Senegal Is On The Brink: The IMF, The World Bank, And The Debt Crisis That Imperils West Africa

BY HANNAH NRAE ARMSTRONG AND JOHN MCINTIRE

W est Africa is reeling. Over the past five years, coups have racked Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and the juntas now in charge are dismantling the countries’ institutions. Even as they repress their subjects, they are losing territory to emboldened insurgents. And as these insurgent groups become more entrenched in the central Sahel, they are beginning to threaten the coastal states of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo.

But amid this upheaval, Senegal remains a democracy in which strong institutions mostly govern capably. The country possesses skilled civil servants with track records of transparent, efficient fiscal management. In 2024, Senegal faced a severe political crisis when the outgoing administration resisted leaving power, but an independent Constitutional Council and an engaged civil society prevented an unconstitutional postponement of elections. Senegal is essentially the only major country in Francophone West Africa whose government remains accountable to its citizens; its stability telegraphs to its neighbors that democratic rule is both desirable and achievable.

Now, however, Senegal is grappling with its own existential threat. On a single day in February 2025, the country went from being considered one of Africa’s most stable economies to one of its most vulnerable after the discovery that President Diomaye Faye’s predecessor, Macky Sall, had hidden extensive debt. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio has since soared from under 75 percent to over 132 percent. Amid a recent fallout between the country’s top two political leaders, Senegal is attempting to negotiate a new program with the International Monetary Fund. Without help, Senegal could default.

A little support in the form of debt relief from the IMF and the World Bank would quickly help restore balance. A punishing debt burden, on the other hand, would sap resources for badly needed public services, infrastructure, and economic development initiatives. Beyond weakening Senegal’s governing capabilities, such an outcome would create new political and security vulnerabilities throughout West Africa at precisely the moment when Russia is trying to exploit disorder to recruit new proxies.

HIDDEN FIGURES

Over the past five years, military regimes seized power in the central Sahel states, Côte d’Ivoire elected an 83-year-old fourth-term president who banned opposition candidates from running, and Togo pushed through constitutional reforms to keep a two-decade-old dynasty in power. But Senegal managed to remain stable and accountable. In 2024, civil society actors and an independent judiciary drew on what the political scientists Ibrahima Fall and Catherine Lena Kelly describe as Senegal’s democratic “muscle memory”—decades of mobilizing to defend checks and balances—to ensure elections proceeded on schedule. A duo of youthful reformers (Faye and the fiery Ousmane Sanko, who now serves as speaker of the National Assembly) defeated Sall’s handpicked candidate in a decisive first-round victory.

And until February 2025, Senegal’s economic outlook was mostly sunny, having enjoyed a strong recovery after the COVID pandemic. In recent decades, Senegal has expanded access to quality public services, closed the gender gap in school enrollment, and significantly reduced infant mortality rates. New hydrocarbon projects were expected to allow for increased government investments in roads, energy, and water.

But when Faye took over from Sall, his government commissioned an independent audit of state finances to establish the extent of Senegal’s public debt amid rumors of anomalies. The audit’s findings, published on February 12, 2025, came as a shock: they revealed an estimated $7 billion to $13 billion in unreported debt incurred between 2019 and 2023. It became clear that over the course of his second term, Sall had significantly boosted government borrowing and spending as he pursued an unconstitutional third term, all while intentionally misreporting debt figures in legally mandated public accounting to Senegal’s parliament.

The huge debt had gone unnoticed because Senegal’s presidency and finance ministry had hidden it from the National Assembly, the IMF, and the World Bank by keeping unrecorded loans off the books. But the latter two institutions played a role in the accrual of the illegal debt. Since the 1990s, the IMF and the World Bank have been long-term development partners for Senegal, making substantial technical and financial commitments intended to promote growth and reduce poverty. The most recent were a $1.8 billion loan package from the IMF and $300 million in budget support from the World Bank. At that point, these institutions had enough material evidence to discern anomalies, yet they kept financing Sall’s government.

Under Senegal’s program with the IMF, the multilateral lender would have had full electronic access to the government’s fiscal and financial data, enabling it to closely monitor financial activity. Senegalese authorities were required to provide electronic reporting every three to six months, often giving the IMF more detailed oversight of the government’s finances than the country’s own parliament enjoys. Such a discrepancy is reprehensible but by no means unusual. Members of parliament and ministry officials across Africa often appeal to World Bank officials for more detailed information about government finances than their own finance ministry provides.

Red flags appeared in Senegal’s reporting to the IMF as early as June 2021, according to IMF biannual reviews that showed that Dakar had requested modifying performance criteria regarding borrowing and fiscal balance; one review in June 2022 even waived the performance criteria altogether. By the summer of 2023, as Sall faced growing public demands that he step down when his term ended, the IMF would already have flagged serious reporting inconsistencies. But despite the IMF’s substantial access to Senegalese records (and, no doubt, misled by reporting that mixed legitimate data with alleged falsifications and significant omissions), the IMF and the World Bank gave Senegal extra money in 2023: in May, the World Bank greenlighted an extra $300 million in budget support to maintain essential public services, and in June, the IMF approved a new $1.8 billion loan package for Dakar, disbursing $279 million immediately.

Sall likely used the June 2023 disbursement as implicit collateral to convince other lenders, such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s regional debt market, to keep loaning him more money. Senegalese authorities submitted internal documents to the IMF in the second half of 2023 that clearly showed overborrowing. In its public December 2023 program review, the IMF identified that a financing “shift” had occurred in Senegal between 2023 and 2024, but it claimed the shift constituted “a debt management operation with no material impact” on Senegal’s debt level.

At best, the IMF failed to carry out the supervision that is essential to its role. At worst, it was pressured to ramp up lending to try to help Sall stay in power. There is some evidence for the latter in the highly anomalous way that the IMF’s reporting acknowledged and rationalized overfinancing, tarting it up as “precautionary liquidity buffers.” Western partners, and France in particular, certainly had reasons for preferring Sall over Faye and Sonko. Sall was a solid Western ally, whereas Faye and Sonko were campaigning on a sovereigntist platform and threatening to leave the French-backed regional currency. At a time when France was rapidly losing African allies to Russia, keeping Senegal close would have been a strong priority.

A DEBT BOMB DETONATES

The IMF and the World Bank are pushing Dakar for talks about restructuring. Yet they have not undertaken efforts to adjust Senegal’s debt service payments or investigate their own roles in exacerbating the crisis; they have merely asked Senegal to create a unified debt directorate and are waiting for the credit crunch to force it to the table. Meanwhile, Sall’s successors, Faye and Sonko, have been harshly punished for the sins of his regime. Senegal’s mushrooming debt problem has hovered over their administration, compelling them to abandon promises to lower electricity and fuel prices, freeze funding for dozens of planned infrastructure projects, impose austerity measures (such as reducing health-care spending by nearly 20 percent), and scramble for new financing.

Worse, the debt crisis has driven a wedge between the reformist duo. Sonko has taken a sovereigntist line and advocated against restructuring the debt (without laying out a convincing alternative), while Faye has preferred to negotiate with the IMF. In May, this dispute blew up their alliance. Faye sacked Sonko from his prime minister role; Sonko resumed his parliamentary seat and was elected the body’s president, with 132 out of 165 members of parliament voting for him. The resulting institutional crisis has pitted Senegal’s executive against its legislature. The latter has the authority to block any budget legislation or debt-restructuring framework that the presidency tries to pass. Sonko warned in June that even if Senegal enters “a crisis involving the dissolution of parliament … there will never be an agreement with the IMF.”

As Senegal’s executive and parliamentary branches remain in a deadlock, the country’s debt continues to grow and the options to address it narrow. The deadlock, however, also reflects the strength and independence of Senegalese institutions, which are nourished by a steady stream of inclusive debate. It highlights the health of a democracy that has been revitalized by a new generation’s participation.

