The ‘Sacred’ Pledge That Will Power The Relaunch Of Far-Right Militia Oath Keepers

Enrique Tarrio, left, former leader of the far-right group the Proud Boys, shakes hands with Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes in Washington on Feb. 21, 2025. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

BY ALEXANDER LOWIE

Stewart Rhodes, the founder of the Oath Keepers, a far-right militia, announced in November 2025 that he will relaunch the group after it disbanded following his prison sentence in 2023.

Rhodes was sentenced to 18 years in prison for seditious conspiracy and other crimes committed during the U.S. Capitol riot on Jan. 6, 2021.

In January 2025, President Donald Trump granted clemency to the over 1,500 defendants convicted of crimes connected to the storming of the Capitol.

Trump did not pardon Rhodes – or some others found guilty of the most serious crimes on Jan. 6. He instead commuted Rhodes’ sentence to time served. Commutation only reduces the punishment for a crime, whereas a full pardon erases a conviction.

As a political anthropologist I study the Patriot movement, a collection of anti-government right-wing groups that include the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers and Moms for Liberty. I specialize in alt-right beliefs, and I have interviewed people active in groups that participated in the Capitol riot.

Rhodes’ plans to relaunch the Oath Keepers, largely composed of current and former military veterans and law enforcement officers, is important because it will serve as an outlet for those who have felt lost since his imprisonment. The group claimed it had over 40,000 dues-paying members at the height of its membership during Barack Obama’s presidency. I believe that many of these people will return to the group, empowered by the lack of any substantial punishment resulting from the pardons for crimes committed on Jan. 6.

In my interviews, I’ve found that military veterans are treated as privileged members of the Patriot movement. They are honored for their service and military training. And that’s why I believe many former Oath Keepers will rejoin the group – they are considered integral members.

Their oaths to serving the Constitution and the people of the United States are treated as sacred, binding members to an ideology that leads to action. This action includes supporting people in conflicts against federal agencies, organizing citizen-led disaster relief efforts, and protesting election results like on Jan. 6. The members’ strength results from their shared oath and the reverence they feel toward keeping it.

Who are the Oath Keepers?

Rhodes joined the Army after high school and served for three years before being honorably discharged after a parachuting accident in 1986. He then attended the University of Nevada and later graduated from Yale Law School in 2004. He founded the Oath Keepers in 2009.

Oath Keepers takes its name from the U.S military Oath of Enlistment, which states:

“I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States …”

Informed by his law background, Rhodes places a particular emphasis on the part of the oath that states they will defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

He developed a legal theory that justifies ignoring what he refers to as “unlawful orders” after witnessing the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Following the natural disaster, local law enforcement was assigned the task of confiscating guns, many of which officers say were stolen or found in abandoned homes.

Rhodes was alarmed, believing that the Second Amendment rights of citizens were being violated. Because of this, he argued that people who had military or law enforcement backgrounds had a legal duty to refuse what the group considers unlawful orders, including any that violated constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to bear arms.

In the Oath Keepers’ philosophy, anyone who violates these rights are domestic enemies to the Constitution. And if you follow the orders, you’ve violated your oath.

Explaining the origin of the group on the right-wing website “The Gateway Pundit” in November 2025, Rhodes said: “… we were attacked out of the gate, labeled anti-government, which is absurd because we’re defending the Constitution that established the federal government. We were labeled anti-government extremists, all kinds of nonsense because the elites want blind obedience in the police and military.”

Rebuilding and restructuring

In 2022, the nonprofit whistleblower site Distributed Denial of Secrets leaked more than 38,000 names on the Oath Keepers’ membership list.

The Anti-Defamation League estimated that nearly 400 of the names were active law enforcement officers, and that over 100 were serving in the military. Some of these members were investigated by their workplaces but never disciplined for their involvement with the group.

Some members who were not military or law enforcement did lose their jobs over their affiliation. But they held government-related positions, such as a Wisconsin alderman who resigned after he was identified as a member.

This breach of privacy, paired with the dissolution of the organization after Rhodes’ sentencing, will help shape the group going forward.

In his interview with “The Gateway Pundit,” where he announced the group’s relaunch, Rhodes said: “I want to make it clear, like I said, my goal would be to make it more cancel-proof than before. We’ll have resilient, redundant IT that makes it really difficult to take down. … And I want to make sure I get – put people in charge and leadership everywhere in the country so that, you know, down the road, if I’m taken out again, that it can still live on under good leadership without me being there.”

There was a similar shift in organizational structure with the Proud Boys in 2018. That’s when their founder, Gavin McInnes, stepped away from the organization. His departure came after a group of Proud Boys members were involved in a fight with anti-fascists in New York.

Prosecutors wanted to try the group as a gang. McInnes, therefore, distanced himself to support their defense that they weren’t in a gang or criminal organization. Ultimately, two of the members were sentenced to four years in prison for attempted gang assault charges.

Some Proud Boys members have told me they have since focused on creating local chapters, with in-person recruitment, that communicate on private messaging apps. They aim to protect themselves from legal classification as a gang. It also makes it harder for investigators or activist journalists to monitor them.

This is referred to as a cell style of organization, which is popular with insurgency groups. These groups are organized to rebel against authority and overthrow government structures. The cell organizational style does not have a robust hierarchy but instead produces smaller groups. They all adhere to the same ideology but may not be directly associated.

They may have a leader, but it’s often acknowledged that they are merely a figurehead, not someone giving direct orders. For the Proud Boys, this would be former leader Enrique Tarrio. Proud Boys members I’ve spoken to have referred to him as a “mascot” and not their leader.

