Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Palestine. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 06, 2026

Venezuela, Gaza, Ukraine: Is The UN Failing?



BY JULIETTE MCINTYRE AND TAMSIN PHILLIPA PAIGE

The United Nations turned 80 in October last year; a venerable age for the most significant international organisation the world has ever seen.

But events of recent years – from last weekend’s Trumpian military action to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine in 2022, to the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza – represent major challenges to the UN system.

Many are now asking whether the United Nations has any future at all if it cannot fulfil its first promise of maintaining international peace and security.

Has the UN reached the end of its lifespan?

The UN Security Council

The organ of the UN that plays the main role maintaining peace and security is the UN Security Council.

Under the rules established by the UN Charter, military action – the use of force – is only lawful if it has been authorised by a resolution from the UN Security Council (as outlined in Article 42 of the Charter), or if the state in question is acting in self-defence.

Self-defence is governed by strict rules requiring it to be in response to an armed attack (Article 51). Even then, self-defence is lawful only until the Security Council has stepped in to restore international peace and security.

The Security Council is made up of 15 member states:

five permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – also known as the P5) ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms.

Resolutions require nine affirmative votes and no veto from any permanent member, giving the P5 decisive control over all action on peace and security.

This was set up expressly to prevent the UN from being able to take action against the major powers (the “winners” of the second world war), but also to allow them to act as a balance to each other’s ambitions.

This system only works, however, when the P5 agree to abide by the rules.

Could the UN veto system be reformed?

As aptly demonstrated by the Russians and Americans in recent years, the veto power can render the Security Council effectively useless, no matter how egregious the breach of international law.

For that reason, the veto is often harshly criticised.

As one of us (Tamsin Paige) has explained previously, however, self-serving use of the veto power (meaning when a member state uses its veto power to further its own interests) may be politically objectionable but it is not legally prohibited.

The UN Charter imposes no enforceable limits on veto use.

Nor is there any possibility of a judicial review of the Security Council at the moment.

And herein lies one of the most significant and deliberate design flaws of the UN system.

The charter places the P5 above the law, granting them not only the power to veto collective action, but also the power to veto any attempt at reform.

Reforming the UN Security Council veto is thus theoretically conceivable – Articles 108 and 109 of the charter allow for it – but functionally impossible.

Dissolving and reconstituting the UN under a new charter is the only structural alternative.

This, however, would require a level of global collectivism that presently does not exist. One or more of the P5 would likely block any reform or redesign that would see the loss of their veto power.

An uncomfortable truth

It does, therefore, appear as though we are witnessing the collapse of the UN-led international peace and security system in real time.

The Security Council cannot – by design – intervene when the P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK and US) are the aggressors.

But focusing only on the Security Council risks missing much of what the UN actually does, every day, largely out of sight.

Despite its paralysis when it comes to great-power conflict, the UN is not a hollow institution.

The Secretariat, for instance, supports peacekeeping and political missions and helps organise international conferences and negotiations.

The Human Rights Council monitors and reports on human rights compliance.

UN-administered agencies coordinate humanitarian relief and deliver life-saving aid.

The UN machinery touches on everything from health to human rights to climate and development, performing functions that no single state can replicate alone.

None of this work requires Security Council involvement, but all of it depends on the UN’s institutional infrastructure (of which the Security Council is an integral part).

The uncomfortable truth is we have only one real choice at present: a deeply flawed global institution, or none at all.

The future of the UN may simply be one of sheer endurance, holding together what can still function and waiting for political conditions to change.

We support it not because it works perfectly, or even well, but because losing it would be much worse.

Should we work towards a better system that doesn’t reward the powerful by making them unaccountable? Absolutely.

But we shouldn’t throw out all of the overlooked good the UN does beyond the Security Council’s chambers because of the naked hypocrisy and villainy of the P5.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Wednesday, October 15, 2025

Hamas Is Battling Powerful Clans For Control In Gaza – Who Are These Groups And What Threat Do They Pose?

Hamas security forces patrol an area of Gaza City during a crackdown on a Fatah-linked clan in 2008. Hatem Houssa/AP

BY MARTIN KEAR
SESSIONAL LECTURER, DEPARTMENT 
OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

Despite the euphoria surrounding the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, Gaza is still wracked with violence.

More than two dozen Palestinians have been killed in recent days in clashes between Hamas and members of various clans. Hamas has also reportedly executed blindfolded men in a public square.

With the Israeli military withdrawing to pre-determined ceasefire lines, Hamas members are beginning to re-assert their control. However, powerful clans are also jockeying for position – some allied to Hamas’ ideological rival, the West Bank-based Fatah movement, and some backed by Israel.

So, who are these clans? What role do they play in Gaza? And how much of a threat are they to Hamas?

Who are the clans?

Familial clans have existed in Palestinian society for centuries. In recent decades, they have come to play a key role in Palestinian politics.

The clans are primarily collections of family groups in various parts of Gaza. One of the largest and most well-armed is the Dughmush clan in Gaza City, headed by Mumtaz Dughmush. This clan was immediately targeted by Hamas after the ceasefire.

The al-Majayda clan also holds sway in part of Khan Younis. Hamas forces raided their neighbourhood earlier this month, killing several family members. This week, however, the clan publicly supported Hamas’ effort to regain control over Gaza.

Importantly, these clans and their relationships with Hamas and Fatah are dynamic and constantly evolving. Members of both Hamas and Fatah also belong to clans. This often leads to clashes over territory and control, with clan loyalties often outweighing movement allegiances.

As Israeli historian Dror Ze’evi notes, any attempt by Hamas or Fatah to disarm the clans would be seen as an affront and met with serious opposition.

A long history of entrenched power

After the 1948 war that saw the creation of Israel and the Palestinian al-naqbah (or Nakba), around 750,000 Palestinians fled Israel to the Gaza Strip, West Bank and neighbouring Arab states.

This was when clans began to assume traditional roles of mediators and patrons. Their organised structures made them best-placed to provide welfare and assistance to a shattered Palestinian society.

As law and order, security and financial independence improved in the territories in the subsequent decades, Palestinians came to rely less on their support. This brought a decline in their power and influence.

This changed, though, during the First Intifada (1987–93) and Second Intifada (2000–05) when Palestinian society was again plunged into crisis. This was especially true in the Gaza Strip, which was known as the engine room of organised Palestinian resistance.

The Second Intifada, in particular, changed the role of the clans significantly, after Israel destroyed much of the organised Palestinian security forces and infrastructure in the territories.

With neither Hamas nor Fatah able to ensure the safety of Palestinians, this created a security vacuum. And some of the clans exploited this by transforming into paramilitary organisations. Again, this was especially true in the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s efforts to crush Palestinian resistance were felt most intensely.

When the Second Intifada ended, the Gazan clans retained a significant amount of political influence and military power. After Hamas won the 2006 elections, some Fatah-aligned clans tried to prevent it from taking power.

So entrenched were these clans that when Hamas finally assumed control of Gaza in 2007, it took the movement a year to effectively bring the more powerful clans under its authority. Even then, it was more of a truce than a victory for Hamas.

Israel backing Hamas rivals

This status quo remained until Hamas’ October 7 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel. Israel’s revenge for these attacks devastated the Gaza Strip, once again robbing Gazans of any semblance of safety and security.

Now, with Israel’s partial troop withdrawal, another security vacuum has been created. And many clans appear keen to fill it, some with the help of Israel.

In June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted his government was arming some Gazan clans, gangs and militias, such as the Popular Forces, led by Yasser Abu Shabab.

Netanyahu’s rationale was that any opposition to Hamas helped Israel and saved soldiers’ lives. It also pitted Palestinian against Palestinian, placing additional pressure on Hamas.

After the ceasefire came into effect, Hamas began targeting what it called “collaborators and traitors” – an apparent reference to those clans and gangs cooperating with Israel.

The Popular Forces, meanwhile, have refused to lay down their arms. A dozen other new militias have also reportedly emerged across the strip in recent days, including one led by Hossam al-Astal, who said:

Hamas was always betting that there won’t be any alternative to replace them in Gaza, but now I’m telling you, today, there is an alternative force to Hamas. It could be me or Abu Shabab or anyone else, but alternatives today exist.

While this violence between Hamas and rival groups does not directly affect the ceasefire that ended the war, it is evidence that Israel is still attempting to meddle in Gaza’s security and exert its control.

But the peace plan negotiated by US President Donald Trump looks shakier by the day, given its call for Hamas to disarm. Trump said this week if Hamas refused to disarm themselves, “we will disarm them […] perhaps violently”.

The peace plan also calls for Hamas to withdraw from Palestinian politics, to be replaced eventually by the Palestinian Authority, which currently administers parts of the West Bank. However, Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected the Palestinian Authority assuming control of Gaza.

This ambiguity over the future governance of Gaza opens the possibility that the more powerful clans could become alternate centres of political power, as they had during the Second Intifada. This time they may do so under the auspices of Israel’s military occupation.

This would further fracture Gaza and weaken any effort by the Palestinian Authority to reunite the territories under a single governance structure. It would also make a future Palestinian state tenuous.

Also, Hamas will not go quietly. And this is a very real danger to peace and security in Gaza, especially if Hamas sees any resistance to its authority from the clans as little more than a proxy war with Israel.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Monday, October 13, 2025

Supporting Palestine While Denying Biafra Height Of Hypocrisy, Igbo Union Tells Tinubu



BY UGOCHUKWU ALARIBE

UMUAHIA (VANGUARD NIGERIA)
– The Igbo National Union–Worldwide (INU-W) has accused the Federal Government of hypocrisy for supporting the recognition of an independent State of Palestine while allegedly suppressing the agitation for Biafra’s sovereignty within Nigeria.