As the leaders of neighboring countries insist that authoritarian rule is necessary to stabilize their countries, Senegal’s democracy stands as a vital rebuttal and applies positive pressure on the citizens and leaders of those countries to seek similar freedoms. Exiled West African civil society leaders often travel to Dakar to pursue graduate degrees, investigate and prepare reports on human rights abuses, and convene conferences on civil liberties. And at a time when West Africa’s rural areas are experiencing deepening abuse and neglect, it is worth noting that these freedoms extend well beyond Senegal’s capital. A few years ago, when Malians and Senegalese people living along the Falémé River mobilized to protest its devastation by gold mining practices, the state responses could not have been more different. Malian forces, siding with miners, beat and detained activists, while Senegal’s Faye issued a decree suspending all mining within 550 yards of the river.

WIN-WIN SOLUTION

Senegal is left with two ugly options: borrow more on worse terms to service its debt or restructure under a new IMF program. Faye is under significant pressure from Sonko’s legislature and the public not to pursue restructuring: the term has acquired a stink, with Sonko calling it a “disgrace.” Restructuring would likely entail highly unpopular measures such as removing fuel subsidies and lowering teachers’ salaries. For many Senegalese people, restructuring recalls the catastrophic structural adjustment programs the IMF imposed on their country in the 1980s and 1990s, which crimped the government’s autonomy and led to cuts in key sectors such as health and education without meaningfully freeing Senegal from cycles of debt and dependence. But in late June, Sonko softened his opposition to restructuring, likely to pave the way for a presidential bid by opening the door for a painful restructuring that will inevitably make Faye look bad.

If Senegal does not restructure its loans, its colossal and criminally acquired debt could crush the economy. Some public salaries are already in arrears, and pensions and energy subsidies could soon face cuts, events that could spark riots and wider unrest. And if the institutional deadlock persists, it could start to erode Senegalese democracy. The IMF already bears some responsibility for the crisis. And now its official insistence on full repayment to creditors is putting Senegal’s macroeconomic stability at risk and undermining the government’s ability to provide health care and education, transition from agriculture to manufacturing, and invest in much-needed public infrastructure.

To pull Senegal back from the brink, Washington should push the IMF and the World Bank to take a significant haircut. Between 2027 and 2031, Senegal is due to pay principal, interest, and fees on its IMF debt amounting to about $891 million; it will owe the World Bank roughly $1.37 billion in debt service over the same period. Taken together, these figures neatly parallel the $2 billion that these institutions lent Senegal in 2023, when it should have been abundantly clear not to. Relief on the approximately $2 billion owed to the IMF and the World Bank could reduce the country’s total external debt service by 16 percent, leaving it with still considerable yet more manageable payments.

The IMF and the World Bank should cancel these payments. These institutions’ principal shareholders, especially Washington and Paris, should urge them to support cancellation and bring other shareholders such as Beijing on board. The IMF and the World Bank likely believe that new oil revenue and increased fiscal pressure (that is, higher taxes and lower fuel subsidies) will allow Senegal to continue to service its debt. They are wrong. Over the past three years, oil revenue has proved disappointing, and much of it may already have been pledged as future sales. Revenues from sharply raising taxes and lowering subsidies will destabilize the country.

Although board members may argue that debt relief sets a bad precedent, the IMF and the World Bank have already helped Argentina on a much bigger scale, and in 2004, the two organizations’ HIPC debt relief initiative, aimed at helping heavily indebted poor countries, granted extensive forgiveness to reduce debt burdens to sustainable levels in Senegal. Canceling Senegal’s debt service would entail trivial losses for these international institutions, which—unlike Senegal—can seek special replenishment from other sources. Beyond assisting Dakar, this relief would benefit Paris and Beijing, its two largest bilateral creditors, by allowing the country to make good on its payments to them. And Paris has an interest in stabilizing Senegal’s debt to prevent a wider contagion. Senegal’s debt crisis threatens the larger regional economic bloc, the West African Economic and Monetary Union, whose shared currency is guaranteed by the French Treasury.

Breathing room would allow Senegal’s leaders to get back to governing and shore up stability in a region that badly needs it. It would also help the IMF and the World Bank retain their reputation for integrity at a moment when such institutions are viewed with increasing skepticism.

Dakar must also launch an investigation into the Senegalese actors responsible for the illegal debt. So far, Faye has declined to do so, likely because he worries his government may have to expose or prosecute political figures whose support he will need in the future. To incentivize Senegal to investigate its own institutions, significant debt relief from international organizations could be made contingent on a public investigation into the illegal debt to ensure a crisis like this cannot happen again and make the country’s institutions even more accountable.

El-Ghassim Wane, a former senior African Union adviser from the Sahel steeped in how good governance helps ward off conflict, noted to us that “the cost of supporting a country that has remained committed to constitutional governance and democratic principles is far lower than the cost of managing instability once it takes hold.” Debt forgiveness would help protect Senegal’s achievements; without it, the country risks falling into a debt trap for years, if not decades. And the region will lose its democratic anchor.

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In Senegal, A 2,000‑Year‑Old Iron Workshop Sheds New Light On The Past

Slag shaped like the seeds of the rattan palm reflects a unique cultural choice. © David Glauser, Fourni par l'auteur

BY MELISSA MOREL, ANNE MAYOR AND LADJI DIANIFABA

How was iron produced 2,000 years ago in Senegal? A recent study at the Didé West 1 archaeological site, in the Falémé Valley in eastern Senegal, sheds light on an ancient iron production technique.

Passed down from generation to generation for nearly eight centuries, this technology appears to have been developed to meet local needs. African archaeology specialists Anne Mayor, Mélissa Morel and Ladji Dianifaba explain the significance of this discovery and what it reveals about the transmission of technical knowledge over the long term.

What did you find?

For over 2,000 years, metalworkers produced iron in what is now Senegal. By studying the remains they left behind, we have been able to reconstruct their technical choices, the natural resources they used, and, to some extent, aspects of their way of life. Beyond their scientific value, these studies also highlight the expertise of ancient blacksmiths, since iron production represented a major technical and social transformation, particularly for agriculture.

In eastern Senegal, in the Falémé Valley, within the Boundou Community Nature Reserve, many ancient iron production sites have been identified in recent years. Archaeological surveys and excavations carried out by an international research team involving scholars from the universities of Geneva and Fribourg in Switzerland, as well as the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, revealed at least five distinct technical iron traditions.

The new study focused on one of these iron production techniques (named FAL02) identified in the region, which is represented at around 100 sites.

The site of Didé West 1 (DDW1), the largest and best-preserved of these sites, stands out for two major reasons. First, it provides one of the earliest known dates for iron-smelting furnaces in Senegal. Second, it documents a long sequence of metallurgical activity spanning nearly 800 years, from 400 BCE to 400 CE. These radiocarbon dates were obtained from charcoal directly associated with the furnaces.

The exceptional preservation of this site allowed us to document this technique in detail, trace its transformations over time, and better understand the choices made by the metallurgists.

How were you able to prove it?

The main evidence of ancient iron metallurgy comes from slag, which is the waste produced when ore is transformed into metal. During the smelting process, this slag flows like molten lava within the furnace before solidifying into rocky masses. Once the operation was completed, the slag was discarded and gradually piled up into large heaps.

Our study of the Didé West 1 slag heap revealed 35 furnace bases, attesting to repeated activity over several dozen generations. Certain technical features define this tradition, including multi-perforated tuyères (clay pipes pierced with holes to allow air to circulate within the furnace), as well as the use of African palm nuts as packing material at the bottom of the furnace. This system appears to have facilitated the separation of metal from slag.

