Showing posts with label Aguiyi Ironsi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aguiyi Ironsi. Show all posts

Sunday, August 04, 2019

Ironsi, Fajuyi & 53 Years Of Unitary System’

Aguiyi-Ironsi


BY MARTINS OLOJA
THE GUARDIAN

There is an issue of historical significance that members of the old and new set-ups in our society can learn from. Barely a week ago, the nation actually marked the 53rd anniversary of the military’s politics of power grab that led to the revenge-seeking counter-coup led by some young officers from the North on July 29, 1966.

Our young ones need to note that the counter-coup led to the assassination of General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, the then Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Head of State had gone to Ibadan on July 28, 1966 to address a conference of traditional rulers of Western Nigeria and there was a successful counter-coup in the dawn of July 29. In a twist of fate, his chief host in Ibadan, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, first Military Governor of Old Western Region who had opportunity to escape, gave his life too and the two of them (General Ironsi & Lt. Col. Fajuyi were killed in a forest along Iwo road, Ibadan. That gruesome episode was 53 years ago old last week.

The anniversary of this tragedy, which some significant colleagues noted last week, is remarkable at such a time like this.

It is still relevant to remind the young ones that though federalism as a bait actually emanated from one of our colonial rulers called Sir Hugh Clifford in 1922, solidified in 1946 by Sir Arthur Richards whose constitution laid the foundation for the prosperous regional governments that built the legacies we still see in the South West, South East and the North till date, the Decree. No 34 of 1966 by AguiyiIronsi killed federalism. And behold, for the past 53 years, death has held federalism captive in the grave.
The anniversary is a sad reminder of the gruesome murder of two young promising officers from the East & the West by their colleagues from the North. And history tells us that two factors could have triggered the reprisal killing in Ibadan that took the lives of the 42 year-old Ironsi and 40 year-old Fajuyi. The first factor fingered then was the bloody overthrow of the civilian regime of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s government, which had taken place six months earlier. The first bloody coup then did not only take the life of Balewa from today’s Bauchi state, many other top functionaries especially of northern extraction, were also killed.

Again, apart from perception that the first coup (January 15, 1966) was led by a group of Igbo soldiers, which was curiously successful in the North and failed in the South, General Ironsi who later became Head of State hailed too from the East: he hailed from Umuahia-Ibeku, present-day Abia State. And this is the origin: On January 14, 1966, soldiers of mostly Igbo extraction led by major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, an Igbo from Okpanam, near Asaba in today’s Delta State, literally eliminated the top echelon of politicians from the Northern and Western provinces. This, among other critical factors effectively led to the fall of the then republican government. It was said that though Ironsi was effectively marked for elimination too, he curiously took effective control of Lagos, the federal capital then. And again with the president then Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo refusing to intervene to ensure the survival of civilian rule, Ironsi courageously forced the remnants of the Balewa’s government to resign. After that, he (Ironsi) made the Senate President then Nwafor Orizu, another Igbo, who was serving as acting President in Azikiwe’s absence to surrender power to him. And he (Orizu) did, thus ending the first republic.

That was how Ironsi inherited a deeply divided country worsened by ethnic and religious cleavages. The fact that none of the high-profile casualties of the 1966 first coup were of Igbo origin and most of the beneficiaries of the coup were Igbo fuelled the belief in the North that the whole coup story was an Igbo conspiracy. Though he tried to dispel this notion by doling political appointments to the aggrieved parties, his failure to punish the coup plotters and promulgation of Decree No. 34, which scrapped the country’s federalism structure and adoption of a unitary system confirmed the conspiracy theory in a way.

In any case, this anniversary is not just about Ironsi and how the nation has not significantly appreciated the sacrifice made by Fajuyi from Ado-Ekiti. Rather this Aguiyi-Fajuyi story is to nudge us about the devastating effects of military intervention in Nigerian politics 50 years ago. And it is sad that the consequences will remain with us longer than we expect. What is more, today, one of the state actors of the time – military rule, is Nigeria’s elected president and one of the hot potatoes he still does not like to be discussed is federalism or restructuring. The ancient grudge was 53 years old, last week. And lest we forget, 53 years on, there is still no love lost between the North and the South. Even in politics, the East is also still crying and one of the Oriental brothers who would like people to listen to Radio Biafra for whatever it is worth at such a time like this, is still being held in Abuja by a government headed by a retired General of northern extraction.

