russian meddlesomeness, it can be dealt with as part of the global anti-authoritarian drive. That of course presupposes strengthening our democracy at home and working for the peace and prosperity of our people.

Nigeria, 105 Years Ago…ll

In the first part of this series started last week, I excerpted from ‘The Nigeria Handbook 1919 (Issued with the approval of the Nigerian Government)’—a 304-page publication which contains ‘Statistical and General Information respecting the Colony and Protectorate’. The main idea was to draw lessons from the Nigeria of 105 years ago. Although I promised to continue the excerpts, I no longer see the need for it given the feedback I received. Most of the mails centre around our colonial experience and ‘where the rain started to beat us’ which, for me, cannot be a justification for our failings. I do not discount the harm of colonialism, but I believe Nigeria is what it is today because of the choices made in the past 63 years.

The Republic of Cyprus was not only colonised like Nigeria but also shares with our country the same Independence Day: 1st October 1960. Like Nigeria, Cyprus has faced wars, military coups and all manner of disruptions, instigated from within and without. But unlike Nigeria, the Eastern Mediterranean Island has done relatively well for itself. In practically all development indicators, Cyprus has fared far much better than Nigeria. So, we cannot continue to cite our colonial experience as reason for the rot in our society. The paradox, as I have written in the past, is that while Nigeria may not be doing well as a country, many of our citizens are doing well as individuals—both at home and in the Diaspora. There is hardly any compilation of the Global 100 in any sphere of human endeavour that does not include at least one Nigerian. That has been the consistent pattern no matter the metrics used and regardless of the field profiled.

Interestingly, my young friend, Ejiro Oghenechovwen, who until recently worked with the Nigeria National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL), seems to understand the essence of my intervention. And I crave the indulgence of readers to publish his mail before I conclude. “I have just finished reading your column on ‘Nigeria, 105 years ago’. I am particularly jolted by your comment that there was no conscious effort at nation building by Nigeria’s postcolonial leaders. Beyond it being painfully true, it strongly suggests that not even national or subnational government and governing processes (which we aren’t even doing well in) are sufficient for a pluralistic country like ours.

“I am delighted that the compiler of the 1919 handbook under reference admitted that organization and order were existent in precolonial Nigeria, contrary to the widespread Western view of an inherently savage and barbaric Africa. Furthermore, hearing a then-active participant in the country’s blossoming political process describe the obtainable government structure as indirect rule is, to me, liberating, as I had always believed that the term was coined in retrospect by future historians. Interestingly, I find astonishing your statistical comparison of the elements of the trade balance between the period covered and that of 2018. The proximity of 1913’s figures to 2018’s is saddening and depicts a merry-go-round affair over a century later, so that, beyond the incredulous fact that we now import palm seedlings – the products of which we earlier exported at two-thirds output volume as you revealed, we have always been a predominantly mono-product economy. When it is palm seeds and their produce, it is majorly palm seeds and their produce; and when it is crude oil, it is equally almost totally crude oil. In other words, we have historically not fared well with diversification.

“It is, therefore, imperative that we pay serious attention to the nation-building question, realizing that the call to leadership goes beyond maintaining, servicing, or upgrading processes, systems, and entities year after year and one democratic dispensation after another. It is also about consciously and masterfully moulding consensus, ensuring that everyone is on the same page – or at least, the same chapter – and journeying collectively, even if in pools and batches, in the same direction. This requires sincerity, courage, and continuous concession-making. I am reminded of a scene in ‘Invictus’, the 2009 movie on Nelson Mandela. Madiba, as he was fondly called, had just been elected South Africa’s first black president and was on his usual pre-dawn walk when he and his two bodyguards saw that day’s newspaper with a banner headline: HE CAN WIN AN ELECTION, BUT CAN HE RUN A COUNTRY? One guard was amazed at such a question when the man wasn’t even up to a day in office. Mandela calmly stated that it was a legitimate query. In like manner, our leaders at all levels and in all spheres must take an informed pause from their routine and reflect deeply on our national question. Why are things falling apart? Why is the nation’s center not holding? What should be done? The real question, perhaps, is, even when we find answers to those questions, are we sincere and courageous enough to respond accordingly?”

Perhaps Ejiro was reading my mind. Despite being blessed with abundant human and material resources, we have failed to aggregate the parts into a collective whole. With no communal sense to build a functioning society, the ‘whole’ of our country remains far much less than the sum of its parts. Essentially because the accumulation of individual greed far outweighs the collective need. When You apply the law of the jungle in competing for scarce resources without any sense of order which nation building entails, the chaos that we have in Nigeria today is inevitable.