Looking ahead

So what does the Rhodes interview indicate about the future of Oath Keepers?

Members will continue supporting Trump while also recruiting more retired military and law enforcement officers. They will create an organizational structure designed to outlive Rhodes. And based on my interactions with the far-right, I believe it’s likely they will create an organizational structure similar to that of the cell style for organizing.

Beyond that, they are going to try to own their IT, which includes hosting their websites and also using trusted online revenue generators.

This will likely provide added security, protecting their membership rolls while making it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to investigate them in the future.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

US Strikes On IS Targets In Nigeria May Only Fan The Flames Of Insurgent Violence

BY ONYEDIKACHI MADUEKE,

THE GUARDIAN

The response of Nigerians to the airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Sokoto state, north-western Nigeria are complicated. The rationale behind them has been widely opposed, but the strikes themselves have been welcomed.

The airstrikes were framed as a response to what have been described as genocidal attacks on Christians in the country. But the Nigerian authorities have consistently rejected this narrative, arguing that armed groups in the country do not discriminate based on religion, and that Christians and Muslims largely coexist peacefully. Ironically, it was Trump’s redesignation of Nigeria as a “country of particular concern” in November that deepened Muslim-Christian tensions. Many northerners, who are predominantly Muslim, blamed southern Nigerians for championing a narrative that ultimately resulted in US sanctions and international stigma.

The geographic and operational focus of the strikes has complicated the “Christian genocide” framing. Sokoto is the spiritual heartland of Islam in Nigeria, but armed violence in the area disproportionately affects Muslim communities. By contrast, attacks against Christian farmers are most prevalent in north-central states such as Benue and Plateau, where violence is often linked to armed Fulani herders rather than explicitly jihadist groups. The strikes targeted IS elements, not herder militias. While some reports suggest tactical collaboration between jihadist groups in the north-west and armed herders, the mismatch between the stated justification and the operational target raises questions about whether Washington fully understands the local drivers of violence it has labelled genocidal.

Despite there being opposition to – and confusion over – the rationale behind the strikes, they have been broadly welcomed, cutting across religious, ethnic and social divides. Earlier fears were shaped by the spectre of the prolonged US occupations in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, cases frequently cited in Nigerian media. By contrast, the Sokoto operation was a limited, targeted precision strike. Moreover, there have so far been no credible reports of civilian casualties, alleviating a major concern in a country where Nigerian air force operations have, on several occasions, accidentally killed hundreds of civilians.

The strikes against IS came at a time of public fatigue with insecurity caused by insurgency, terrorism, banditry and communal violence. Nigerians were ready to accept almost any intervention that promised relief. As terrorist networks become increasingly interconnected across the Sahel and West Africa, Nigerian security forces have become overstretched. Persistent corruption, inadequate training and equipment shortages continue to undermine counterinsurgency efforts. In some theatres, groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter factions now wield more sophisticated weaponry than state forces.

The Nigerian authorities have confirmed that they endorsed the operation. The minister of foreign affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, acknowledged that Abuja provided intelligence that enabled the strikes and Nigerian officials remained in communication with US forces until minutes before execution. This joint counter-terrorism action, rather than a unilateral violation of Nigerian sovereignty, eased concerns about territorial integrity and external military overreach.

Despite the support, Nigeria’s insecurity will not be resolved through airpower alone. Airstrikes may yield short-term tactical gains, but they risk generating longer-term strategic setbacks. Framing the intervention as the defence of persecuted Christians may strengthen extremist narratives of foreign “crusader” aggression, potentially attracting more external funding and support for jihadist groups. Organisations such as Isis-Sahel and emerging groups such as Lakurawa thrive on such symbolism.

The durable solution lies in starving violence of its fuel by addressing its structural drivers: deep socioeconomic inequality (Sokoto has one of the highest numbers of out-of-schoolchildren in Nigeria), desertification and climate stress, weak state presence in rural areas, porous borders and fragile security institutions. Strengthening state capacity to manage grievances, regulate competition over land and resources, and counter extremism remains the only sustainable path to peace.

Abu Mohammed Al-Golani May Become The Face Of Post-Assad Syria – But Who Is He And Why Does He Have $10M US Bounty On His Head?

Abu Mohammad al-Golani

BY SARA HARMOUCH

PH.D CANDIDATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now?

One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad.

But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers.

What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad.

The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world.

In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.”

This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid.

Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria.

Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success?

Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria.

The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war.

It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold.

This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics.

Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally.

How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria?

To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations.

Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement.

This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services.

Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups.

Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses.

In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government.

This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups.

In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs.

Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests.

Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off.

What does the US think of the group and al-Golani?

The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions.

Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani.

However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list.

What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader?

First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad.

But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies.

First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large.

This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws.

Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups.

Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity.

Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country.

However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Rethinking Responses To Coups In West Africa

BY AISSATOU KANTE

ECOWAS should use its special summit on regional integration in 2025 to reconsider its approach to managing coups.

Recurrent coups since 2020 and the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reveal the region’s deep governance and democracy challenges.

ECOWAS’ struggle to address these crises, along with perceptions of double standards in its handling of military coups vs. ‘constitutional’ coups perpetrated by elected governments, has damaged the organisation’s image in West Africa.

The decision by ECOWAS heads of state to hold a Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa in 2025 presents an opportunity to resolve these issues. The summit will be inclusive and consultative and aims to strengthen ECOWAS, making it more efficient and reactive. West African leaders also called for a strategic review, including of ‘the relationships between electoral processes, democracy and development.’