And here is the thing: When will Peace and Reconciliation Committee for the purpose of burying the ghosts of January 15 and July 29, 1966 be set up? When will the ‘militicians’ (military politicians) in the country accept responsibility for killing federalism with Decree No.34 50 years ago? When will the people power prevail against Unitary System (we call federal government) that is so entrenched in Abuja where they continue to tell us that Nigeria is not negotiable? When shall we lift the ban imposed on federalism principles by the Generals who have been ruling us and have been helping other lackeys that have been ruining us since 1966?

BIAFRA AND ECHOES OF 1966: Ironsi Exposed My Dad To Coup Plotters — Son Of Ojukwu’s Deputy

Philip Effiong. Image via Vanguard

BY CHARLES KUMOLU, DEPUTY EDITOR
VANGUARD INTERVIEW

This interview with Philip Effiong, II, a Prof of Drama in Michigan State University, whose father, Lt. Col Philip Effiong, was the Second-in-command to then Head of State, defunct Republic of Biafra, Lt.Col Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, brings you face-to-face with many untold events of the Nigerian Civil War. From the position of a witness to history, Effiong corrects some long-held notions about key events during the civil war, with emphasis that the January 15, 1966, coup which some still regard as an Igbo coup wasn’t really the major reason for the massacre of the Igbo during and after the July 29, 1966, counter-coup. His revelations on how the Biafran first families left the break-away republic, his father’s escape from Kaduna, Ojukwu’s conversations with his father, and life as the privileged people in Biafra among others, speak to the futility of war.

Your dad was a Lt Col in the Nigerian Army when the second coup, otherwise known as counter-coup, took place on July 29, 1966. Where precisely was your family and how did your father survive since many officers of Eastern origin were killed?

We lived in a barrack called AN Barracks. It is here in Lagos. When the first coup took place, my father was reposted to the State House under Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, who was the Head of State. He was the Principal Staff Officer to Ironsi. As Principal Staff Officer, his roles were not defined like the Director of Ordinance, which was the position he held before being posted to work with Ironsi. He was trained as an ordinance officer. His posting to the State House almost cost him his life. When he was sent there he learned that the July 29, 1966 Coup was being planned and told his boss, Gen Ironsi. Instead of working with the intelligence, Ironsi brought my father before the Supreme Military Council and asked him to repeat what he told him. That experience was painful to my father and made him a marked man. As an Ibibio, no one could have easily marked my father but what Ironsi did made him a target. From that moment, the planners of the coup considered him a threat to their plans.

If Ironsi had succeeded in thwarting the coup based on the information my father provided, what could have been the fate of people like Gen Theophilus Danjuma, Gen Murtala Mohammed and then Governor of Northern Region, Gen Hassan Katsina among others, who took part in the coup? My father became a targeted man from that day. I am not here to insult anybody but exposing my father to danger for trying to save him was not the right thing for Ironsi to have done. He betrayed my father and posted him to Kaduna to be the acting Commander of the First Brigade. Kaduna was not a place my father wanted to go because he knew what was coming. The coup took place a month after my father was posted to Kaduna and we were in Lagos at the time.

How did he survive in Kaduna when the second coup took place?
He had to go into hiding in Kaduna. We are grateful to a lot people, who helped him to escape. The American Consulate in Kaduna, the Catholic Church and his Brigade Commander, Samuel Ogbemudia saved him from being killed like other officers from Eastern Nigeria. He escaped in disguise from Kaduna to Lagos and we had to leave the barrack. We left the barrack without taking anything along. When we left, the family of another military officer, Col Rudolf Trimnell, harboured us. Col Rudolf Trimnell was from Ukwuani, Igbo-speaking group in Delta State, like my mother but they are also classified as Igbo. He was in hiding but we stayed at the family compound of his wife at Spencer Street, Lagos. His wife is a Yoruba woman. They were gracious but the place was crowded. Food was not a problem but it was difficult feeding many people because the Trimnell children were six and we were seven. That was in addition to other relatives living with them. We didn’t know where my father was and my mother cried everyday thinking he had been killed. That was our situation when the first and second coups took place. Eventually, my father managed to escape to the east. I didn’t know how he made an arrangement for us to take a boat from Lagos to Port Harcourt. The boat that took us was a big boat which was captained by a white man. Till date, I get scared any time there is lightning because of the sounds of shelling I heard during the war. I also got scared any time I found aeroplane flying after the war because of the air raids we witnessed.

I was young and the things I can recall are the things that affected me. Virtually everything about the war affected me. That is why I can tell vivid sad stories of the things that happened during the war.

Some authors, and even eminent people, who gave first-hand information about the war like Frederick Forsyth, Alexander Madiebo, and Nnamdi Azikiwe among others, said Ojukwu literally ran a one-man government in Biafra. What type of working relationship did your dad have with him?

