Militarising The Sahel Will Not Defeat Terrorism

BY AYODELE S. OWOLABI

ASSOCIATE LECTURER  IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS, AT LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES

UNIVERSITY

After launching what he called “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS [ISIL] terrorist scum” in northwest Nigeria on December 25, United States President Donald Trump promised “many more”, reaffirming his stance that the US “will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to prosper”. The strikes occurred less than a week after the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) commissioned a joint military force comprising a 5,000-strong contingent, presented as a symbol of collective self-reliance and security autonomy, in a concerted effort to combat terrorist groups in its member states. They also followed moves by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish an ambitious plan announced in August 2025 to activate a 260,000-strong joint counterterrorism force, backed by a proposed $2.5bn annual budget for logistics and front-line support.

While these developments may be presented by their proponents as decisive steps against terrorism, there is little evidence that militarised escalation alone can defeat armed groups in the Sahel. Instead, they signal an accelerating militarisation of the region. Not only does this fuel emerging geopolitical tensions in West Africa, but it also, more importantly, edges the Sahel towards interstate armed conflict, posing far graver risks to regional peace and stability.

A friendship turned sour

Until 2021, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel were governed by a loosely coordinated, non-hierarchical security architecture built around diplomatic and military collaboration among regional and extra-regional actors. This architecture brought together ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, external powers such as the US and France, as well as regional powers such as Algeria and Nigeria, with ECOWAS playing a central coordinating role.

A typical example was the 2013 African-led International Support Mission to Mali, organised by ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU, UN and France to confront Tuareg rebels and allied armed groups in northern Mali. More prominent was the EU-financed G5 Sahel counterterrorism force, which brought together African and European troops and operated between 2017 and 2023. While these arrangements were often marked by tension, competition and uneven outcomes, they functioned within a shared security framework that limited direct confrontation between states.

This balance was disrupted after the 2023 coup in Niger. By threatening the use of force to restore constitutional order, ECOWAS crossed a political threshold that transformed its role from intermediary to perceived adversary in the eyes of the Nigerien junta. That threat was widely interpreted as an act of aggression, and it proved catalytic. In response, Niger’s military rulers, alongside their counterparts in Mali and Burkina Faso, moved to establish the Alliance of Sahel States as a deliberate effort to reclaim security autonomy, dismantle the existing multilateral security regime and sever ties with longstanding partners including ECOWAS, the EU, the US and France.

Notably, the AES institutionalises a mutual defence pact that codifies this break with the previous multilateral security order by explicitly framing ECOWAS and its Western partners as threats to the sovereignty and national security of its member states. Beyond deepening the rift between former allies, this posture signals a dangerous shift towards the securitisation of neighbouring states, raising the spectre of interstate conflict in West Africa, a phenomenon largely absent since the 1990s.

Emerging geopolitical tensions

In severing security ties with the West, the AES have pivoted towards Russia as a principal security partner to counterbalance decades of US and European influence in West Africa, signalling a deepening but still evolving security partnership with Moscow. While these strategic choices reflect an emerging self-help posture with new preferences for non-conventional allies, they are also intensifying geopolitical tensions across the region.

Nigeria’s military role in countering an attempted coup in neighbouring Benin was praised as a major win for ECOWAS. But when a Nigerian Air Force C-130 aircraft made an emergency landing in Burkina Faso two days later, the AES interpreted this as a violation of its airspace and sovereignty, authorising its air force to neutralise any aircraft involved in further violations. Tensions were heightened by reports that France had provided Nigeria with surveillance and intelligence support during the Benin intervention, fuelling apprehension about France’s potential re-entry into the AES security landscape. With Nigeria now willing to extend security cooperation with the US following the Christmas Day strikes, the stakes have risen further for the AES. Although aimed at militants operating in northwest Nigeria, the strikes appear calculated to bolster US strategic legitimacy as a counterterrorism actor in the region, potentially opening the door to further operations in Nigeria’s northeast, where ISWAP and Boko Haram remain active.

Given Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS, this emerging security partnership with the US is likely to shape the operational capacity of the proposed 260,000-strong ECOWAS force. This does not bode well for the AES, which is intent on insulating its member states from Western security influence in the name of sovereignty. Because ECOWAS forces would be deployed in member states at the epicentre of terrorist violence, many combat engagements would take place in locations adjacent to AES territories. With AES troops also operating in these areas, military clashes between the two sides become increasingly likely, particularly given the region’s porous borders and fluid combat environments. Given that the Christmas Day strikes reportedly hit unintended targets, the risk that future air strikes by a US-backed ECOWAS could spill into AES territory cannot be dismissed. For deterrence, the AES may seek to leverage Russia’s military backing, evoking echoes of Cold War-era security brinkmanship.

Implications for regional stability

Without reconciliation between the AES and ECOWAS, two major risks loom for regional peace and stability. First, rising geopolitical tensions could draw AES and ECOWAS member states into direct interstate military confrontations, potentially plunging West Africa into a regional war. Such a conflict would serve neither side’s counterterrorism objectives. Beyond devastating the region, it would create space for armed groups to expand their operations amid fractured and distracted security responses. Second, the standoff risks turning West Africa into a new theatre for global power rivalry, with a Russia-backed AES on one side and a US and France-backed ECOWAS on the other. In the context of an emerging New Cold War, the use of veto power by these global actors at the UN Security Council could further complicate conflict resolution, with profoundly destabilising consequences for the region.

The AES and ECOWAS now face a stark choice: to revive Cold War-style bloc politics in West Africa while the region slides towards chaos, or to negotiate a security sub-coalition that prioritises human security alongside national sovereignty. Regardless of how the AES views ECOWAS, the burden lies with the latter to manage the unintended consequences of escalating tensions. While there are few indications that the AES is willing to cooperate directly with a West-backed ECOWAS on counterterrorism, ECOWAS could pursue diplomatic engagement to negotiate a concept of operations that guarantees respect for AES sovereignty. As Africa’s most experienced regional security organisation, ECOWAS possesses the diplomatic capacity to do so. For progress to be made, Francophone ECOWAS member states should take the lead in these efforts, while Nigeria exercises its influence more discreetly. Whether ECOWAS can reclaim ownership of its security agenda and define the terms of external engagement will shape not only West Africa’s future, but that of the continent as a whole.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

The US’ West Africa And Sahel Challenge

 

BY LIAM KARR

Washington needs to counter Russian propaganda in the region, and highlight that a US partnership is a win-win for the Sahel and West Africa.

The Trump administration’s push for greater US engagement with West Africa is a smart move. The region is a focal point for geopolitical competition with China and Russia, counterterrorism efforts that bolster US security, and business potential for American investors.

However, the United States will face obstacles from within and without as it works to grow partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea, which lies along Africa’s western coast, and the Sahel, which includes neighboring landlocked countries in the lower reaches of the Sahara Desert. American officials should develop a framework that balances competing US priorities on defense, democracy, human rights, and immigration with the needs of regional partners.

To address counterterrorism interests, US officials have traveled to the Sahel to re-engage with the Alliance of Sahel States, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this region, defense is a top priority, as the United States and African partners seek to degrade rapidly strengthening Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. American military officials describe the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warn that these groups could develop the ability to attack the US homeland.

