ECOWAS Commission Promotes Free Movement Across West Africa

BY CHINEDU EZE

ACCRA, GHANA (THIS DAY) - Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS) said it has embarked on the promotion of free movement of people across the nations of the sub-continent, encouraging the removal of barriers at the boundaries to enable citizens move freely.

The commission said it was the encumbrances to free movement that have retarded economic development of the region because they inhibit inter-state trade and travel.

ECOWAS Commission in a recent meeting at Accra Weizo, held last week in Ghana, disclosed the efforts it has been making to facilitate free movement and goods across West African states.

The Director in Charge of Enterprise, ECOWAS Commission, Dr. Tony Elumelu, in his presentation at the Accra Weizo conference held recently in Accra, Ghana, said ECOWAS has been working assiduously to promote the free movement of persons, goods capital, and services within the community and the efforts made so far are yielding fruits.

According to him, at the heart of our integration efforts lies the Free Movement Protocol, a visionary policy that has revolutionized the way “we travel and conduct business within our region.

“By enabling citizens of ECOWAS member states to travel freely within the region, this protocol has not only promoted people-to- people diplomacy but also facilitated trade and investment, thereby fostering economic growth and development. The protocol’s impact cannot be overstated, as it has removed a significant barrier to intra-regional travel and commerce, allowing us to harness the full potential of our collective resources and talents,” he said.

He further said: “By enabling citizens of ECOWAS member states to travel freely within the region, this protocol has not only promoted people-to- people diplomacy but also facilitated trade and investment, thereby fostering economic growth and development. The protocol’s impact cannot be overstated, as it has removed a significant barrier to intra-regional travel and commerce, allowing us to harness the full potential of our collective resources and talents.”

Elumelu said ECOWAS has harmonised tourism policy that has been instrumental to facilitating the development of tourism infrastructure, products, and services across the region, thereby enhancing the overall tourist experience.

“Furthermore, our hotel classification system has ensured that tourists can expect a certain standard of accommodation, regardless of the country they are visiting, which has undoubtedly boosted confidence in our tourism industry. By promoting intra-regional travel, we are not only generating revenue but also fostering greater understanding and appreciation of our diverse cultures and traditions,” he added.

A Powerful, Opaque al-Qaeda Affiliate Is Rampaging Across West Africa

Members of the Ghana Immigration Service patrol their country’s porous border with Burkina Faso, inspecting cars crossing in Gwollu, Ghana. (Guy Peterson/For The Washington Post)

BY RACHEL CHASON AND ADRIAN BLANCO RAMOS

TUMU, GHANA (WASHINGTON POST) — In the space of just a few months, the al-Qaeda affiliate has overrun major cities in Burkina Faso and Mali, carried out the deadliest-ever attack on soldiers in Benin and expanded its hard-line Islamist rule across the region. No one knows when its fighters will strike next — or where they plan to stop.

After years spent quietly gaining strength, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is now the most well-armed militant force in West Africa and among the most powerful in the world, according to regional and Western officials, with as many as 6,000 fighters under its command. Local strategies employed to combat JNIM are accelerating its rise, officials and experts say, as atrocities by West African forces have allowed the group to claim the moral high ground and legitimize its growing authority.

The United States has largely pulled back from — or been pushed out — of the fight, leaving in its wake a deepening security vacuum and mounting anxiety over JNIM’s aims and capabilities.

“They’re creating a proto-state that stretches like a belt from western Mali all the way to the borderlands of Benin. … It is a substantial — even exponential — expansion,” said Héni Nsaibia, West Africa senior analyst for the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project, or ACLED, a nonprofit research group.

JNIM, along with the rival Islamic State-Sahel Province, has turned the region into an epicenter of Islamist insurgency. The Institute for Economics & Peace’s annual index last year found 51 percent of terrorism deaths worldwide were in the Sahel, a vast, tumultuous region south of the Sahara that spans the breadth of Africa. The chaos ravaging the region has helped military officers seize power in coups — vowing to break with the West and restore calm.