I am sure another opinion of Ojukwu from another person would sound differently. Many people say that. Officers found themselves in a very difficult situation during the crisis. My father joined the army in 1945 before many people joined. He was already an officer before some of them including Gen Yakubu Gowon joined the army. In the picture of Nigeria’s first military officers in 1951, they sat and stood according to their ranks. The highest rank was Major. There were about three Majors and the next in order of seniority were Captains and my father was one of those Captains. The remaining people were Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants. That was where Ojukwu and Gowon belonged. When my father found himself in Biafra, he had to submit himself to Ojukwu, who had been his junior and that is not easy in the military. At that time my father’s concern was not about himself but the welfare of the people. He was not the Second-in-command immediately he found himself in the Biafran Army. He was assigned to different positions. At some point, he headed the Biafran Militia before he was made the Deputy Head of State. The official designation was Chief of General Staff. Brigadier Njoku could have been given the position but he had a fallout with Ojukwu for the reasons we are talking about. Let me give Ojukwu some credits.

We can only imagine what it was like for him as the Governor of Eastern Region to suddenly have a refugee crisis on his hands. How old was he then? He was only 34 years old. They were quite young and did what they could. On that level, he handled the refugee crisis and created a safe passage for non-Igbo to leave the east. Though some people were angry and the house of the Mayor of Enugu, who was a northerner was burnt. When he went to Aburi, he did well by negotiating well. Unfortunately, the federal government revised it because they did not renege completely.

Are you saying the declaration of Biafra was not an immediate result of the failure of the Aburi Accord?

We have to remember that the creation of 12 states by Gowon was the immediate reason for the declaration of Biafra by Ojukwu. The implication of the creation of states was that Ojukwu no longer had the authority to govern the eastern region. The voiding of Ojukwu’s position was not reassuring for the Igbo because Ojukwu was the only one, who spoke for them until that point. The appointment of Ukpabi Asika, someone, who they didn’t know as the Governor of East Central State, was a clear message that their authority in the army was now being removed. That didn’t go down well with the people and they wanted to maintain what was left of their autonomy with this leader they trusted. That was a major reason Biafra was created. Biafra was blessed with respected statesmen like the late Chief Michael Opara, Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe among others. The federal side didn’t have much like the eastern region but they had Awolowo, a well-respected man. What did Gowon do? He immediately made him his deputy and listened to his wise counsel. On the side of Gowon, the creation of states was brilliant from military and political standpoints. I don’t believe it was Gowon’s original idea but it showed that he was listening to those, who were more experienced than him, probably, Awolowo. In Biafra, the opposite was happening because most of the eminent people were asking Ojukwu to listen to them. Their argument was that they were not getting a lot of cooperation from Gen Ojukwu. The people who complained were Dr. Opara, Dr. Azikiwe, among others. Azikiwe eventually left Biafra. Essentially, he didn’t only change sides but talked about his problems. Now, this is what he said not what I know. He said it was hard to get along with Ojukwu. He said he had made significant gains in trying to get support for Biafra for some African countries to get a peace deal, but added that Gen Ojukwu was always countering his proposals.

He said Ojukwu believed in a military solution while Biafra didn’t have the military might. The Secretary to the Biafran Government, a man from my place, Mr. N. Akpan, who was very close to Ojukwu also said the same thing in his book. In my father’s book, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, he also said there were some problems getting Gen Ojukwu to see things differently. It is a common complain. The reason I told the Aburi story is to present a balanced picture because it is not all about condemnation like people tend to do. People look at Ojukwu’s faults and use them to speak completely against Biafra but it goes beyond his personality. My father once talked about how he told Ojukwu that Biafran forces needed to protect Ikot Ekpene which leads to the heart of Biafra. He said when he made the proposal, Ojukwu said maybe Biafra needed reinforcement to protect Nnewi, where he, Ojukwu, hailed from. Ojukwu thought my father made the statement because of the assumption that he was from Ikot Ekpene. We are not from Ikot Ekpene but Ibiono. My grandfather only settled in Ikot Ekpene which is Ananland while Ibiono is Ibibio. Some also said there were problems with the Igbo and minorities in Biafra. These minorities didn’t play minor roles in the war. Some problems arose because some had been given states. It contributed to the saboteur narrative in Biafra. Some non-Igbo were killed by Biafran forces for suspicions of being saboteurs.