The group was reacting to President Bola Tinubu’s call—delivered through Vice President Kashim Shettima—for the recognition of Palestine as an independent state during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 80) held recently in New York, USA.

In a statement signed by its Administrative Secretary, Mazi Austin-Mary Ndukwu, INU-W said Nigeria’s position at the UN amounted to “the height of hypocrisy” and “a clear case of double standards,” given the continued detention of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).

“The most significant and symbolic item presented by Nigeria at the meeting was her tacit recognition of a Palestinian State,” the statement read.

“Therefore, the question being asked by the Igbo National Union–Worldwide is this: did Nigeria act because other nations did so, or did she suddenly recognize the importance of freedom for indigenous peoples? Or was it simply an individual decision by the Vice President in solidarity with his Muslim brothers?”

The group said Nigeria had no moral right to champion the freedom of indigenous peoples elsewhere while “hundreds of pro-Biafra agitators” were allegedly detained in correctional centres and police cells across the country.

“Nigeria must purge herself of such hypocrisy by releasing all prisoners of conscience—epitomized by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu—and save herself from international embarrassment. That is the irony of recognizing a Palestinian State while denying Biafra’s right to self-determination,” INU-W stated.

The organisation further cautioned against granting Africa, particularly Nigeria, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, citing widespread insecurity and corruption across the continent.

“Nigeria, with the highest rate of insecurity, criminality, and corruption in almost all the 36 states and the FCT, lacks the moral justification and capacity to be admitted into the Security Council as a permanent member.

“Charity, they say, begins at home. Nigeria must first fix the insecurity ravaging her land, which has claimed countless lives and destroyed infrastructure, before seeking to play a global leadership role,” the group added.

Tuesday, October 07, 2025

View From The Hill: Two Years Of A Distant War Have Brought Much Damage To Australian Society

Executive Council of Australian Jewry co-CEO Alec Ryvchin (centre) joins protestors as the hold placards of Israeli hostages following a press conference marking the two-year anniversary of the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel. Bianca De Marchi/AAP

BY MICHELLE GRATAN
PROFESSIONAL FELLOW,
UNIVERSITY OF CANBERRA

Two years ago, who would have imagined the police and the Palestine Action Group (PAG) would be fighting in court over whether demonstrators should be allowed to rally outside the Sydney Opera House?

Indeed, 24 months ago, who would have thought we’d have (or need) designated “envoys” to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia in Australia?

On Tuesday’s second anniversary of the Hamas atrocities in Israel, it is sobering to reflect how much damage this horrific Middle East conflict, which has cost tens of thousands of lives, most of them Palestinian, has done to Australia’s own society.

In Fitzroy in Melbourne, pro-Palestinian graffiti appeared to mark the anniversary: “Glory to Hamas”, “Oct 7, do it again”, “Glory to the martyrs”.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described this as “terrorist propaganda” that was “abhorrent,” saying those responsible “must face the full force of the law”.

On Wednesday, the issue of Sunday’s proposed protest outside the Opera House will be back in court. The police don’t want the protesters’ march to be allowed to end in the tight space at the Opera House, citing dangers to safety.

The lawyer for the PAG said on Tuesday: “If the police application is conceded to, the ramifications for the right to protest in Australia will not be confined to the Opera House, but for a wide variety of protest activities”. The group argues the issue is a constitutional one.

In the past two years, this faraway conflict has done substantial harm to Australia’s social cohesion, raised questions about the future of multiculturalism, and produced serious divisions about where lines should be drawn on limiting free speech and the right to protest. The response of institutions, universities in particular, has been tested and in some cases found wanting.

NSW Labor Premier Chris Minns gave a flavour of the cross pressures when speaking on Sydney radio on Tuesday.

“We’ve moved significant changes to hate speech laws in New South Wales and we’ve done it because we recognise we live in a multicultural community and yes, you’ve got a right to freedom of speech but someone else has a right not to be vilified or hated on the basis of their race or religion. All of those laws are currently being challenged in the High Court because of the implied freedom of political communication.”

As hope, however tentative, is glimmering that the peace plan advanced by United States President Donald Trump just might bring a real breakthrough in this terrible war, the fissures it has produced in Australia seem as sharp as ever.

In two years, the Australian Jewish community has been embattled, with attacks on synagogues and other Jewish places, and many individuals deeply frightened for their own and their families’ safety. Iran’s intervention, behind at least two attacks, sought to stoke division.

In that time, the determination of Palestinian supporters has been steadfast, with regular weekend demonstrations maintained throughout.

The conflict has fractured the Australia-Israel relationship, with the Albanese government increasingly critical of Israel’s unrelenting prosecution of the war, and the Netanyahu government turning on Australia.

This culminated with Australia’s recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations during the prime minister’s recent trip. The recognition was the end of Labor’s internal journey, which commenced many years before this war began.

The Greens Party have been at the left edge of the political spectrum.

The Australian community was divided about Palestinian recognition: an Essential poll published in late September showed 34% in favour, and 30% against.

The conflict has shattered what used to be a bipartisan Middle East policy, when both main parties strongly supported Israel and also backed a two-state solution for a long-term Middle East settlement.

Over the past two years, the Coalition has been strongly pro-Israel, accusing the Labor government of deserting an ally and failing to deal robustly with antisemitism in this country.

Opposition leader Sussan Ley used her parliamentary speech on Tuesday’s anniversary to home in on the government’s policy towards Israel.

“To our great shame, under the leadership of the Albanese Labor government, Australia has not stood with the people of Israel, nor with the United States, as they have sought to dismantle Hamas and establish the conditions for peace”.

The local rifts that have come to the surface in Australia were there well before October 7 2023. The war caused them to widen dramatically and explode.

Even if, and when, this conflict subsides, it will leave fractures, anger, bitterness and fear within sections of the Australian community.

Whatever healing takes place almost certainly won’t be complete. For governments, federal and state, intractable policy challenges will remain.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Tuesday, September 30, 2025

The 5 Big Problems With Trump’s Gaza Peace Plan

Israel launched scores of airstrikes on Gaza City last weekend as Trump foreshadowed a peace plan was on the way. Yousef Al Zanoun/AP

BY IAN PARMETER
RESEARCH SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The 20-point plan announced by US President Donald Trump at a joint news conference with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu comes close to living up to Trump’s hype. It is a bold attempt to address all of the issues that need to be resolved if there is to be lasting peace in Gaza.

Could it work? Both sides are tired of the war. Throughout history, quite a number of wars have simply come to an end when both sides were too exhausted to continue. Two-thirds of Israelis want the war to end, and though polling of Palestinians is difficult, they clearly want the devastation and suffering in Gaza to stop, too.

So, this plan, despite its limitations, could come at the right time.

However, there are many outstanding questions about the feasibility of the plan and to what extent it is likely to be successful. Given the Middle East’s violent history, it’s impossible to be optimistic at this point.

Here are five main reasons for concern.

1. Trust is lacking

There’s zero trust between both sides right now. And several aspects of the plan are so vague, there is a big risk both sides could accuse the other of breaking their promises.

The last ceasefire between the two sides only lasted two months before Netanyahu backed out, blaming Hamas for not releasing more hostages before negotiations on the next phase could proceed.
2. The plan is asymmetrical

The deal favours Israel more than it does Hamas. Hamas is essentially being asked to give up all of the remaining Israeli hostages it holds and all of its weapons at the same time, rendering it entirely defenceless.

Hamas, with its lack of trust in Israel and Netanyahu, in particular, may fear the Israeli leader could use this as an opportunity to attack it again without worrying about harming the hostages.

Hamas was also not invited to negotiate the terms of the agreement. And it now faces an ultimatum: accept the terms or Israel will “finish the job”.

Given the asymmetry of the plan, Hamas may decide the risks of accepting it outweigh the potential benefits, despite its offer of amnesty for Hamas fighters who lay down their arms.

Israel is being asked to make some compromises in the plan. But how realistic are these?

For example, the deal envisions a future when the Palestinian Authority (PA) can “securely and effectively take back control of Gaza”. Netanyahu has previously said he would not accept this.

Likewise, it would also be very difficult for Netanyahu to accept “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”, as outlined in the plan. He has firmly rejected this in the past, most recently in his defiant address to the UN General Assembly last week.

3. Important details are lacking

The implementation strategy of the plan is extraordinarily vague. We know nothing at this stage about the “International Stabilisation Force” that would take the place of the Israeli military after it withdraws from Gaza.

Which countries would participate? It would obviously be a mission fraught with danger to the personnel involved. Netanyahu has previously mentioned an Arab force taking over in Gaza, but no Arab states have yet put their hands up for this.

There is also no timeframe in the plan for the Palestinian Authority reforms, nor any details on what these reforms would entail.

Presumably, there would need to be new elections to install a credible leader in place of current President Mahmoud Abbas. But how that would be done and whether the people of Gaza would be able to take part is still unknown.

In addition, the details of the civil authority that would oversee the reconstruction of Gaza are very unclear. All we know is that Trump would appoint himself chair of the “Board of Peace”, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair would also somehow be involved.

This board would need the absolute confidence of the Netanyahu government and Hamas to be effective. Trust is always in short supply in the Middle East.

4. No mention of the West Bank

The West Bank is clearly a flashpoint. There are disputes and clashes every day between the Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents, which are only likely to get worse.

Just last month, the Israeli government gave final approval to a controversial plan to build a new settlement that would effectively divide the West Bank in two, making a future, contiguous Palestinian state unviable.

The West Bank must be central to any overall settlement between Israel and Palestine.

5. Israel’s right-wing cabinet remains an obstacle

This could be the ultimate deal breaker: the hardline right-wing members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, have said they will not accept anything less than the complete destruction and elimination of Hamas.