The military juntas that control the three countries distanced themselves from the West after taking power and turned to Russia for support. Niger’s junta kicked out 1,000 US troops who were helping fight the terror groups and assumed control over a $110 million US-built drone base in 2024. Russian private military corporation Wagner Group has troops in all three countries.

Russia’s failures have left these countries in need, but the military regimes’ poor democratic and human rights track records limit possible US assistance. US law restricts most foreign and military aid to coup governments until a democratically elected government retakes office. US law also prohibits government assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross human rights violations. These laws exist to align US aid with American strategic interests by avoiding American support for abusive security forces that can create anti-American sentiment and agitate insurgencies.

To bridge this gap, US officials should encourage their Sahelian counterparts to take credible steps to address these issues, thereby qualifying for waivers that would enable greater US aid. This will be a challenge, as Burkinabe and Malian security forces have perpetrated several atrocities that violate US laws, and all three junta leaders have repeatedly extended their stay in power.

How American officials frame the issue will be critical. US officials should focus on discussing human rights abuses as a shared security concern, given their counterproductive nature, instead of overemphasizing US values. Until then, US officials should focus on providing non-lethal assistance and intelligence sharing as legally allowed. This cooperation will facilitate more effective counterinsurgency operations, save lives, and rebuild trust with these partners.

Greater cooperation could unlock future opportunities for critical mineral access, although this is highly unlikely in the short term. While gold, lithium, and uranium deposits can be found across the Sahel, US companies are highly unlikely to invest given the precarious security situation. This authoritarian shift has also created a hostile business environment, further limiting US private investment.

Counterterrorism is also on the agenda in the Gulf of Guinea. Countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have sought to grow defense ties with the United States to help confront insurgents. They are seeking to distance themselves from France, and the United States can help ensure Russia does not further fill the void. All three countries receive funding from America’s Global Fragility Act and are becoming increasingly important US defense partners. Congress and the administration should ensure this trajectory continues.

Through strengthened ties, the United States can also open economic opportunities. The Togolese port of Lomé—partially owned by a multinational shipping company with US stakeholders—is poised to become a regional shipping hub and gateway. Côte d’Ivoire ranks among the top ten countries on the continent in terms of GDP and GDP growth, and can serve as a conduit for American investment across the region.

A clear approach is key to preventing Russia, which is playing a zero-sum game and seeks to lock the United States out, from playing spoiler. The Kremlin views its Sahel alliance as a strategic project to help strengthen Russian influence on the continent. Russia’s position in Libya and the Sahel creates a suite of opportunities—ranging from conventional threats to irregular tools, such as weaponizing migration—for Russia to destabilize Europe. The Kremlin’s growing inroads into coastal West Africa threaten US partnerships and strengthen Russia’s ability to project power into the Atlantic, posing a long-term risk for NATO and ultimately the United States.

Moscow’s favored strategy is to use pro-Russian politicians, civil society actors, and media to falsely portray America as an exploitative power—a tactic that consistent messaging and engagement from the United States can stymie. The Trump administration is well-positioned to speak the sovereigntist, “Africa First” language prevalent in West Africa, and capitalize on it by highlighting how a US partnership is a win-win for all involved. This framing can make clear—to African officials and the public—that any anti-US Russian activities are for Moscow’s benefit, not the region’s gain.

The United States will have to balance its immigration priorities as it works with these countries, having already restricted the entry of Nigerien and Togolese citizens due to high visa overstay rates. Benin, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire could also face a travel ban—a move that has recently drawn backlash from African leaders.

The opportunities for the Trump administration in West Africa are numerous and go beyond efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel to include Trump’s summit with leaders of five other coastal West African countries in early July. However, the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel are unique, and US officials must be prepared to deftly navigate internal obstacles while standing strong against Russia to make serious headway.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

UN Investigates Sexual Exploitation Allegations Against Aid Workers In Chad Following AP Story

A woman who fled war in Sudan and requested anonymity because she fears retribution after reporting sexual exploitation, holds her injured arm in a refugee camp in Andre, Chad, Thursday, October 3, 2024. (AP Photo/Sam Mednick)

BY SAM MEDNICK

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — The United Nations in Chad has launched an internal investigation, following an Associated Press report on allegations of sexual exploitation of Sudanese refugees, which included aid workers.

The statement, written days after the AP published the story last week, was seen on Tuesday. It said the seriousness of the allegations cited in the AP’s story, warranted immediate and firm measures and that those responsible should be punished.

“Refugees are already vulnerable and traumatized by the events that led them to flee their country and under no circumstances should they be the victims of abuse by those who are supposed to help them,” said Francois Batalingaya, the U.N. resident and humanitarian coordinator in Chad.

The U.N. did not immediately respond to questions about what the internal investigation entailed.

Earlier this month, the AP reported accusations by some Sudanese women and girls that men, including those meant to protect them such as humanitarian workers and local security forces, had instead sexually exploited them in Chad’s sites for displaced people. They said the men offered money, easier access to assistance, and jobs. Such sexual exploitation in Chad is a crime.

Hundreds of thousands of people, most of them women, have streamed into Chad to escape Sudan’s civil war, which has killed over 20,000 people.

Sexual exploitation during large humanitarian crises is not uncommon, especially in displacement sites. Aid groups have long struggled to combat the issue, citing a lack of reporting by women, not enough funds to respond and a focus on first providing basic necessities.

Experts say exploitation represents a deep failure by the aid community and that people seeking protection should never have to make choices driven by survival.

The U.N. said it raised the risk alert level for protection against sexual exploitation of abuse to four, which is very high, especially since Chad was already classified as a country at high risk. Raising the alert is meant to enable the U.N. to take rapid measures in the next three months, according to an internal email about the AP’s article, circulated among aid groups and seen by the AP.

The UN said it’s cooperating with local authorities and human rights groups to hold those responsible to account and that refugees’ trust in humanitarians is paramount.

The organization has encouraged anyone with information about exploitation to come forward.

Chad Nationalizes Assets By Oil Giant Exxon, Says Government

FILE —Chadian workers guide a pipe down a well in the Doba oil fields in southern Chad Oct. 10, 2003. Chad is nationalizing all assets from oil giant Exon Mobil, including hydrocarbon and exploration permits, said Haliki Choua Mahamat the government's general secretary on state media Thursday March 23, 2023. (AP Photo/Susan Linnee, File)

BY SAM MEDNICK

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Chad is nationalizing all assets from multinational oil giant Exxon Mobil, including its hydrocarbon and exploration permits, said the government.

″The finance and budget minister must make sure the said decree is implemented from the date of its publishing,” said Haliki Choua Mahamat the government’s general secretary on state media.

The nationalization of a private company means that all assets are now owned by the government. While this used to happen in the 1960s and 1970s, it hasn’t happened recently and doesn’t conform to usual legal frameworks in the sector, say energy experts.

Chad began producing oil in 2003 and Exxon has been operating in the country for several decades. It was running the Doba oil project in Chad.

The move could scare away investors from West Africa at a time of growing global energy demand and a decline in foreign investments in the region, said Olufola Wusu, a partner and head of the oil and gas desk at Megathos Law Practice based in Nigeria.