By combining these observations, we were able to reconstruct how this technique worked. The metalworkers used small circular furnaces equipped with a removable chimneys rather than permanent shafts. The iron ore likely consisted of laterites (a type of soil) collected from the immediate surroundings. Taken together, these elements reflect a high level of technical expertise.

Who were the people behind this technology?

Research on African societies during the first millennium BCE and the first millennium CE comes with several challenges. Written sources are scarce, and organic materials that could provide information about housing or diet are poorly preserved. Even iron artefacts are usually too degraded to survive.

On many sites, only pottery fragments remain. It is therefore still difficult to identify precisely the populations behind the FAL02 technique. This specific technical tradition was recognised through the shapes of the furnaces, tuyères, and slag found at the sites. Iron production techniques are not merely technical processes. They reflect traditions, choices and know-how specific to each cultural group.

Analysis of the slag volumes also helps estimate how much iron was produced. At Didé West 1, the data point to modest and irregular production, likely seasonal. These elements suggest that the activity was intended to meet local needs, rather than large-scale production for export.

Why this matters

The origins of iron metallurgy in west Africa are still debated. Two major hypotheses continue to be discussed. One argues that ironworking spread from the Hittite world in Anatolia (in present-day Turkey) via the Maghreb or the Nile Valley. The other suggests an independent invention in sub-Saharan Africa. To date, the available evidence does not allow a definitive conclusion.

However, several ancient iron production sites dating from the first millennium BCE have been identified in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Nigeria, Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso, and now in Senegal. These discoveries tend to strenghten the case of local development.

Within this context, the dates obtained at Didé West 1, reaching at least the 4th century BCE, make it one of the earliest known ironworking techniques in Senegal. The site therefore contributes important new data to a still limited body of evidence and helps document the early development of metallurgy in the region.

What happens next?

This study marks an important milestone, but several questions remain unanswered. The next challenge is to better understand the other iron production techniques identified in the Falémé Valley. At least four other traditions have been recognised.

Some of these techniques were in use at the same time, revealing a complex metallurgical landscape where very different traditions coexisted. This diversity raises several questions: which groups of metallurgists were behind them? How can we explain their transformations? Why do certain techniques disappear? Were some techniques more efficient than others?

The study of the FAL02 technique over nearly 800 years demonstrates that these practices evolved, with phases of continuity and transformation. By cross-referencing this data with findings from the study of ceramics and settlements, it becomes possible to better understand the societies that produced this iron and how they changed over time.

These remains allow us to move beyond the purely technical question: they offer insight into settlement dynamics, the circulation of knowledge and expertise, and long-term societal transformations, even before the emergence of medieval kingdoms and the expansion of trans-Saharan trade.

We hope that future research will help to answer some of these questions.

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The Bias In Medical Research: Africa Carries A Huge Disease Burden But Is Missing From Clinical Trials

Researchers at the Institute of Medical Research and Medicinal Plant Studies in Yaounde, Cameroon. Daniel Beloumou Olomo / AFP via Getty Images

BY BAMBA GAYE

ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITE

CHEIKH ANTA DIOP DE DAKAR

Modern medicine prides itself on being a universal science, built on evidence from clinical trials.

But there’s a bias in medical research. While Africa accounts for roughly 25% of the global disease burden and 19% of the global population, the continent’s people are largely invisible in some clinical trials.

The scale of the erasure is revealed in a landmark study of 2,472 randomised controlled trials globally published between 2019 and 2024.

I led this team of researchers, who scrutinised the world’s most influential medical publications to quantify African representation. They included the New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, the Journal of the American Medical Association, Nature Medicine, and the British Medical Journal. There were also three leading cardiovascular journals in the study: Circulation, the European Heart Journal and the Journal of the American College of Cardiology.

I am a physician-scientist working at the intersection of cardiometabolic epidemiology and biomedical data science. I also focus on large-scale population studies in Africa and data-driven cardiovascular prevention.

Randomised controlled trials are a cornerstone of evidence-based medicine. Introduced in the mid-20th century, they rigorously evaluate the safety and effectiveness of treatments by randomly assigning participants to different groups. This is done to minimise bias. Trials like these have been central to major medical breakthroughs, from cardiovascular therapies to vaccines. They continue to guide clinical decisions and the development of new treatments worldwide.

What we discovered

Our findings show a profound imbalance in the global clinical research landscape. Across the five most prestigious general medical journals, only 3.9% of trials were conducted exclusively in Africa. In cardiovascular health, the numbers drop to a statistical whisper. Of the major trials published in leading cardiology journals, just two studies (0.6%) were conducted solely on African soil.

This is a crisis of scientific accuracy. When clinical trials exclude African populations, they produce evidence that lacks “external validity”. This refers to how well the results of a study can be generalised beyond the participants. It asks whether findings from a clinical trial will still hold true when applied to different populations, settings, or real-world conditions.

Without that validity, doctors are essentially conducting unmonitored experiments on millions of patients every day.

Modern medicine cannot claim to be universal if entire populations remain invisible in the evidence base. Biology, health systems and disease patterns are not identical across the world.

The gap and why it matters

Many treatments used across the continent are based on evidence generated in non-African populations, raising concerns about their applicability.

Moreover, most Africa-based trials still focus on infectious diseases, despite the rising burden of non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular disease.

Emerging evidence shows that genetics, environment and diet can radically alter how a body responds to a drug. It therefore makes no medical sense that an entire continent is left out of the trial net.

There’s also evidence showing that certain treatments have different safety profiles in Black patients. Diabetes and gout are just two examples. So are certain common blood pressure medications, such as angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors. Research shows that they carry a three- to four-fold higher risk of severe, life-threatening side effects in people of African descent compared to other populations.

When clinical trials exclude populations, doctors are forced to extrapolate findings from one population and apply them to another.

The study also highlights a dangerous lag between global research funding and the evolving reality of African health. The new data show that nearly 76% of trials conducted exclusively in Africa focused on infectious diseases. But the continent is undergoing a massive epidemiological shift. Non-communicable diseases – heart disease, stroke, and diabetes – now account for about 38% of all deaths in many African nations.

The middle class in Africa has tripled to 300 million people from roughly 100 million people in the early 2000s. More people are now living long enough with lifestyles that increase the risk of chronic conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension. Consequently, there is a growing need and market for long-term treatments that manage these diseases, rather than short-term therapies for infections. Yet cardiovascular trials continue to be discouraged.

Even within the continent, the data show deep “black holes” of information. South Africa accounted for over 62% of all trials conducted on the continent. Central Africa, a region that’s home to more than 180 million people, was virtually non-existent in the global research record. It contributed less than 3% of the continent’s limited trial output. Possible reasons include South Africa’s decades of cumulative investment, seen in stronger academic hubs, research governance, experienced trial units, and more established sponsor relationships. Other regions face barriers like fewer resourced research institutions, less access to trial platforms, and sometimes language and publication issues that can reduce visibility in top-tier journals.

The inequity extends into the hierarchy of science itself. Even when African sites are included in large, multicontinental trials, they are often relegated to the role of “recruitment hubs” rather than scientific partners. Our study found that African scientists led only 3.6% of multicontinental trials that included an African site.

Towards a new era of African science

Africa should not simply be a location where studies are conducted.

It must be a place where research is conceived, led and interpreted. The current model creates a cycle of external dependence where international institutions manage the funding and the data. This leaves local research systems fragile and unable to translate evidence into national policy.

There is need for “ring-fenced” funding for African-led research, the development of regional trial networks, and a mandate for medical journals to report on the diversity of trial populations.

There are signs of a rising momentum. Organisations like Alliance for Medical Research in Africa are working to equip a new generation of African investigators. Africa must create a research ecosystem that is too important for the global community to ignore.