And although Hamas would be disarmed and politically sidelined under this plan, its ideology would remain intact, as would a significant number of its fighters.

So, does it have a chance?

If Hamas accepts Trump’s plan, we could soon have the answers to several of these questions.

But it is going to require a great deal of work by the United States to maintain the pressure on Israel to stick to the deal. The chief Palestinian mediators, Qatar and Egypt, would also need to maintain pressure on Hamas so it doesn’t breach the conditions, as well.

Netanyahu is likely assuming there will be sufficient off-ramps for him to get out of the agreement if Hamas doesn’t live up to it. Netanyahu has already done this once when he backed out of the ceasefire in March and resumed Israel’s military operations.

In his forceful speech to a partially empty UN General Assembly hall last week, Netanyahu didn’t indicate he was thinking of walking away from any of the red lines he had previously set to end the war. In fact, he condemned the states recognising a Palestinian state and vowed, “Israel will not allow you to shove a terror state down our throats.”

Given this, Netanyahu would not have agreed to Trump’s plan at all if the US leader hadn’t put pressure on him. At the same time, Trump said at his news conference with Netanyahu that if Hamas fails to live up to the agreement or refuses to accept it, Israel would have his full backing to finish the job against Hamas.

This promise may be enough for Netanyahu to be able to persuade Smotrich and Ben-Gvir to support the plan – for now.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Tuesday, August 19, 2025

‘There’s No Such Thing As Someone Else’s Children’ – Omar El Akkad Bears Witness To The Destruction Of Gaza And The West’s Quiet Assent



BY CLARE CORBOULD
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND
ASSOCIATE HEAD (RESEARCH) OF THE
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

Omar El Akkad does not want you to look away. An award-winning journalist and novelist, El Akkad was born in Egypt, lived as a teenager in Qatar and Canada, and migrated as an adult to the US, where he now lives with his family in the Pacific Northwest.

His essay collection, One Day, Everyone Will Have Always Been Against This, draws on his life, from childhood to new fatherhood. He combines these reflections with a sharp grasp of modern history to examine responses in the west to “the world’s first livestreamed genocide” in Gaza.

Finding that response wanting, he urges readers to watch, listen, reflect and act.

As someone whose parents migrated to the west for the freedoms and opportunities it would afford their children, El Akkad has an acute sense of the past events, ideas and structures that have shaped the present. He pays keen attention to the legacies of colonial rule.

Witnessing history

El Akkad’s descriptions of atrocity are not easy to read. Nor is his blunt demand to do something. Yet the force of his observations and the bite of his prose make it hard to turn away.

His purpose is akin to many famed witnesses in history. Contemporaneous statements about violence often serve later as testimony in determining what happened, who was responsible, and what recompense is due.

Think of George Orwell on propaganda in Spain. Or British journalists Gareth Jones and Malcolm Muggeridge exposing famine in 1930s USSR, while other western communists looked away. Or Victor Klemperer’s diaries, published after the war, which tracked how the Nazis twisted everyday speech.

Above all, this kind of testimony guards against future claims of innocence, against the reassuring assertion that “they didn’t know what was going on” or “they were of their time”.

Less well-known to Australian readers may be American journalist Ida B. Wells, but El Akkad’s fire and fury also brought her to mind. In the 1890s, Wells fiercely attacked lynching in her own newspaper, the Memphis Free Speech. She investigated specific instances of ritualised mob violence.

Wells also catalogued how news outlets told those stories. They minced words to protect the perpetrators, while smearing the reputations of the dead, who were always named.

El Akkad also pays close attention the way the violence in Gaza is framed and described. He observes how reporters use the passive voice, which not only hides the names of killers but implies mass death came about by accident or magic. “Palestinian Journalist Hit in Head by Bullet During Raid on Terror Suspect’s Home,” read one Guardian headline, he notes.

Both Wells and El Akkad show how victims of racist and colonial violence are cast as already guilty. With lynching, the pretext was often an accusation of rape, though that was rarely the actual spark. Far more common were disputes between men over land, pay, labour organising, business competition or voting drives.

In the case of Gaza, the media mimics the claims of Israeli politicians, its military and allies of both. They all cast civilians as terrorists or terrorists-in-waiting, even children. The words clean the consciences of onlookers. They launder harm as if it were cash.

Modes of resisting

As the book’s title, which began life as a viral tweet, goes: One Day, Everyone Will Have Always Been Against This.

Bearing witness to the atrocities and the gutless responses, El Akkad reminds liberal readers that if Gaza had happened in the past, they would condemn the violence. What’s more, they would imagine that, had they been alive at the time, they would have firmly resisted the wrong or even taken a heroic stance against it.

One blistering passage will hit very close to home for Australian readers:

I read an op-ed in which a writer argues that the model for Palestinian-Israeli coexistence is something like Canada’s present-day relationship with the Indigenous population, and I marvel at the casual, obvious, but unstated corollary: that there is an Indigenous population being colonized, but that we should let this unpleasantness run its course so we can arrive at true justice in the form of land acknowledgments at every Tel Aviv poetry reading.

As well as diagnosing the problem, El Akkad surveys and evaluates modes of resisting what is happening in Gaza. He discards as ineffective the old appeal to westerners’ self-interest. Pointing out that horrors they permit elsewhere will eventually come for them just doesn’t work.

His essays were written between the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and August 2024, when the US presidential campaign was in full swing. Much of his energy goes to addressing the “lesser of two evils” debate about voting in a democracy where the options are far right and, at most, centre-a-bit-left. Only from a relatively protected position, he observes, could one vote for the Democratic Party on the grounds that the other side “would be so much worse”.

Making this case, El Akkad says, rests on a quiet assent to mass death. He calls this a “reticent acceptance of genocide” and asks liberals in the United States (and by implication in other western democracies) to examine their consciences.

The remedying action El Akkad proposes is widespread negation, or “walking away”. People, en masse, must refuse to accept that the meagre promises of the less conservative political parties are the best options on offer.

This will require sacrifices. El Akkad provides examples of people he admires: the writer who refused a prize from an organisation that had been silent about Gaza; the teacher brave enough to talk with teenage students about the intolerable rate of children and civilians (not “noncombatants”) dying. Most starkly, he writes of Aaron Bushnell, the US Air Force veteran, whose last words before setting himself on fire outside the Israeli embassy in Washington D.C. were “free Palestine”.

Systematic violence

Like Wells, El Akkad links systematic violence to the structures that underpin the modern world. Chief among them is capitalism. Real change, he suggests, will come when enough of us, to use the old 1960s parlance, “drop out”, though he prefers “negation”, a word that that implies there is something to defy.

It is time, he argues, for a well-educated western citizenry to say “enough”. Our phones are smart enough; we are (collectively) rich and sated enough.

It might be hard at first, but we will learn that “maybe it’s not all that much trouble to avoid ordering coffee and downloading apps and buying chocolate-flavored hummus from companies that abide slaughter”.

Doing so might just halt a genocide. In time, this kind of collective action might also stop other looming calamities, not least climate collapse. El Akkad’s steady focus throughout the book on the death, maiming and immeasurable psychic injury to the children of Gaza makes that case feel urgent.

If that sounds hyperbolic, El Akkad might ask what children you had in mind when you flinched from his diagnosis and prognosis. Your answer likely turns on the location, colour and wealth of the children you have in mind. Children in Tuvalu, for example, know he is not exaggerating.

In one of the book’s most arresting lines, El Akkad asks: “How does one finish the sentence: ‘It is unfortunate that tens of thousands of children are dead, but …’”

Better, he suggests, that we all behave in a way whose ethics is grounded in the claim: “there’s no such thing as someone else’s children.”

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Tuesday, August 12, 2025

The Dark History Of Forced Starvation As A Weapon Of War Against Indigenous Peoples

The ‘Navajo Long Walk’ – the 1864 forced removal of the Navajo people from their ancestral homelands in present-day Arizona and New Mexico. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration via Wikimedia Commons

BY RASALYN P. LAPIER
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY,
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

There is increasing evidence that “widespread starvation, malnutrition and disease” are driving a rise in hunger-related deaths“ in Gaza, a group of United Nations and aid organizations have repeatedly warned.

A July 29, 2025, alert by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a global initiative for improving food security and nutrition, reported that the "worst-case scenario of famine is currently playing out in the Gaza Strip,” as access to food and other essential items is dropping to an “unprecedented level.”

More than 500,000 Palestinians, one-fourth of Gaza’s population, are experiencing famine, the U.N. stated. And all 320,000 children under age 5 are “at risk of acute malnutrition, with serious lifelong physical and mental health consequences.”

U.N. experts have accused Israel of using starvation “as a savage weapon of war and constitutes crime under international law.”

They are calling on Israel to urgently “restore the UN humanitarian system in Gaza.”

Israel is not the only government in history to cut off access to food and water as a tool of war. As an Indigenous scholar who studies Indigenous history, I know that countries – including the United States and Canada – have used starvation to conquer Indigenous peoples and acquire their land. As a descendant of ancestors who endured forced starvation by the U.S. government, I also know of its enduring consequences.

Dismantling Indigenous food systems

From the founding of the U.S. and Canada through the 20th century, settler colonizers often tried to destroy Indigenous communities’ access to food, whether it was their farms and livestock or their ability to access land with wild animals – with the ultimate aim of forcing them off the land.

In 1791, President George Washington ordered Secretary of War Henry Knox to destroy farms and livestock of the Wea Tribe that lived along the Ohio River valley – a fertile area with a long history of growing corn, beans, squash and other fruits and vegetables.

Knox burned down their “corn fields, uprooted vegetable gardens, chopped down apple orchards, reduced every house to ash, [and] killed the Indians who attempted to escape,” historian Susan Sleeper-Smith noted in her 2018 book, “Indigenous Prosperity and American Conquest.” Women and children were taken hostage. The goal was to destroy villages and farms so that Indigenous people would leave and not return.