Was it like the public execution of Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Col Victor Banjo on September 25, 1967?
Ifeajuna and Banjo were even assumed to have plotted a coup against Ojukwu. I am talking about innocent civilians, who were targeted and accused of being sympathetic to the federal troops. They were killed. My father’s younger brother, Etim, who fought for Biafra and rose to the rank of Sergeant, was almost killed. When Ikot Ekpene fell to the federal troops, they were trekking to Umuahia, along the way, a vigilante group stopped them. When Igbo was spoken to them, my father’s younger brother was not able to speak Igbo and they almost killed him. They were just fortunate enough to convince the vigilante members that he was my father’s younger brother. Some would argue that enough was not done in Biafra to consolidate the unity between the Igbo and non-Igbo. The person that suggested the name, Biafra, Chief Opigo was not an Igbo man but Ogoja. My father said he insisted that if the problem was not handled, it would be among the forces that would work against Biafra. Maybe Biafra would have fallen, but that also contributed to the loss of the war. However, I still want people to look at the leader of Biafra from a different angle and not to condemn him.

Would it be safe to say that what made your father’s escape from Kaduna and your family’s refuge at the home of the father of Col Trimnell’s wife was the absence of mistrust among Nigerians at the time?

I agree absolutely because many of the people, who helped my father at the time were not easterners. When he was hiding in Lagos also, a lot of people who helped him were Yoruba. The mistrust was not there but we have increasingly established boundaries among ourselves and it is causing problems. However, we managed to escape and ended up at Ikot Ekpene, which is my parents’ adopted home. Our real home is Ibiono. From there, we went to Enugu. I was there when the war started and when Enugu was shelled.

The January 1966 coup is widely belived to have been conceived by Major Ifeajuna and led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu. There were other majors like Timothy Onwuatuegwu, Chris Anuforo, Don Okafor, Humphrey Chukwuka, and Adewale Ademoyega. Some roles were played by some rustics like non-commissioned officers. Does the ethnic composition of the leading actors not justify the labeling of the coup as an Igbo coup?

I am not a fan of Nzeogwu, I am not a fan of Ifeajuna, and I am not a fan of Ademoyega, who were the three principal actors in the January 1966 coup. We talk of others like Nwobosi, and Onwuatuegwu. There are many others that people don’t talk about including Atom Kpera, who later became the military governor of Benue and Anambra states. There were also other non-commissioned officers, who people don’t talk about. The coup can’t be called an Igbo coup because most of the principle players were Igbo-speakers. There is no doubt about that and I am not exonerating them. Therefore, to hold the entire Igbo ethnic nationality responsible for the coup is wrong. We have to look at the real reasons Igbo were slaughtered in the second coup. It is not because of the first coup or the Decree 34 ,Unitarisation Decree, because a lot of people involved in the slaughter of the easterners didn’t even know the tenets of Decree 34 at the time. If that was the case, why did they kill for what they didn’t understand? When people lie about reasons for an atrocity like that, it only creates problems because people become angry and indignant. Even people, who were not born at the time, are going to learn about what happened to their communities, families, businesses and homes and there are going to be reactions. That is why it is important to tell the truth. Some of my greatest heroes are not from my tribe. One of the things the Igbo people have done is that they have excelled tremendously in business and other areas. Before independence, they had excelled in education, sports, military and other sectors of the Nigerian society, They played leading roles everywhere even in the north where they were in the majority of the non-indigenes and were very aggressive commercially before independence. Unfortunately, independence brought rivalry and people became territorial. It was a situation that made the Igbo become very powerful and visible but it created problem because indepence had created new boundaries and rivalries. The prominence of the Igbo became a threat and there was a question of what to do with them. If people are marked for attack or elimination flimsy reasons are always given. Long before the coup, then Premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was very powerful spiritually and politically, in an interview, talked about the Igbo in the north. He complained that the Igbo always wanted to be the head and take charge. If he had said the Igbo in the north were committing crimes, I would have agreed with him but he was saying good things about the Igbo, which to him were reasons they were threats to them in the north. That made me realise that even before the pogroms of 1966, there were already plans to attack the Igbo. The first coup and Decree 34 presented themselves as opportunities to attack the Igbo.

Do you mean the Nzeogwu coup and the Decree 34 , Unitarisation Decree, were not the reasons they struck on July 29, 1966? 

The reasons were that the Igbo were considered as economic and political threats. But the decree and first coup were used as reasons. That was just an excuse and not a justifiable reason. The decree gave many powers to the centre. 

Has it changed?

This question is germane to your concerns about the profiling of the coup as an Igbo coup.