But in most countries the security situation has only gotten worse. In 2024, Burkina Faso ranked as the nation most affected by terrorist violence for a second straight year, and Niger saw the largest increase in terrorism-related deaths globally. In a sign of JNIM’s southward spread, Togo reported the most terrorist attacks it its history; Benin has reported nearly as many deaths in the first three months of this year than in all of 2024.

Increasingly, experts say, JNIM’s informant and supply chain networks are stretching into stable nations such as Ghana, Senegal and Guinea. Governments fear their fighters could soon follow.

The Washington Post interviewed experts and officials in five countries to shed light on why the group is growing so fast — and what its end game might be. Reporters also traveled to the porous borderlands between Burkina Faso and Ghana, where tens of thousands have fled violence by JNIM and government forces, to speak to refugees about life under militant rule.

They recounted how gun-toting JNIM members burst into mosques in Burkina Faso in recent years, announcing that strict Islamic laws would be implemented, schools would be closed and state institutions would be targeted. Violating the rules, the extremists made clear, would carry a price. Nearly 6,000 civilians have been killed by the group in the past five years, according to ACLED data.

Refugees said that initially, they rejected the group outright. But their anger was redirected by the government’s response: a militia-led wave of killing targeting the Fulanis, a semi-nomadic, predominantly Muslim ethnic minority spread out across West Africa. Skeptical locals became eager recruits.

“They were afraid, and they ran to them,” said Amadou Diallo, a 69-year-old Burkinabe refugee, describing his three daughters and their husbands who joined JNIM after militia members killed scores of their fellow Fulani.

As the threat grows across West Africa, the region has largely fallen off the radar in Washington, according to interviews with four current and former U.S. officials. Like other officials in this story, they spoke to The Post on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive details.

American drones once flown from Niger — where U.S. troops were forced out last year by the country’s military junta — have been moved out of West Africa, according to two former U.S. officials with knowledge of the situation. They added that plans to relocate the drones to Ivory Coast and Benin have been scrapped.

There are now fewer than 200 troops in the region, mostly stationed in countries along the coast — down from about 1,400 as recently as 2023 — according to current and former officials.

The State Department press office said the U.S. “continues to work with various partners in West Africa to counter the scourge of terrorism from groups like [JNIM]" and noted that Will Stevens, a top American official in the region, recently visited Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin “to discuss the growing presence of violent extremist organizations.”

U.S. Africa Command (Africom) declined to comment. A spokesperson pointed to recent remarks by Gen. Michael E. Langley, the head of Africom, who emphasized that the U.S. was focused on helping African nations build the “self-reliance” to fight terrorism.

But the vast majority of programs run through the Global Fragility Act — a multiyear initiative intended to bolster stability in vulnerable West African countries — have been shut down by the Trump administration.

“JNIM is ascendant,” one of the former U.S. officials said. “In a region where we used to monitor what was happening, we no longer have the tools.”

Evolving tactics

JNIM, founded in Mali in 2017 as an umbrella organization combining four Islamist extremist groups, is headed by Iyad ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa, leaders of a 2012 uprising that saw separatists and Islamists take over much of the country’s north.

Ag Ghali belongs to the mostly Muslim Tuareg ethnic group, which has fought for decades to establish an independent state in northern Mali. Koufa is a Fulani preacher based in central Mali. The differences between the two men have given the group broad appeal — and contributed to uncertainty about its goals.

The group operates on a “franchise” model, experts say, tailoring its strategies to local customs and its recruiting to local grievances. But wherever its fighters go, they enforce a strict Salafist version of Islamic law.

Ali Diallo, a 53-year-old herder from Burkina Faso’s Boucle du Mouhoun region, was washing himself before prayers at his local mosque in 2023 when a group of bearded men wearing turbans forced him and other men inside and locked the door.