Seventy-two years later, General Kit Carson conducted a scorched-earth campaign to remove the Navajo from what is now Arizona and New Mexico. Similar to Knox, he destroyed their villages, crops and water supply, killed their livestock and chopped down over 4,000 peach trees. The U.S. military forced over 10,000 Navajo to leave their homeland.

Indigenous famine

By the late 19th century, numerous famines struck Indigenous communities in both the U.S. and Canada due to the “targeted, swift, wholesale destruction” of bison by settlers, according to historian Dan Flores; this, too, was done in an effort to acquire more Indigenous land. One U.S. military colonel stated at the time: “Kill every buffalo you can! Every buffalo dead is an Indian gone.”

There were an estimated 60 million bison before U.S. and Canadian settlement; by the 1890s, there were fewer than 1,000. Indigenous communities on the northern Great Plains in both the U.S. and Canada, who believed bison were a sacred animal and who relied on them for food, clothing and other daily needs, now had nothing to eat.

Historian James Daschuk revealed in his 2013 book, “Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life,” that between 1878 to 1880, Canadian Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald did little to stop a multiyear famine on the Canadian Plains, in what is now Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Macdonald did not hide his intentions. He and his government, he said, were “doing all we can, by refusing food until the Indians are on the verge of starvation.”

Indigenous peoples on the Canadian Plains were forced to eat their dogs, horses, the carcasses of poisoned wolves and even their own moccasins. All the Indigenous peoples in the region – an estimated 26,500 people – suffered from the famine. Hundreds died from starvation and disease.

Malcolm C. Cameron, a House of Commons member at the time, accused his government of using “a policy of submission shaped by a policy of starvation” against Indigenous peoples. His denunciation did little to change their policy.

What my great-grandparents experienced

Many Indigenous peoples’ families in the U.S. and Canada have stories of surviving forced starvation by the government. Mine does, too.

In the winter of 1883-1884, my grandmother and grandfather’s parents experienced what is remembered as the “starvation winter” on the Blackfeet reservation in what is now Montana.

Similar to what happened in Canada, the near extinction of bison by American settlers led to a famine on the Blackfeet reservation. In an effort to slow the famine, Blackfeet leaders purchased food with their own money, but the U.S. government supply system delayed its arrival, creating a dire situation. Blackfeet leaders documented 600 deaths by starvation that one winter, while the U.S. government documented half that amount.

As historian John Ewers noted, the nearby “well-fed settlers” did nothing and did not offer “any effective aid to the Blackfeet.”

My family survived because a few men and women within our family were able to travel far off the reservation by horseback to hunt and harvest Native foods. I was told the story of the “starvation winter” my entire life, as were most Blackfeet. And I now share these stories with my own children.

Weapon of war

Thousands of children in Gaza are malnourished and dying of hunger-related causes.

Due to mounting international pressure, Israel is pausing its attacks in some parts of Gaza for a few hours each day to allow for some aid, but experts have noted it is not enough.

“We’re talking about 2 million people. It’s not 100 trucks or a pausing or a few hours of calm that is going to meet the needs of a population that has been starved for months,” Oxfam official Bushra Khalidi told The New York Times.

“This is no longer a looming hunger crisis – this is starvation, pure and simple,” Ramesh Rajasingham, director of the U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, said on Aug. 10, 2025.

Many might assume that the use of starvation as a weapon of war happened only in the past. Yet, in places like Gaza, it is happening now.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Monday, August 11, 2025

Beyond Recognition: The Challenges Of Creating A New Palestinian State Are So Formidable, Is It Even Possible?

A man walks with a Palestinian flag in front of the Israeli separation barrier near Hebron in the West Bank in 2022. Abed Al Hashlamoun/EPA

BY MARTIN KEAR
SESSIONAL LECTURER, DEPARTMENT
OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, UN IVERSITY OF SYDNEY

Australia will recognise a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly meeting in September, joining the United Kingdom, Canada and France in taking the historic step.

Recognising a Palestinian state is at one level symbolic – it signals a growing global consensus behind the rights of Palestinians to have their own state. In the short term, it won’t impact the situation on the ground in Gaza.

Practically speaking, the formation of a future Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem is far more difficult to achieve.

The Israeli government has ruled out a two-state solution and reacted with fury to the moves by the four G20 members to recognise Palestine. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the decision “shameful”.

So, what are the political issues that need to be resolved before a Palestinian state becomes a reality? And what is the point of recognition if it doesn’t overcome these seemingly intractable obstacles?

Geographical complexities of a future state

Second is the issue of a future border between a Palestinian state and Israel.

The demarcations of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem are not internationally recognised borders. Rather, they are the ceasefire lines, known as the “Green Line”, from the 1948 War that saw the creation of Israel.

However, in the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured and occupied the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula (since returned), and Syria’s Golan Heights. And successive Israeli governments have used the construction of settlements in the occupied territories, alongside expansive infrastructure, to create new “facts on the ground”.

Israel solidifies its hold on this territory by designating it as “state land”, meaning it no longer recognises Palestinian ownership, further inhibiting the possibility of a future Palestinian state.

For example, according to research by Israeli professor Neve Gordon, Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries covered approximately seven square kilometres before 1967. Since then, Israeli settlement construction has expanded its eastern boundaries, so it now now covers about 70 square km.

Israel also uses its Separation Wall or Barrier, which runs for around 700km through the West Bank and East Jerusalem, to further expropriate Palestinian territory.

According to a 2013 book by researchers Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, the wall is part of the Israeli government’s policy of cleansing Israeli space of any Palestinian presence. It breaks up contiguous Palestinian urban and rural spaces, cutting off some 150 Palestinian communities from their farmland and pastureland.

The barrier is reinforced by other methods of separation, such as checkpoints, earth mounds, roadblocks, trenches, road gates and barriers, and earth walls.

Then there is the complex geography of Israel’s occupation in the West Bank.

Under the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, the West Bank was divided into three areas, labelled Area A, Area B and Area C.

In Area A, which consists of 18% of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority exercises majority control. Area B is under joint Israeli-Palestinian authority. Area C, which comprises 60% of the West Bank, is under full Israeli control.

Administrative control was meant to be gradually transferred to Palestinian control under the Oslo Accords, but this never happened.

Areas A and B are today separated into many small divisions that remain isolated from one another due to Israeli control over Area C. This deliberate ghettoisation creates separate rules, laws and norms in the West Bank that are intended to prevent freedom of movement between the Palestinian zones and inhibit the realisation of a Palestinian state.

Who will govern a future state?

Finally, there are the conditions that Western governments have placed on recognition of a Palestinian state, which rob Palestinians of their agency.

Chief among these is the stipulation that Hamas will not play a role in the governance of a future Palestinian state. This has been backed by the Arab League, which has also called for Hamas to disarm and relinquish power in Gaza.

Fatah and Hamas are currently the only two movements in Palestinian politics capable of forming a government. In a May poll, 32% of respondents in both Gaza and the West Bank said they preferred Hamas, compared with 21% support for Fatah. One-third did not support either or had no opinion.

Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Authority, is deeply unpopular, with 80% of Palestinians wanting him to resign.

A “reformed” Palestinian Authority is the West’s preferred option to govern a future Palestinian state. But if Western powers deny Palestinians the opportunity to elect a government of their choosing by dictating who can participate, the new government would likely be seen as illegitimate.

This risks repeating the mistakes of Western attempts to install governments of their choosing in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also plays into the hands of Hamas hardliners, who mistrust democracy and see it as a tool to impose puppet governments in Palestine, as well as Israel’s narrative that Palestinians are incapable of governing themselves.

Redressing these issues and the myriad others will take time, money and considerable effort. The question is, how much political capital are the leaders of France, the UK, Canada and Australia (and others) willing to expend to ensure their recognition of Palestine results in an actual state?

What if Israel refuses to dismantle its settlements and Separation Wall, and moves ahead with annexing the West Bank? What are these Western leaders willing or able to do? In the past, they have been unwilling to do more than issue strongly worded statements in the face of Israeli refusals to advance the two-state solution.

Given these doubts around the political will and actual power of Western states to compel Israel to agree to the two-state solution, it begs the question: what and who is recognition for?

REACD STORY HERE

Sunday, August 10, 2025

Israel Is Deepening Its War In Gaza - Here Are 5 Big Questions About Netanyahu’s Ill-Advised Next Phase

Protesters in Tel Aviv demanding the end of the war and immediate release of hostages held by Hamas. Mahmoud Illean/AP

BY IAN PARMETER
RESEARCH SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES,
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is moving forward with his plan to take full control of Gaza, expanding his war efforts amid a deepening starvation crisis in the strip and intensifying international condemnation.

In the plan, Netanyahu’s government also announced it would only end the war once five “principles” were met. These included the demilitarisation of the strip, the release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas, and the disarmament of the group.

This new phase of the war follows a familiar pattern of poorly devised strategy-making on Netanyahu’s part, without sufficient reasoning or apparent forward planning. Given his new stated goal of taking full control of Gaza City, an end to the war does not feel likely, or imminent.

Here are five questions about whether the plan makes sense.

1. Is it necessary, or wise, militarily?

Significantly, the chief of staff of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, has opposed the decision to expand operations in Gaza. He has warned that any plan to occupy the Gaza Strip would “drag Israel into a black hole”.

For one, Zamir believes expanding the military campaign is not necessary – he says the IDF has “met and even exceeded the operation’s objectives” in Gaza.

Hamas has been substantially degraded as a military force and its senior leadership has been killed. It is no longer an organised force in Gaza – it is now embracing guerrilla-style tactics.