“Expropriation of any sort without compensation is not a step in the right direction, because it is going to erode investor confidence in that particular country and once investors are jittery, they pull back their investment, so regulators and leaders in Africa need to play by the rules,” he said.

The government’s decision came after a long dispute between Exxon and Chad, which rejected the sale of the company’s operations last year.

Tensions have risen in the West African nation in recent months with unprecedented protests mounting against the government of President Mahamat Idriss Deby.

Deby was declared the head of state after his father’s death in April 2021. The son’s succession did not follow Chad’s constitutional line of succession. Opposition political parties at the time called the handover a coup d’etat, but later agreed to accept Deby as interim leader for 18 months.

———-

Associated Press reporter Chinedu Asadu in Abjua Nigeria contributed

Bodies Of 27 Migrants Found In Chad Desert, Says UN Group

BY SAM MEDNICK

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — The bodies of 27 migrants including four children have been found in the Chadian desert, the International Organization for Migration said Tuesday, adding that it is “shocked and saddened” by the discovery.

The migrants left in a pick-up truck nearly a year and a half ago from Moussoro, a town in west-central Chad, and are believed to have gotten lost deep in the desert when the truck broke down and they died of thirst, said the migration organization, which is affiliated to the U.N.

“We are deeply saddened by this most recent tragedy and extend our heartfelt condolences to the migrants’ families,” said Anne Kathrin Schaefer, the organization’s head of mission in Chad. ”We need stronger collective action to prevent further deaths.”

More than 5,600 people have died or gone missing trying to cross the Sahara Desert in the last eight years with 110 migrant deaths recorded in Chad, including these most recent ones, said the organization. The actual numbers, however, are thought to be higher as many deaths go unrecorded. This year nearly 150 migrants have died in that desert, it said.

For decades Chad has been a transit route for people trying to reach Libya and other North African countries from where they will try to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. Since 2016 pressure by European Union countries to discourage illegal migration has forced migrants to take dangerous routes resulting in many deaths, say conflict analysts.

“Those migrants come from South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Cameroon, and other countries in the region that are willing to take the risks with the hope of reaching Northern Africa and eventually Europe,” said Rida Lyammouri, senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan-based organization.

“Sometimes they have to take riskier routes to avoid security forces and human traffickers and at times that risk could cost their lives,” he said.

Chad Govt Suspends 7 Political Parties After Deadly Protests

Anti-government demonstrators set a barricade on fire during clashes in N'Djamena, Chad, Thursday Oct. 20, 2022. Chadian security forces have opened fire on anti-government demonstrators in the country's two largest cities killing at least 60 people, the government spokesman and a morgue official said. Authorities imposed a curfew after Thursday's violence, which came amid protests in the central African nation against interim leader Mahamat Idriss Deby's two-year extension of power. (AP Photo)

BY EDOUARD TAKADJI

N’DJAMENA, CHAD (AP) — Chad’s government clamped down on the country’s opposition Friday, suspending seven political parties and searching party offices a day after unprecedented protests around the country left more than 60 people dead.

Prominent

opposition leader Succes Masra tweeted that the national headquarters of his Les Transformateurs party was “being ransacked by security forces who forced their way in.”

“After having shot 70 people, arrested, wounded and tortured more than 1,000 others, they are now attacking buildings and documents,” he tweeted.

Masra’s party was listed first among the seven suspended by Chad’s government for a 3-month period. The decree covers all political activities nationwide.

Demonstrators in the capital, N’Djamena, and several other cities took to the streets Thursday to protest against interim leader Mahamat Idriss Deby extending his time in power by two more years.

Deby became head of a transitional government when his father, former President Idriss Deby Itno, died in April 2021 after more than 30 years in power. Mahamat Idriss Deby initially agreed to an 18-month transition, a term that would have ended Thursday.

However, the government recently announced he would stay in power another two years, prompting the protests. After using tear gas, security forces fired live ammunition at the demonstrators in N’Djamena, according to witnesses. A government spokesman confirmed 30 dead, though activists put the figure higher.

In the country’s second-largest city, Moundou, a morgue official said there were 32 deaths following a similar protest crackdown there. He spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Prime Minister Saleh Kebzabo later defended the government’s use of force, telling reporters the unrest was “an attempted coup.”

The deadly response drew swift rebukes from France, the United States and others. African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat said he strongly condemned “the repression of the demonstrations.”

“I call on the parties to respect human life and property and to favor peaceful means to overcome the crisis,” he tweeted.

Thursday’s unrest was unprecedented in Chad, which saw little public dissent during the previous regime of Deby’s father. Officials have said the late Deby was killed by rebels while visiting his troops on the battlefield.

Several demonstrations have taken place since his son became interim leader. Security forces fired on civilians in two other instances, according to Amnesty International.

Lake Chad Not Shrinking, But Climate Is Fuelling Terror Groups: Report

BY NATALIE SAUER

LAKE CHAD (CLIMATE HOME NEWS) -- Satellite analysis shows ‘vanishing’ lake has grown since 1990s, but climate instability is driving communities into the arms of Boko Haram and Islamic State

Climate change is aggravating conflict around Lake Chad, but not in the way experts once thought, according to new research.

Berlin-based think tank adelphi debunked the widely held idea that the lake is currently shrinking. While severe droughts in the 1970s and 80s shrunk the lake from a high-point of 25,000 sq km to 2,000 sq km in the 1990s, it has since grown to 14,000 sq km and remained relatively stable in the past two decades.

The findings draw on new analysis of 20 years of satellite imagery and long-term hydrological data from the Lake Chad basin, including ground measurements.

Previous satellite images underestimated the amount of water in the lake, in part because of the growth of plants that stood in the water, lead author Janani Vivekananda told Climate Home News.

“Different satellites give you different kind of information, and have limitations,” Vivekananda said. “Very often when you’re looking down from 30,000 feet, you miss information such as the water that’s under vegetation cover.” Researcher looked at infrared images to probe into the volume of water, she said.

The conflict and humanitarian crisis driven by the “shrinking” lake is often cited as a textbook example of climate change affecting security. But warming remains an important factor, according to the study, which also drew on 200 interviews with local communities.

Rising temperatures – up to one and a half times faster than the global average – and increasingly erratic rain patterns have created food insecurity, ultimately pushing communities into the arms of terrorist groups like Boko Haram or Islamic State West Africa Province.

“The unpredictability of rains means that people are just giving up,” Vivekananda said. “After the third or fourth failed harvest, not knowing when to switch from fishing to farming, the offer of a livelihood of food every day and business loans becomes more attractive.”

Lake Chad, which straddles Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, is home to 17.4 million people. Around 10.7 million people require humanitarian assistance, with 5 million suffering from food insecurity. Some 2.5 million people have fled their homes.

Since 2009, violence in northeast Nigeria has boiled over into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. A range of factors were feeding the region’s instability. Successive economic crises, divisive reforms and weak governance in the region, coupled with rising inequality and dismay at corruption among the ruling elite have created a hotbed for tensions.

Climate change, the report found, both worsened the conditions at the root of conflicts, and undermined communities’ ability to deal with them.

Where elders once used to serve as mediators in disputes, recurring war and heat waves have shredded the social fabric to such a point that this is no longer possible.