In your conversations with your dad, who was the Director of Ordinance when Nzeogwu carried out Operation Damisa , did he ever mention names of non-Igbo, who were involved in the coup whose names were never made public?
I know I have a list of those involved which is a product of research. The point is that there was a more diverse group of people, but the non-Igbo have been isolated and the focus has been on the Igbo. We should remember that Nzeogwu is from Okpanam—a town close to Asaba. We need to identify the fact that he was of Igbo background, but there were people I met from Igbo-speaking area of Delta who said they are not Igbo. Let us assume that everybody that participated in the coup were Igbo, it is still not enough to call it an Igbo coup. There have been coups in this country that have been affiliated to certain groups but no coup was ever profiled as northern or Hausa coup. There was never an Igbo coup and I hope there would never be. Saying that it is an Igbo coup implies that the Igbo came together, planned and executed the coup. For instance, the fact that Major Ademoyega was involved does not mean that Yoruba people planned the coup. He operated as an individual not as a representative of the Yoruba people. It is obvious that war times are not interesting times.

Was that the case for your family which was the number two family in Biafra after Ojukwu’s family?
There were privileges but we have to look at them within the context of Biafra. When planes came to bomb Biafra, they didn’t look for privileged people to bomb. Everybody was a target. At some point, we were homeless. When Umuahia fell, we were destitutes and were taken in by my father’s first ADC’s family. The father of the ADC kept us in his house. My father’s ADC, Hillary Iroegbulam was a young man then. He is still in New York. We stayed in his father’s house until Owerri was recaptured and we went to Owerri. There was Ojukwu Bunker in Umuahia, which was said to have been the place Ojukwu stayed when Umuahia fell.

Why didn’t your family take refuge there?

That is what people say but if there was a bunker, I never saw it and we didn’t have one. Maybe there was but when Umuahia fell, regardless of the bunker, Ojukwu had to leave Umuahia. There may be truth in some but it is important to verify before believing. For instance, some said he left Biafra with his Mercedes-Benz. The truth is that we left Biafra on cargo planes.

Which of the tiny cargo planes would have contained the Mercedes Benz? When you people were boarding the “last flight in Biafra” at Uli Airstrip, did you leave with Ojukwu?
Towards the end of the war it was clear that Biafra was losing. This talk about Ojukwu leaving Biafra for peace deals was not the case. I am not here to insult anybody but to say the truth. Biafra had engaged in a few peace talks. That was the first time he was going for the purported peace talks with his entire family, including his mother. Everybody that was remotely connected to Ojukwu was flown out of Biafra. When it was clear that he was leaving, he told my father. At the time and my mother was pregnant with my younger sister, Philipa. My father told him that if that if he was leaving for him , my father, to stay back, he must take his wife ,my mother, and her children, which included my older brother, Charles, my younger brother, Francis, I and my cousin, who was staying with us. Prior to this time, some countries were taking Biafrans out as refugees. About a year earlier, my oldest brother and my older sisters were taken out. My siblings were taken to Ireland but I was in Biafra until the last minute with my older brother Charles.

So what was the picture of the last flight from Biafra?
The flight took place before my father announced the surrender of the Biafran forces which ended the 30-month civil war. I remember what happened vividly because it was not planned for us to leave. My [dad] had gone to Ojukwu in Nnewi to make the request for us leave with them. Other people said my father threatened Ojukwu that he must include us among those leaving Biafra with him. The wife of a military officer, who was a colleague of my father, told me that my father had the conversation with his riffle drawn. The woman is old now and lives in Maryland but that was not true. Before our departure, we were in Owerri which had been recaptured by Biafrans and the recapture was a major victory for Biafra. There was a night my father was away and there were explosions. It was common to hear the gunshot sounds but the sounds of the explosion were so loud that we had to leave. My mother had a driver, Goddy. It was a special arrangement because the car belonged to Goddy. We left with the car but we didn’t have a destination. The car was very slow and eventually stopped. We stood at the roadside and saw a convoy of four vehicles coming. We knew it was someone of importance because convoys were used by Ojukwu, my father and Madiebo. We waved and the convoy stopped. My dad emerged from one of the cars. He took us to a place we slept that night before leaving for Nnewi the next day. Nnewi was one of the few places that were never captured by the Nigerian troops.

Was it a stroke of luck that Nnewi was never attacked?