This makes an expanded campaign in an urban environment such as Gaza City risky. Hamas will be able to use its vast tunnel network to mount surprise attacks on Israeli soldiers and place booby-traps in buildings.

As such, Netanyahu’s plan will inevitably lead to more IDF casualties. Nearly 900 IDF personnel have been killed so far in the war.

Moreover, taking full control of the strip would take months to complete and lead to countless more Palestinian civilian deaths.

Zamir has also warned it could endanger the lives of the remaining living Israeli hostages, which are believed to number around 20.

The freeing of Israeli hostages has only occurred during ceasefires – not as the result of military action. Hamas murdered six hostages in late 2024 when Israeli forces seemed to be getting close. Why wouldn’t it do so again if it was cornered?

2. Does Israel have enough military personnel for such an operation?

Israel has a relatively small army totalling about 169,000. It relies on more than 400,000 reservists, who have completed their military service, to augment the IDF during emergencies.

But taking reservists from their normal jobs for lengthy periods has adverse effects on the economy and harms Israel in the long term.

Netanyahu’s goal of degrading Hamas’ control of Gaza follows a basic strategy of “clear, hold and build”. First, the IDF clears an area of Hamas fighters, then it holds the area with sufficient military personnel to prevent their return, and finally it builds an environment in which Hamas cannot function, for example, by destroying their tunnels and encouraging the return of civilian governance.

Israel does not have sufficient IDF personnel and reservists to deploy this strategy for the entire strip. It also needs soldiers in the West Bank, where clashes between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents have become increasingly violent in recent years.

Netanyahu says he doesn’t want to permanently occupy Gaza, yet the far-right members of his cabinet do. They have made clear they want Israeli settlements re-established in Gaza and also to annex most, if not all, of the West Bank.

The mixed messages out of Netanyahu’s government make it very difficult to know what his actual long-term plan is for Gaza, if he even has one.

3. What kind of ‘Arab force’ would eventually come in?

In an interview this week, Netanyahu said he envisions the future security control of the strip would eventually pass to “Arab forces”. But which Arab states would contribute military personnel to such a force?

Arab states have long held the position that they will not solve Israel’s Palestinian problem for it, nor will they agree to any outcome in Gaza or the West Bank that Palestinians oppose. In short, while they oppose Hamas, they refuse to do Israel’s dirty work on its behalf.

A Hamas official, Osama Hamdan, also warned this week that his group would treat any force formed to govern Gaza as an “occupying” force linked to Israel. Any personnel policing Gaza on Israel’s behalf would have targets on their back.

4. What is the plan for Gaza’s civilian population?

In July, Defence Minister Israel Katz announced a plan to force Gaza’s entire population of two million people into a “humanitarian city” in the southern part of the strip. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert likened it to a “concentration camp”.

Little has been said about the plan in recent weeks, but implementing it would no doubt exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the strip even further and draw even more international condemnation of Israel.

Earlier this year, Israel’s security cabinet also approved a plan to facilitate the “voluntary transfer” of Gazans from the strip to third countries. This plan, too, was decried as an attempt to ethnically cleanse the enclave.

Certainly, no states in the Arab League would have any willingness to receive more than two million Palestinian refugees.

5. Is Netanyahu willing to deepen Israel’s isolation?

In a piece for The Conversation on Friday, Middle East expert Amin Saikal pointed out just how much of a hit Israel’s international credibility has taken since the start of the war – even among Americans.

Israelis are becoming aware that travel outside their country could involve risks. Two Israelis were recently detained and questioned in Belgium after attending a music festival and allegedly waving the flag of their army brigade. A human rights group accused the pair of being complicit in war crimes in Gaza.

In addition, the international community has immediately responded to Netanyahu’s decision to expand the war. Germany, in a major step, announced it would halt all arms exports to Israel. The country is the second-largest supplier of arms to the Jewish state.

Netanyahu has responded to international criticism and moves by Israel’s allies to recognise a Palestinian state by accusing them of stoking antisemitism and rewarding Hamas.

However, the Israeli leader seems to be varying his strategy to deal with developments as they occur. He and others in his government probably feel they can continue weathering the international storm over their actions in Gaza until after the war and then work on rehabilitating relationships.

The final and biggest question, however, is: when will be the war be over?

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Saturday, August 02, 2025

Why UK Recognition Of A Palestinian State Should Not Be Conditional On Israel’s Actions



BY KAREN SCOTT
PROFESSOR IN LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

The announcement this week by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on the recognition of a Palestininian state has been welcomed by many who want to see a ceasefire in Gaza and lasting peace in the region.

In contrast to other recent statements on the status of Palestine, however, the UK has said it will recognise Palestine as a state in September unless the Israeli government takes substantive steps to end the appalling situation in Gaza and commits to a long term sustainable peace, including through allowing the UN to restart without delay the supply of humanitarian support to the people of Gaza to end starvation, agreeing to a ceasefire, and making clear there will be no annexations in the West Bank.

Until this week, the UK’s position had been that recognition would only follow a negotiated two-state solution in Israel-Palestine. Other countries have now begun to shift from that position, too.

The latest UK statement was preceded by announcements from France on July 25 and Canada on July 31 that they too would recognise Palestine as a state in September.

But the UK position is different in one important way: it is conditional on Israel failing to comply with its international humanitarian obligations in Gaza and the West Bank.

In other words, recognition of Palestine as a state by the UK is being used as a stick to persuade Israel to agree to a ceasefire. Should Israel agree to those conditions, the UK will presumably not recognise Palestine as a state in September, but will revert to its original position on a two-state solution.

Conditional recognition subject to action by Israel – a third state – represents an unwelcome and arguably dangerous departure from international practice.

While recognition (or otherwise) of states is inherently political – as demonstrated by the unique status of Taiwan, for example – it is not and should not be made conditional on the action or inaction of third states.

How states are recognised

According to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a state must have a permanent population, territory, an independent government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, as well as self-determination.

Palestine has arguably met all these criteria, with the possible exception of an independent government, given the level of Israeli intervention in the West Bank and the current situation in Gaza.

Although recognition by other states is arguably not a formal criterion of statehood, it is very difficult to function as a state without reasonably widespread recognition by other states.

Some 147 countries – two-thirds of UN members – now recognise the State of Palestine, including Spain, Ireland and Norway, which made announcements in 2024.

Those choosing not to formally recognise a Palestinian state are now in a small minority, including Australia and New Zealand. This is inevitably leading to calls in those countries to change position.

Australia is considering such a shift, subject to conditions similar to those set out by Canada – including the release of Israeli hostages, the demilitarisation of Hamas, and reform of the Palestinian Authority.

New Zealand is currently maintaining its longstanding position of recognising Palestine within the context of a two-state solution. On July 30, Foreign Minister Winston Peters and 13 of his counterparts issued a joint statement – the “New York Call” – demanding an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and reiterating “unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution”.

The statement also asserted that “positive consideration” to recognise the state of Palestine is “an essential step towards the two-state solution”.

Better options are available

The UK’s position, however, introduces another dynamic. By using recognition of Palestine as a tool to punish Israel for its actual and alleged breaches of international law in Gaza, it is implicitly failing to respect Palestine’s right to self-determination.

If Palestine deserves statehood, it is on its own terms, not as a condition of Israel’s policies and actions.

But it is also setting a dangerous precedent. Countries could choose to recognise (or not recognise) states to pressure or punish them (or indeed other states) for breaches of international law. Such breaches may or may not be connected to the state actually seeking recognition.

This is important, because the post-colonial settlement of geographical boundaries remains deeply insecure in many regions. As well, low-lying island nations at risk of losing territory from sea-level rise may also find their status challenged, as territory has traditionally been a requirement of statehood.

The UK’s apparent conditional recognition of Palestine is only likely to increase this international instability around statehood.

While the UK’s announcement may be “clever politics” from a domestic perspective, and avoids outright US opposition internationally, it has conflated two separate issues.

The better option would be for the UK to recognise Palestine as a state, joining a growing number of countries that plan to do so in advance of the UN General Assembly meeting in September. It could make this subject to conditions, including the release of hostages and exclusion of Hamas from Palestinian governance.

And it should continue to press Israel to agree to a ceasefire in addition to the other demands set out in its announcement, and hold Israel accountable for its gross breaches of international law in Gaza. It can back up those demands with appropriate diplomatic and trade sanctions.

New Zealand, too, has a range of options available, and can help increase the pressure on Israel by using them.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Sunday, July 27, 2025

Ceasefire Talks Collapse – What Does That Mean For The Humanitarian Catastrophe In Gaza?

Two year old malnourished boy Yazam Abu Ful in a refugee camp in Gaza City. Jehad Alshrafi/AAP

BY ALI MAMOURI
RESEARCH FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
STUDIES, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

Efforts to end the relentless siege of Gaza have been set back by the abrupt end to peace talks in Qatar.

Both the United States and Israel have withdrawn their negotiating teams, accusing Hamas of a “lack of desire to reach a ceasefire”.

US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff says it would appear Hamas never wanted a deal:

While the mediators have made a great effort, Hamas does not appear to be coordinated or acting in good faith. We will now consider alternative options to bring the hostages home and try to create a more stable environment for the people in Gaza

The disappointing development coincides with mounting fears of a widespread famine in Gaza and a historic decision by France to formally recognise a Palestinian state.

French President Emmanuel Macron says there is no alternative for the sake of security of the Middle East:

True to its historic commitment to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, I have decided that France will recognise the State of Palestine

What will these developments mean for the conflict in Gaza and the broader security of the Middle East?

‘Humanitarian catastrophe’

The failure to reach a truce means there is no end in sight to the Israeli siege of Gaza which has devastated the territory for more than 21 months.

