Ugandan Women Work In The Middle East Even Though They Face Abuse. They Told Us Why

Migrant work, inside and outside Uganda, is one of the many things people do to cope with dire economic situations. Unsplash

BY HANNE O. MOGENSEN AND JULIANA A. OBIKA

Labour migration from Uganda to the Middle East has surged since the early 2000s, with many young women travelling for employment as domestic workers. Most of these jobs are in Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

However, researchers, journalists and organisations like Human Rights Watch and the International Labour Organisation have documented the widespread abuse and exploitation of Ugandan migrant domestic workers by their employers.

Cases include physical, sexual and psychological abuse, and restrictions on movement. Collectively, these accounts point to conditions that have been described as “modern slavery”.

The Ugandan government has attempted to regulate recruitment agencies and negotiate bilateral agreements on working conditions. It’s had limited success.

Networks of authorised and unauthorised recruitment agencies, and rows of posters in Kampala, continue to lure women with promises of well-paid domestic work in the Middle East. This is despite reports of exploitation surfacing regularly in Ugandan media.

Governments and organisations should protect the rights of migrant domestic workers. But it’s equally important to recognise these women as active agents, not just victims.

We are social scientists who research changing gender relations in Uganda. In a recent paper, we studied women’s decisions to migrate to the Middle East for domestic work. We wanted to understand why so many do so even though they are aware of the risks.

Between 2018 and 2022, we interviewed a group of Ugandan women who had worked in the Middle East. We use the term “Middle East” broadly because our focus was on the women’s experiences rather than the differences between the countries where they worked.

We were interested in why they’d migrated and how their experiences abroad affected their lives back home.

Their stories revealed striking contradictions. They spoke of slavery, humiliation and confinement, but also about “becoming somebody” through migrant domestic work.

This points to the reforms needed to improve working conditions abroad and expand opportunities at home.

Gender shifts

In countries where a majority of the population depends on the informal sector or subsistence agriculture, migrant work offers unmarried women, in particular, a rare opportunity to earn an income.

In Uganda, family identity and social status are traced through the father. Marriage has traditionally been formalised through the payment of bridewealth by the man’s family to the woman’s family.

Formalised marriage has become less common in recent decades, however. In the 1995 census, 64% of Ugandan women aged 15-49 described themselves as “married”, while 9% said they were “co-habiting”. By 2016, only 30% of women considered themselves married, while 30% were co-habiting.

The Uganda Bureau of Statistics stopped distinguishing between marriage and cohabitation in 2022. But close to 40% of the population considers itself neither married nor cohabiting.

During our fieldwork, we found that men are finding it increasingly difficult to pay bridewealth. As a result, many women spend their adult lives in a blend of partnerships; men go in and out of their lives while they remain with their children.

Women in our study linked their decision to migrate to the Middle East to men’s failure to live up to the ideal of being providers. They saw migration as a way to gain control over resources rather than waiting for a relationship to be formalised with a man who would then provide for them.

As one of our respondents stated:


First find yourself some money – marriage will always be there.

The women saw themselves as people who had taken their future into their own hands.

They readily acknowledged the harsh realities of the work. Many spoke of losing their freedom and encountering degrading attitudes towards women and, at times, racism. Yet, as one woman put it:

First get yourself the Arab experience then maybe you will become the lucky one who manages to move on to something else.

They hoped migrant work would be the first step towards a new life. And for some women in our study it did happen. They got better jobs in other countries.

Many however, did not. They returned several times to the Middle East before eventually settling down in Uganda.

Some returned home with savings, which they couldn’t do on a Ugandan wage. Earnings in the Middle East vary widely, so getting precise amounts proved difficult. And at home, they faced competing demands, like sharing resources with relatives and trying to build a permanent home of their own.

Even though many women never marry, motherhood remains a powerful social expectation. One in three Ugandan households are headed by women, according to the 2022 demographic survey. We found that even more women are actually heads of households even if a man is around some of the time.

Ugandans may say that a woman is “fathering a home” in the sense that she is building a house for herself and her children, making decisions and controlling resources. Not everybody succeeds in doing so, even after years in the Middle East. But some do. And the hope is there.

Power dynamics of migration

Recruitment agencies and other intermediaries profit from those hopes. The women’s “Arab bosses” may make possible the lives they aspire to build, while sustaining exploitative and oppressive labour relationships.

These experiences are shaped by wider global inequalities.

European countries are part of this unequal system. They restrict opportunities for low-wage migrants through tightening immigration policies. In doing so, they reinforce inequalities in who can move, where they can work and under what conditions.

The women in our study didn’t describe themselves as trying to challenge global inequalities or transform existing power structures. Rather, they sought greater control over resources and decision-making within their families and communities.

Their main motivation was to provide for their families. Yet they are also reshaping power and gender relations in Uganda and beyond.

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How The War In Iran Has Brought European Countries Closer Together – Without Trump

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz met in Paris to discuss the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Michel Euler/AP/AAP

BY ROMAIN FATHI

The United States under President Donald Trump and the European Union have a complicated relationship. On one hand, European countries and the US have built some of the strongest alliances since the end of the second world war. On the other, since the start of Trump’s second term in 2025, they have openly clashed on significant issues: tariffs, NATO contributions, Palestinian statehood, Israel’s interventionism, Ukraine support levels and Greenland’s sovereignty.

Trump’s sudden war on Iran is the latest of these clashes, but it is distinctive because it is shaking the world’s economy. The US war on Iran, alongside Israel’s war on Lebanon, is accelerating a notable reshaping of European alliances and strategic thinking about the union’s future.

The EU has more than 450 million inhabitants, and its GDP is nearly on par with that of the US or China. Despite its polymorphic nature, and in fact perhaps because of it, it is a world player that can exercise considerable sway over international affairs.

European leaders are now attempting to drive a lasting ceasefire, and perhaps even peace, between the US and Iran, with the aim of reopening the strait of Hormuz as soon as possible.