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US Military Completes Withdrawal From Junta-Ruled Niger

FILE - U.S. and Niger flags fly at the Niger Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, April 16, 2018. (AP Photo/Carley Petesch, File)

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Niger is complete, an American official said Monday.

A small number of military personnel assigned to guard the U.S. Embassy remain, Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh told reporters.

Earlier this year, Niger’s ruling junta ended an agreement that allowed U.S. troops to operate in the West African country. A few months later, officials from both countries said in a joint statement that U.S. troops would complete their withdrawal by the middle of September.

The U.S. handed over its last military bases in Niger to local authorities last month, but about two dozen American soldiers had remained in Niger, largely for administrative duties related to the withdrawal, Singh said.

Niger’s ouster of American troops following a coup last year has broad ramifications for Washington because it’s forcing troops to abandon critical bases that were used for counterterrorism missions in the Sahel. groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group operate in the vast region south of the Sahara desert.

One of those groups, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, known as JNIM, is active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and is looking to expand into Benin and Togo.

Niger had been seen as one of the last nations in the restive region that Western nations could partner with to beat back growing jihadi insurgencies. The U.S. and France had more than 2,500 military personnel in the region until recently, and together with other European countries had invested hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance and training.

In recent months Niger has pulled away from its Western partners, turning instead to Russia for security. In April, Russian military trainers arrived in Niger to reinforce the country’s air defenses.

‘Barcelona Or Die.’ For Senegalese Dreaming Of Europe, The Deadly Atlantic Route Is Not A Deterrent

BY MARK BANCHEREAU

THIAROYE-SUR-MER, SENEGAL (AP) — Salamba Ndiaye was 22 when she first tried to get to Spain, dreaming of a career as a real estate agent. Without her parents’ knowledge, she made it onto a small fishing boat known as a pirogue, but the Senegalese police intercepted the vessel before it could leave.

A year later Ndiaye tried again, successfully making it off the coast but this time a violent storm forced the boat to stop in Morocco, where Ndiaye and the other passengers were sent back to Senegal.

Despite her two failed attempts, the 28-year-old is determined to try again. “Right now, if they told me there was a boat going to Spain, I would leave this interview and get on it,” she said.

Ndiaye is one of thousands of young Senegalese who try to leave the West African country each year to head to Spain, fleeing poverty and the lack of job opportunities. Most head to the Canary Islands, a Spanish archipelago off the coast of West Africa, which is used as a stepping stone to continental Europe.

Since the beginning of the year, more than 22,300 people have landed on the Canary Islands, 126% more than the same period last year, according to statistics released by Spain’s Interior Ministry.

While most migrants leaving Senegal are young men, aid workers in the Canary Islands say they are increasingly seeing young women like Ndiaye risk their lives as well.

Earlier this year, the EU signed a 210 million euro deal with Mauritania to stop smugglers from launching boats for Spain. But the deal has had little effect on migrant arrivals for now.

The Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez will visit Mauritania, Senegal and Gambia this week to tackle irregular migration. The West African nations are the main launching pads for migrants traveling by boat.

The Atlantic route from West Africa to the Canary Islands is one of the deadliest in the world. While there is no accurate death toll because of the lack of information on departures from West Africa, the Spanish migrant rights group Walking Borders estimates the victims are in the thousands this year alone.

Migrant boats that get lost or run into problems often vanish in the Atlantic, with some drifting across the ocean for months until they are found in the Caribbean and Latin America carrying only human remains.

But the danger of the route is not a deterrent for those like Ndiaye, who are desperate to make a better living for themselves and their families in Europe. “Barsa wala Barsakh,” or “Barcelona or die” in Wolof, one of Senegal’s national languages, is a common motto of those who brave the deadly route.

“Even if we stay here, we are in danger,” said Cheikh Gueye, 46, a fisherman from Thiaroye-sur-Mer, the same village on the outskirts of Senegal’s capital that Ndiaye is from.

“If you are sick and you can’t pay for treatment, aren’t you in danger? So, we take our chances, either we get there, or we don’t,” he added.

Gueye also attempted to reach Europe though the Atlantic route but only made it to Morocco following bad weather, and was sent back to Senegal.

Like many inhabitants of Thiaroye-sur-Mer, he used to make a decent living as a fisherman before fish stocks started to deplete a decade ago due to overfishing.

“These big boats have changed things, before even kids could catch some fish here with a net,” Gueye said, pointing at the shallow water.

“Now we have to go more than 50 kilometers out before we find fish and even then we don’t find enough, just a little,” he adds.

Gueye and Ndiaye blame the fishing agreements between Senegal and the European Union and China, which allow foreign industrial trawlers to fish in Senegalese waters. The agreements impose limits on what they can haul in, but monitoring what the large boats from Europe, China and Russia harvest has proven difficult.

Ahead of the Spanish prime minister’s visit to Senegal on Wednesday, Ndiaye’s mother, Fatou Niang, 67, says the Senegalese and Spanish governments should focus on giving young people in the West African country job opportunities to deter them from migrating.

“These kids don’t know anything but the sea, and now the sea has nothing. If you do something for the youth, they won’t leave,” Niang says.

“But if not, well, we can’t make them stay. There’s no work here,” she said.

Associated Press writer Ndeye Sene Mbengue in Dakar, Senegal, contributed to this report.

Follow AP’s coverage of migration issues at https://apnews.com/hub/migration

Senegal Just Saved Its Democracy. That Helps All West Africa.

Senegal's President Bassirou Diomaye Faye

BY JOSEPH SANY

Senegal’s dramatic transfer of presidential power this week highlights that West Africa, routinely seen as a zone of democratic erosion and failure, includes an arc of resilient coastal democracies — from Senegal to Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria. The Senegalese people’s resolute reversal of last month’s constitutional crisis shows that US and international efforts to counter violent extremism and military coups can reinforce a potent West African democratic constituency. Vital next steps include these: supporting Senegal’s democratic forces in shifting from “campaign mode” to inclusive governance; promoting economic investment to bolster youth employment and rule-of-law reforms; and energizing a West African democratic alliance against extremism and coups.

How Democracy Won

Senegal’s orderly inauguration of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye is a victory of the democratic resilience that is needed to reverse Sahelian West Africa’s slide into chaos, and prevent its vastly more disruptive spread to the five-times-more-populous West African coastal states. This peaceful transfer of power, Senegal’s fourth since its independence, serves as a national rejection of former President Macky Sall’s attempt, a month ago, to unconstitutionally postpone the vote and extend his term in power. The March constitutional and political crisis followed years of Sall’s progressive suppression of independent political voices and manipulation of the judiciary and elections.

Senegalese democracy defeated this assault through a reassertion of democratic will that was critically strengthened by quick, well-calibrated support from democracies abroad. Senegalese responded through homebred democratic culture and institutions. Their resistance included young street protesters, religious leaders and civil society. Some 40 civil society groups quickly formed an alliance, called Aar Sunu Election (Protect Our Election), that joined opposition parties to demand adherence to the law. After Sall worked for years to manipulate Senegal’s constitutionally independent judiciary, last month’s national outcry buttressed Senegal’s Constitutional Council in reasserting judicial independence and reversing Sall’s order. Sall backed down, scheduling the election and releasing Faye and other political prisoners just 10 days before the vote.

Alongside Senegal’s democratic culture and institutions, the professionalism and patriotism of its armed forces was essential. Amid rising turmoil under Sall and public discussion about whether they might seize power, Senegal’s soldiers abstained from any such move, meeting the expectations of their fellow citizens and presenting a pro-democracy model for other West African militaries. Also critical was that the officeholder assaulting democratic norms in his bid to retain power was a politician, not a military ruler or a warlord facing trial upon being deposed.