Amid mounting fears of mass starvation, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says Gaza is in the grip of a “humanitarian catastrophe”. He is urging Israel to comply immediately with its obligations under international law:

Israel’s denial of aid and the killing of civilians, including children, seeking access to water and food cannot be defended or ignored.

According to the United Nations Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA, more than 100 people – most of them children – have died of hunger. One in five children in Gaza City is malnourished, with the number of cases rising every day.

Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini says with little food aid entering Gaza, people are neither dead nor alive, they are walking corpses […] most children our teams are seeing are emaciated, weak and at high risk of dying if they don’t get the treatment they urgently need.

The UN and more than 100 aid groups blame Israel’s blockade of almost all aid into the territory for the lack of food.

Lazzarini says UNRWA has 6,000 trucks of emergency supplies waiting in Jordan and Egypt. He is urging Israel – which continues to blame Hamas for cases of malnutrition – to allow the humanitarian assistance into Gaza.

Proposed ceasefire deal

The latest ceasefire proposal was reportedly close to being agreed by both parties.

It included a 60-day truce, during which time Hamas would release ten living Israeli hostages and the remains of 18 others. In exchange, Israel would release a number of Palestinian prisoners, and humanitarian aid to Gaza would be significantly increased.

During the ceasefire, both sides would engage in negotiations toward a lasting truce.

While specific details of the current sticking points remain unclear, previous statements from both parties suggest the disagreement centres on what would follow any temporary ceasefire.

Israel is reportedly seeking to maintain a permanent military presence in Gaza to allow for a rapid resumption of operations if needed. In contrast, Hamas is demanding a pathway toward a complete end to hostilities.

A lack of mutual trust has dramatically clouded the negotiations.

From Israel’s perspective, any ceasefire must not result in Hamas regaining control of Gaza, as this would allow the group to rebuild its power and potentially launch another cross-border attack.

However, Hamas has repeatedly said it is willing to hand over power to any other Palestinian group in pursuit of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. This could include the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which governs the West Bank and has long recognised Israel.

Support for a Palestinian state

Israeli leaders have occasionally paid lip service to a Palestinian state. But they have described such an entity as “less than a state” or a “state-minus” – a formulation that falls short of both Palestinian aspirations and international legal standards.

In response to the worsening humanitarian situation, some Western countries have moved to fully recognise a Palestinian state, viewing it as a step toward a permanent resolution of one of the longest-running conflicts in the Middle East.

Macron’s announcement France will officially recognise a full Palestinian state in September is a major development.

France is now the most prominent Western power to take this position. It follows more than 140 countries – including more than a dozen in Europe – that have already recognised statehood.

While largely symbolic, the move adds diplomatic pressure on Israel amid the ongoing war and aid crisis in Gaza.

However, the announcement was immediately condemned by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who claimed recognition “rewards terror” and risks creating another Iranian proxy, just as Gaza became. A Palestinian state in these conditions would be a launch pad to annihilate Israel – not to live in peace beside it.

Annexing Gaza?

A Palestinian state is unacceptable to Israel.

Further evidence was recently presented in a revealing TV interview by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak who stated Netanyahu had deliberately empowered Hamas in order to block a two-state solution.

Instead there is mounting evidence Israel is seeking to annex the entirety of Palestinian land and relocate Palestinians to neighbouring countries.

Given the current uncertainty, it appears unlikely a new ceasefire will be reached in the near future, especially as it remains unclear whether the US withdrawal from the negotiations was a genuine policy shift or merely a strategic negotiating tactic.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Friday, July 04, 2025

Friday Essay: ‘Whose Agony Is Greater Than Mine?’ Testimonies Of Gaza And October 7 Ask Us To Recognise Shared Humanity

Displaced Palestinians in Gaza (left) and a Jerusalem protest about hostages held by Hamas, 2025. Abed Rahim Khatib, Anadolu, Getty Images/Abir Sultan, Getty Images

BY JULIET ROGERS
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF CRIMINOLOGY,
THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

In 1962, poet and Auschwitz survivor Yehiel Dinur took the stand in Jerusalem in the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. Dinur was a much-anticipated witness, bearing the audience’s hope this man, a poet, would be able to explain – to capture and to transmit – the experience of Auschwitz, and of the Holocaust; that he could speak the unspeakable. Prosecutor Gideon Hausner hoped such a witness might “do justice to the six million personal tragedies”.

Dinur used the name Katzetnik 135633 in his writings, also translated as “Prisoner 135663”. On the stand, he said: “I believe wholeheartedly that I have to continue to bear this name until the world awakens.”

Awakening, understanding, empathy and change are the sentiments many survivors hope for, or ask for, during and after periods of trauma. The 20th century saw many of those pleas. The 21st century has done no better at honouring the promise, captured in the title of the 1984 Argentinian commission report on forced disappearances, Nunca Mas: never again. No matter how many such pleas appear before the courts, before the aggressors, before those in solidarity, the horrors of war, torture, starvation and genocide seem to happen again – and again.

Three recent books from the region where war was been raging since the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 2023, and the ensuing war on Gaza, are part of these pleas.

Eyes on Gaza is an on-the-ground account of the death and destruction of the first 45 days of the war by now 23-year-old Palestinian journalist Plestia Alaqad, who moved to Melbourne with her family in November 2023. Letters from Gaza is a collection of 50 stories, poems and fragments from Palestinian writers enduring the past 20 months. And Gates of Gaza is the story of Israeli journalist Amir Tibon, a resident of Nahal Oz, one of the border kibbutz attacked by Hamas on October 7.

These are all first-person testimonies of experiences of being under attack, though those attacks differ. We might say they fit into the genre adopted in truth commissions, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: a response to the nation’s years of living under the apartheid laws, discarded when Nelson Mandela took power in 1994.

The commission was one effort to heal from this past. But, like the Eichmann trial, it needed stories to explain the histories of violence, and it needed the pain to be voiced to explain its impacts on communities, families and relationships.

The use of people’s narratives to “bear witness” to the complex layers of legally sanctioned and militarily executed pain, loss and the traumas they can produce, is sometimes effective in helping audiences understand them. The Bringing Them Home Report in 1997 used this form to explain the incidence and impacts of the forced removal of Indigenous children by the Australian state. It was effective as one form of creating a shared reality for all in Australia, who then understood the term “stolen generations” and the pain, loss and genocidal intent to which this phrase refers.

More recently, the Yoorrook Justice Commission in Victoria, Australia’s first formal truth-telling inquiry into historic and ongoing systemic injustices perpetrated against First Nations Peoples by colonisation, has also brought histories of loss, dispossession and abuse to light, using stories. Stories can make sense of the impact incurred through the intertwined web of policies, statistics, discrimination and quotidian violence at the hands of the state.

The work of testimony

The narratives in these books written since October 7 2023 are part of this genre of testimony or storytelling. But at least two of these books are not attempting to explain the past. They might be described better as pleas to stop what the International Court of Justice has called “a plausible genocide” happening in the present.

They are, in one reading, wishes for the world to understand the experience of pain, rage, loss, fear, distress and defeat that accompanies destruction and unbearable loss. A wish for the world to hear, or perhaps feel, the words on the page – and make the pain stop.

They wish the world would “awaken” to what is happening right now.

The dynamic of awakening is the stock in trade of truth commissions. One party testifies or speaks to an experience, and the audience wakes up to what has been happening. As a result, they either change or facilitate change. The truth, captured as testimony, is supposed to set people free. Not just the speaker, but the community of speakers weighed down by history – or by the struggles of the past or the present.

In legal forms the reason to speak is clear. The reason to speak in literature, biographies and works of nonfiction is less clear. What does the author want from us, the readers? But perhaps more importantly, what can we offer?

Plestia wants her life back

Plestia Alaqad is very clear about what she wants in her book, The Eyes of Gaza: A Diary Of Resilience.

She wants the genocide to stop. She wants a free Palestine. She wants her home and her life back. The stories in this book show readers outside Gaza some of the life and death of those first six and a half weeks.

Her last entry before she leaves Gaza for Egypt – and then Australia – is dated Day 45. During those 45 days, she puts on a press helmet and jacket, which both give her protection and weigh her down. And then she speaks: to cameras, to followers, to anyone who will listen. Her social media feeds documenting the war gained worldwide attention, her Instagram following rising from around 3,700 to 4.1 million today.

There are too many deaths to be witnessed – by her and the reader. She describes genocide as an understatement for what is occurring in Gaza: “we lose more people than our hearts can handle”. She has seen so much death, heard so many screams. By day 30, all you can hear is a voice crying for help from under the rubble. You turn your back and walk away, because there’s nothing you can do to help.

But Plestia’s project is more than documenting death. She is careful to show many aspects of life in Gaza. She shows how Palestinians retain relationships, family and pets. How a young boy just needs his “pot plant” from his destroyed house, under skies filled with drones and bombs. This is a plea for the genocide to stop, but it is also a celebration of being Palestinian. It is an homage to life in Gaza.

It is also a plea to see Palestinians as more than numbers – and more than how they are depicted by Israel.

“The world,” she says, “sometimes treats us like terrorists, trying to justify its complacency in allowing us to be massacred. And we know the perception, we read the propaganda just like everyone else. But the reality is that we’re the opposite.”

She describes gentle moments of love and care between her fellow journalists and the people they interview. The children they bring sweets for, the “bird lady” who renames her tortoise “Plestia” after her. Both Plestia the tortoise and the “bird lady” are now living in a tent. She speaks of the doctors who work tirelessly.

In the midst of brutal amputations and unimaginable burns, she recounts the care of a doctor giving cream for a skin rash that has tormented her, diagnosed as a product of her anxiety. Anxiety seems a gentle diagnosis for symptoms produced by witnessing and documenting such brutality.