“I thought we were going to die,” Ali Diallo said, recalling that the men wore machine guns across their chests. “But two men stood where the imam usually stood and started preaching. They said their fight was with the government and their goal was to spread Islam, not to kill us.”

Shortly afterward, the extremists closed his children’s school. “We were angry,” said Asseta Diallo, his 19-year-old daughter. “We just started sitting at home.” Strict dress codes were enforced in the community, with veils required for women and short pants for men. Naming and wedding ceremonies were banned. Loud music too.

In its strongholds in central and southern Mali, experts say, the group has made agreements with communities that compel residents to adhere to JNIM’s rules and pay zakat, or taxes, in exchange for not being attacked. In recent months, these local pacts have allowed JNIM to shift its focus, and move its manpower, to neighboring Burkina Faso and coastal nations such as Benin.

“These guys are smart, sophisticated and evolving,” said Corinne Dufka, a veteran Sahel analyst based in Washington. “And now, there is a model for mainstreaming their political evolution.”

Some of JNIM’s senior figures, Dufka said, are looking to Ahmed al-Sharaa — the Syrian leader who has recast himself as a moderate after once being associated with al-Qaeda — as a potential model for their own trajectory.

When Sharaa’s rebel group overthrew the Assad regime last year, JNIM issued a statement of congratulations. And when Koufa was interviewed by a French journalist in October, he did not mention al-Qaeda, prompting speculation about a possible break with the group.

Western and West African officials and experts estimate JNIM has between 5,000 and 6,000 combatants but say a lack of intelligence makes it difficult to arrive at a definitive figure. Fighters have long targeted symbols of foreign influence in the region, including attacks against French and U.N. forces, and more recently have threatened Russian mercenaries fighting alongside Malian troops.

Aneliese Bernard, a former State Department adviser who now runs a private security firm working in West Africa, said the group has metastasized to such an extent that it now “directly impacts [U.S.] national security.”

And, she added, “they are expanding undeterred into the countries we have long considered robust security partners.”

Propaganda war

Military officers have staged coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in response to the growing violence, promising an all-out war against the extremists. In Burkina Faso, President Ibrahim Traoré’s strategy has hinged on arming more than 50,000 militia members, who have committed scores of atrocities, rights groups say.

Each attack has become a recruiting opportunity for JNIM.

In March, in the town of Solenzo, Burkina Faso, government militias killed dozens of mostly Fulani civilians and filmed the aftermath, according to rights groups. Videos shared by the perpetrators on social media showed the dead, including women and children, piled into trucks.

In the days after the attack, JNIM released videos condemning the government. “These miscreants want us to fight back and kill innocent women and kids … which will lead to a civil war,” said one JNIM leader in another video. “Yet our fight is not to defend a country or an ethnicity, but religion instead.”

The videos were part a wider propaganda blitz by the group during Ramadan in March. Fighters in brightly colored headscarves were filmed in action at training camps, or reading from the Quran, guns propped in front of them.

Since 2019, the group has killed more than 5,800 civilians in the region, according to ACLED; about 9,600 civilians have been killed by regional militaries and government-allied militias. In areas where JNIM has achieved strong control, violent attacks against civilians tend to decline, analysts say

When Amadou Diallo, the 69-year-old Burkinabe refugee, learned that his daughters and their husbands had joined JNIM, he said he was so distraught that he stopped sleeping. But then, he said, he thought of his three cousins who had been killed by government militias. Village elders had told Fulani residents to leave, that they could no longer protect them.

“The alternative was death,” he said. “At least now I hope they are safe.”

A lucrative insurgency

Long-haul truck driver Yakubu Janwi travels across the region, a dangerous job that gives him a window into JNIM’s expanding influence. The group controls many of the major roads in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, he said; truck owners have cut deals with the militants to ensure drivers are not stopped.