A non-UN/NATO sanctioned conflict

EU countries believe in the rules-based order and international institutions. This is not only because of their democratic constitution and values, but also because they offer them better protection than “might makes right”.

Trump’s unilateral war on Iran sits well beyond international conventions. It was neither sanctioned by a UN mandate or resolution, nor approved by NATO. As a result, European leaders have refused to contribute.

Spain and Italy have outwardly refused to allow US weapon-carrying planes bound for the Iran conflict to use their bases. Meanwhile, France is taking a more case-by-case approach in authorising or declining use of its airspace as part of operations linked to the conflict.

Spain, Italy, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have also refused to send direct military support to contribute to Trump’s war. However, France and the UK are willing to deploy within a peace or maritime security framework once the war is over.

Europe united, at last?

Trump’s war on Iran has accelerated a much deeper, more significant process: the coordination of European leaders on central issues such as European strategic independence in defence, diplomacy and energy.

Since Trump’s return to the Oval Office, there has been a subtle but important diversification of the EU’s diplomatic and military agreements with regional partners. Six such agreements have been signed by the EU, followed by a dozen more bilateral agreements of its member states with other countries.

This greater European coordination is being validated and reinforced by the war in Iran. The global disruption in the production and circulation of petro-based products generated by the near total closure of the Straight of Hormuz is prompting urgent European responses.

On April 17, in Paris, UK and French leaders Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, flanked by their German and Italian counterparts Friedrich Merz and Giorgia Meloni, co-presided over a conference on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. They were joined by 49 other countries, with more than half of the EU’s member states present alongside representatives of EU institutions and international organisations.

The meeting proposed the “full, immediate, and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz”. The leaders agreed to start planning, from London next week, a neutral mission to guarantee safety and free passage in the strait.

The war in Iran and Trump’s criticisms of the pope have ruptured Trump’s relationship with Meloni, whose electoral base has grown worried about the US president’s unpredictability.

A shifting tide

For a time, Trump and the MAGA movement had worked hard, and somewhat successfully, to drive a wedge between European leaders. They supported the far right in Germany, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Meloni in Italy.

But, just three days before Meloni arrived in Paris, Orbán faced an enormous electoral defeat. During the 16 years of his iron-fist rule in Hungary, the pro-Russian Orbán had been a critic of Europe, creating considerable headaches for the EU by blocking a range of initiatives and providing sensitive information to his friend Vladimir Putin. His replacement by a more moderate leader, Péter Magyar, has sparked significant hope in European chancelleries for greater unity.

The internal divisions that Trump relied on to deal with Europe are eroding.

Furthermore, his threats to acquire Greenland only months ago were met by immediate European reactions such as putting a commercial agreement with the US on ice, launching operation “Arctic Endurance”, and affirming Danish and European sovereignty. The EU has once again shown its ability to resist Washington’s pressures and affirm its strategic autonomy.

Where now for Europe?

These episodes in national and international affairs have prepared the ground for a more united approach to the current crisis. European leaders, so often hampered by divisions exacerbated by Russia and the US, are now in a unique position to weigh in on the current Iran crisis and the shock it is delivering to the global economy.

This is because the concerns that unite them – energy security, potential inflation and unemployment – overrule any ideological affinity towards Moscow or Washington.

Besides greater diplomatic integration of European member states, the current crisis is also a catalyst for the European Commission to accelerate its efforts to limit consumption of fossil fuel, safeguard supply networks and accelerate the electrification of Europe’s economies through nuclear and renewables.

Paradoxically, the Iran and Hormuz crises have – as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did in 2022 – driven further European integration. This renewed faith in a European voice is happening both between member states and between European institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Foreign Affairs Council.

This rapprochement between European leaders is starting to yield outcomes beyond the Iranian crisis. Visiting Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on April 20, Macron declared he was “reasonably optimistic” for a “new era in Europe”, starting with more support for Ukraine, previously vetoed by the departed Orban.

The significant disruptions created by Trump’s attack on Iran may well have the side effect of a more autonomous and sovereign Europe. Despite the tensions between the US and European states, all have an interest in a peaceful Iran – and Ukraine.

For some in Europe, the war in Iran may be resolved amicably if further collaboration is achieved through US support in Ukraine.

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NATO’s Internal Cohesion Is Being Threatened (Again) – But In Pushing For Support On Iran, Trump May Risk Eroding US Influence On The Alliance

BY MICHAEL A. ALLEN, CARLA MARTINEZ MACHAIN AND MICHAEL E. FLYNN

Soon after the Israeli-U.S. war in Iran began on Feb. 28, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump called upon NATO allies to help support the effort. The response of European leaders was at first mixed. Some, like the United Kingdom, offering limited or qualified support. Others — chief among them Spain — refused to assist the U.S. at all.

NATO members’ opposition to getting involved with the conflict hardened further after the alliance decided to sit out the subsequent U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

The extent of the division between Washington and other members is such that European leaders have quietly begun considering a plan B should Trump make good on his threats to pull out of NATO altogether.

As experts on foreign policy, overseas military bases and security cooperation, we believe that even though historical tensions within NATO are not new, the recent divisions nonetheless pose a major challenge for the long-term viability of the alliance, particularly in an increasingly fragile U.S.-led international order.
The divisions that preceded Iran

Beyond the recent disagreements over Iran, 2026 has also seen the possibility of conflict between NATO members themselves.

In January, long-standing Trump designs over Greenland seemed closer than ever, with the U.S. verbally, at least, suggesting it was prepared to use economic and military coercion to acquire the territory from Denmark, a NATO ally. Despite tensions having since subsided, Denmark has released unprecedented details about how it prepared to defend against military action by its longtime ally.

While the extent of the Trump-originated rifts are new, NATO member nations disagreeing – sometimes vociferously – is not.

In the 1960s and ‘70s, when the U.S. was embroiled in the Vietnam War, members of Congress called on NATO members to contribute more to their own defense. Those were demands that the first Trump administration would later repeat.

In 2003, the U.S. push to invade Iraq also divided NATO. While some members, like the U.K. and Poland, joined the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, others, such as France and Germany, opposed the invasion. Turkey, another NATO member, notably denied the U.S. use of bases in its territory in the lead-up to the campaign.