Anxiety over her helplessness, perhaps, over the lack of sleep, of nourishing food: dwindling even in those first 45 days. Anxiety seems like a Western preoccupation, from this writing distance. What Plestia experiences seems more like layers of embodied distress. Her empathy allows her to feel, perhaps too much. Empathy can be an enemy.

Around page 100, she begins to deteriorate. “It’s funny how genocide changes a person,” she writes, describing herself as “Genocide Plestia”. She’s devastated, exhausted. She has lost hope. The journal entries are shorter, more repetitive. They recite her helplessness with what Jacqueline Rose, co-director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, has called the “repetitive thud of referentiality”.

You feel Plestia’s effort to try to speak with some life in the pages, to use writing as a therapeutic tool. You wish it for her, but she has trouble summoning the energy, the life, any hope. As she poignantly quips: “Fake it till you make it doesn’t work during a Genocide”. What is there to say in such relentless days of loss?

You want Plestia to get up, you want a happy ending, for a conclusion to the painful story, but the problem is time. The reader’s time, the reality of time since she wrote her book.

Day 45, her last day in Gaza, is Monday November 20 2023. I read this book in June 2025, 646 days later – and it hasn’t stopped. When Plestia leaves Gaza and finally arrives here in Melbourne, the conditions she describes have been ongoing for more than 20 months. A recently released survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research estimates almost 84,000 people died in Gaza between October 2023 and early January 2025, as a result of the war. And that was six months ago.

50 letters from Gaza

The numbers are a way of reducing the experience of grief, devastation, loss (and the viewer’s guilt) to simple digits. Digits have no face and no sound. This is helpful to viewers, but it does not do justice to the 84,000, as Gideon Hausner knew well. No one awakens by hearing the numbers. But they matter.

In Letters from Gaza, psychologist Ahmed Mortaja fears becoming a news story, “a dull number … I don’t want my name and my family name to be reduced to mere numbers, whether odd or even”.

This book, a fragmented collection of 50 poems, stories and accounts, is devoted to giving life to those numbers. To animating the loss, so readers can apply their own imaginations, so we can understand the incomprehensible. It is a collection of fragments of lives since October 7 2023, squeezed into expressive pages. There is no “letter” more than six pages long. They are backed up against each other, permeating one another.

Each letter tells a different story and the same story. Each finds a detail that has no language: flowers in a girl’s hair, dreams of careers that will perhaps never be, the sounds of explosions. They are stories of the impossible search for bread, the longing for a bed and a pillow. And, as in Plestia’s account, they evoke the relentless buzz of the drones in the sky in Gaza: everywhere, all day, every day since October 7 2023. Like tinnitus, like torture.

The book begins with an effort to give names to numbers. On the first page, in the publisher’s note, we read that two of the authors, Sara al-Assar and Basma al-Hor, cannot be contacted. Because of communication lines and constant displacements, the details “may not reflect their current location or circumstances”. Authors may have died or been further displaced. Communication towers are destroyed. Tents are moved as people are moved on. Tents are destroyed.

In Plestia’s accounts, there are displacements to safe zones that then become unsafe, so they move again and again – until the only choice is tents, often without food or blankets. She describes seeing 33,000 people in a displacement shelter, this number increasing daily. Just as numbers are not people, tents are not homes. In Letters from Gaza, the displaced tents are character, metaphor and reality.

The stories are different, as are the deaths and losses within them, but these painful accounts help explain each other. The personal stories help animate words like displacement, refugee camp, genocide, so they do not fall into the pile of legal terms disconnected from names.

But after the United Nations declarations in the opening pages, we hear no more of law – and little of justice. As Palestinian human rights lawyer and founder of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Raji Sourani said: Gaza is in danger of becoming “the graveyard of international law”. What is left are stories. The short stories, poems and brief accounts are packaged so they do not ask too much of the reader – just enough to provoke tears, and perhaps donations. Many readers will feel some of the helplessness in these pages.

There are stories of hunger; the loss of grandmothers and children. I cried many times reading this book, but the next story would quickly arrive and sometimes bring relief. There is something sad, but ordinary, about details like a cat who finds a tent too hot. Unlike Plestia’s clear analysis and summation of the genocide in Gaza, the politics of this book are comparably quiet. Not absent, but quiet. The word genocide is mentioned four times, “Holocaust” only once. (I counted.)

In Letters from Gaza, no one says Israel, only “the occupiers”. Husam Maarouf writes, “we no longer want anything from you […] Only to die in safety.” His entry is dated March 1 2024; he may well be dead. Batool Abu Akleen makes simple requests of the reader (or perhaps of God): “I want a grave, I don’t want my corpse to rot in the open road.” But the book seems to intentionally not accuse. We are told:

this is not a book about war. It is a book about human souls that strive to avoid being hunted down by war. It is about how innocents are forced to learn how to survive when everything around them is about killing, destruction and death.

But the accusation is there. How could it not be? Against Israel as occupier and aggressor – and the reader as bystander.

Accusation sometimes comes embedded in questions. “Is one person’s pain greater than another’s?” asks Gaza poet and teacher Doha Kahlout. This question resonates with one inscribed on the Holocaust Memorial Tree in Hungary: “Whose agony is greater than mine?”

When comparing agony, only one can live

Jewish author, philosopher and psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, writing on Palestine and Israeli peace struggles, cautions against pitting stories from Israel and Palestine against each other, such that “only one can live”. Only one story, one narrative, one version of pain and loss.

Holding multiple stories of suffering in mind is very difficult: for the survivor, for the listener and even for the psychoanalyst. Many survivors suffer symptoms of trauma that reduce the world to interpretation through their experience of its painful histories.

In Eyes of Gaza, writing from Melbourne, Plestia shows a moment of this:

On the train home, I see a lady with a suitcase, and the first thing that I think of is displacement, imagining how everyone in Gaza carries their whole life in their bag […] Then the announcement: Next Stop […] And I’m snapped back into reality.

In this moment, the suitcase is only read through the lens of the past. It’s what is described colloquially as living in the past – a type of banal flashback, often a symptom of trauma. But when pain colonises bodies and narratives, recognising the pain of others is difficult to see. It may be impossible to see the experiences of the other’s world through any other lens than one’s own pain. Whose agony is greater than mine? is a competitive statement, not a question.

In the war of greater pain, an Israeli child in fear may be read against a Palestinian child enduring the loss of their limbs and their whole family. Only one (story) can live.

To hold two competing stories of pain, loss and agony in mind requires a feat of mental health endurance few are capable of: the Nelson Mandelas of this world. Working in the field of transitional justice, I have met a few.

Most have experienced great loss and know there is no comparison at the level of agony. They resist “the repetitive thud of referentiality” because it drowns out conversation, annihilating curiosity and empathy alike. They know all stories must have their time.

In October 2023, “liberal” London Jewish journalist and filmmaker Michael Segalov, once a “staunch defender of Israel”, tried to hold competing stories. He wrote about seeing Israel–Palestine through the lens of “fear and trauma – of the Shoah, of the Nakba, of generations now born into perpetual fear”.

Early Jewish settlers were not “imperial soldiers”, but “a persecuted population failed by global governments pre and post Holocaust”, he points out. But by 1948, the year after the UN resolution that called for Palestine to be divided into Arab and Jewish states, “more than 750,000 Palestinians were made refugees, 15,000 killed”.

“While these lands might well feel a Jewish ancestral home,” he wrote, “within living memory, it was shared with another people: the majority.” In 1922, in the first census carried out under the British Mandate, the population of Palestine was 763,550: 89% were Arabs and 11% Jewish.

As Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad El Sarraj stressed while talking with Jessica Benjamin during peace negotiations, we must “stand simultaneously for the recognition of all injuries, while at the same time being clear that one side was coming from the position of Occupied and less powerful, the other Occupying and dominating”. Stories matter, politics matters.

And some stories take more time than others – some stories are given more time than others. This is a matter of politics and practicality.

Surviving the October 7 attacks

Israeli journalist Amir Tibon and his family survived the October 7 attack on Kibbutz Nahal Oz, on the Gaza border; they are now internal refugees in northern Israel. He and his partner settled in Nahal Oz and raised a family. On the morning of October 7, they heard the sounds of the attack and raced to their safe room, spending the next five hours in there trying to keep their children – Galia, 3 years old and Carmel, aged 19 months – quiet.

In discussing Tibon’s book, Gates of Gaza: a story of betrayal, survival and hope in Israel’s borderlands, I risk comparison and competition. Sometimes stories speak to each other, even when they speak to the silences. I resisted this one’s proximity to the above stories. But that is also to resist reality. It is to resist the importance of difference. All experience is valuable, but sometimes comparison reveals inequality.

Plestia knows this well. The survivor guilt of which she writes is part of the hierarchy experienced by all survivors of mass violence. That she and her family survived, that she migrated, is to feel guilt for escaping the fate of those who have been starved, tortured, obliterated.

Yehiel Dinur spoke from this position of guilt on the stand in 1962, saying he was speaking for those who died in Auschwitz. In the face of others’ death, all survivors struggle with justification. Competition is one form of this: Whose agony is greater than mine?

Tibon was a resident of Nahal Oz, having moved there with his partner because of its beauty, nine years before October 7. He describes it as having “a strong, left-wing, liberal political leaning”, and says residents of the border areas are “some of the strongest advocates of Israeli–Palestinian peace”. He writes that the kibbutz movement has, “for decades”, been in favour of “a compromise that would allow Jews and Arabs to share this land, with agreed-upon borders – borders that, of course, would have to be protected”.

In the 300-plus pages, Tibon describes the morning of October 7 in detail. The fear of his children and his partner as they stayed quiet in a safe room for some five hours. The sounds of shootings and desperation as he read pleas and accounts from other residents on the community’s WhatsApp group as the attacks unfolded.