The summit should, however, specifically reflect on how to better respond to coups, manage military transitions, and strengthen democratic governance. This includes the recurrence of coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger and the prolonged nature of their transitions back to civilian rule. The ability of military leaders to resist pressure from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), United Nations and bilateral actors should also be on the agenda.

Africa is currently facing a broad crisis of multilateralism. In this context, ECOWAS’ strategic review should first consider the regional features that led to the recent coups and challenged its ability to effectively respond and support transitions. Three features in West Africa stand out.

The first is that the popular support initially shown to the putschists was less about giving them carte blanche than an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the overthrown regimes.

The second is the lack of effective responses from ECOWAS and the AU to terrorism since 2012, particularly in the Sahel, and to governance crises stemming from constitutional amendments and controversial third terms. This situation limits both organisations’ ability to play a decisive role in current and future crises.

The third is Western partners’ diminishing influence amid heightened geopolitical competition with Russia. Combined with the sovereigntist stance of military regimes, external actors have little room for manoeuvre in the region. Paradoxically, this has caused the fragmentation of political and security cooperation in West Africa at a time when violent extremism is rising in the Sahel and spreading to Gulf of Guinea countries.

New Institute for Security Studies research shows that given the consolidation of current military regimes and the failure of regional and continental coup management approaches, pragmatism is needed to stabilise affected countries. This includes improving specific ECOWAS regulations and institutional practices.

ECOWAS will need to refine its tools and procedures when dealing with coups based on its experiences in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Following the Niger overthrow in July 2023 in particular, the regional body applied an unprecedented array of political, economic and financial sanctions and threatened to intervene militarily.

None of these measures worked – instead, they consolidated popular support for the military. The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States and the announcement of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s withdrawal has fragmented ECOWAS and severely limited its deterrent capability.

To build support, it is crucial for ECOWAS to make its Supplementary Act on sanctions clearer and more predictable. Well-defined procedures on the use of force are also needed, along with strategies for carrying out military action while maintaining its strategic and financial autonomy.

More broadly, ECOWAS heads of state should restart efforts to revise the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These were initiated in 2015 after the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré and again in 2021 after the succession of recent coups began. Member states proposed ways to strengthen democracy and governance, including giving ECOWAS additional means to act against the manipulation of constitutions, and establishing a standard on term limits for presidents.

The timing of the proposals indicates ECOWAS’ tendency to react rather than prevent crises. The lack of progress suggests that heads of state are more concerned with protecting their power than meeting popular demands for better governance oversight. This largely explains West Africans’ disillusionment with ECOWAS, which is widely perceived as a ‘union of heads of state’ more concerned with the interests of leaders than the region’s people.

The political stakes of ECOWAS reform are high. The commitment of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to the goal of promoting and protecting democratic governance is crucial. But these are the very states whose positions have undermined ECOWAS.

Ahead of its 50th anniversary in 2025, ECOWAS remains a key player in regional integration and security cooperation. Becoming more efficient and reforming its ability to manage coups will improve the organisation’s image in the eyes of West African citizens. Above all, it will help to stabilise a region facing major political and security problems.

Written by Aïssatou Kanté, Researcher, Littoral West African States, ISS Regional office for West Africa and the Sahel.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

In Africa, The Need To Engage With Democracies And Coup Regimes

BY JOSEPH SANY, PH.D

Three West African coup leaders — a general, a colonel and a captain — gathered last weekend to formally ally their regimes in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Their meeting dramatized two realities for Americans and allies who hope to see our children live in a world governed by laws rather than brute force. First, any strategy toward that less violent world must elevate Africa to the status of a front-line priority, not unlike Europe. Second, we must calibrate our support realistically, based on the conditions in each country. That realism means avoiding automatic, unilateral disengagements when democracy efforts are set back, as by an armed coup.

How Africa Will Shape Our Children’s World

American policy debates seldom include Africa alongside top-priority issues such as Russia’s brutalization of Ukraine, US tensions with China or Middle East wars. Yet more than any other continent, Africa — with its enormous crises, resources and opportunities — will shape the world our children will inherit. Africa’s population is the world’s fastest-growing and will form a quarter of all humanity within 25 short years. Its globally critical supply of strategic minerals offers opportunities for international partnerships to accelerate economic and human development in Africa and a more sustainable global economy. Its unfarmed arable lands form a huge portion of our planet’s total — 60% by some estimates. Yet unless its farmers can adapt to (and help reduce) climate change, Africa is likely to suffer productivity losses in this century that could increase malnutrition, the UN. agricultural agency has reported.

In short, the continent’s massive scale of simultaneous possibility and risk means that international investment in Africa’s strivings for effective democracy and rule of law can help make it a 21st-century engine of stability and prosperity, at home and beyond. By contrast, an Africa that is ignored and allowed to slide into chaos will multiply global catastrophes of recent years: wars, unprecedented human displacement and migrations, unaddressed climate disasters and risks of epidemic disease.

These global stakes make Africa a front line in efforts to save the 80-year-old experiment, led by America after World War II, of international institutions and a “rules-based order” to reduce global violence. The United States and other rule-of-law advocates must urgently help reform and revitalize that multinational system by making it fairer to a “global south” excluded from its formation and, still, from its power centers. The alternative is to risk seeing authoritarians — from Russia, China or elsewhere — force the system’s collapse in part by recruiting help from African and other governments that find too little hope in it.

As 30 years ago, following the Cold War, a “global struggle to define the future of the international system is driving disorder in Africa,” notes the National Security Council’s recent Africa director, Judd Devermont, in a recent Foreign Affairs essay. Yet “with Western powers focused on addressing the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, they are not directing enough attention and resources to meet the current challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa.”