The increasing tensions led the NATO secretary-general at the time, George Robertson of Britain, to downplay the growing divide and assure the world that NATO members still supported the United States.

NATO countries have even come close to war with each other in the past. Most notably, Turkey and Greece came to blows several times, usually over their still-unresolved territorial conflict over Cyprus in the Mediterranean.
NATO’s evolving mission

Reducing tensions among European nations was always part of the NATO project. With the two world wars driven in large part by French-German rivalry, reducing intra-alliance conflict was central to NATO’s purpose. The first secretary-general of NATO, Lord Lionel Hastings Ismay, famously described NATO as aimed at “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”

With the fall of the Soviet Union, one of NATO’s core pillars collapsed.

In the 1990s, the organization’s mission shifted from an anti-Russian defense pact to promoting European regional security. During this period, NATO took part in conflicts in the Balkans from 1992 to 1999. It still maintains a peacekeeping presence there.

In 2001, when launching its war against Afghanistan, the U.S. invoked Article V, NATO’s collective defense clause, for the first and, to date, only time. This led NATO member nations to become militarily active well beyond Europe’s borders, including operations in Pakistan, the coast of Africa, Libya and Iraq.

The 1990s and early 2000s also saw NATO expand to include several former Soviet republics, a move that Russia opposed as hostile to its interests. In fact, post-Cold War NATO expansion into East Europe has long been one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief grievances against U.S. foreign policy in Europe.

The Russian invasions of Crimea in 2014 and Ukraine in 2022 led to a renewed focus on Russia and Europe’s eastern borders, with NATO member nations coordinating on sanctions and military aid in support of Ukraine’s government. The war also led to another round of expansion, with Finland joining the alliance in 2023 and Sweden in 2024.
Trump’s opposition to NATO

While NATO has grown and its mission focus has changed over time, the Trump administration’s call to action against Iran is not an obvious extension of the organization’s evolved focus.

The war is geographically removed from Europe, and Trump has largely been unsuccessful in making the case for why Iran posed an imminent threat to NATO nations. The United States’ motivations and war aims also remain unclear and have been prone to change.

European countries largely agree on issues like preventing Iran from pursuing an unlimited nuclear program. But they have long preferred diplomatic initiatives – like the 2015 nuclear accord deal with Iran brokered during the Obama Administration – to military strikes.

Part of the disconnect now is how the U.S. under Trump views multilateral institutions compared with his predecessors. While past U.S. presidents have viewed NATO as an extension of the United States’ global interests, they also tended to value the alliance as a whole, despite Washington not always getting its preferred outcomes from it. For Trump, it is far more transactional.

Indeed, the Trump administration has framed the lack of support from NATO nations as evidence of the alliance’s decreased utility to the U.S.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently echoed that position, questioning the use of the alliance after several NATO members refused to allow the U.S. to use their airspace to conduct military operations in Iran.

During his first term, Trump also openly questioned NATO’s purpose. And he has repeatedly pressured allies to increase their defense spending, suggesting that allies were cheating the U.S. by an overreliance on American military strength.
The specter of unintended consequences

Even before Trump’s threats during his second term, Europe had already decided to change course. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the increasing fragility of the United States’ involvement in NATO, European countries began increasing military spending; NATO allies have also set targets for further increases in the coming years.

Germany aims to increase its military personnel by 50% in the next 10 years, and it has created its first permanent military deployment abroad – in Lithuania – since World War II. France has likewise announced plans to expand its nuclear arsenal and use it for extended deterrence for the rest of Europe.

Ironically, more spending may increase the chance of tensions between the Trump administration and NATO members.

Over time, the U.S. has reaped some benefits when allies spend less on their own defense. That’s because the U.S. has historically provided security guarantees for countries in exchange for more say over their foreign policies – something scholars refer to as the security–autonomy trade-off.

However, as the U.S. moves further away from a shared vision with European countries and U.S. policy becomes more volatile, American security guarantees may be less reliable in the eyes of many Europeans. Increased European defense budgets will therefore mean NATO members have more opportunities to assert their preferences against those of the U.S.
A changing role for NATO?

The world for the past 80 years has been characterized largely by U.S. political and military dominance. While it is clear that that world is changing, it is less clear what will replace it.

But understanding NATO’s history and its possible paths forward can give us some clues as to what that world will look like. And contrary to Trump’s short-term aims in nudging NATO allies to rebuild their militaries, a more powerful Europe likely means less U.S. influence in the long term, not more.

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Shiite Grief Over Attacks In Iran’s Sacred Cities Has Deep Historical Roots

The shrine of Fatima Masumeh in Qom, Iran. Mansoreh Motamedi/Moment via Getty images

BY MARY THURLKILL

PROFESSOR OF RELIGION,

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI

Several Shiite communities in South Asia recently refrained from celebrating Eid as they mourned the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. From Nigeria to Kashmir – well beyond the Gulf region – the assassination has stirred deep concerns among Shiite Muslims.

Shiite Islam is the official, and majority, religion of Iran. Shiite minorities in other countries tend to view Iranian leaders as protectors and have sometimes risked personal safety to protest the war.

As the violence expands around Tehran, Shiites are not only grieving the death of their leaders but also fear the loss of holy cities and shrines that anchor their collective memory.

Many of the cities targeted in the war today are home to these types of shrines, including Qom, Isfahan and Mashhad. In Isfahan, the 17th-century Jame Abbasi Mosque, also known as Shah Mosque, sustained damage during one of the airstrikes. After the ayatollah’s death, Shiites gathered at Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad to mourn his loss. In a signal recognized by all Shiites, Iran raised the black flag at the shrine’s dome to mark the community’s shared grief.

Qom, located about 80 miles south of Tehran, has attracted much media attention because of the large-scale military attacks against it. Various social media platforms are showing destroyed buildings and plumes of smoke filling the skyline.