How International Support Helped

While international responses have failed to seriously confront democratic erosions in many African nations, the response on Senegal was fast, firm, united and calibrated. French President Emmanuel Macron, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other foreign officials called Sall to urge a quick return to what the United States pointedly called “Senegal’s strong democratic tradition.” The African Union, European Union and United States all spoke in similar terms, along with West Africa’s regional bloc, ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). In speaking respectfully of Senegal’s own democratic traditions, this modulated diplomacy avoided giving Sall or his supporters a way to stir a nationalist backlash.

Senegal’s preservation of democracy — and the contrasting failures to do so over a decade or more in neighboring, coup-stricken states of Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger — offer lessons for action. The core, long-term policy failure in the coup-damaged states has been to ignore slow erosions of democratic institutions — freedoms of speech, press and assembly — so that when political crisis strikes, neither local citizens nor outside partners have the kind of energetic civil society, press, democratic culture and judiciary that just saved the day in Senegal.

In Guinea, as President Alpha Condé progressively weakened democracy — suppressing free speech and finally manipulating a constitutional referendum to give himself an unprecedented third term in office — African and international democracies failed to respond effectively. The country’s 2021 coup was the result. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the spread of jihadist violence — and the military-led responses supported and funded by Western democracies — corroded democratic institutions, including civil societies, opening the path to armed coups d’état. Notably in Niger, African and international democracies failed to actively oppose the narrowing of civic spaces and imprisonment of journalists that opened paths for a coup. And when it struck last year, Niger’s democratic forces and partners in the region and beyond — the United States, France and ECOWAS — failed to act in concert as they just have done in Senegal.

Build a West Africa “Democratic Alliance”

While policymaking and public discourse must stay focused on the four West African states (and their more than 85 million people) under military rule, failed democracies are not West Africa’s only reality. Democracies that have shown significant resilience — Senegal, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria (as well as the island nation of Cape Verde) — govern three times as many West Africans, more than 274 million, who represent fully 65% of those in the 15-nation ECOWAS bloc. Each of these democracies faces daunting challenges to its democratic systems: unemployed, desperate youth; corruption; lack of investment; climate shocks and others.

Independent analyses of their quality of governance, democratic freedoms and levels of violence show their varied strengths and weaknesses. But Senegal’s democratic victory this week buttresses this group and offers a new opportunity to help it consolidate into a potent, pro-democracy alliance.

At home, Senegal must strengthen democratic institutions. The most urgent need is better opportunities and livelihoods for millions of citizens, most of them young, who are unemployed, economically impoverished, under-educated — and desperate. Over 60% of Senegalese are 25 or younger; 20% of youth are unemployed; 90% of citizens depend on “informal” work with no social protections; and Senegalese increasingly risk death in dangerous Saharan or ocean crossings, fleeing toward to any hope for their lives in Europe.

To leverage Senegal’s emergence from constitutional crisis in favor of West African democracy, U.S., international and African partners must weigh policy initiatives that include three vectors:

Energetically support vital political dialogue and problem-solving in Senegal. Faye and Senegal’s democratic forces now must shift from populist mobilizing to democratic problem-solving. International partners should quietly campaign with all Senegalese political elites to build on the accommodating post-election discourse among Faye, his chief rival (and Sall’s ally) in the election, and Sall. They should support Senegal’s civic and democracy activists in leveraging their recent alliance with political parties, notably Faye’s coalition, to pass government reforms to better prevent democratic erosions.

Build an initiative, with Senegalese, African and international business sectors, to seek new investments in Senegal as part of bolstering youth employment, strengthening the rule of law and advancing anti-corruption reforms. Democracy advocacy in Africa has too often overlooked the power of investment to drive such reforms. Following economic shocks from COVID and Russia’s war on Ukraine, Sall’s government invested heavily in railways, roads and other infrastructure, but those steps, while needed, did not improve immediate economic conditions for poor citizens. Senegal is on the cusp of opening oil and gas fields that will boost its gross domestic product; a vital question for Faye’s government, businesses and Senegal’s marginalized millions will be how that new income is distributed. Faye has sought to balance his appeal for deep reforms to help impoverished Senegalese, particularly youth, with assurances to investors of a stable investment environment. In a very real way, Senegal’s youth saved their democracy. To keep it, now democracy has to deliver for them.

Leverage Senegal’s success in supporting a focused alliance of West African democracies to lead ECOWAS and the region. For Africans and international partners, democracy support requires a “long game” that meets each country where it is, not where we wish it were. A bipartisan study group convened by USIP recommended in January a strategy to partner with local and regional actors more broadly than in the narrower stabilization efforts so far that have focused heavily on security. One lesson of the Senegal-vs.-Guinea contrast is that investment in civil society is vital — and cost-effective in the long run. African and international partners need to match this “long game” of democracy-building with a sophisticated “short game” of crisis response. In the case of Senegal, they applied the needed steps for that “short game,” helping to avoid disaster. Senegal’s survival of a constitutional crisis reaffirms it as a potent partner and example in building democracy across West Africa. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s victory signals that young leaders can win power through ballot boxes and not through bullets. Many Africans hope that others in the region will follow his example.

Dr. Joseph Sany joins USIP as the vice president of the newly established Africa Center. Dr. Sany has been working at the forefront of peacebuilding with civil society, governments, businesses, and international organizations in Africa for over 20 years.

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‘Women Farmers Are Invisible': A West African Project Helps Them Claim Their Rights — And Land

Mariama Sonko and other members of the "Nous Sommes La Solution" (We Are the Solution) movement take a census of the different varieties of rice grown in the Cassamance village of Niaguis, Senegal, Wednesday, March 7, 2024. This quiet village in Senegal is the headquarters of a 115,000-strong rural women's rights movement in West Africa, We Are The Solution...(AP Photo/Sylvain Cherkaoui)

BY JACK THOMPSON

ZIGUINCHOR, SENEGAL (AP) — Mariama Sonko’s voice resounded through the circle of 40 women farmers sitting in the shade of a cashew tree. They scribbled notes, brows furrowed in concentration as her lecture was punctuated by the thud of falling fruit.

This quiet village in Senegal is the headquarters of a 115,000-strong rural women’s rights movement in West Africa, We Are the Solution. Sonko, its president, is training female farmers from cultures where women are often excluded from ownership of the land they work so closely.

Across Senegal, women farmers make up 70% of the agricultural workforce and produce 80% of the crops but have little access to land, education and finance compared to men, the United Nations says.

“We work from dawn until dusk, but with all that we do, what do we get out of it?” Sonko asked.

She believes that when rural women are given land, responsibilities and resources, it has a ripple effect through communities. Her movement is training women farmers who traditionally have no access to education, explaining their rights and financing women-led agricultural projects.

Across West Africa, women usually don’t own land because it is expected that when they marry, they leave the community. But when they move to their husbands’ homes, they are not given land because they are not related by blood.

Sonko grew up watching her mother struggle after her father died, with young children to support.





“If she had land, she could have supported us,” she recalled, her normally booming voice now tender. Instead, Sonko had to marry young, abandon her studies and leave her ancestral home.

After moving to her husband’s town at age 19, Sonko and several other women convinced a landowner to rent to them a small plot of land in return for part of their harvest. They planted fruit trees and started a market garden. Five years later, when the trees were full of papayas and grapefruit, the owner kicked them off.

The experience marked Sonko.

“This made me fight so that women can have the space to thrive and manage their rights,” she said. When she later got a job with a women’s charity funded by Catholic Relief Services, coordinating micro-loans for rural women, that work began.

“Women farmers are invisible,” said Laure Tall, research director at Agricultural and Rural Prospect Initiative, a Senegalese rural think tank. That’s even though women work on farms two to four hours longer than men on an average day.