In the past, “two parties might go to an elder and agree to some kind of restitution,” Vivekananda said. “They might make amends by giving them a share of their next harvest. But these don’t work any more, because the influx of people – because of the conflicts and displacement – make it a very transient society.”

Competition over natural resources has also flared, as fertile land becomes scarcer.

Authors urged governments to incorporate climate resilience into their strategy for peacebuilding in the region. Among an array of solutions, the report suggested policymakers provide better hydrological information to communities so that they could plan around rain-falls. Also essential were investments into long-term infrastructure and better resource management.

On the other hand, heavy-handed military responses, such as blanket bans to certain areas in an attempt to root out terrorist groups, have failed the region, provoking further displacement.

Lake Chad has long been the poster child of climate security. In 2015, Barack Obama urged military officials to “understand climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the world. Yet, what we also know is that severe drought helped to create the instability in Nigeria that was exploited by the terrorist group Boko Haram.”

The United Nations Security Council is increasingly recognising the role of climate change in exacerbating conflict, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel region, where Lake Chad lies.

At a meeting of the security council in January, France and the UK were joined by Germany, Peru, Poland and Belgium in a call for a system to help them respond to climate security threats. France also called for the UN secretary general to deliver an annual report to the security council on the issue. Only Russia explicitly opposed the development of new UN capabilities.


THIS ARTICLE ORIGINALLY APPEARED AT CLIMATE HOME NEWS

AQIM’s Alliance In Mali: Prospects For Jihadist Preeminence In West Africa

BY JACOB ZENN

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

APRIL 21, 2017

AQIM militant in northern Mali (Source: al-Jazeera)

Trends in the two main theaters of jihadist activity in West Africa have moved in al-Qaeda’s favor in recent months. In the Mali/Sahel region, the formation of a new alliance has consolidated al-Qaeda’s position as the preeminent jihadist force in the region, while in Nigeria/Lake Chad, the faction of Boko Haram loyal to Islamic State (IS) — known formally as West Africa Province — has stayed relatively quiet and even shown continued signs of an ideological and logistical disconnect from its parent organization.

With the IS leadership currently in too much disarray in Libya and too distracted in Syria to consistently focus on West Africa, it is unlikely IS will be able to compete in the long-term with al-Qaeda for supremacy over jihadist groups in West Africa. Instead, al-Qaeda’s strategy of “localization” — which it has employed to a greater or lesser extent successfully in theaters such as Syria and Yemen — is likely to see al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) gaining increasing prominence as jihadism in West Africa becomes both more local and more diffuse.

The establishment of the new alliance, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims), in Mali in March 2017 sees al-Qaeda’s “localization” strategy at its most effective. It also demonstrates how adaptable al-Qaeda can be. The group can continue to exist in the region as an umbrella organization, accepting new members and groups tied to it by interpersonal and strategic bonds, while making open affiliation with IS and the massacre of civilians redlines for membership.

Al-Qaeda Alliance in Mali: JNIM

When the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra merged with Syrian rebel groups to become (or at least appear to become) a more locally rooted organization and reduce its al-Qaeda “branding,” it did so with the approval of a Syria-based deputy of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The al-Qaeda leader himself would have rejected such a merger because many of the groups with which Jabhat al-Nusra merged were too secular or outwardly nationalist for al-Zawahiri’s liking. An al-Qaeda insider has revealed that Jabhat al-Nusra’s localization in Syria was nonetheless consistent with al-Qaeda’s overall philosophy, but this specific merger represented an “organizational dispute” with al-Qaeda leadership that, once undertaken, could not be reversed. As a consequence, al-Qaeda’s leadership has subsequently accepted it (s04.justpaste.it, April 4).

In direct contrast, the formation of JNIM in Mali was welcomed wholeheartedly by AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and al-Qaeda’s General Command, including al-Zawahiri (justpaste.it/14k9a, March 17).

The new alliance brings together leaders of multiple ethnic groups, including: Ag Ghaly, the ethnically Tuareg leader of Ansar Dine who is the overall leader of JNIM; Muhammed Kufa, the ethnically Fulani leader of Ansar Dine sub-affiliate Katiba Macina; Yahia Abu al-Hamam, the ethnically Algerian Arab leader of AQIM’s Sahara Region; the AQIM Islamic law judge Abou Abderrahman al-Senhadji, who is ethnically Berber; and al-Hasan al-Ansari, a Malian Tangara Arab (referring to his clan’s Mauritanian ancestry) who is the deputy leader of al-Mourabitun (al-Masra #42, March 6).

This allows al-Qaeda to portray itself as a pan-Islamic movement unconstrained by tribalism, something particularly important in the context of AQIM’s earlier bias in favor Algerian Arabs.

The inclusion of Kufa’s Katiba Macina group — the name Macina is a reference to a historic Fulani Islamic emirate of central Mali — is a particular boon. Kufa was a leader of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) in 2013 when the group controlled parts of northern Mali and began shifting toward central Mali. By bringing him into the JNIM alliance, AQIM can consolidate its presence among Fulanis in central Mali where in previous years it has had limited operations.

The group has so far seen one setback — a key “sub-faction” that had been expected to join JNIM’s orbit, the relatively new Burkina Faso-based Ansaroul Islam, has openly criticized it. Ansaroul Islam’s leader, Mallam Dicko, may suspect JNIM chief Ag Ghaly is an Algerian agent, or be unimpressed by his Salafist credentials, especially considering Dicko appears to be an even more radical Salafi-jihadist than AQIM members (Alakhbar.info, April 16).

Given Ansaroul Islam’s increasingly high level of operations and impact in a part of the Sahel that formerly experienced almost no jihadist activity, it is likely the group has backing from a larger entity (Lemonde.fr, April 9). Burkina Faso says the group’s supporters are members of the former government deposed in a coup in 2016, but it is also possible that the IS faction in northern Burkina Faso under Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, who was also a MUJWA leader, is working with it (Aib.bf, March 24). Indeed, pro-IS channels on social media have announced that a new pledge of allegiance to IS “from the Sahel” will be forthcoming, although they have not identified Ansaroul Islam by name. Al-Qaeda supporters dismiss the reports as a “myth” intended to embellish IS’ strength in the Sahel.

Strengthened Position in Northern Mali

The emergence of JNIM comes as Mali is attempting to implement the Algiers Accord of 2015, a peace deal agreed between the government and armed groups in northern Mali. AQIM’s sustained attacks — or, since March 2017, JNIM’s attacks — undermine the Malian people’s confidence in the agreement. Moreover, JNIM can portray itself as an indigenously rooted alternative if the new regional government’s attempts at bringing together various former rebels fails (Liberation.fr, March 3). Ag Ghaly, familiar with Mali’s political terrain from his former life as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia, which is where he developed his Salafist worldview, can be expected to exploit any failure in the Algiers Accord’s implementation.

The JNIM alliance represents the most effective employment of al-Qaeda’s localization strategy and puts a nail in the coffin of IS’ hopes to grow its own network in West Africa, even if Ansaroul Islam announces a pledge to IS caliph Abubakr al-Baghdadi.