After Khamenei’s death, the city was targeted because the Assembly of Experts gathered there to elect his successor. Israel attacked Qom’s Shokouhiyeh Industrial Zone, known for its drone production companies.

With the news blackout in Iran and Gulf states, it’s impossible to know the impact of military operations on holy sites like Qom. Regardless of the level of material damage, Shiites are deploring the physical and spiritual assaults against their sacred landscape.

That’s because in Shiite Islam, grief is not only personal but collective. As a scholar of medieval Islam and Shiite piety, I have seen how this grief is expressed through rituals, pilgrimage and devotion to saints.

Redemptive suffering

Shared sorrow is a key part of Iran’s Twelver Shiite identity, which venerates the Prophet Muhammad’s family through daughter Fatima and cousin and son-in-law, Ali.

Fatima and Ali’s lineage is called the Imamate, with each individual imam recognized as a sinless spiritual leader. Each imam is responsible for providing guidance as the “proof of God” on earth.

Ali’s leadership and the imams’ leadership wasn’t recognized by all Muslims, however. Some of Muhammad’s companions and early leaders of the Umayyad dynasty, which ruled from 661-750 C.E., rejected their authority and punished their followers.

According to Shiite tradition, in 680 C.E. supporters of Ali’s family living in Kufa – in modern-day Iraq – appealed to Husayn, the prophet’s grandson, for assistance. They had refused to pledge their allegiance to the Umayyad Caliph Yazid because they viewed him as illegitimate and oppressive.

Husayn gathered a small group of friends and family, including wives, children and siblings, and headed to Kufa. Their party was intercepted outside the city, on the plains of Karbala, by Yazid’s forces led by Umar ibn Sa’d.

Cut off from water and vastly outnumbered, Husayn’s camp suffered for 10 days in the desert, and the Kufans never rallied to their defense. Desperate from thirst, Husayn rode out of the camp with his infant son to appeal for water, but an enemy archer shot an arrow through the child’s neck.

Tradition says that on the 10th of Muharram, Husayn and his companions met Yazid’s military on the battlefield and were massacred. Many of the men were beheaded and women captured; Umar ibn Sa’d marched the spiked heads and shackled women through various towns on the way back to Caliph Yazid in Damascus to deter further protest.

Husayn’s Kufan supporters acknowledged their failure to aid the imam and pledged to publicly atone. In 685 C.E. about 4,000 penitents revolted against Umayyads in Syria; the majority died.

Shiites worldwide still commemorate Husayn’s death at Karbala as a sacrifice for the community’s collective redemption.

Shiites frame their own suffering – from facing injustice to martyrdom – as symbolically participating in Husayn’s sacrifice. Public ceremonies include “taziyeh” plays performed during Muharram that recreate Husayn’s martyrdom and the public recitation of poetry dedicated to his family.

A sacred landscape

America and Israel associate holy sites such as Qom with underground bunkers, uranium plants and military headquarters. But for Shiites they are centers of pilgrimage, where the faithful seek connection with God, the imams and their sacred history.

Qom has universities and stunning sacred architecture that date back to the Safavids, a dynasty that ruled Iran from 1501 through 1736. Its seminary is the foremost clerical institution in the world, training students from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan in a wide range of topics, including Shiite jurisprudence, Quranic interpretation and Arabic literature. Women also attend the seminary but with segregated classrooms and some course restrictions.

Qom’s primary sacred site, the shrine of Fatima bint Musa, who died in 816 C.E., is one of the most important sacred sites for Shii Muslims worldwide and attracts millions of pilgrims each year.

Popularly known as Fatima Masuma, she is the daughter of seventh imam Musa al-Kazim and sister to the eighth imam, Ali al-Rida.

Iranian Shiites – known as Twelvers – believe there are 12 imams in the Prophet Muhammad’s family lineage with exalted spiritual status, and that the 12th imam never died but went into “hiding.” Shiites know the 12th imam as al-Mahdi, or the messiah: they believe he will return at the world’s end times to restore God’s justice and peace.

According to Fatima’s hagiographies, or popular sacred stories, she remained unmarried and devoted herself to scholarship. She’s known as a trustworthy transmitter of hadith – sayings from the prophet and his family – and she studied the Quran and jurisprudence. She’s especially revered in Shiite Islam because of her kinship with the imams.

Tradition notes that when Fatima’s father, Musa al-Kazim, was unable to meet visitors with spiritual questions, he directed them to consult his daughter.

During her lifetime, the Abbasid dynasty rose to power in Baghdad and quickly sought to curtail the imamate’s popularity because many Muslims viewed Ali’s family as the only legitimate rulers.

Saintly intercession

Just on the outskirts of Qom is a village called Jamkaran, home to another important pilgrimage site. According to tradition, the 12th imam, or Imam al-Mahdi, appeared to a devotee in the 10th century and requested a shrine be constructed.

From 1995 to 2005 the Iranian government greatly expanded the mosque complex and city infrastructure to support the millions of pilgrims who visit annually.

Shiites believe al-Mahdi is mysteriously present at the site and listens to their concerns. In a popular ritual of prayer and piety, visitors write personal requests on bits of paper and drop them down the “Well of Requests.”

Shiites share political pain and injustice not only with each other but also with the imams, bound in collective grief and prayers for redemption. These traditions help explain the powerful reactions seen across Shiite communities following attacks on sacred sites and the killing of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei.

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Trump And Netanyahu Want Regime Change, But Iran’s Regime Was Built For Survival. A Long War Is Now Likely

Smoke rises in central Tehran after the US-Israel attack. Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA

BY AMIN SAIKAL

EMERITUS PROFESSR OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY; THE

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA; VICTORIA

UNIVERSITY

The joint US–Israel strikes on Iran, which killed the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and neighbouring Arab countries have again plunged the Middle East into war.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said their aim is to bring about a favourable regime change in Iran. The implications of this for Iran, the region and beyond should not be underestimated.

Although Khamenei’s killing is a significant blow to the Islamic regime, it is not insurmountable. Many Iranian leaders have been killed in the past, including Qassem Soleimani, Tehran’s regional security architect, who was assassinated by the US in January 2020.