But when women earn money, they reinvest it in their community, health and children’s education, Tall said. Men spend some on household expenses but can choose to spend the rest how they please. Sonko listed common examples like finding a new wife, drinking and buying fertilizer and pesticides for crops that make money instead of providing food.

With encouragement from her husband, who died in 1997, Sonko chose to invest in other women. Her training center now employs over 20 people, with support from small philanthropic organizations such as Agroecology Fund and CLIMA Fund.

In a recent week, Sonko and her team trained over 100 women from three countries, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia, in agroforestry – growing trees and crops together as a measure of protection from extreme weather – and micro gardening, growing food in tiny spaces when there is little access to land.

One trainee, Binta Diatta, said We Are the Solution bought irrigation equipment, seeds, and fencing — an investment of $4,000 — and helped the women of her town access land for a market garden, one of more than 50 financed by the organization.

When Diatta started to earn money, she said, she spent it on food, clothes and her children’s schooling. Her efforts were noticed.

“Next season, all the men accompanied us to the market garden because they saw it as valuable,” she said, recalling how they came simply to witness it.

Now another challenge has emerged affecting women and men alike: climate change.

In Senegal and the surrounding region, temperatures are rising 50% more than the global average, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the UN Environment Program says rainfall could drop by 38% in the coming decades.

Where Sonko lives, the rainy season has become shorter and less predictable. Saltwater is invading her rice paddies bordering the tidal estuary and mangroves, caused by rising sea levels. In some cases, yield losses are so acute that farmers abandon their rice fields.

But adapting to a heating planet has proven to be a strength for women since they adopt climate innovations much faster than men, said Ena Derenoncourt, an investment specialist for women-led farming projects at agricultural research agency AICCRA.

“They have no choice because they are the most vulnerable and affected by climate change,” Derenoncourt said. “They are the most motivated to find solutions.”

On a recent day, Sonko gathered 30 prominent women rice growers to document hundreds of local rice varieties. She bellowed out the names of rice – some hundreds of years old, named after prominent women farmers, passed from generation to generation – and the women echoed with what they call it in their villages.

This preservation of indigenous rice varieties is not only key to adapting to climate change but also about emphasizing the status of women as the traditional guardians of seeds.

“Seeds are wholly feminine and give value to women in their communities,” Sonko said. “That’s why we’re working on them, to give them more confidence and responsibility in agriculture.”

The knowledge of hundreds of seeds and how they respond to different growing conditions has been vital in giving women a more influential role in communities.

Sonko claimed to have a seed for every condition including too rainy, too dry and even those more resistant to salt for the mangroves.

Last year, she produced 2 tons of rice on her half-hectare plot with none of the synthetic pesticides or fertilizer that are heavily subsidized in Senegal. The yield was more than double that of plots with full use of chemical products in a 2017 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization project in the same region.

“Our seeds are resilient,” Sonko said, sifting through rice-filled clay pots designed to preserve seeds for decades. “Conventional seeds do not resist climate change and are very demanding. They need fertilizer and pesticides.”

The cultural intimacy between female farmers, their seeds and the land means they are more likely to shun chemicals harming the soil, said Charles Katy, an expert on indigenous wisdom in Senegal who is helping to document Sonko’s rice varieties.

He noted the organic fertilizer that Sonko made from manure, and the biopesticides made from ginger, garlic and chilli.

One of Sonko’s trainees, Sounkarou Kébé, recounted her experiments against parasites in her tomato plot. Instead of using manufactured insecticides, she tried using a tree bark traditionally used in Senegal’s Casamance region to treat intestinal problems in humans caused by parasites.

A week later, all the disease was gone, Kébé said.

As dusk approached at the training center, insects hummed in the background and Sonko prepared for another training session. “There’s too much demand,” she said. She is now trying to set up seven other farming centers across southern Senegal.

Glancing back at the circle of women studying in the fading light, she said: “My great fight in the movement is to make humanity understand the importance of women.”
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The Associated Press receives financial support for global health and development coverage in Africa from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust. The AP is solely responsible for all content. Find AP’s standards for working with philanthropies, a list of supporters and funded coverage areas at AP.org.

Senegal: Macky Sall’s Reputation Is Dented, But The Former President Did A Lot At Home And Abroad

Senegal's Macky Sall

BY DOUGLAS YATES

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AMERICAN GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARIS (AGS)

Macky Sall’s legacy as Senegal’s president since 2012 became more complex in his last year in office. The year was so filled with transgressions that they appeared to have tarnished his reputation indelibly.

For some months he gave the impression to his adversaries and critics that he had third-term ambitions – not uncommon in contemporary west African politics.

A public outcry followed his decision on 3 February 2024 to postpone the polls that had originally been scheduled for three weeks later. Then his deputies in the national assembly voted unanimously to postpone the elections and prolong Sall’s term in office until December.

On 6 March, the country’s Constitutional Council ruled that the delay was unconstitutional and that the elections would have to be held before 6 April before April 2 rather, when Sall’s presidential term expires.

In compliance, Sall slated Senegal’s election for 24 March. With that decision, the danger of an authoritarian drift in Senegal appears to have been averted.

The time has therefore come for a more reasoned evaluation of his eight years in office.

I’ve been an observer of Senegalese politics since the late 1990s, doing democracy building for the US Information Agency’s Africa Regional Bureau, teaching African politics to graduate students in Paris, and commenting in the media on developments in Senegalese politics.

Based on my experience, I would argue that Sall’s presidential terms have made some economic, domestic and international achievements worth remembering now, in these days of suspense and doubt.

In my view the legacy of Macky Sall has been saved. Or at least that is how it appears.

What he leaves behind

Among his presidential legacies are major infrastructure projects, including airports, a better rail system and industrial parks.

Senegal’s airports were in a deplorable condition when he came to office. The country had 20 airports, but only nine had paved runways. In their poor state, these airports did not attract the major international business flyers who could set up businesses and hire the country’s educated workforce or collaborate with its innovative entrepreneurs.

Blaise Diagne International Airport, named after the first black African elected to France’s parliament in 1914, opened in December 2017. The project, which was started in 2007 by his predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, was completed by Sall.

Located near the capital, Dakar, with easy access via a modern freeway, it has boosted passenger mobility and freight transport. The national airline, Air Senegal, is based here. It reaches more than 20 destinations in 18 countries.

Sall also built the country’s first regional express train, the Train Express Regional, an airport rail link that connects Dakar with a major new industrial park (also built during Sall’s tenure) and the Blaise Diagne International Airport.

Sall also strengthened the regional airport hubs of the country. He spearheaded the reconstruction of five regional airports within Senegal.

The Diamniadio Industrial Park, 30km east of Dakar, financed by loans from Eximbank China, was completed in 2023. The park is a flagship industrial project of Sall’s industrialisation strategy for Senegal.

The new park is positioned at the heart of a network of special economic zones, including Diass, Bargny, Sendou and Ndayane.

Enterprises from multiple fields, including pharmaceuticals, electronic appliances and textiles, are setting up offices in the park, which is expected to manufacture high-quality products that meet local needs.

The airports, trains and industrial parks are expected by Sall’s supporters to make a real contribution to Senegal’s transformation from post-colonial peanut exporter to import-substitution manufacturing hub.

In my view, what Sall leaves behind is substantial, particularly when compared with the highly controversial African Renaissance Monument of his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade. The 171-foot-tall bronze statue located on top of a hill towering over Dakar, built by a North Korean firm, has contributed little or no value to the country’s economy.

Sall has also made some contributions to Senegal’s reputation abroad, positioning himself as a respected and influential player on the international stage. As president of the regional economic body Ecowas in 2015-2016, he made improving economic integration the focus of his term.