IS can still count as loyal the faction of Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, whose pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi was aired by IS in October 2016, as well as that of another former MUJWA commander, Hamadou Kheiry. But al-Sahrawi has been quiet for several months, and Kheiry has done little since announcing his loyalty to IS in 2015.

Both factions would seem to benefit from Ansaroul Islam joining IS, although it is unclear what financial or other benefits they could offer Dicko’s group. It may therefore be the case that a link with Ansaroul Islam is mostly ideological, albeit IS propaganda support could significantly upgrade Ansaroul Islam from the platform it currently uses — Facebook. There could also be a latent MUJWA connection, given that Dicko too is a former member.

Islamic State’s Faltering West Africa Network

Further south in the Nigeria/Lake Chad region, IS has a more effective operational presence, but has seen limited success on the propaganda and ideological end. Its West Africa Province — the Abu Musab al-Barnawi-led faction of Boko Haram — is still loyal to al-Baghdadi, but has issued only a single video since Abu Musab al-Barnawi deposed Abubakr Shekau as leader in August 2016. Even then, that video’s narrative was tailored more toward contextualizing events in Nigeria in order to encourage IS sectarian narratives in Syria and Iraq, rather than inspire jihadists in Nigeria or the Lake Chad region (the video portrayed Iranian and Shia influence in Nigeria, for example) (archive.org, February 13).

While some West Africa Province propaganda photos released by IS have shown its hisba (sharia enforcement) patrols in villages around Lake Chad, West Africa Province’s de-facto reign over territories it has held in northern Borno State since 2014 has otherwise rarely been featured in IS propaganda. Indeed, this may be because West Africa Province is barely governing its territory. Unlike IS, which enforces its social provisions, West Africa Province allows the population in areas it controls to live with little interference, as long as they avoid collaborating with the Nigerian government (Naji.com, March 28).

In addition to the apparent disconnect between West Africa Province and the IS media apparatus, which likely reflects a broader disconnect to IS leadership, the group also appears to be coordinating with various cells in Nigeria that are or were part of Ansaru, the now operationally dormant al-Qaeda sub-group in Nigeria.

Such coordination would be unlikely if these Ansaru members believed West Africa Province was behaving toward the population in the same way IS does in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, evidence from conversations between West Africa Province leaders suggests the main area where West Africa Province does respect IS orders is the kidnapping of women, including the Chibok schoolgirls (Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2016).

West Africa Province leaders claim al-Baghdadi has permitted them to take captive only Christian women, not Muslims, even if the Muslim women are “apostates” who participate in democracy. Shekau, by contrast, considers any apostate — whether Muslim or Christian — to be deserving of enslavement and does not trust the West Africa Province leaders’ claims about relaying al-Baghdadi’s orders on the issue of slavery. In all other respects, West Africa Province appears not to take orders from IS on day-to-day affairs.

Developments in Kogi State

The West Africa Province-Ansaru relationship can be seen most prominently in developments in Nigeria’s Kogi State, which, like virtually all states south of Abuja, has been largely free from attacks since the start of the insurgency in 2009. There have, however, been a small number of notable incidents that show Ansaru is the main group to have a presence there, including:
an ambush by Ansaru in late 2012 on Mali-bound Nigerian troops before the French-led intervention that ousted AQIM, MUJWA and Ansar Dine from northern Mali commenced in 2013 (Vanguard, January 20, 2013);
the arrest of Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi in April 2016 (Vanguard, December 28, 2016); and
a series of raids on bomb-making factories and prison breaks in 2012-2013, although these were not claimed by Ansaru or any other faction (Leadership, April 6, 2012).

Kogi State came back into the spotlight in February 2017 when the Nigerian government reported that a Kogi-based group called the Muslim Brotherhood — with no apparent relation to the Egypt-founded global Islamist group of the same name — had sent fighters for training with IS in Libya.

Some of these fighters are now returning to Nigeria. In February, members of the new group attacked police stations in Okehi, Kogi State, killing two people (thecable.ng, February 10; Premium Times, February 10).

A possible explanation for this Kogi State-Libya nexus is that the Salafist extremist cells that have reportedly been brewing in Kogi for years have finally connected with a broader umbrella jihadist movement, such as IS (Newsrescue.com, October 28, 2015).

It may also be the case that Ansaru cells in Kogi have grown impatient with the operational dormancy of Ansaru, left the group to form the Muslim Brotherhood and then traveled to Libya with West Africa Province’s support (al-Risalah, January 10). The overlap between the Muslim Brotherhood sending fighters to Libya and Ansaru can be seen in reports from the Nigerian security forces in northwestern Nigeria, where Ansaru was formed in 2011, that say at least two Ansaru cells there have been sending fighters to train with IS in Libya (Thenewsnigeria.com.ng, August 22, 2016; Premium Times; February 9, 2016).

While some Nigerians traveled to Libya independently to fight with IS, West Africa Province has likely facilitated others — at least five men and one child have featured in IS propaganda in Libya, and several Nigerian women have been recorded as married to IS fighters.

The reason for this coordination is that West Africa Province, Ansaru and presumably the Muslim Brotherhood share a common ideology, history (West Africa Province’s key leaders were former Ansaru members), area of operations and strategic objectives in Nigeria that make experience and training in Libya mutually beneficial. The West Africa Province-planned attack on the U.S. and UK embassies, for example, which was exposed in April, reflects the long-standing “far enemy” targets of Ansaru (Vanguard, April 12).

In sum, the new Muslim Brotherhood group is likely related to Ansaru and both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansaru may be cooperating with West Africa Province for mutual gain, regardless of their affiliations.

The State of Play for JAS

Boko Haram’s faction under the leadership of Abubakr Shekau — known as Jamaat Ahlisunnah Liddaawati Wal-Jihad (JAS) — is neither affiliated to al-Qaeda nor IS and is operating independently but keeping a hand extended to IS.

It still claims to be an Islamic State in West Africa and issues video footage with IS branding, even though its films are not made or promoted by IS, and Shekau still declares al-Baghdadi to be the caliph. That aside, West Africa Province (and mainstream Muslims more generally) criticize JAS for its killing of Muslims civilians who Shekau deems to be “apostates” for not joining his group.

JAS has been engaged in a new narrative campaign targeting Nigeria’s Salafists and Ansaru sympathizers. JAS argues that Nigeria’s largest Islamic group, the Salafist/Wahhabist Izala movement, was wrong to have ultimately rejected the preaching of Boko Haram founder Muhammed Yusuf, whose blood JAS says “is valuable to us, more valuable than the blood of all Nigerians, all Nigerians, starting from [Nigerian President Muhammadu] Buhari, his aides, ministers, judges, military and everyone” (Youtube, April 3).

At the same time, JAS has reaffirmed its commitment to Yusuf’s successor, Shekau, who JAS describes as “the strong, courageous one, feared by the West, who is now the biggest threat to Nigeria.” Two other recent JAS videos have focused specifically on JAS attacks in Cameroon. They also, for the first time in JAS’ media output, highlighted French-speaking fighters, suggesting Shekau is trying to break out of his isolation by targeting Nigerian Salafist/Wahhabist and Cameroonians (Youtube, April 1; Vanguard, February 27).