But they have been replaced relatively smoothly, and the Islamic regime has endured.

Khamenei’s departure is unlikely to mean the end of the Islamic regime in the short run. He anticipated this eventuality, and reportedly last week arranged a line of succession for his leadership and that of senior military, security and political leaders if they were “martyred”.

However, Khamenei was both a political and spiritual leader. He has commanded followers not only among devout Shias in Iran, but also many Muslims across the wider region. His assassination will spur some of them to seek revenge, potentially sparking a wave of extremist violent actions in the region and beyond.

A regime built for survival

Under a constitutional provision of the Islamic Republic, the Assembly of Experts – the body responsible for appointing and dismissing a supreme leader – will now meet and appoint an interim or long-term leader, either from among their own ranks or outside.

There are three likely candidates to be his successor:

* Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the head of the judiciary

* Ali Asghar Hejazi, Khamenei’s chief-of-staff
*Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic,

 Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini.

The regime has every incentive to do what it must to ensure its survival. There are many regime enforcers and defenders, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate paramilitary Basij group, across the country to suppress any domestic uprisings and fight for the endurance of the regime.

Their fortunes are intimately tied to the regime. So are a range of administrators and bureaucrats in the Iranian government, as well as regime sympathisers among ordinary Iranians. They are motivated by a blend of Shi’ism and fierce nationalism to remain loyal to the regime.

Trump and Netanyahu have called on the Iranian people – some 60% of whom are below the age of 30 – to topple the regime once the US-Israeli operations have crippled it.

Many are deeply aggrieved by the regime’s theocratic impositions and dire economic situation and took to the streets in protests in late 2025 and early 2026. The regime cracked down harshly then, killing thousands.

Could a public uprising happen now? So far, the coercive and administrative state apparatus seems to be solidly backing the regime. Without serious cracks appearing among these figures – particularly the IRGC – the regime can be expected to survive this crisis.

Global economic pain

The regime has also been able to respond very quickly to outside aggression. It has already hit back at Israel and US military bases across the Persian Gulf, using short-range and long-range advanced ballistic missiles and drones.

While many of the projectiles have been repelled, some have hit their targets, causing serious damage.

The IRGC has also set out to choke the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow strategic waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. Some 20% of the world’s oil and 25% of its liquefied gas flows through the strait every day.

The United States has vowed to keep the strait open, but the IRGC is potentially well-placed to block traffic from going through. There could be serious implications for the global energy supply and broader economy.

Both sides in this conflict have trespassed all of the previous red lines. They are now in open warfare, which is engulfing the entire region.

A prolonged war looks likely

If there was any pretence on the part of Washington and Jerusalem that their attacks would not lead to a regional war, they were wrong. This is already happening.

Many countries that have close cooperation agreements with Iran, including China and Russia, have condemned the US-Israeli actions. The United Nations secretary-general António Guterres has also urgently called for de-escalation and a return to diplomatic negotiations, as have many others.

But the chances for this look very slim. The US and Iran were in the middle of a second round of talks over Tehran’s nuclear program when the attacks happened. The Omani foreign minister, who mediated between the two sides, publicly said just days ago that “peace was within reach”.

But this was not enough to convince Trump and Netanyahu to let the negotiations continue. They sensed now was the best time to strike the Islamic Republic to destroy not just its nuclear program but also its military capability after Israel degraded some of Tehran’s regional affiliates, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and expanded its footprint in Lebanon and Syria over the last two and a half years.

While it is difficult to be definitive about where the war is likely to lead, the scene is set for a long conflict. It may not last days, but rather weeks. The US and Israel do not want anything short of regime change, and the regime is determined to survive.

With this war, the Trump leadership is also signalling to its adversaries – China, in particular – that the US remains the preeminent global power, while Netanyahu is seeking to cement Israel’s position as the dominant regional actor.

Pity the Iranian people, the region and the world that have to endure the consequences of another war of choice in the Middle East for geopolitical gains in an already deeply troubled world.

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Despite Massive US Attack And Death Of Ayatollah, Regime Change In Iran Is Unlikely

A group of demonstrators in Tehran wave Iranian flags in support of the government on Feb. 28, 2026. AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

BY DONALD HEFLIN

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE EDWARD

R. MURROW CENTER AND SENIOR 

FELLOW OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, THE

FLETCHER SCHOOL, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran. Iranian media reported Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Khamenei was attacked.

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran. The regime has enough depth to survive the death of several of its leaders. The thing to watch will be who winds up in the top jobs, hardliners or realists. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

This article was updated on Feb 28, 2026, to include confirmation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.

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Syria’s New Leader Promised Democracy. Then He Excluded Women From Parliamentary Elections

A Syrian cleric from an electoral college casts his vote during the recent parliamentary elections in Syria. Hussein Malla/AP

BY KINDA AISAMARA, ELEANOR GORDON AND ELLIOT DOLAN-EVANS

Women’s political participation is often treated as a measure of a country’s commitment to equality and democracy.

Earlier this year, Syria’s new leader, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, described his country as moving in a “democratic direction” after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in late 2024. He said:

If democracy means that the people decide who will rule them and who represents them in the parliament, then, yes, Syria is going in this direction.

Yet, in Syria’s recent parliamentary elections, women only won six seats in the 210-member body. Exclusion was not merely reflected in the outcome, it was engineered into the very structure of the process.

A long history of marginalisation

Assad ruled Syria with an iron fist for more than two decades through widespread repression, war crimes and systematic violence against civilians.

Parliamentary elections were highly controlled, with Assad’s Ba’ath Party and its allies dominating every vote. Women held between 6% and 13% of seats from 1981 to the end of Assad’s tenure, according to estimates from a global organisation of national parliaments.

Although the parliament had little real power, it served to legitimise Assad’s rule through the appearance of a democratic process.

In December 2024, al-Sharaa’s Islamist-led coalition took advantage of the power vacuum created by the decline of Iran’s regional influence and the collapse of its allied armed groups to oust Assad and dissolve Syria’s symbolic legislature.