West Africa: Democracies and Coups

No region dramatizes Africa’s contrast of opportunity and risk more than the continent’s west. Last week’s meeting of three defiant military rulers reflects a commonly seen image of West Africa. Their countries are part of the world’s largest contiguous region of direct military rule: six Sahel countries governing 150 million people from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Russian forces of the former Wagner Group support at least four of those coup-installed regimes in their militarily unwinnable fights against decade-old jihadist insurgencies. This gives Russia an open-ended opportunity to manipulate these conflicts for lucrative mining concessions, political influence, UN. General Assembly votes, or disinformation warfare. Russia’s roles in the Sahel firmly disprove, if it were necessary, any illusion that the 21st-century world permits such a thing as an isolated conflict.

But West Africa’s often-overlooked good news is that a vibrant arc of evolving yet resilient democracies — from Senegal to Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria — weighs against authoritarianism. West Africans are already doing the heavy lifting of building democracy. International support, within and beyond the region, has helped win progress.

Liberia this year accomplished its second consecutive peaceful transfer of presidential power, this after an excruciatingly close vote tally. Liberian civic groups, with US diplomatic support, allied with West Africa’s 15-nation bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to press Liberia’s political parties to sign and respect the Farmington River Declaration, committing them to avoiding inflammatory rhetoric and ensuring peaceful elections.

Weeks later, ECOWAS and other international partners backed Senegalese citizens in nonviolently defeating an attempt by President Macky Sall to unconstitutionally extend his rule. Peaceful street protests and a campaign by civic groups helped steel a constitutional court into overruling Sall’s attempt, leading him to accept a peaceful election and transfer power to his opponent, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye.

Sahel Coup Regimes Dig In

Amid current global crises, the July 6 meeting of coup leaders from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso stirred only modest headlines. The men proclaimed that they had formed a “confederation,” the Alliance of Sahel States, in defiance of ECOWAS, which adamantly opposes military coups and from which they are withdrawing. ECOWAS vowed to intensify its efforts at dialogues to achieve transitions to civilian rule.

The three officers seized power between 2020 and 2023; they accuse their elected civilian predecessors of surrendering their countries’ interests to their former colonial ruler, France, and to ECOWAS, notably its heavyweight member, Nigeria. The three army regimes now rule in defense of “national sovereignty,” declared Niger’s ruler, General Abdourahmane Tiani, and with support “from sincere partners such as Russia, China and Turkey,” according to Mali’s coup leader, Colonel Assimi Goita.

The Sahel militaries’ new alliance reflects their entrenchment in power. In Mali, Goita’s army regime promised in 2020 to hold elections for a civilian government within 18 months, but has twice extended its rule, most recently in May, and now says it can rule until 2027. Days later, Burkina Faso’s army regime extended its originally promised 21-month transition period to five years.

Sustained, Calibrated Engagement

To support African democracy, prosperity, and security, the US government should tailor engagements in each country to fit the local conditions, which vary widely. This means assessing the state of democratic governance — accountability, rule of law, citizen participation, human rights and public services, including citizen security — and the efforts that a government is making or permitting for improvements. Wherever US engagement can use (or open) space for those improvements, even under armed rule, the United States should stay in the game.

While US law rightly halts aid such as “train and equip” missions to any military that commits a coup, democratic partners should intensify other engagements to build incentives and relationships that can advance transitions to more inclusive and effective democratic governance.

These engagements should use the classic US “three D’s” of foreign policy — diplomatic, defense and development efforts to build capacities of government and civil society that will be important to a transition. This could include elections personnel; human rights and anti-corruption activists; peacebuilders; representatives of politically marginalized groups; police; journalists and news organizations; legislators and judicial personnel. Even soldiers could be invited for training that builds relationships and understanding that military rule is a dead end.

People-to-people engagement — through programs such as the Peace Corps, the Young African Leaders Initiative, fellowships and visitors programs — strengthen relationships and underscore the shared values of Americans and Africans. Such programs should be elevated and can be part of a broader narrative to counter disinformation campaigns, which the Africa Center for Strategic Studies finds have quadrupled over just two years ago, exacerbating anti-Western ideas and poisoning political atmospheres continent-wide.

America’s toolbox should include a “fourth D.” Diaspora communities nationwide offer a powerful advantage over America’s authoritarian competitors for influence. We should find creative ways worldwide to engage these resources, which on Africa are deeply under-recognized and unused. A first step, with many more needed, is that a White House advisory council on African diaspora engagement, named last year, convened in March and discussed with business and other representatives ways to bolster investment in Africa from within America’s Black business communities.

US and allied engagement with African democracies should add the “heavy pro-democracy tool” of focused investment. Promoting investment “flips the script” of traditional development programming, responding to Africans’ own priorities — and it can be designed to bolster their local efforts to consolidate the rule of law and transparent governance. African democracies also should be invited as close partners — in high-level meetings such as the state visit to Washington in May of Kenya’s president, and in Kenya’s designation as a US “major non-NATO ally.” It is these democracies — South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria are other examples — whom we should make our closest partners in the reforms of international institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank and Group of Twenty nations.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

In Nigeria’s Hard-Hit North, Families Seek Justice As Armed Groups Seek Control

Joshua Danjuma, 36, poses with a handcrafted riffle in Kunji Village, Southern Kaduna Nigeria, Thursday , April 27, 2023. Danjuma, a hunter who lost two of his five children in a late night March 2023 gunmen attack that left 33 people dead, has joined others in protecting their homes. (AP Photo/Chinedu Asadu)

BY CHINEDU ASADU

NIGERIA (ASSOCIATED PRESS) — Christian Jonathan’s mother was holding the 9-month-old boy in her arms when she was shot dead during an attack on their village in northwestern Nigeria. The assailants cut off one of Christian’s fingers and abandoned him by the side of the road with a bullet wound in his tiny leg.