Biafran forces really protected the town because it was a target of the federal troops. Biafran soldiers deserved credit for protecting Nnewi. They also protected the Uli Airstrip. Sometimes when the Airstrip was bombed, Biafran engineers fixed it within three days. Those people deserved credit for their ingenuity. The next day we left for Nnewi. At a point we were driving behind a lorry that was carrying bags of rice. Some of the bags were leaking and were streaking on the roads. People were packing them into their containers. It was a sad sight and showed how people starved in Biafra because I never starved in Biafra. When my mother, older brother, my younger brother, I and my cousin arrived at Ojukwu’s personal house in Nnewi, I was shocked. They took us into the house and I saw children playing with toys that I had never seen since the war started. I am talking of cars and aeroplanes running with batteries. They gave me Bournvita that I had never drank since the war started and I drank it and felt as if I was in heaven. My brother and I were not comfortable there and they took us outside where we sat. At that point, they were making plans for us to leave with Ojukwu’s family. In that house all Ojukwu’s relatives were there, meaning that they had assembled. The plan was to evacuate them. It was at that point that my father made the request. We were there and his official car drove in at some point. It was so strange that he came and left without speaking to us. Apparently that was when they concluded the negotiations of our exit inside Ojukwu’s house. We didn’t know what was happening. In the night, they put us in a car and took us somewhere. As we were driving, we got to a place where some people with torch-light asked us to turn off our light. The place turned out to be the Airstrip. I saw cargo planes with two propellers with no seats inside. There was a ladder leaning on the aeroplane and people were climbing. I can recall Ojukwu’s mother who was an elderly woman, having problems while climbing the ladder. After struggling, she entered the plane, and they invited us to climb the ladder. We didn’t have any property with us. We flew the same plane with Ojukwu’s mother. We left two days before Ojukwu. We landed at Sao Tome. From there, people started going to different places, because there was really no plan. 

You said your plane landed at Sao Tome but Ojukwu departed Biafra for Ivory Coast, How come? 

We joined Ojukwu later in Ivory Coast but we first stayed in Sao Tome, after which we left for France and Portugal because there were no plans. These countries were sympathetic to Biafra. I had a Biafran passport but didn’t know what we were travelling with. We ended up in Bourke, Ivory Coast where his family was staying. Ojukwu was staying in Yamoussoukro where Felix Houphouët-Boigny hailed from. We visited him once but his family stayed in Bourke with us. We used to go to school in a refugee camp. I am grateful to Ivory Coast because if not for what it did, those children taken from Biafra would have died of Kwashiokor. Some of the children were able to trace their families while others didn’t return and integrated into the country. That is why I believe that there are descendants of Biafra in Ivory Coast. We stayed there until the war ended. Based on the instructions my mother gave my brother and I, we flew to Ireland where we stayed.

 As of late 1968 and 1969, it was obvious that Biafra was losing the war. Now, in your conversations with your dad, did he ever say that the war was fought with the conviction that the war would end in favour of Biafra? 

When Biafra started, it didn’t have resources in terms of trained soldiers and weapons of war. That was always source of concern but as a Biafran, my father and other Biafrans felt it was a just cause and they felt they had the right to defend themselves. Along the way, a number of them believed there would be some international interventions. I am not going to say that there wasn’t any belief because people thought they would be able to defend themselves. A number of people also didn’t imagine that Gowon would use maximum force against Biafrans. At the initial stage people volunteered to join the army but as at 1968, people were conscripted into the army. That showed that the morale was dropping.

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

C. Odumegwu Ojukwu On The July 29, 1966 Mutiny And Massacre


I have considered with my Executive Committee the very grave events in some parts of the country regarding the rebellion by some sections of the Nigerian army against the National Military Government which resulted in the kidnapping of His Excellency the Head of the National Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, and the cold premeditated murder of officers of eastern Nigerian origin.

In the course of this rebellion, I had discussions with the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Ogundipe, who, as the next most senior officer in the absence of the Supreme Commander, should have assumed command of the army; my colleagues, the other military governors; and the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon. During this discussions it was understood that the only conditions on which the rebels would agree to cease-fire were:

1). That the Republic of Nigeria be split into its component parts;

2). That all Southerners resident in the North be repatriated to the South, and all Northerners resident in the South repatriated to the North.

In spite of the fact that the only representations made at these cease-fire negotiations were those of the rebels and and their supporters in the North, and notwithstanding that the views of the people of the Eastern group provinces had not been ascertained, it was agreed to accept these proposals and stop further bloodshed.

The public is aware of the wanton and deliberate massacre of several people of Eastern Nigerian origin in last May’s disturbances in parts of the Northern group of provinces. In view of the very strong feelings aroused among the people of the east at that time as to whether their membership in the Nigerian nation was desirable, I appealed to chiefs and leaders of the people to use their influence to stop any retaliation or precipitate action, in the hope that this would be the final act of sacrifice Easterners would be called to make in the interest of Nigerian unity. However, the brutal and planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigerian origin in the last few days has again cat serious doubts as to whether the people of Nigeria after these cruel and bloody atrocities, cn ever sincerely live together as members of the same nation.