Al-Sharaa’s rise was initially hailed as a potential turning point toward political reform and reconciliation. However, early signs suggest that entrenched patterns of marginalisation – especially of women – are continuing to shape Syria’s politics.

How women (and others) were sidelined

The recent parliamentary elections in early October did not factor in the people’s will, nor were they permitted to vote. They weren’t involved in the process at all.

Instead, the elections were overseen by a government body called the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections, appointed by al-Sharaa. Its composition was revealing: nine men and only two women.

The process was complicated and deliberately exclusionary. The Supreme Judicial Committee was tasked with forming electoral subcommittees around the country, which then reviewed applicants for individuals to be appointed to electoral colleges. Only those selected were allowed to participate in the voting process or nominate candidates.

Ordinary citizens had no direct role in the election.

Under this framework, the electoral colleges selected representatives for two-thirds of the parliament seats. Al-Sharaa will appoint the remaining third.

Unsurprisingly, women’s representation in the subcommittees was minimal. Drawing on raw figures published on the official Syrian election website, women only constituted about 11% of all subcommittee members (18 out of roughly 180 nationwide).

Even where women did have decent representation, no female parliamentarians were elected. In Damascus, for example, women comprised nearly a third of the registered applicants (44 out of 145) for the electoral college and a third of the local subcommittee members. Yet, not a single woman from the capital was elected.

Minority representation was also limited. Of the 119 members elected so far, only ten belong to religious or ethnic minorities, including Kurds, Alawites and Christians (who won just two seats). Christians are believed to make up 10% of Syria’s 24 million population.

Previous research on gender and political institutions has shown that exclusionary electoral structures tend to produce exclusionary outcomes. Syria’s case fits this broader pattern.

Syrian officials have explained women’s exclusion as a cultural matter. Mohammad Taha al-Ahmad, the head of the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections, appeared on television to express “surprise” at the low number of female candidates, attributing it a society that traditionally views politics as the domain of men. He said the results also reflected alliances (based on established male networks) that formed among members of the subcommittees.

While such attitudes undoubtedly shape gender dynamics, they cannot by themselves account for the low participation of women in the election.

Women were constrained from the outset. Invoking “culture” shifts the blame away from the institutional barriers.

Ultimately, this was not a free or fair election. When women’s involvement is reduced to symbolic inclusion under state supervision, elections cease to be instruments of representation and become performances of legitimacy.

What can be done?

Reversing this pattern requires more than rhetoric. There must be institutional reform, including:

gender quotas that reserve a proportion of candidacies or seats for women, allowing them to gain political experience and visibility

increased funding, training and local networking initiatives to help women build community-based constituencies

reforming electoral processes to move toward more direct, transparent voting that limits alliances among elites and presidential control 

instituting new school curricula and civil society programs that normalise women’s participation in public life and challenge gendered perceptions of political leadership.

Until such reforms are enacted, Syria’s elections will continue to reflect not popular will, but the entrenched hierarchies of a state that governs through exclusion.

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Hamas Is Battling Powerful Clans For Control In Gaza – Who Are These Groups And What Threat Do They Pose?

Hamas security forces patrol an area of Gaza City during a crackdown on a Fatah-linked clan in 2008. Hatem Houssa/AP

BY MARTIN KEAR

SESSIONAL LECTURER, DEPARTMENT 

OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

Despite the euphoria surrounding the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, Gaza is still wracked with violence.

More than two dozen Palestinians have been killed in recent days in clashes between Hamas and members of various clans. Hamas has also reportedly executed blindfolded men in a public square.

With the Israeli military withdrawing to pre-determined ceasefire lines, Hamas members are beginning to re-assert their control. However, powerful clans are also jockeying for position – some allied to Hamas’ ideological rival, the West Bank-based Fatah movement, and some backed by Israel.

So, who are these clans? What role do they play in Gaza? And how much of a threat are they to Hamas?

Who are the clans?

Familial clans have existed in Palestinian society for centuries. In recent decades, they have come to play a key role in Palestinian politics.

The clans are primarily collections of family groups in various parts of Gaza. One of the largest and most well-armed is the Dughmush clan in Gaza City, headed by Mumtaz Dughmush. This clan was immediately targeted by Hamas after the ceasefire.

The al-Majayda clan also holds sway in part of Khan Younis. Hamas forces raided their neighbourhood earlier this month, killing several family members. This week, however, the clan publicly supported Hamas’ effort to regain control over Gaza.

Importantly, these clans and their relationships with Hamas and Fatah are dynamic and constantly evolving. Members of both Hamas and Fatah also belong to clans. This often leads to clashes over territory and control, with clan loyalties often outweighing movement allegiances.

As Israeli historian Dror Ze’evi notes, any attempt by Hamas or Fatah to disarm the clans would be seen as an affront and met with serious opposition.

A long history of entrenched power

After the 1948 war that saw the creation of Israel and the Palestinian al-naqbah (or Nakba), around 750,000 Palestinians fled Israel to the Gaza Strip, West Bank and neighbouring Arab states.

This was when clans began to assume traditional roles of mediators and patrons. Their organised structures made them best-placed to provide welfare and assistance to a shattered Palestinian society.

As law and order, security and financial independence improved in the territories in the subsequent decades, Palestinians came to rely less on their support. This brought a decline in their power and influence.

This changed, though, during the First Intifada (1987–93) and Second Intifada (2000–05) when Palestinian society was again plunged into crisis. This was especially true in the Gaza Strip, which was known as the engine room of organised Palestinian resistance.

The Second Intifada, in particular, changed the role of the clans significantly, after Israel destroyed much of the organised Palestinian security forces and infrastructure in the territories.

With neither Hamas nor Fatah able to ensure the safety of Palestinians, this created a security vacuum. And some of the clans exploited this by transforming into paramilitary organisations. Again, this was especially true in the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s efforts to crush Palestinian resistance were felt most intensely.