He also worked to build closer relations with other international organisations, including the G7, G20 and the African Union. While chairman of the AU from 2022 to 2023 he lobbied for inclusion of the African Union in the G20, complaining that South Africa was the continent’s only member of any economic forum of international importance.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, he championed the cause of the continent. There was no excuse, he said, for failing to ensure consistent African representation in the world’s key decision-making bodies.

He emphasised the importance of increased funding from developed countries for climate adaptation initiatives in developing countries, particularly those in Africa.

Sall’s management of the COVID crisis, which reached Senegal in March 2020, was his first major test of leadership. Despite its limited resources, Senegal outperformed many wealthier countries in its COVID pandemic response, thanks to Sall’s leadership.

Contribution to Senegal’s democratic tradition

His important legacy will be his participation in the democratic tradition of Senegal.

Firstly, he took on Abdoulaye Wade’s dynastic ambitions to name his son Karim Wade as the heir apparent. Sall then went on to respect his two-term limit on the presidency. This means he will soon hand power over to a successor, maintaining a unique and uninterrupted tradition of power transition in one of west Africa’s most stable democracies.

It hasn’t all been plain sailing. In recent years, the temptation of power seemed to have overwhelmed Sall. He started giving out troubling signs of his desire to remain in office beyond his constitutional mandate.

Then, after testing the waters and finding public opinion was strongly opposed to his violating the limits that he himself had imposed while in the opposition to his predecessor, he declined to present himself for elections. Instead, he endorsed the candidacy of his then-prime minister Amadou Ba.

But this was followed by a series of arrests of his most vocal opponents, in particular the popular social media celebrity Ousmane Sonko.

More than 350 protestors were arrested during demonstrations in March 2021 and June 2023. At least 23 died.

Then came his last-minute presidential decree postponing the election earlier scheduled for 25 February.

This was followed by democracy protests and by violent police repression of urban protests, which resulted in civilian deaths.

After protests, Sall made another extraordinary about-turn. He announced that he would respect the Constitutional Court decision, which denied him the right to prolong his presidential mandate and required that elections be held before 6 April.

In doing so he preserved the system of checks and balances in Senegal. In addition, his decision to release Sonko and his other opponents from prison and grant them amnesty has preserved the space for democratic opposition and civil liberties.

Sall’s legacy as a voice of Africa may offer him a lateral promotion from the presidency of Senegal to the seat of some international organisation.

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The First Woman To Run For President In Years In Senegal Is Inspiring Hope

Presidential candidate Anta Babacar Ngom greets supporters during her electoral campaign caravan in Dakar, Senegal, Monday, March 11, 2024. (AP Photo/Sylvain Cherkaoui)

BY BABACAR DIONE AND JESSICA DONATI

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Senegal’s only female presidential candidate may have little to no chance of winning in Sunday’s election, but activists say her presence is helping to advance a decadeslong campaign to achieve gender equality in the West African nation.

Anta Babacar Ngom, a 40-year-old business executive, is a voice for both women and young people — groups hit hard by the country’s economic troubles, widespread unemployment and rising prices. She has promised to create millions of jobs and a bank for women to support their economic independence.

“Our country has enormous potential. The natural resources are there, and they can be developed,” she told The Associated Press. “The young girls I meet ask for my support. They do so because they know that when a woman comes to power, she will put an end to their suffering. I’m not going to forget them.”

Few expect Ngom to be among the leading candidates for the presidency, but activists say the fact that a woman has made it to the presidential race for the first time in years reflects how women are moving ahead in the struggle for equality.

“We have to be there, even if we don’t stand a chance,” said Selly Ba, an activist and sociologist. “We don’t stand a chance in these elections. But it’s important that we have women candidates, women who are in the race.”

Ngom is the first female candidate to run for president in over a decade, reflecting how progress has been frustratingly slow for activists, who say there has been a shift among young people toward more traditional views of women’s roles in society.

Popular social media accounts, often by Senegalese posting from abroad where there is more freedom to speak out, debate taboo topics like sex before marriage and whether polygamy is fair.

One TikTok user, who goes by the name Ngo Keĩta, plays the role of a popular agony aunt, posting clips in Wolof, the language spoken most widely in Senegal. One clip with over 2 million views describes a bitter feud between a woman and her husband in a polygamous marriage, and invites followers to comment.

Ngo Keĩta did not respond to a written request for comment.

Some young women in Senegal are returning to the traditional notion of marriage, said Marième Wone Ly, the first woman to lead a political party in Senegal over two decades ago.

“We have to be very careful. There is a certain regression,” she said, referring to how erroneous interpretations of Islam can act against the forces of progress toward equality. “We’ve gone backwards a bit despite parity.”

Through the 1990s, Senegalese women mobilized through grassroots organizations. The country appointed its first female prime minister in 2001, and in 2010 a law that required all political parties to introduce gender parity in electoral lists helped to drive up female participation in politics.

“Women’s rights have evolved at the political level over the last 10 years and particularly since the gender parity law came into force,” said Bousso Sambe, a former parliamentarian, adding that women have yet to systemically take advantage of the law.

In 2012, two women ran for president, and while they earned less than 1% of the vote each, analysts say their participation was important. Women in Senegal now make up more than 40% of parliament, one of the highest levels of representation in Africa.

“It’s crucial to strike a balance between modern evolution and respect for our customs. Women must be able to express themselves without hindrance, while preserving our cultural identity and valuing the traditional values that have shaped our society,” Ngom told the AP.

Ngom, who runs her family’s food company, has made the economy a focus of her campaign, which most analysts agree is a key concern for the population. Economic hardship has driven thousands of Senegalese to attempt dangerous journeys in search of a better life in the West.

Ngom’s supporters say they are proud to back a female candidate and hopeful for a change with the next government.

“Our children are dying at sea because of unemployment and job insecurity. Unemployment is endemic. Women are tired,” activist Aicha Ba said at a recent rally.

Follow AP’s Africa coverage at: https://apnews.com/hub/africa

In Senegal’s Capital, Nicaragua Is A Hot Ticket Among Travel Agents As Migrants Try To Reach US

Gueva Ba sells used cell phones in Dakar's Colobane market Thursday, Feb. 1, 2024. Ba, who tried to reaach Europe via Morocco 11 times, flew legally to Nicaragua and made the rest of the ourney illegally by land to Mexico's northern border, before being repatriated from the United States to Senegal in 2023. (AP Photo/Sylvain Cherkaoui) 

BY BABA AHMED

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Gueva Ba tried to reach Europe by boat 11 times from Morocco, failing each attempt. Then, in 2023, the former welder heard about a new route to the United States by flying to Nicaragua and making the rest of the journey illegally by land to Mexico’s northern border.

“In Senegal, it’s all over the streets — everyone’s talking about Nicaragua, Nicaragua, Nicaragua,” said Ba, who paid about 6 million CFA francs ($10,000) to get to Nicaragua in July with stops in Morocco, Spain and El Salvador. “It’s not something hidden.”

Ba, 40, was deported from the U.S. with 131 compatriots in September after two months in detention, but thousands of other Senegalese have gained a foothold in America. Many turn to savvy travel agents who know the route — touted on social media by those who’ve successfully settled in the U.S.

They are part of a surge in migration to the United States that is extraordinary for its size and scope, with more people from far-flung countries accounting for crossings at the border. And as with this route used by the Senegalese, more are figuring out plans, making payments, and seeking help via social networks, and apps like WhatsApp and TikTok.

Arrests for illegal crossings on the U.S. border with Mexico reached record highs in December. January saw a drop for the month, but arrests have topped 6.4 million since January 2021. And Mexicans account for only about 1 of 4 arrests, with the others coming from more than 100 countries.