“They left him on the ground beside his mother’s body,” said Joshua Jonathan, Christian’s father. “They thought the boy was dead.”

The late-night attack in April in Runji in Kaduna State left 33 people dead, most of them burned alive or shot dead. Many more have been killed since in the continuing clashes between nomadic cattle herders and farming communities in northwest and central regions of the West African nation, including more than 100 this month in Plateau state.

The decadeslong violence is becoming more deadly, killing at least 2,600 people in 2021, according to the most recent data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. Once armed with sticks, the groups now fight with guns that have been smuggled into the country.

Both sides accuse the government of injustice and marginalization, but the clashes have also taken on a religious dimension, giving rise to militias that side with the herders, who are primarily Muslim, or the farmers from Christian communities.

The growing security crisis presents a huge challenge for Nigeria’s incoming president, Bola Tinubu, who rose to power in Nigeria — Africa’s largest economy and among its top oil producers — promising to improve the lives of affected communities and address the root causes of the crisis by providing jobs and ensuring justice. Tinubu’s inauguration is scheduled for Monday.

If the violence isn’t reined in, analysts say, it could further destabilize the country and drive more of its 216 million people into poverty. U.N. agencies say the violence affects mostly children, who are already threatened by malnutrition, and women, who are often abducted and forced into marriage.

The response of security forces can be slow and arrests are rare, prompting a growing number of communities to defend themselves when they come under siege.

“There is a substantial loss of confidence in the government as a protector of citizens,” said Nnamdi Obasi, the senior adviser for Nigeria at the International Crisis Group. Obasi warned that the failure of the incoming administration to speedily resolve the conflict would lead to “more people seeking their own self-defense, more proliferation of weapons, more criminal groups and a rise in organized armed groups.”

In Runji, an agrarian village, The Associated Press spoke to some survivors in hospital beds and others touring a mass grave and their razed houses. They said they were under attack for hours and that the gunmen fled long before security forces arrived.

Every household bears a scar.

Christopher Dauda’s family was trying to escape when the gunmen caught up with his wife and four children, killing all five. Danjuma Joshua’s two daughters were shot in the back while they tried to flee. In the home of Asabe Philip, who survived but has burns all over her body, the assailants burned five children alive as they cowered in one room.

Christian’s aunt has tried to fill the void left by the killing of his mother. His father said Christian cries a lot and barely sleeps, although his physical wounds are gradually healing.

“We try to manage with what we have left,” Joshua Jonathan said.

On the other side of the conflict, the herders say they are also under attack. They complain of cattle rustling and extrajudicial killings by local security groups working as community vigilantes.

Abdullahi Bello Bodejo, the president of the national herders’ association, denied that anyone in the group was responsible for the violence. Most of the herders belong to the Fulanis, an ethnic group.

“Fulanis are not the killers. Any person carrying out killings is not our member. Sometimes, when communities accuse us of killings, 75% is not true; they have their own crisis but always blame Fulanis,” said Bodejo.

Nigerian security forces say they have arrested dozens of gunmen and recovered their weapons. But the assailants are estimated to number in the thousands and can easily recruit new members, according to Abdulaziz Abdulaziz, a conflict researcher.

“There is a limit to the kinetic (military) operations, as it doesn’t address the socioeconomic issue that gave rise to banditry in the region in the first place,” said Oluwole Ojewale of the Africa-focused Institute of Security Studies. He said the incoming Tinubu administration must work with state governments to address unemployment, poverty and social injustice.

The recent violence has led to the formation of community, state and regional security outfits that experts say could create bigger problems for Nigeria’s security architecture if not properly monitored.

And their recruits are young.

Felix Sunday, a college student in Kaduna, said that he was 16 when he joined a local vigilante group in 2021, and that he struggles to combine the night watch with his studies.

Across much of West and Central Africa, porous national borders facilitate the smuggling of weapons. A survey-based report published in 2021 by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey in collaboration with the Nigerian government found that at least 6 million firearms may have been in the hands of civilians in the country at the time.

The military and police have recovered hundreds of firearms in Nigeria in the last year, but weapons dealers elsewhere are exacerbating the problem.

“Things have gotten considerably worse. Some are large military weapons imported from other countries,” said Confidence MacHarry with the Lagos-based SBM Intelligence security firm.

With sophisticated weapons, the gunmen have launched daring attacks in areas with a heavy security presence, including a military base and an airport in Kaduna, indicating that the problem may be the motivation of the security forces themselves.

Survivors of the attack in Plateau told the AP that the police didn’t arrive until the next day, echoing comments from people living in Runji, which has a security checkpoint nearby.

“When we call the soldiers, it is after the attackers have left that the soldiers come. Even if we hear they (the attackers) are coming and we report to the government, they don’t take proactive action,” said Simon Njam, a vigilante leader near Runji who uses bows, arrows and locally-made guns to secure the area.

Part of the problem is that the security forces are disorganized and unprepared to respond to the attacks, according to Kabir Adamu, the founder of Beacon Consulting, a security firm based in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja.

“We don’t have a coordinated security sector that identifies and counters threats,” he said. “They need to work together to protect lives and currently, we are not seeing enough of that.”

The Nigerian military and police didn’t respond to written and phone inquiries seeking a response to the claims.

As more families mourn the loss of their loved ones, forced to replace farmland with graveyards, their priority is demanding justice.

“How can people just come and kill and nothing will happen?” asked Dauda in Runji, remembering his life with his wife and four children. “They cannot bring back my lost family, but the government can at least rebuild my home and ensure justice.”