During one dispute over payment, he said, JNIM members seized his truck full of tea and left him wandering in the bush. He was rescued by another driver about 24 hours later, he said, but it took his boss a full year to get the vehicle back.

The trucking agreements are just one strand in a complex web of illicit commerce that JNIM uses to finance its insurgency. Members are involved in gold mining in Burkina Faso and Mali, according to experts and a former member of the group. Others engineer massive cattle-rustling schemes, including in Ghana, run kidnapping networks or are involved in smuggling drugs and motorcycles.

Analysts say an increasingly large share of JNIM’s funding comes from the taxes levied on communities in Mali and Burkina Faso. Solidifying its base of operations has allowed the group to devote more resources to attacks in Benin, said Andrew Lebovich, a research fellow with the Clingendael Institute.

An ambush last month in the far north of the country killed 54 soldiers, the military said. Soldiers were caught off guard, according to a Benin military official: “It is hard to track their movement,” the official said.

JNIM is now actively recruiting in Benin, according to the official and experts. In the country’s far north, recruiters now openly present themselves to local leaders, as they did when they first moved into parts of Burkina Faso and Mali.

The group’s weapons come largely from the government forces it has defeated, according to a recent report by Conflict Armament Research. There have been so many of those defeats that JNIM has been able to amass a formidable arsenal of machine guns, drones and antiaircraft weaponry — and has demonstrated it can deploy them to deadly effect.

The looming threat

Last month, JNIM took control of Djibo, a regional capital in northern Burkina Faso — killing scores of soldiers and civilians and holding the city from 5 a.m. to 2 p.m. Fighters posed for pictures on the streets and in government offices, including under a photo of Traoré, and vowed they were coming for the young president.

At a recent U.S.-led military training in Tamale, in northern Ghana — a stand-alone Africom exercise spared from the Trump administration’s regional cuts — soldiers from Ghana, Benin and Ivory Coast said the images from Djibo circulated in their WhatsApp groups. JNIM is now top of mind across the region.

“They’re more violent, more organized and have more means,” said a military official from Ivory Coast. “They wanted to spread Islam at first, but now it seems like they want to get all the way to the sea.”

That theory was echoed by a U.S. official, who said the group sees its expansion as a kind of “manifest destiny,” and appears to be pushing for a route to the Atlantic, which would dramatically increase the reach of its smuggling networks.

Ghana, a nation of 33 million still seen as a bright spot of stability and democracy in West Africa, has not been attacked yet by JNIM. But officials from neighboring countries have told their Ghanaian counterparts to be on guard. Already, regional officials and experts said, JNIM is using Ghana to restock its supplies and rest its fighters after assaults in Burkina Faso.

Along the countries’ shared border, which is marked by narrow, sandy footpaths and potholed roads, a group of Ghanaian immigration officers are doing their best to patrol but said they need more resources.

Sixteen officers are tasked with guarding the 10-mile border. They can often hear the echo of gunshots on the other side. “Burkinabes cross every day, and they tell us what is happening there,” said Gabriel Afful, one of the officers.

Was he nervous about the future? Afful simply nodded.

Blanco Ramos reported from Madrid. Ayamga Bawa Fatawu and Ahmed Jeeri contributed to this report.

Will ECOWAS Survive Until 2030? – Analysis

BY KOMLAN AVOULETE

(FPRI) — The West African geopolitical landscape is undergoing a seismic shift. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) inability to effectively address the region’s political and security challenges has eroded faith in its vision. The institution has lost its legendary prestige in the eyes of West Africans, and its conduct has caused instability in the region.

ECOWAS, which will celebrate fifty years of existence on May 28, 2025, appears to lack the maturity of its age. The organization, which once symbolized unity, stability, and regional integration, is now a faltering union, a nonchalant entity undermined by internal and external problems that, if not resolved, could lead to its complete disintegration in the coming years.

The rise of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS), comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, led by military juntas, represents not only a daring step but also a fundamental challenge to the existing West African organization.