Despite JAS’s “outreach,” West Africa Province’s Abu Musab al-Barnawi — along with his close allies Mamman Nur and Abu Fatima, both of whom used to operate with Ansaru — continues to criticize Shekau’s killing of fellow Muslims (Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2016). This criticism, which is the same as that al-Qaeda levies against IS, suggests there are ideological differences between the leaders of West Africa Province and the leadership of IS, even if for the time being West Africa Province’s belief in the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi’s position as IS caliph supersedes these differences.

Ansaru, for its part, is leaderless and largely inactive operationally, even if its members or former members still engage in jihadist activities. Some supporters still post on Facebook and criticize Shekau. Historically, Ansaru criticized Shekau not only for his killing of Muslims civilians and his bizarre mannerisms — such as a “crotch-scratching” incident during his video claiming the bombing of the Grand Mosque in Kano in November 2014 – but also his apparent heterodoxy (al-Hiddaya, February 10, 2015). For example, Ansaru supporters in a video posted on Facebook declared Shekau as an apostate for saying that Jesus Christ was not born through the word of God (Zalunci Haram, April 1).

Maintaining Preeminence in West Africa

The jihadist landscape of West Africa is prone to shifting alliances. To maintain its pre-eminence in the region, al-Qaeda will attempt to keep the newly formed JNIM clear of IS infiltration and JNIM is unlikely to openly cooperate with any IS-affiliated group.

In the long-term, if West Africa Province withdraws its support for IS — especially if al-Baghdadi dies, or IS loses its territory and there are doubts over the legitimacy of the caliphate — then JNIM could be further strengthened. An IS collapse could see West Africa Province, together with former Ansaru members and Muslim Brotherhood members, re-integrate into al-Qaeda structures and ultimately join JNIM.

Issues such as Ansaroul Islam’s current rejection of JNIM are manageable for JNIM. It seems unlikely that even if the Burkina Faso-based group pledges allegiance to IS it can overshadow JNIM’s operational tempo, even if allied with the other IS factions operating around Burkina Faso.

In Nigeria, JAS is unlikely to re-integrate into al-Qaeda structures unless Shekau is killed. But even that scenario is not so difficult to imagine — an assassination could come at the hands of West Africa Province or by former Ansaru members who tend to know the location of his hideouts. Shekau now refuses to meet with West Africa Province leaders for fear they will plant a tracking device on him (Vanguard, February 24).

The best-case scenario for JNIM — and as such for al-Qaeda — would be if al-Baghdadi dies, the IS caliphate folds and Shekau is killed. In that situation, it would not be inconceivable that JNIM could pull a newly united West Africa Province, JAS, Ansaru and the Muslim Brotherhood into the JNIM fold, likely under new names.

In such a case, Ansroul Islam or any other pro-IS leaning factions would be left marginal and obsolete, and would likely eventually fall into JNIM’s orbit.

Life Sentence On Habre, A landmark In The Global Fight Against Impunity, Says U.S

THE NEWS

MAY 30, 2016

The United States on Monday welcomed the Extraordinary African Chambers’ (CAE) sentencing of former Chadian President, Hissene Habre to life in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) recalls that Habre was also convicted of charges of murder, torture, rape, and sexual slavery and sentenced to life in prison.

U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry in a statement by State Department in New York, said the ruling was a landmark in the global fight against impunity for atrocities.

The statement said Habre’s crimes were numerous, calculated, and grave.

According to the statement, beginning in 1982, Habre’s eight-year term as the president of Chad is marked by large-scale systematic violations.

It said Habre committed murder of an estimated 40,000 people, widespread sexual violence, mass imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and torture.

It added that without the persistence of his accusers and their demand for justice, Habre might never have faced a court of law.

“I especially commend the courage of the nearly 100 victims who testified.

“I hope the truths uncovered through a fair and impartial trial will bring some measure of peace to his thousands of victims and their families.

“As a country committed to the respect for human rights and the pursuit of justice, this is also an opportunity for the U.S. to reflect on, and learn from, our own connection with past events in Chad.

“I strongly commend the Senegalese Government, the Chadian Government and the African Union for creating the CAE that allowed for a fair and balanced trial.

“Let this be a message to other perpetrators of mass atrocities, even those at the highest levels.

“And including former heads of state, that such actions will not be tolerated and they will be brought to justice”, it said.

NAN recalls that a special court in Senegal sentenced Habre to life in prison after convicting him of crimes against humanity, torture and sexual slavery.

The verdict on Monday brings to an end a 16-year battle by victims and rights campaigners to bring the former leader to justice in Senegal.

He fled after being toppled in a 1990 coup in the central African nation.

In a judgment, Gberdao Kam, President of CAE court, said: “Hissene Habre, this court finds you guilty of crimes against humanity, rape, forced slavery, and kidnapping, as well as war crimes.

“The court condemns you to life in prison.”

He gave Habre 15 days to appeal against the sentence.

NAN reports that human rights groups accused the 72-year old of being responsible for the deaths of 40,000 people during his rule from 1982 to 1990.

Habre’s case was heard by the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal’s capital, Dakar, a special criminal court set up by the African Union within the West African nation’s court system.

Chad Ex-Dictator Rejects Trial; Judge Commands Attendance

People stand in line before entering the court building, rear, where the trial of former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre is taking place in Dakar, Senegal, Monday, July 20, 2015, The trial of former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre, accused of overseeing the deaths of thousands, had a chaotic beginning Monday as security forces ushered the ex-leader into and then out of the Senegal courtroom amid protests by his supporters. (AP)

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Former Chad dictator Hissene Habre on Monday denied the legitimacy of the special court set up to try him in Senegal for the deaths of thousands during his rule, but the head of the tribunal said he would be compelled to participate.

Habre's lawyers said he was forced to attend the first day of his trial for crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture — an unprecedented case of one African country trying the former leader of another — but he was quickly ushered back out after he and a few supporters in the court caused chaos.

"This is not a trial, this is a masquerade!" the white robed Habre shouted as he was taken away. "There is no trial. There are no lawyers. This is a false trial. Down with colonialism." The Extraordinary African Chambers, a special tribunal, was created to try him in Senegal for the alleged crimes during his 1982-1990 rule.

Habre later issued a statement saying he had been illegally detained and would "not respond to the court." Tribunal head Gberdao Gustave Kam read the statement, adjourned proceedings until Tuesday and said Habre would be made to attend.

Lawyers for Habre have threatened to boycott the trial and one of them, Cire Cledor Ly, removed his legal robes in protest and took a seat in the court audience. "They talk of international justice in Africa?" said Cledor Ly. "This is theater."

Habre was first indicted by a Senegalese judge in 2000, according to Human Rights Watch, but twists and turns, arrests and releases over more than a decade brought the case to Belgium, and then finally back to Senegal, where Habre fled after being overthrown in 1990.

Under a new president, Senegal's national assembly adopted a law to create the special tribunal. It is the first trial in Africa of a universal jurisdiction case, in which a country's national courts can prosecute serious crimes committed abroad, by a foreigner and against foreign victims, said Human Rights Watch. It is also the first time the courts of one country are prosecuting the former ruler of another for alleged human rights crimes.