The narrative of that morning is interspersed with accounts from people who survived in his community: his parents, some of those who attended the Nova music festival, and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers. The narrative moves between that morning and a history of the kibbutz, framed in a history of Israel’s political lurching between right and left – and back again – over the 87 years since its recognition as a nation state by the UN.

In one reading, this is a history book of 87 years – not just an account of five hours. It is a particular history.

The narrative of those five hours is intense, peppered with stories of his parents racing from Tel Aviv to the kibbutz. Tibon’s father is a crucial figure in this narrative. A retired IDF general with “more than three decades” in the military, including combat experience, he seemingly has the capacity to assess situations and navigate a war zone with skill. It is his father who finally knocks on the “safe room” door in the afternoon (about halfway through the book). Tibon reports hearing “a strong bang and a familiar voice” from inside.

The father, we could say, is the embodiment of Tibon’s feelings for – and belief in – a strong, kind Israel. An army general, protective husband and grandfather (in Hebrew, Saba), he is longed for by Tibon’s young children, who “loved their grandparents”, particularly his father, “who pampered and spoiled them at every opportunity”. This grandfather’s presence at the safe-room door allows the family to re-enter the safety of Israel.

If the father is Israel, the sleeping children are its citizens. Carmel and Galia slept through much of the conflict, barely awakened by gunshots. They were rushed to the safe room the moment the shots were heard.

Once you know the stories from Letters of Gaza, it is hard not to compare this to the waking of Mohammed Al Zaqzooq’s three boys – Baraa, Jawad and Basil – to the sound of “Huge missiles in large numbers making terrifying sounds” and the need to flee. Not least, because Amir’s children were barely awakened by shots outside. Their safe room kept the noise muffled and the danger at bay. This is not to say their fear won’t impact on their actions later. Transgenerational trauma has a way of influencing the future.

Mohammed’s children moved quickly, within half an hour, to a refugee camp. At the time of writing, they remain there. His story is five pages long. Amir’s is 300-plus. Amir, an author and award-winning diplomatic correspondent for Haaretz, Israel’s liberal paper of record, has access to a computer, electricity and the security required to think, research and write.

But why does he write this book? In the acknowledgements, he describes himself as needing to be encouraged, unsure of the worth of telling the story of his five hours in the safe room. But he describes much more than five hours.

His book is a story of Israel – and particularly, of its informal settlements. In the early 1950s, he writes, 20 young soldiers – ten men and ten women – were taken by bus to this site to settle it. Nahal Oz is so close to Gaza, it has “agricultural lands which literally touch the border fence”. The kibbutzim functioned as a kind of human border, with increased populations: the 20 broke into couples, then families. Within a few years, they had a small farming community, with a person devoted to security.

Empty land?

This is not a story of military invasion and colonisation, however. It is a story of settlement on land represented as empty. We know this story well in Australia. In this context, it can be a plea for a recognition of innocence.

As Amir tells it, there were no Palestinians in the place before: no one was removed or relocated. Only in passing does he mention the Bedouin who passed through the area before.

In Australia, Irene Watson and Aileen Moreton-Robinson have, in different ways, explained lands do not need to be sites of permanent agriculture to be crucial to the survival of some groups or nations. Borders and settlements can disturb land, law and life regardless of whether houses are demolished or not.

The beauty of Nahal Oz, Amir writes, was due to its access to water and its site on fertile land, where trees provided shelter and probably food. Its loss was likely no small thing to people who required sustenance and shelter as they moved through. After the settlement, they no longer could.

After Israel set up its border there, only Israelis could pass through without being subject to the checkpoints that are well documented sites of humiliation and arbitrary punishment for Palestinians.

By 1997, the walls went up near Nahal Oz. But the walls to shield Nahal Oz from Gaza – and particularly from its people – were not enough. Amir describes the elaborate and extensive tunnels used by Palestinian soldiers to enter Israel (he calls them “terrorists” and “suicide bombers”).

The tunnels became the problem of Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlers. To deal with this problem, the concrete walls were built, reaching 160 metres underground, preventing any permeation. Then, on October 7, the walls could not provide security. Then, there was only the safe room.

The safe room is an obvious metaphor in this book. It is Israel under attack. One of these rooms has been built into every house in the kibbutz, so families can be safe from the mortar attacks from Gaza – a regular occurrence since the 1987 Intifada.

Plestia tells us that the materials for a safe room are not allowed to be brought into Gaza. There are no safe rooms there. Tibon doesn’t mention this; maybe he doesn’t even know this fact, which is its own symptom of the political and social environment in Israel.

He does describe “the unimaginable destruction that Israel has unleashed on Gaza in the aftermath” of the October 7 attacks. He is critical of this “destruction”, though he does not use the term genocide. (There are those who wait for the International Court of Justice to decide if it was more than “plausible” – and there are those who cannot wait.)

Tibon is critical of Israel’s right wing, which cultivates war. He wants peace. But peace here is its own violence.

Like the rhetoric of reconciliation in South Africa, calls for peace can do violence to historical experiences of injustice. There, reconciliation discourse has been criticised, along with its apolitical leanings. Reconciliation in South Africa has largely meant people subject to historical injustices must reconcile themselves to their losses and their reality.

A story attributed to Father Mxolisi Mapanbani, of Tom and Bernard and the bicycle, has been used many times to critique “reconciliation” rhetoric in South Africa. It is helpful here.

Tom and Bernard are friends and live opposite each other. One day, Tom stole Bernard’s bicycle. Every day, Bernard saw Tom cycling to school on it. After some time, Tom went up to Bernard and said, “Let us reconcile and put the past behind us.” Bernard said, “Okay, let’s reconcile – what about the bicycle?” “Oh no,” said Tom, “I’m not talking about the bicycle, I’m talking about reconciliation.”

In the Australian context, after Kevin Rudd’s apology to the stolen generations in 2008, human rights and social justice campaigner Tom Calma described this form of reconciliation as the “unfinished business of justice”.

The apology might have offered some form of acknowledgement, and gone some way toward creating a shared reality on the injustices of the past, but while justice remains unfinished, many are not at peace.

Amir wants peace. He doesn’t want to live in a safe house – but he wants his house and his family to live securely in Nahal Oz. He wants Palestinians to be at peace with this reality.

The word “peace”, like “reconciliation”, does a lot of work to present Tibon on the side of “the good”. Just like, in Letters From Gaza, the relative lack of the word “genocide” keeps the accusation at bay and politics in the background – and it keeps its calls for recognition of suffering at the fore. In this book about “human souls”, the editors call for a recognition of shared humanity.

Tibon is careful not to group “terrorists” under that name – though he uses a Hebrew word that means exactly that. (Mehablim, he calls the people who attacked Nahal Oz.) Why? Though he writes in English and undoubtably spoke Hebrew throughout the siege, why does he speak of the Palestinian attackers as Mehablim?

The answer might be found in the fact no Palestinian name, beyond former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, appears in these pages. He has interviewed many people, but none of them are Palestinian. Their narrative remains outside his text.

We must find the humanity of the Palestinians in other stories.

If the safe room is a metaphor for Israel, the tent – as described in so many of the stories in Letters from Gaza, and in Plestia’s account of those 45 days – is a metaphor for the lives of Palestinians in Israel, and perhaps the world’s eyes.

A tent is permeable, fragile, disposable. Bodies within it are subject to displacement, starvation, genocide. Every house in Tibon’s kibbutz has a safe room. There have been at least seven bombings of tent camps in Gaza. How can you not do the maths?

Stories, awakening and halting the bombs

Stories demand people are not reduced to mathematics. They place the reader in the scene and plead for identification and understanding. Writing on the Eichmann trial, Holocaust historian and legal scholar Lawrence Douglas describes “the words of the survivors that built a bridge from the accused to the world of ashes”.

Afrikaaner journalist and poet Antje Krog writes, on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, “In all the stories a landscape is created.”

But this landscape, if it is to have any effect, must be mapped across previous perceptions. For that, it must do damage to the secure world – the pre-existing imaginative landscape – of the reader or of the listener.

Moral philosopher Rai Gaita describes remorse as “a dying to the world”: a little death is required of the listener or reader who is implicated as a bystander, encountering the suffering of others. A death of complacency. A small disintegration that may mean our own peaceful worlds are no longer tenable.

This is why stories, particularly, are mobilised in truth commissions. They animate the impossible numbers – the dry policies and repetitive loss – with scenes of humanity. Testimony – personal stories – link the words (genocide, massacre, terror) to an imagination of a scene, a person, a child or a parent. To people we can identify or empathise with.

Like the two worlds connected in Ahmed Mortaja’s poem, Hubb and Harb, In Letters from Gaza:

tonight I will fall asleep telling myself that the noise outside is fireworks, a celebration and nothing more. 
That the frightened screams of children are the gleeful terror of suspense before something long-awaited, like Eid.
Tonight, I will fall asleep scrolling through the photos on my phone, telling myself that my evening with friends wasn’t that great – really, I was bored – so now I’m skimming through memories to pass the time.


If empathy were all it took to halt the counting of the 646 days in Gaza, then Letters from Gaza and Eyes on Gaza would achieve their aim. But empathy rarely produces political change.

Stories – the 50 voices in Letters from Gaza, accounts like Plestia’s – make us cry, perhaps make us donate, but they do not halt the bombs. This, and more, might be what Yehiel Dinur meant when he asked for the world to “awaken”, that it change, that it stop what Tibon calls “the unimaginable destruction”.

Until then, Dinur pledged to remain Katzetnik 135633. Until then, we will likely only know “Genocide Plestia”: “it’s funny how genocide changes a person”.

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