I have noted the action taken to stop bloodshed in the country, and I now consider that the next step is to open discussions at the appropriate level to allow other sections of the igeria eple to express their views, as their Northern compatriots have recently done, as to what form of association they desire for themselves in accordance with the ceasefire terms.

As a result of the pressures and representations now being made to me by the chiefs, leaders and organizations in the Eastern group of provinces, I am arranging for representatives of chiefs and organizations in these provinces to meet and advise me.

Meanwhile, I appeal to our people of these provinces not to give expression to their feelings in any violent form but to cooperate with the law enforcement authorities in he assurance that their rights of self-determination will be guaranteed.

I have further conveyed to the Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters, my fellow military governors, and the Chief of Staff at Army Headquarters my understanding that the only intention of the announcement made by the Chief of Staff at Army Headquarters today is the restoration of peace in the country, while immediate negotiations are begun, to allow the people of Nigeria to determine the form of their future association.

August 1,1966 Broadcast, Enugu, Eastern Nigeria Government House.

Sunday, January 08, 2012

C. Odumegwu Ojukwu's Diary Of Events July 05 - August 26, 1966


July 5-25, 1966: Appeasement measures by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi continue. Efforts at personal friendship and alliance with Northern Emirs. Sultan of Sokoto visits Lagos. Persistent rumors of Northern Nigeria’s plan to secede from the Federation. Meeting of the Supreme Military Council. The council endorses the Supreme Commander’s plan to undertake and educate the people tour of the country.

July 25, 1966: Major General Ironsi begins national tour with a two day visit to Northern Nigeria. Series of dramatic and bloody events follow in cities and towns of Nigeria.

July 25-27, 1966: Ikeja; A Northern Nigerian basketball team from Abeokuta Barracks arrives in battle order to rehearse and reconnoiter for undisclosed “impeding operations.” Secret meetings of Northern Nigerian army officers with Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed, and Major Alao in Ikeja Garrison.

July 28:1966: Ibadan: The Supreme Commander, Major General Ironsi, addresses a meeting of traditional rulers. In Lagos, Lt.-Col. Mohammed, Major Alao, and Major Martin Adamu alert and address the Northern soldiers in secret. This is followed by the disarming of Southern Soldiers, seizure of the armory, and distribution of arms and ammunition to Northern troops. Abeokuta (Western Nigeria): Two sections of Northern Nigeria troops break into a meeting of officers mess and kill Major Obienu, Lieutenant Orok, and Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Okonweze - all Eastern and Mid-Western officers. Ibadan: Southern troops in the Supreme Commander’s bodyguard at Ibadan Government House are removed and disarmed by troops sent by Lieutenant Colonel Gowon. The Northerners among the bodyguards are reinforced by a special contingent of 24 Northern soldiers. Midnight; Ikeja: The stage is set for a coup. The leader of the coup Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, moves into his rebel headquarters at Ikeja Barracks. The code word for the coup is Araba Day - Secession Day.

July 29-30, 1966: Eastern Nigerian officers and soldiers are lined out and shot along with some Eastern Nigerian policemen and civilians. Abeokuta: Northern troops disarm Southern soldiers among the guards, break into armory, arm all northern troops, arrest and detain all Southern Soldiers. The eastern Nigerian soldiers among those arrested are sorted out and shot. Captain Ogbonna (an easterner) manages to escape from Abeokuta and telephone Enugu to alert me of the coup. This is my first knowledge of what is happening. Kaduna (Northern Nigeria capital): Eastern Nigeria Commanding Officer of 3rd Battalion, Lieutenant Okoro, is shot by two Northern Nigerian officers, Lt. Gambo and Lt. Buka Dimka. Alarm is sounded early in the morning and all troops assemble at the hockey pitch, which is surrounded by Northern troops. All the eastern Nigerian soldiers are shot dead. Ibadan: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. I. Akahan, commanding officer of 4th Batallion, convenes a meeting of his officers. When the officers arrive 74 of them who are Easterners are arrested and shot. Looting of property and raping of wives of Eastern Nigerian soldiers by Northern troops begin. Lietenant Colonel Akahan later gives an assurance to eastern Nigerian soldiers in hiding that there will be no more bloodshed. The soldiers came out of their hiding places and are massacred by northern troops. Enugu (Eastern Nigeria): Northern Nigerian troops attempt to seize the armory and arm themselves, to carry out their scheduled assignment in the coup. The attempt is foiled by the precautionary measure of Lieutenant Colonel Ogunewe, who is already alerted by the telephone call from Abeokuta.