"This is a first in Africa, and we must extend congratulations for this," said Mbaye Gueye, a neutral legal representative who addressed the court and called for a fair trial. Many have argued that the International Criminal Court unfairly targets African leaders, so a fair trial with a credible verdict could support the argument that Africans can try their own.

Habre's government was responsible for an estimated 40,000 deaths, according to a report published in May 1992 by a 10-member truth commission formed by Chad's current President Idriss Deby. The commission singled out Habre's political police force for using torture.

Jacqueline Moudeina, the lead counsel for the civil parties, made a plea in the name of more than 4,000 victims and urged the court to give them justice on Monday. "The world watches you, it watches us. This process touches humanity ... a humanity that was not afforded to these victims," she said in her opening statement.

Survivors of the abuse have been the main advocates for justice, working toward this trial for about 15 years. About 100 are expected to testify during hearings that are likely to last three months. Clement Abaifouta, president of the main victims' association and a detainee who was forced to bury fellow prisoners, said his memories continue to haunt him.

"I hope for the condemnation of Habre because he now cannot escape," he said prior to the trial.

Associated Press writer Babacar Dione contributed to this report from Dakar.

Nowhere To Go For S.Sudanese In Central African Republic

South Sudanese refugee Ibrahim Abakar poses for a picture in the courtyard of the mosque where he and other people seeking safety from deadly sectarian violence have been spending the night, in the Kilometer 5 neighborhood of Bangui, Central African Republic. As tens of thousands of other Africans have been repatriated to their home countries, Abakar is one of a small group of refugees who has nowhere to go. His country is on the brink of civil war. 'I can't return and I can't stay here, he says. 'I just want to go somewhere where there is peace.'

BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ASSOCIATED PRESS) — Ibrahim Abakar sleeps with a machete at his side, terrified the darkness will bring death or disappearance as it did for his wife and young sons when armed Christian fighters showed up at their door in the capital of Central African Republic.

Returning to the land of his birth isn't an option though — South Sudan is now on the brink of civil war, mired in conflict just as the area was when he fled from there more than two decades ago. "I can't return and I can't stay here," the 38-year-old Muslim said desperately. "I just want to go somewhere there is peace. I have seen too many people here killed in front of me."

Death is possible if he stays, or if he goes to the only other country that will take him. Abakar has spent most of his life in Central African Republic, where he also married his wife, but has no passport to travel with.

Abakar's dilemma underscores the volatility of this corner of the world, where the deepening crisis in Central African Republic has forced some to flee across borders to desperately poor and unstable countries like Chad and Congo. Others are now escaping to home countries where they don't even speak the local language fluently, and have few remaining relatives or job prospects.

Central African Republic has long teetered on the brink of anarchy, but the new unrest unleashed by a March 2013 coup has ignited previously unseen sectarian hatred between Christians and Muslims. More than 1,000 people were killed in December alone and nearly 1 million displaced.

The United States closed its embassy in Bangui last year and urged its citizens to leave. Many Africans with businesses and family ties to Central African Republic, though, chose to stay after the March coup. France sent 1,600 troops to bolster an African Union force expected to reach 3,000 troops. But the imperative to leave now has spiked as the country's minority Muslim population has come under growing recriminatory attacks from Christians.

France's U.N. ambassador told a U.N. meeting Wednesday on the prevention of genocide that his country underestimated the hatred and resentment between Christian and Muslim communities. "We knew there was some inter-sectarian violence but we did not forecast such a deep ingrained hatred," he said.

Araud said African and French soldiers in the impoverished country are facing "nearly an impossible situation." Araud said France is discussing what the soldiers should do to prevent the killings. He urged consultations with psychologists or ethnologists to understand the roots of the hatred, because religious leaders' calls for an end to the fighting are being ignored.

Abakar is one of 67 South Sudanese who are currently stuck in Bangui, according to Daniel Anakleto, a representative for the community of South Sudanese refugees that includes both Christians and Muslims.

Tens of thousands of other Africans — mostly Muslims — have been repatriated home to Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal in recent weeks, according to the United Nations. Hundreds of Malians have been brought back to the capital of Bamako after seeking refuge at the Senegalese consulate in Bangui because the Malians do not have an embassy there. Another 550 people were being brought back to Mali on Tuesday and Wednesday by the International Organization for Migration.

Malian national Aissata Daf was born in Central African Republic, and said she and her family had lived through all kinds of political crises there but had never chose to leave until last week when she was brought to Bamako.
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She recalled the horror of watching a pregnant neighbor in labor brutally attacked before her eyes by the Christian militia known as the anti-balaka. "Even before she could get to the hospital, the anti-balaka found her and they opened her stomach with machetes and killed the baby," she said. "It was horrible — there was blood everywhere. And they only attacked her because she was Muslim."
Daf doesn't know what she will do now in Mali, where she and other repatriated Malians speak to each other in Sango, the national language of their adopted country. Nearly 4,000 Cameroonians have been airlifted free of charge from Bangui to Douala since mid-December. Upon arrival in Cameroon, they were given bus fare to the town of their choice.

Nigerian Ahamdu Mandako, 43, had lived in Bangui for 20 years building his business. His shop was razed by Christian fighters, though he escaped with his life. Now he, his wife and five children have returned to Adamawa State in northeast Nigeria.

"A lot of Nigerians have been killed and their corpses burnt. Others are still trapped in Central Africa," he said. "We have lost everything we labored for but we thank the Nigerian government for rescuing us and we hope we can start life again."

Abakar, the native of South Sudan, has not seen his wife or 8-year-old son since the night he crawled out of a window when the Christian militiamen came to their door. His 12-year-old son Isaka's body turned up at a neighborhood morgue.

"We don't sleep at night out of fear for our lives," said Abakar, who has left the shelter of a mosque to stay with a friend. "We are asking for people to come and save us."

Larson reported from Dakar, Senegal. Associated Press writers Baba Ahmed in Bamako, Mali; Fidelis Mbah in Abuja, Nigeria; Anne Mireille Nzouankeu in Yaounde, Cameroon and Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations contributed to this report.

Follow Krista Larson on Twitter at https://twitter.com/klarsonafrica.

C. African Republic Leader Is Subject Of Summit

People who had been sleeping in a food distribution area push their way back in, as they are ordered to move to a new settlement area, in an informal camp housing an estimated 100,000 displaced people, at Mpoko Airport in Bangui, Central African Republic, Wednesday, Jan. 8, 2014. Food and supplies distribution by the World Food Program and the United Nations Refugee Agency began Tuesday and was expected to last 10 days.

N'DJAMENA, CHAD (ASSOCIATED PRESS) — The rebel leader-turned-president of Central African Republic is at a regional summit where he's expected to face renewed pressure to step aside less than a year after he seized power.

Michel Djotodia was installed as president after his rebel fighters stormed the capital of Bangui in March. The country has since deteriorated into near anarchy. Violence between Christians and Muslims left more than 1,000 people dead in December, and nearly 1 million have fled their homes in fear.

Djotodia is attending a regional summit Thursday in the Chadian capital along with presidents from Chad, Congo and Gabon. His spokesman has issued a statement denying rumors that Djotodia will step down at the meeting.

Djotodia's critics say he has failed to stem the attacks blamed on his fighters. In a message to the summit, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, "'The danger of further upheaval along religious lines is real and poses a long-term danger to the country."