Since the beginning of the year, for instance, the recurring news in our country is that of kidnappings by sundry cartels of criminals who seem to have overpowered the capacity of the state. Not only is the list of victims becoming increasingly long, but there are also thousands of others across the country who have been in prolonged captivity and whose ordeals are heart-wrenching for their families. They remain nameless: mere statistics in a nation where human life has become easily dispensable. What is the national response? Let us continue to pray!

Notwithstanding misgivings over the 1914 amalgamation, distortions to our federal structure caused by years of military rule, and disappointment with the current crop of leaders and the choices they make; it is also appropriate to remind ourselves that we have come a long way as a nation. Not even the most implacable enemies of Nigeria will deny its socio-economic potential, the enormous capacity of its people and the bright future that continues to beckon. If only our leaders would look beyond artificial differences, apply themselves to the jobs for which they were elected or appointed and rally our diversity as the real source of our strength.

------------THIS DAY

Coup Trio’s Exit From West Africa Bloc Shakes Region

BY CAMILLE LAFFONT

The military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have announced their immediate withdrawal from the West African bloc, Ecowas, accusing it of posing a threat to their sovereignty.

Burkina Faso and Mali said they had sent the Economic Community of West African States “formal notice” of their exit, with Niger expected to follow suit soon, after the three countries unveiled their move in a joint statement at the weekend.

Some observers fear the exit of three founding members of the Ecowas, formed in 1975, could compromise trade and push back the return to civilian rule in the countries concerned as they battle jihadist violence and poverty.

The three slammed Ecowas’s “irrational and unacceptable posture” after the 15-member bloc imposed a range of sanctions in an attempt to hasten a return to democratic rule.

In August, Ecowas threatened military intervention after the toppling of Niger’s president, Mohamed Bazoum. Although that did not materialise, the fallout notched up tensions that had been brewing following coups in Mali in 2020 and Burkina Faso in 2022.

On Sunday, the trio — who have formed an Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — said Ecowas had come “under the influence of foreign powers, betraying its founding principles” and was a “threat to member states and peoples”.

Burkina Faso and Mali were supposed to hold elections later this year, which would meet an Ecowas condition to drop sanctions. But the military authorities want to extend the “transition” periods, citing the insecurity engendered by jihadist unrest.

Niger’s military leader, General Abdourahamane Tiani, has yet to unveil an intended timeline for restoring civilian rule.

Fahiraman Rodrigue Kone, a Sahel regional expert for the Institute for Security Studies, suggested that “the AES states anticipated a coming debate on the end of the transitions”.

“Withdrawing from Ecowas seems to put that on the back burner.”

Le Patriote, a pro-government newspaper in Côte d’Ivoire, commented: “Well ensconced and enjoying the trappings of power, they [the AES leaders] wish to linger forever in their presidential chairs.”

Withdrawal will hit hard given that Ecowas guarantees visa-free travel and right of settlement and work in member countries. Losing such benefits will cause concern, as will the potential effect on regional trade.

All three countries are landlocked and their main coastal economic partners, notably Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, are, like them, members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The grouping also guarantees “freedom of movement and residence” between its eight members, as well as tariff-free trade on certain items along with tariff harmonisation and trade norms.

One country that could feel the effects of the triple withdrawal is Nigeria, which is not a WAEMU member. Nigeria accounts for more than half of Ecowas’s overall GDP and is neighbouring Niger’s main economic partner — although much of their shared 1  500km border is poorly controlled both in terms of security and trade.

“Even if it’s through smuggling, goods and people will return to Niger. You can’t separate Sokoto [northern Nigeria] from Konni [Niger] — it’s the same people,” said Chaibou Tchiombiano, secretary general of Niger’s import-export and wholesalers’ union.

Although the military regimes say they are withdrawing “without delay”, Ecowas regulations stipulate that requests to leave must be made in writing a year beforehand.

Ecowas said on Sunday that it had not received notification.

“Legally, withdrawal with no delay is not possible,” Kone said. “These states will have to find some form of agreement and negotiations will go in the direction of finding the means to undertake withdrawal gradually.”

Amid jihadist advances in the Sahel, “the region is fragmenting, becoming the object of stronger geostrategic competition, and this is not good news for stability”, Kone warned.

Sharp criticism of the CFA franc, the common currency of WAEMU members, by the military regimes and their supporters could see Alliance of Sahel States countries leave the organisation and renounce the free exchange of goods and labour. — AFP