IRS granted tax-exempt status to extremists, including an Oath Keepers foundation – here’s why that’s not as surprising as it sounds

BY ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, UMASS, AMHERST

When someone mentions nonprofits, chances are you picture homeless shelters, free medical clinics, museums and other groups that you believe are doing good one way or another.

Most of these organizations are legitimate. But not all nonprofits are principled or embrace missions everyone considers worthy of the tax-exempt status that the government grants some 2 million organizations.

You might presume that the government would automatically refuse to grant tax-exempt status to white nationalist and anti-government groups. Yet as a scholar who has researched nonprofit accountability, I’ve seen the authorities struggle to draw the line between which organizations deserve to operate as nonprofits and those that don’t.
8 purposes allowed

The wide array of U.S. nonprofits includes many media outlets, chambers of commerce and political parties. But the term usually refers to the organizations that meet the requirements of Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. Officially designated as charities, these groups don’t pay income taxes and can accept tax-deductible donations.

All 501(c)(3)s must apply to the Internal Revenue Service for tax exemption unless their revenues are less than US$5,000 or they are a church, synagogue, mosque or other house of worship.

The IRS usually grants this status to any applicant with at least one of eight purposes, including being charitable or educational.

Figuring out if food banks deserve exemption is generally straightforward, as they engage in an obviously charitable activity.

Determining whether organizations are truly religious or educational is harder.
Oath Keepers Educational Foundation

Some groups with ties to the Oath Keepers – an extremist group with leaders who were found guilty of seditious conspiracy connected to the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol – were granted this status.

Until recently, the Oath Keepers had chapters scattered across the country, and the main group never became a 501(c)(3) organization. But the Oath Keepers Educational Foundation and several smaller affiliated groups did obtain that status.

The foundation told the IRS when it sought charitable status that its primary purpose was “to give veterans an opportunity for continued involvement in community service.”

The Oath Keepers network has largely collapsed amid the prosecution of its members who engaged in the Jan. 6 attack. Most notably, founder Stewart Rhodes was found guilty in 2022 of seditious conspiracy for helping plot the insurrection. He is expected to be sentenced around May 25, 2023, and could spend more than two decades in prison. Rhodes was also listed as the foundation’s president when it was established.

When the Oath Keepers’ former spokesman Jason Van Tatenhove testified before Congress in 2022, he revealed that the group was radicalizing its followers and spreading violent messaging.

The Three Percenters, another extremist group with ties to people who were convicted for their role in the Jan. 6 attacks, was a charity at that time. Its leadership subsequently dissolved the organization.
Unite the Right ties

Other white nationalist groups, such as Identity Evropa and the National Policy Institute, have received 501(c)(3) status over the years.

Both of those groups were among the organizers of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017, where participants attacked progressive counterprotesters, killing one of them and injuring many others.
Policing tax exemption

Although it’s a crime to lie on the application, some groups seeking to become charities do. The IRS doesn’t verify those statements, however, presumably because the threat of prosecution generally prevents misrepresentations, and the cost of verifying what every group says is very high.

Small groups can use a simplified version of the required form, but it is so poorly designed that the IRS has granted exemption to many ineligible organizations. In one extreme case, a scam artist set up 76 fake charities using this form, as The New York Times discovered in 2022.

Another obstacle is that applicants are usually forming new organizations, so the IRS examines their intentions rather than their actions.
Respecting free speech

Because Americans prize the right to free speech, the IRS treads carefully when determining which nonprofits don’t deserve tax-exempt status.

Big Mama Rag, a radical feminist nonprofit magazine, lost its tax exemption in the late 1970s. The IRS revoked its charitable status upon seeing that the magazine refused to publish views contrary to its own. When the magazine fought back, an appeals court determined that the criteria the IRS and a district court had used to deny exemption were unconstitutional because they were based on the organization’s constitutionally protected views.

This case set an important precedent: The government considers charities advancing unpopular views to be educational enough to keep their tax-exempt status.

The IRS now evaluates educational methods, not content. Educational charities must support their assertions with facts and without inflammatory language.

The only reported court case of a group failing this test was a blatantly racist organization, the Nationalist Movement.

That organization sought to “favor Caucasian, Christian, and English-speaking Americans of Northern European descent.” The IRS revoked its 501(c)(3) status in 1994 after determining that the Nationalist Movement was a propaganda organ.
Revoking charitable status is complicated

And it is not always easy to revoke tax exemption, either.

The IRS has historically been underfunded. In 2013, when the Republican-led Congress decided that the IRS was biased against conservative nonprofits, lawmakers penalized the agency by cutting its budget and explicitly forbidding it from creating rules that would draw sharper lines between political and charitable purposes.

It turned out that the IRS was also subjecting progressive groups to an extra layer of scrutiny – and official government reports found inappropriate criteria but no anti-conservative bias. In any case, because it hampered IRS enforcement, this dust-up made it harder for the IRS to root out charities that didn’t deserve the designation.

Unfortunately, the $80 billion added to the IRS budget from 2022 to 2031 is unlikely to increase the scrutiny of charities, because there are too many other priorities, like updating software and making tax scofflaws pay up.
Maintaining diversity

The Oath Keepers Educational Foundation appears to have lost its 501(c)(3) status. The government, which makes it hard to tell why a former charity has lost its tax-exempt status, has not clearly indicated whether this was a voluntary decision on its part or the result of a negotiated settlement with the IRS.

It’s also possible that the organization simply failed to file required annual paperwork with the IRS for three years in a row. That omission automatically causes charities to lose their tax-exempt status, although it can be restored.