U.S. authorities arrested Senegalese migrants 20,231 times for crossing the border illegally from July to December. That’s a 10-fold increase from 2,049 arrests during the same period of 2022, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Many cross in remote deserts of western Arizona, like Ba, and California.

Word of the Nicaragua route began spreading early last year in Dakar and took hold in May, said Abdoulaye Doucouré, who owns a travel agency that sold about 1,200 tickets from Dakar to Nicaragua in the last three months of 2023, for the equivalent of several thousand dollars each.

Some are motivated by Senegal’s political turmoil — authorities delayed February’s presidential elections by 10 months — but the sudden draw seemed to hinge largely on social media posts and the spread of the route there.

Spikes attributed to social media have occurred in other West African nations, whose people have historically turned first to Europe to flee. Mauritanians have arrived at the U.S. border with Mexico in similarly large numbers, and migrants from Ghana and Gambia have come, too.

Many are eventually released in the U.S. to pursue asylum in immigrant courts that are backlogged for years with more than 3 million cases.

Passports from many African countries carry little weight in the Western Hemisphere, making the journey by land to the United States difficult to even begin. Senegalese can fly visa-free to only two countries in the Americas: Nicaragua and Bolivia, according to The Henley Passport Index. Nicaragua is much closer than Bolivia and avoids the notoriously dangerous Darien Gap in Panama.

As U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua’s repressive government have increased, the government of President Daniel Ortega has used migration to push back.

The Nicaraguan government went so far as to hire a Dubai-based firm to train Nicaraguan civil aviation to manage national immigration procedures for charter flight passengers. More than 500 charter flights landed from June to November, mostly from Haiti and Cuba, according to Manuel Orozco, director of the migration, remittances and development program at the Inter-American Dialogue.

But migrants from farther afield, like Ba, also made their way to Nicaragua on a series of connecting commercial flights from Africa. In African capitals, migrants typically buy multileg tickets from travel agents connecting through Istanbul or Madrid, followed by stops in Bogota, Colombia, or San Salvador, El Salvador, before ultimately arriving in Managua, Nicaragua. From there, they meet smugglers offering to take them to the Honduran border, or arrange the trip all the way to the U.S.

The U.S. State Department has called on Nicaragua to “play a responsible role” in managing hemispheric migration, but that has yet to be seen. Nicaraguan first lady and Vice President Rosario Murillo did not respond to a request for comment on the surge in extra-continental migration through her country.

In October, El Salvador began charging $1,130 for citizens of 57 largely African countries and India transiting the country’s airport. Authorities said most of those charged were on their way to Nicaragua aboard Avianca, a Colombian commercial carrier.

El Salvador’s fee caused airfares from Dakar to rise toward the end of 2023, said Serigne Faye, an agent at the Touba Express travel agency in Senegal’s capital. Some passengers instead fly through Bogota. Stopovers in Turkey are the most expensive.

While most asylum claims fail, the immigration court backlog means that people can remain in the U.S. for years, with eligibility for work permits. The asylum grant rate for Senegalese was 26% in the U.S. government’s budget year ended Sept. 30, compared with 14% for all nationalities, according to Justice Department figures.

Ousmane Anne, 34, left Senegal on Sept. 25 with a plane ticket to Nicaragua, purchased from a travel agency. His journey took a month — longer and costlier than anticipated. Mexico was treacherous, he said, describing his traveling group as frequently harassed, threatened and robbed by gangs.

Despite the enthusiasm back home, he said, he’d be hard-pressed to recommend the trip to anyone who doesn’t understand the risks. But he made it to New York, which has the largest Senegalese population of any U.S. metropolitan area, according to census data.

“I knew it would not be very easy to come here to the States, but the hope that I had was higher than all the obstacles and problems,” Anne said. “I knew the opportunities would be greater here.”

He recently attended a forum in Harlem, hosted by the Senegalese Association of America. He learned basics of U.S. law, heard some do’s and don’ts from police officers about the e-bikes and mopeds that are popular with migrants, and got tips on navigating the health care system.

Even if he came away with more questions than answers, Anne said, he remains hopeful.
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This story corrects the spelling of Colombia.
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Associated Press writers Philip Marcelo in New York, Elliot Spagat in San Diego, and Christopher Sherman and Maria Verza in Mexico City contributed.

Senegal Parliament Delays Election Until December After Opposition Lawmakers Are Blocked From Voting

FILE - Senegal’s President Macky Sall speaks during a plenary session at the COP28 U.N. Climate Summit, Friday, Dec. 1, 2023, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Senegalese President Macky Sall on Saturday, Feb. 3, 2024, postponed presidential elections scheduled for Feb. 25, citing controversies over the disqualification of some candidates and allegations of corruption in election-related cases. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool, File)

BY BABACAR DIONE

DAKAR, SENEGAL (AP) — Senegal’s parliament voted Monday to delay the West African nation’s presidential election until Dec. 15 in a chaotic voting process that took place after opposition lawmakers were forcefully removed from the chambers as they debated President Macky Sall’s earlier decision to delay the crucial election.

Security forces stormed the legislative building and forcefully removed several opposition lawmakers who were trying to block the voting process on the unprecedented delay of the presidential election initially scheduled for Feb. 25. The adopted bill extends Sall’s tenure — which was due to end on April 2 — until a new election.

Authorities on Monday restricted mobile internet access amid growing protests by opposition supporters against the delay.

As the lawmakers debated the bill, security forces fired tear gas at protesters gathered outside the legislative building. Many of the protesters were arrested as they poured into the streets of the capital, Dakar, burning tires and criticizing the country’s leader.

On Monday, two opposition parties filed a court petition challenging the election delay. It was not clear what would become of their request for Senegal’s Constitutional Council to direct “the continuation of the electoral process.”

Analysts say the crisis in Senegal is putting one of Africa’s most stable democracies to the test at a time when the region is struggling with a recent surge in coups.

Sall — who in July said he would not seek a third term in office — had cited an electoral dispute between the parliament and the judiciary regarding the candidacies as reason for the postponement but opposition leaders and candidates rejected the move, calling it a “coup.”

The African Union urged the government to organize the election “as soon as possible” and called on everyone involved “to resolve any political dispute through consultation, understanding and civilized dialogue.”

“We will not accept a constitutional coup in this country. It is up to the people to come out and liberate themselves,” said Guy Marius Sagna, an activist and opposition lawmaker, who was among the protesters.

The private Walf television network, whose signal was cut off as they broadcast the protests on Sunday, said their broadcasting license has been revoked.

The Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications and Digital Economy said mobile internet services were cut Monday “due to the dissemination of several hateful and subversive messages relayed on social networks in the context of threats and disturbances to public order.”

“The government’s abrupt shutdown of internet access via mobile data and Walf TV’s broadcasting ... constitutes a blatant assault on the right to freedom of expression and press rights protected by Senegal’s constitution,” Amnesty International’s regional office for West and Central Africa said in a statement.

Sall had said the dispute between the judiciary and parliament over the disqualification of some candidates and the reported dual-nationality of some qualified candidates has resulted in a “sufficiently serious and confusing situation.”

Political tensions have run high in Senegal for at least a year. Authorities also cut internet access from cellphones in June 2023 when supporters of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko clashed with security forces. Sonko is one of two opposition leaders whom election authorities disqualified from the final list of presidential candidates this month.

Sall’s decision to postpone the election “reflects a sharp democratic decline” in Senegal, said Mucahid Durmaz, a senior analyst at global risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft.

“The growing democracy deficit not only threatens to tarnish Senegal’s reputation as a beacon of democratic stability in the region but also emboldens anti-democratic practices in West Africa,” said Durmaz.

Associated Press writer Chinedu Asadu in Abuja, Nigeria contributed.

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