When the Second Intifada ended, the Gazan clans retained a significant amount of political influence and military power. After Hamas won the 2006 elections, some Fatah-aligned clans tried to prevent it from taking power.

So entrenched were these clans that when Hamas finally assumed control of Gaza in 2007, it took the movement a year to effectively bring the more powerful clans under its authority. Even then, it was more of a truce than a victory for Hamas.

Israel backing Hamas rivals

This status quo remained until Hamas’ October 7 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel. Israel’s revenge for these attacks devastated the Gaza Strip, once again robbing Gazans of any semblance of safety and security.

Now, with Israel’s partial troop withdrawal, another security vacuum has been created. And many clans appear keen to fill it, some with the help of Israel.

In June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted his government was arming some Gazan clans, gangs and militias, such as the Popular Forces, led by Yasser Abu Shabab.

Netanyahu’s rationale was that any opposition to Hamas helped Israel and saved soldiers’ lives. It also pitted Palestinian against Palestinian, placing additional pressure on Hamas.

After the ceasefire came into effect, Hamas began targeting what it called “collaborators and traitors” – an apparent reference to those clans and gangs cooperating with Israel.

The Popular Forces, meanwhile, have refused to lay down their arms. A dozen other new militias have also reportedly emerged across the strip in recent days, including one led by Hossam al-Astal, who said:

Hamas was always betting that there won’t be any alternative to replace them in Gaza, but now I’m telling you, today, there is an alternative force to Hamas. It could be me or Abu Shabab or anyone else, but alternatives today exist.

While this violence between Hamas and rival groups does not directly affect the ceasefire that ended the war, it is evidence that Israel is still attempting to meddle in Gaza’s security and exert its control.

But the peace plan negotiated by US President Donald Trump looks shakier by the day, given its call for Hamas to disarm. Trump said this week if Hamas refused to disarm themselves, “we will disarm them […] perhaps violently”.

The peace plan also calls for Hamas to withdraw from Palestinian politics, to be replaced eventually by the Palestinian Authority, which currently administers parts of the West Bank. However, Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected the Palestinian Authority assuming control of Gaza.

This ambiguity over the future governance of Gaza opens the possibility that the more powerful clans could become alternate centres of political power, as they had during the Second Intifada. This time they may do so under the auspices of Israel’s military occupation.

This would further fracture Gaza and weaken any effort by the Palestinian Authority to reunite the territories under a single governance structure. It would also make a future Palestinian state tenuous.

Also, Hamas will not go quietly. And this is a very real danger to peace and security in Gaza, especially if Hamas sees any resistance to its authority from the clans as little more than a proxy war with Israel.

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View From The Hill: Two Years Of A Distant War Have Brought Much Damage To Australian Society

Executive Council of Australian Jewry co-CEO Alec Ryvchin (centre) joins protestors as the hold placards of Israeli hostages following a press conference marking the two-year anniversary of the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel. Bianca De Marchi/AAP

BY MICHELLE GRATAN

PROFESSIONAL FELLOW,

UNIVERSITY OF CANBERRA

Two years ago, who would have imagined the police and the Palestine Action Group (PAG) would be fighting in court over whether demonstrators should be allowed to rally outside the Sydney Opera House?

Indeed, 24 months ago, who would have thought we’d have (or need) designated “envoys” to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia in Australia?

On Tuesday’s second anniversary of the Hamas atrocities in Israel, it is sobering to reflect how much damage this horrific Middle East conflict, which has cost tens of thousands of lives, most of them Palestinian, has done to Australia’s own society.

In Fitzroy in Melbourne, pro-Palestinian graffiti appeared to mark the anniversary: “Glory to Hamas”, “Oct 7, do it again”, “Glory to the martyrs”.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described this as “terrorist propaganda” that was “abhorrent,” saying those responsible “must face the full force of the law”.

On Wednesday, the issue of Sunday’s proposed protest outside the Opera House will be back in court. The police don’t want the protesters’ march to be allowed to end in the tight space at the Opera House, citing dangers to safety.

The lawyer for the PAG said on Tuesday: “If the police application is conceded to, the ramifications for the right to protest in Australia will not be confined to the Opera House, but for a wide variety of protest activities”. The group argues the issue is a constitutional one.

In the past two years, this faraway conflict has done substantial harm to Australia’s social cohesion, raised questions about the future of multiculturalism, and produced serious divisions about where lines should be drawn on limiting free speech and the right to protest. The response of institutions, universities in particular, has been tested and in some cases found wanting.

NSW Labor Premier Chris Minns gave a flavour of the cross pressures when speaking on Sydney radio on Tuesday.

“We’ve moved significant changes to hate speech laws in New South Wales and we’ve done it because we recognise we live in a multicultural community and yes, you’ve got a right to freedom of speech but someone else has a right not to be vilified or hated on the basis of their race or religion. All of those laws are currently being challenged in the High Court because of the implied freedom of political communication.”

As hope, however tentative, is glimmering that the peace plan advanced by United States President Donald Trump just might bring a real breakthrough in this terrible war, the fissures it has produced in Australia seem as sharp as ever.

In two years, the Australian Jewish community has been embattled, with attacks on synagogues and other Jewish places, and many individuals deeply frightened for their own and their families’ safety. Iran’s intervention, behind at least two attacks, sought to stoke division.

In that time, the determination of Palestinian supporters has been steadfast, with regular weekend demonstrations maintained throughout.

The conflict has fractured the Australia-Israel relationship, with the Albanese government increasingly critical of Israel’s unrelenting prosecution of the war, and the Netanyahu government turning on Australia.

This culminated with Australia’s recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations during the prime minister’s recent trip. The recognition was the end of Labor’s internal journey, which commenced many years before this war began.

The Greens Party have been at the left edge of the political spectrum.

The Australian community was divided about Palestinian recognition: an Essential poll published in late September showed 34% in favour, and 30% against.

The conflict has shattered what used to be a bipartisan Middle East policy, when both main parties strongly supported Israel and also backed a two-state solution for a long-term Middle East settlement.