While the fact that the white nationalist groups mentioned above ever got charitable status is disturbing, a search of the IRS database of tax-exempt organizations shows that none of them have it today.

In my opinion, a large part of the strength of the nonprofit sector lies in its diversity of causes and viewpoints. For this reason, I think it’s better for the government to err on the side of authorizing too many tax-exempt organizations than to quash free speech or meddle with trying to determine which faith traditions are deserving.

But it should be clear that charities that encourage violence and cheer on extremism are not contributing to society with any of the purposes the IRS allows.

Sudan Crisis Explained: What’s Behind The Latest Fighting And How It Fits Nation’s Troubled Past

BY CHRISTOPHER TOUNSEL, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Days of violence in Sudan have resulted in the deaths of at least 180 people, with many more left wounded.

The fighting represents the latest crisis in the North African nation, which has contended with numerous coups and periods of civil strife since becoming independent in 1956.

The Conversation asked Christopher Tounsel, a Sudan specialist and interim director of the University of Washington’s African Studies Program, to explain the reasons behind the violence and what it means for the chances of democracy being restored in Sudan.

What is going on in Sudan?

It all revolves around infighting between two rival groups: the Sudanese army and a paramilitary group known as the RSF, or Rapid Support Forces.

Since a coup in the country in 2021, which ended a transitional government put in place after the fall of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir two years earlier, Sudan has been run by the army, with coup leader General Abdel-Fattah Burhan as de facto ruler.

The RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – who is generally known by the name Hemedti – has worked alongside the Sudanese army to help keep the military in power.

Following Bashir’s ouster, the political transition was supposed to result in elections by the end of 2023, with Burhan promising a transition to civilian rule. But it appears that neither Burhan nor Dagalo has any intention of relinquishing power. Moreover, they are locked in a power struggle that turned violent on April 15, 2023.

Since then, members of the RSF and the Sudanese army have engaged in gunfights in the capital, Khartoum, as well as elsewhere in the country. Over the course of three days, the violence has spiraled.

The recent background to the violence was a disagreement over how RSF paramilitaries should be incorporated into the Sudanese army. Tensions boiled over after the RSF started deploying members around the country and in Khartoum without the expressed permission of the army.

But in reality, the violence has been brewing for a while in Sudan, with concern over the RSF seeking to control more of the country’s economic assets, notably its gold mines.

The developments in Sudan over the last few days are not good for the stability of the nation or its prospects for any transition to democratic rule.

Who are the two men at the center of the dispute?

Dagalo rose to power within the RSF beginning in the early 2000s when he was at the head of the militia known as Janjaweed – a group responsible for human right atrocities in the Darfur region.

While then-Sudanese President Bashir was the face of the violence against people in Darfur – and was later indicted on crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court – the Janjaweed is also held responsible by the ICC for alleged acts of genocide. While they were doing so, Dagalo was rising up the ranks.

As head of the RSF, Dagalo has faced accusations of overseeing the bloody crackdown of pro-democracy activists, including the massacre of 120 protesters in 2019.

The actions of Burhan, similarly, have seen the military leader heavily criticized by human rights groups. As the head of the army in power and the country’s de facto head of government for the last two years, he oversaw a crackdown of pro-democracy activists.

One can certainly interpret both men to be obstacles to any chance of Sudan transitioning to civilian democracy. But this is first and foremost a personal power struggle.

To use an African proverb, “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.”

So this is about power rather than ideology?

In my opinion, very much so.

We are not talking about two men, or factions, with ideological differences over the future direction of the country. This cannot be framed as a left-wing versus right-wing thing, or about warring political parties. Nor is this a geo-religious conflict – pitting a majority Muslim North against a Christian South. And it isn’t racialized violence in the same way that the Darfur conflict was, with the self-identified Arab Janajaweed killing Black people.

Some observers are interpreting what is happening in Sudan – correctly, in my opinion – as a battle between two men who are desperate not to be ejected from the corridors of power by means of a transition to an elected government.

How does the violence fit Sudan’s troubled past?

One thing that is concerning about the longer dynamics at play in Sudan is the violence now forms part of a history that fits the trope of the “failed African nation.”

Sudan has, to my knowledge, had more coups than any other African nation. Since gaining independence from the U.K. in 1956, there have been coups in 1958, 1969, 1985, 1989, 2019 and 2021.

The coup in 1989 brought Bashir to power for a three-decade run as dictator during which the Sudanese people suffered from the typical excesses of autocratic rule – secret police, repressions of opposition, corruption.

When Bashir was deposed in 2019, it was shocking to many observers – myself included – who assumed he would die in power, or that his rule would end only by assassination.

But any hopes that the end of Bashir would mean democratic rule were short-lived. Two years after his ouster – when elections were due to be held – the army decided to take power for itself, claiming it was stepping in to avert a civil war.

As striking as the recent violence is now, in many ways what is playing out is not unusual in the context of Sudan’s history.

The army has long been at the center of political transitions in Sudan. And resistance to civilian rule has been more than less the norm since independence in 1956.

Is there a danger the violence will escalate?

A coalition of civilian groups in the country has called for an immediate halt to the violence – as has the U.S. and other international observers. But with both factions dug in, that seems unlikely. Similarly, the prospect of free and fair elections in Sudan seems some ways off.

There doesn’t appears to be an easy route to a short-term solution, and what makes it tougher is that you have two powerful men, both with a military at their disposal, fighting each other for power that neither seem prepared to relinquish.