July 30: 1966: Some Northern Nigerin political leaders and their Western allies of the Nigerian National Democratic Party hold a series of secret meetings with Northern army officers to finalize plans for the break-up of the country. Lt.-Col. Gowon hoists and flies in front of the 2nd Battalion headquarters at Ikeja (his temporary headquarters) a flag in red, yellow, black, green, andkhaki colors - the new flag of the “Republic of the North.” Telephone conversation with the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Ogundipe. He says that the Northern troops are determined to continue the bloodshed until Northern Nigeria is allowed to secede from the Federation. I agree to the terms to further bloodshed. Situation deteriorates. Increased massacre of Easterners by Northern troops. Brigadier Ogundipe flees.

July 31, 1966: Telephone conversation with Lt.-Col Gowon. He confirms the mutineers’ terms mentioned yesterday by Brigadier Ogundipe. I agree. I pledge my cooperation to help stop the bloodshed before we call on the people to decide the future of the country. I warn him that my government does not recognize the mutiny and that he should not announce himself as Supreme Commander.

August 1, 1966: Scheduled day for beginning of the commission of inquiry into May 29, 1966 Pogrom. Thwarted by July 29 mutiny, British High Commissioner, Cumming Bruce, has top-secret talks with Lt. Col. Gowon and sends envoys to Northern Nigerian emirs to dissuade Northern Nigeria from secession. Lt. Col Gowon appoints himself Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. In the broadcast, he declares that there is no basis for Nigeria unity. Major Ekanem, Provost Marshall, reporting for duty in response to Lt.-Col Gowon’s assurance of safety, is shot dead on Carter Bridge in Lagos by Lieutenant Numan, a northern Nigerian officer,

August 2, 1966: Release of Western Nigeria army officers who took part in the January 15, 1966, revolution. At the same time, their eastern Nigerian counterparts who were detained in the North are shot by Northern officers at a spot 19 miles fro kaduna.

August 8, 1966: At the army workshop, Yaba, all eastern Nigerian army personnel are ordered to leave on pain of execution.

August 9, 1966: Meeting of representatives of the military governors is convened in lagos to consider what immediate steps are to be taken to stop further bloodshed and reduce the extremely high tension existing in the country.

August 12, 1966: Mass arrest of all NCO’s of Eastern Nigerian origin in Apapa, Yaba and Surulere.

August 16, 1966: Army officers of eastern Nigerian origin are abducted from Benin Prisons and shot by Northern Nigerian troops. The rebel troops at the same time release the Northern Nigeria troops. The rebel troops at the same time release the Northern Nigerian soldiers who are in detention with the easterners for their participation in the January 15, 1966 revolution. Major Daramola orders the shooting of 15 eastern soldiers.

August 18, 1966: Atmosphere of insecurity heightens in the country. I assure a delegation of oil companies of the maximum protection of their business by my government.

August 20, 1966: Following the decision to return troops to their regions of origin, I send for eastern Nigeria soldiers. To forestall this, Lt. Nuhu gives orders for the execution of 22 Eastern Nigerian non-commissioned officers detained by the mutineers in Ikeja barracks.

August 25, 1966: Influx of refugees from all parts of Nigeria back to the region increases by the hour. I give directives to ministries and departments to absorb as many refugees and servants as they can.

August 26, 1966: I set up the Rehabilitation Commission wit an initial sum of 1 million Pounds.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Nigeria: The January 1966 Crisis


"(Lagos, Nigeria) St. Petersburg Times, January 18, 1966. The leader of the bloody uprising that propelled Nigeria to the brink of civil war has surrendered, the provincial military government announced yesterday. The surrender of rebel Chukwuma Nzeogwu apparently placed the entire military squarely behind Major-General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, the 41-year old Army ...Commander-in-Chief who took over the government Sunday. Radio reports quoted Ironsi as saying Nzeogwu had surrendered his command and offered to serve the new government. Ironsi said he had accepted Nzeogwu's pledge of loyalty to the new government. It was uncertain whether disciplinary was planned against the rebels. Ironsi attributed the Satuday revolt to general disorder in the Army.' He said every effort was being made to locate Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Finance Minister Festus Okotie Eboh who were kidnapped in the early hours (January 15, 1966).

Ironsi who some observers saw as a potential military strongman, said he had no desire to become permanent leader of the vast West African Republic and its 56-million inhabitants. He said, however, a 'Supreme Military Council' would rule Nigeria until a new constitution can be brought into being according to the wishes of the people. Meanwhile, Ghana accorded swift recognition to the new regime but Britain - former colonial ruler of the African State - held back, apparently to wait out developments there. The British government said it received confirmation last night that rebel resistance in the northern province of Nigeria had collapse...'"

----St. Petersburg Times, January 18, 1966

War, Erasure, And The Politics Of Culture In Sudan

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