Over the past two years, the Coalition has been strongly pro-Israel, accusing the Labor government of deserting an ally and failing to deal robustly with antisemitism in this country.

Opposition leader Sussan Ley used her parliamentary speech on Tuesday’s anniversary to home in on the government’s policy towards Israel.

“To our great shame, under the leadership of the Albanese Labor government, Australia has not stood with the people of Israel, nor with the United States, as they have sought to dismantle Hamas and establish the conditions for peace”.

The local rifts that have come to the surface in Australia were there well before October 7 2023. The war caused them to widen dramatically and explode.

Even if, and when, this conflict subsides, it will leave fractures, anger, bitterness and fear within sections of the Australian community.

Whatever healing takes place almost certainly won’t be complete. For governments, federal and state, intractable policy challenges will remain.

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The 5 Big Problems With Trump’s Gaza Peace Plan

Israel launched scores of airstrikes on Gaza City last weekend as Trump foreshadowed a peace plan was on the way. Yousef Al Zanoun/AP

BY IAN PARMETER

RESEARCH SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The 20-point plan announced by US President Donald Trump at a joint news conference with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu comes close to living up to Trump’s hype. It is a bold attempt to address all of the issues that need to be resolved if there is to be lasting peace in Gaza.

Could it work? Both sides are tired of the war. Throughout history, quite a number of wars have simply come to an end when both sides were too exhausted to continue. Two-thirds of Israelis want the war to end, and though polling of Palestinians is difficult, they clearly want the devastation and suffering in Gaza to stop, too.

So, this plan, despite its limitations, could come at the right time.

However, there are many outstanding questions about the feasibility of the plan and to what extent it is likely to be successful. Given the Middle East’s violent history, it’s impossible to be optimistic at this point.

Here are five main reasons for concern.

1. Trust is lacking

There’s zero trust between both sides right now. And several aspects of the plan are so vague, there is a big risk both sides could accuse the other of breaking their promises.

The last ceasefire between the two sides only lasted two months before Netanyahu backed out, blaming Hamas for not releasing more hostages before negotiations on the next phase could proceed.
2. The plan is asymmetrical

The deal favours Israel more than it does Hamas. Hamas is essentially being asked to give up all of the remaining Israeli hostages it holds and all of its weapons at the same time, rendering it entirely defenceless.

Hamas, with its lack of trust in Israel and Netanyahu, in particular, may fear the Israeli leader could use this as an opportunity to attack it again without worrying about harming the hostages.

Hamas was also not invited to negotiate the terms of the agreement. And it now faces an ultimatum: accept the terms or Israel will “finish the job”.

Given the asymmetry of the plan, Hamas may decide the risks of accepting it outweigh the potential benefits, despite its offer of amnesty for Hamas fighters who lay down their arms.

Israel is being asked to make some compromises in the plan. But how realistic are these?

For example, the deal envisions a future when the Palestinian Authority (PA) can “securely and effectively take back control of Gaza”. Netanyahu has previously said he would not accept this.

Likewise, it would also be very difficult for Netanyahu to accept “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”, as outlined in the plan. He has firmly rejected this in the past, most recently in his defiant address to the UN General Assembly last week.

3. Important details are lacking

The implementation strategy of the plan is extraordinarily vague. We know nothing at this stage about the “International Stabilisation Force” that would take the place of the Israeli military after it withdraws from Gaza.

Which countries would participate? It would obviously be a mission fraught with danger to the personnel involved. Netanyahu has previously mentioned an Arab force taking over in Gaza, but no Arab states have yet put their hands up for this.

There is also no timeframe in the plan for the Palestinian Authority reforms, nor any details on what these reforms would entail.

Presumably, there would need to be new elections to install a credible leader in place of current President Mahmoud Abbas. But how that would be done and whether the people of Gaza would be able to take part is still unknown.

In addition, the details of the civil authority that would oversee the reconstruction of Gaza are very unclear. All we know is that Trump would appoint himself chair of the “Board of Peace”, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair would also somehow be involved.

This board would need the absolute confidence of the Netanyahu government and Hamas to be effective. Trust is always in short supply in the Middle East.

4. No mention of the West Bank

The West Bank is clearly a flashpoint. There are disputes and clashes every day between the Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents, which are only likely to get worse.

Just last month, the Israeli government gave final approval to a controversial plan to build a new settlement that would effectively divide the West Bank in two, making a future, contiguous Palestinian state unviable.

The West Bank must be central to any overall settlement between Israel and Palestine.

5. Israel’s right-wing cabinet remains an obstacle

This could be the ultimate deal breaker: the hardline right-wing members of Netanyahu’s cabinet, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, have said they will not accept anything less than the complete destruction and elimination of Hamas.

And although Hamas would be disarmed and politically sidelined under this plan, its ideology would remain intact, as would a significant number of its fighters.

So, does it have a chance?

If Hamas accepts Trump’s plan, we could soon have the answers to several of these questions.

But it is going to require a great deal of work by the United States to maintain the pressure on Israel to stick to the deal. The chief Palestinian mediators, Qatar and Egypt, would also need to maintain pressure on Hamas so it doesn’t breach the conditions, as well.

Netanyahu is likely assuming there will be sufficient off-ramps for him to get out of the agreement if Hamas doesn’t live up to it. Netanyahu has already done this once when he backed out of the ceasefire in March and resumed Israel’s military operations.

In his forceful speech to a partially empty UN General Assembly hall last week, Netanyahu didn’t indicate he was thinking of walking away from any of the red lines he had previously set to end the war. In fact, he condemned the states recognising a Palestinian state and vowed, “Israel will not allow you to shove a terror state down our throats.”

Given this, Netanyahu would not have agreed to Trump’s plan at all if the US leader hadn’t put pressure on him. At the same time, Trump said at his news conference with Netanyahu that if Hamas fails to live up to the agreement or refuses to accept it, Israel would have his full backing to finish the job against Hamas.

This promise may be enough for Netanyahu to be able to persuade Smotrich and Ben-Gvir to support the plan – for now.

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