The concern is that the fighting might escalate and destabilize the region, jeopardizing Sudan’s relations with its neighbors. Chad, which borders Sudan to the west, has already closed its border with Sudan. Meanwhile, a couple of Egyptian soldiers were captured in northern Sudan while violence was happening in Khartoum. Ethiopia, Sudan’s neighbor to the east, is still reeling from a two-year war in the Tigray region. And the spread of unrest in Sudan will be a concern to those watching an uneasy peace deal in South Sudan – which gained independence from Sudan in 2011 and has been beset by ethnic fighting ever since.

As such, the stakes in the current unrest could go beyond the immediate future of Burhan, Dagalo and even the Sudanese nation. The stability of the region could also be out at risk.

Military Violence In Myanmar Is Worsening Amid Fierce Resistance And International Ambivalence

BY THARAPHI THAN, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

In the early days of a brutal 2021 military crackdown on anti-coup protesters in Myanmar, members of the nascent resistance movement began asking “how many dead bodies” it would take for the world community to act.

More than two years on from a coup that installed military rule in the Southeast Asian country, pro-democracy protesters say they have yet to receive an adequate answer.

On April 11, 2023, the country’s armed forces dropped multiple bombs on a gathering in Pazigyi, a village in Sagaing Region, killing around 100 people, it has been estimated, including many children.

As a scholar on Myanmar’s history, I would argue that the escalating violence can be attributed to two main factors, one internal and one external: a miscalculation by the military over the resistance of Myanmar’s people, and ambivalence from the international community.

From coup to civil war

Myanmar has witnessed killings by the military almost daily since generals seized control of the country in 2021. The coup ended the short period of democratic rule under Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy.

But there are, I believe, reasons to suggest that the Myanmar military grossly miscalculated the timing of the coup, and underestimated the sentiment of a people unwilling to give up the freedom and prosperity they experienced under democracy.

In this, the military may have been misled by the experience of their counterparts in neighboring Thailand. In 2014, generals in Thailand launched a coup ending months of political instability and promising a process back to democratic rule. That coup was met by sporadic protests, but no unified armed resistance emerged in response.

The Myanmar military similarly promised “free and fair elections” further down the line after its coup.

Unlike in Thailand, people in Myanmar – especially younger generations that came of age in the democratic decade after 2010 – fiercely resisted the army’s takeover and were skeptical of claims that it would restore democracy.

After peaceful protests following the coup were met with live ammunition, pro-democracy activists turned to armed resistance.

In the years since, many young people have undergone military training – often by armed ethnic groups that already existed along the country’s borders – and fought back under the umbrella resistance group, People’s Defense Forces.

Protracted counter-coup activities have humiliated the Myanmar army. The commander in chief, Min Aung Hlaing, recently conceded that two years after the coup, the military was still not in control of swaths of the country. He vowed to intensify a crackdown against people he branded “terrorists.”

The growing instability, Min Aung Hlaing said, meant that promised elections – after which the military was to hand over power to a civilian government – cannot be scheduled.

Uniting around a common enemy

Myanmar’s military leaders have vowed to annihilate resistance groups. Yet there are reasons to believe that the resistance is only getting stronger.

Despite slow initial progress to show a common front, the Bamar majority and minority ethic groups such as Karen, Chin, Kachin, Rakhine and Karenni appear to be unifying against military rule. And resistance fighters have widespread support throughout the country.

A lot will now depend on whether Myanmar soldiers lose the will to fight. Already there are signs of strain. The military is reportedly facing an acute shortage of new recruits, resulting in women being trained to fight in combat. People in the Bamar heartlands, including Sagaing where the April 11 massacre occurred, are refusing to let their sons join the Myanmar army.

In such circumstances, the Myanmar army is increasingly relying on guns and bombs rather than troop numbers.

But the longer the resistance lasts, the more humiliating it will be for a junta that has upped its annual spending on the military to an estimated US$2.7 billion – more than 25% of the national budget – largely to suppress its own population.

Leaving the oil and gas taps running

These internal dynamics have taken place largely in the absence of intense scrutiny from the international community, pro-democracy activists say.

The Ukraine war has seemingly pushed Myanmar down the list of international concerns. It has also exacerbated cracks among the global powers that would, otherwise, likely be on the same page over the worsening situation – prolonged violence and instability in Myanmar is not in any country’s strategic interests, not least China’s or the United States’.

Both the U.S. and the United Nations have made statements in support of democracy in Myanmar, and condemned killings.

But concrete action – which to date has been largely limited to sanctions on individuals and entities – falls well short of what human rights groups have demanded. There has, for example, been no comprehensive global arms embargo despite the use of weapons against civilians. Neither has Myanmar been shut off from foreign currency revenues. And the country is still able to purchase the jet fuel being used by bombers, despite calls for a global ban on such sales to accompany the recent sanctions imposed by some governments, including the U.S.

Moreover, sanctions have yet to bite Myanmar’s energy sector. Activist group Justice for Myanmar has identified 22 oil and gas companies from countries including the U.S. that have continued to provide revenue to Myanmar’s generals during the civil war. Indeed, U.S. oil companies including Chevron lobbied hard against broad sanctions against the Myanmar military.

The failure to shut off oil revenue allows Myanmar’s generals – for whom oil and gas is a major revenue source – to fund the military.

To many within the resistance movement, the reluctance of the international community to exert more pressure on the country’s military looks like global collusion. It also has the potential to prolong the violence by funding the military’s campaign.

Beware the tiger’s tail

A well-known Myanmar phrase warns against the dangers of “catching hold of a tiger’s tail” – once you do so there is no turning back; let go and you will be killed.

It aptly sums up the position now for Myanmar’s military rulers and the resistance fighters being drawn deeper into conflict with each atrocity. They are fighting for the past, present and the future and can’t let go now.