Ban also said that the United Nations intends to establish a commission to "document abuses and human rights violations. Together, we must send a strong message that those committing atrocities will be held accountable."

Associated Press writer Peter James Spielmann contributed from the United Nations.

Six Chadian Peacekeepers Killed In Central African Repubublic

French soldiers drive past the burnt-out shell of a pick-up truck in the Gobongo neighborhood of Bangui, Central African Republic, Thursday, Dec. 26, 2013. Residents and anti-balaka militiamen claimed the neighborhood had been attacked by Chadian soldiers firing rockets, and that anti-balaka militiamen had retaliated by destroying a pick-up truck carrying soldiers with a grenade. Their account could not be independently verified. Several nearby homes and shops were destroyed. The spokesman for an African Union peacekeeping force says six Chadian peacekeepers were killed and 15 were wounded, after being attacked Wednesday. The Chadian contingent, which is made up of Arabic-speaking Muslim soldiers, has been accused of taking sides against the Christian population in the country's sectarian conflict.

BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (ASSOCIATED PRESS) — Elodiane Baalbe hid underneath her bed as gunfire echoed around her on Christmas Day in the capital of Central African Republic. When it finally died down on Thursday, she made a dash for safety, hiding behind houses as she fled her neighborhood.

On her way out she passed the calcified car of a unit of Chadian peacekeepers, the charred body of one soldier still upright in the vehicle inside. "I had my 3-year-old on my back. I looked for a second, and then I kept running," she said.

A total of six Chadian soldiers from the African Union peacekeeping force were killed on Christmas Day in the Gobongo neighborhood of the capital, the AU said. Their destroyed car, with some of their remains, had still not been removed a day later, underscoring how dangerous this chaotic country has become, even for the international forces tasked with pacifying it.

"A total of six Chadian soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded in an ambush at noon yesterday. The assailants have not yet been identified," said African Union mission spokesman Eloi Yao. The Central African Republic has tilted into anarchy, as the country's Christian majority seeks revenge against the Muslim rebels who seized power in a coup nine months ago. Both Christian and Muslim civilians are now armed, and the international troops brought in to try to rein in the violence are accused of having taken sides.

The Chadians, part of an African Union force made up of soldiers from several neighboring nations, are Muslim and are seen by the population as backing the Seleka rebels who toppled the nation's Christian president in March. Earlier this week when Christians marched on the capital, an Associated Press journalist saw a unit of Chadian peacekeepers drive into the crowd. Moments later, gunfire rang out, suggesting they had opened fire on the crowd.

On the flip side, the 1,600 French troops who were deployed here in the first week of December are accused of backing the nation's Christian majority. Their patrols have come under fire in Muslim neighborhoods, like the tense streets of Kilometer 5.

Caught in the middle are civilians, both Christians and Muslims, who are now bearing the brunt of collective punishment. Militiamen have been seen desecrating the corpses of their victims. An AP journalist saw Christian fighters known as anti-Balaka brandishing the severed penis of one dead victim, and the hacked off foot of another. Unclaimed bodies left to rot were found missing their genitals. Another was missing his nose.

The barbarity unleashed on the streets of this capital has surprised many. Although chronically poor, the Central African Republic was relatively stable for the 10 years following its second-to-last coup in 2003. That military takeover brought Christian leader Francois Bozize to power.

Though he was accused of favoring members of his ethnic group, and further marginalizing the Muslim minority, based in the country's north, the country never saw violence on the scale it is witnessing now.

On Thursday, the United Nations emergency response office said in a statement that some 639,000 people out of a population of 4.5 million are displaced. Altogether 2 million people need humanitarian aid — almost half the country.

Baalbe, a 36-year-old midwife, is now at the airport, sharing the asphalt with tens of thousands of other mostly Christian refugees. At her side are her six children — the youngest a 3-year-old toddler.
"I carried him on my back and like that I ran all the way here, to the airport. In Gobongo, I saw the burnt-out car. They burnt those people (the Chadians) just like that. I saw their cadavers inside, and then I fled," she said.

__ Callimachi contributed to this report from Dakar, Senegal. Associated Press staffers Rebecca Blackwell in Bangui, and Baba Ahmed in Dakar, Senegal, also contributed to this report.

Chad’s Former Dictator Arrested In Senegal

AFP

Sunday, June 30, 2013

Senegalese authorities detained former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre on Sunday, the first step towards a trial on charges of crimes against humanity that is seen by many as a milestone for African justice.

The man once dubbed “Africa’s Pinochet” also stands accused of war crimes and torture during his eight years in power in Chad, where rights groups say that some 40,000 people were killed under his rule.

“Hissene Habre has been taken into custody as part of the probe,” said a prosecutor with a special court set up in February to try the 70-year-old former leader.

One of Habre’s lawyers, El Hadji Diouf, told local radio he had been arrested at his home in Dakar where he lives with his wife and children and taken to an unknown destination.

His other lawyers said in a later statement that Habre had been “illegally seized and taken away by force”.

Ibrahima Diawara and Francois Serres said Habre had been “taken by force from his home even though no summons or search or arrest warrant from a judge had been issued to him”.

The statement seen by AFP said the lawyers “denounce most firmly this illegal kidnapping which is a very grave violation of President Habre’s rights, and demand his immediate release”.

Delayed for years by Senegal where he has lived since being ousted in 1990, Habre’s trial will set a historic precedent as until now African leaders accused of atrocities have only been tried in international courts.

Typically dressed in combat fatigues during the years of his rule, Habre earned the nickname “desert fighter” after he seized power in 1982 from former rebel ally Goukouni Weddeye during a long conflict with Libya, which wanted to annex the north of Chad.

His regime was marked by fierce repression of his opponents and the targeting of ethnic groups, and in 1990 he fled to Senegal after being ousted by Chad’s now President Idriss Deby Itno.

A decade later a group of victims filed charges against him in Senegal, but he has never been brought to trial and former president Abdoulaye Wade repeatedly tried to “get rid of him”.

On a visit to Senegal on Thursday as part of his three-nation Africa tour, US President Barack Obama hailed Dakar’s efforts to prosecute the former dictator as a sign of the country’s commitment to justice in Africa.

“This is a trial that we have supported and we welcome Senegal’s leadership in undertaking this effort to see that justice is done and in fact we have committed resources in support of their efforts,” said US deputy national security advisor Ben Rhodes.

Senegal and the African Union signed an agreement in December to set up the court to try Habre for the offences, allegedly committed between 1982 and 1990.

The AU had mandated Senegal to try Habre in July 2006, but the country stalled the process for years under Wade.

Habre was also wanted for trial in Belgium on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges after three Belgian nationals of Chadian origin filed suit in 2000 for arbitrary arrest, mass murder and torture during his 1982-1990 regime.

Senegalese President Macky Sall, Wade’s successor who took office in April 2012, ruled out extraditing Habre to Belgium, which was prepared to try him, vowing to organise a trial in Senegal.

In May, lawyers for Habre said they had filed a lawsuit in Senegal to try to prevent the trial from going ahead, saying the west African country had violated his human rights.

Under Senegalese law, Habre can be held in custody for a period of 48 hours, renewable once.