The Alliance of Sahel States is Weakening ECOWAS’ Authority

The ASS was not formed by impulsive acts but rather a direct consequence of the latent frustrations with ECOWAS’ perceived failures. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, each having experienced coups d’état and grappling with severe security challenges, have increasingly viewed ECOWAS as an obstacle rather than a reliable partner. ECOWAS’ economic sanctions against those countries and its willingness to consider military intervention in Niger after a military junta seized power in July 2023 were the final reasons for the breakup.

The departure of the Sahel states is rooted in the perception of ECOWAS applying a double standard in holding its leaders democratically accountable. While swift condemnation and sanctions were imposed on the Sahelian states following their military takeovers, there is a palpable sense that other member states with less overt but equally damaging democratic deficiencies, such as Togo, have been allowed to operate with impunity. This discrepancy has created resentment and encouraged the narrative that ECOWAS is more concerned with maintaining a certain image than with genuinely advancing democratic values in the region and addressing the fundamental needs of its

The Sahelian states, facing existential threats from Islamist terrorism and feeling abandoned by ECOWAS, have pursued alternative solutions. Their alignment with countries such as Russia and Turkey is a clear indication of their disillusionment with the established ECOWAS-backed order and their willingness to forge new paths to ensure their survival and sovereignty.

Forming the ASS represents a defiant act, a rejection of what they perceive as a biased and ineffective regional body. This bold move, while fraught with its own risks and uncertainties, reflects a deep-seated belief that the existing regional structure has failed them and that a new and assertive Sahelian bloc is necessary for their future.

The recent surge of support for the ASS, both on the continent and across the diaspora, and, particularly, for Capitaine Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso in the face of Western scrutiny and various failed coups, articulates a clear message: The ASS represents a powerful alternative, a vision of leadership that resonates deeply within Africa. It suggests a yearning for leadership that honestly champions the continent’s aspirations and exemplifies the strength and determination that the African people desire in their leaders. This unified protest heralds a profound shift in how the continent envisions its future, while ECOWAS seems to go in the opposite direction.

ECOWAS, from Regional Power to Agonizing Institution

For many decades, ECOWAS served as a cornerstone of regional integration in West Africa, promoting economic cooperation, military collaboration, peace, and stability. Initially, it achieved notable successes in fostering trade, facilitating movement, and even intervening to manage conflicts. However, it has faced significant challenges that have eroded the organization’s credibility and sown the seeds of discontent and distrust, particularly among its populations.

A significant point of contention is ECOWAS’ selective approach to democratic governance. While the organization has, at times, condemned and even imposed sanctions on countries experiencing blatant military takeovers, its response to more insidious forms of democratic backsliding, such as rigged electoral processes and clinging to power beyond constitutional limits, has been conspicuously muted. ECOWAS’ silence raised a sense of injustice and marginalization among populations witnessing the erosion of their democratic rights. Many citizens in West Africa, particularly in the Sahelian states and coastal countries of West Africa, are rebuffing an ECOWAS they perceive as a club for presidents whose agendas are not coordinated with the actual needs and aspirations of the people.

Additionally, ECOWAS has been criticized for its perceived deference to external powers, leading to accusations of being a tool of Western interests rather than a truly independent African institution. Actors seeking to undermine ECOWAS’ authority and foster alternative alliances have exploited this perception, whether or not it is entirely accurate.

The organization’s inability or unwillingness to proactively address the security challenges, development, and governance issues plaguing the region has further fueled the narrative of its insignificance in the eyes of its constituents. The rise of undemocratic regimes, often through the manipulation of elections and consolidation of power under the protection of external influences, has been a blatant wound that ECOWAS has failed to adequately heal, contributing directly to the current fracturing of the regional bloc.

Is ECOWAS Heading Slowly but Certainly Towards its End?

The world has changed, and citizens worldwide aspire to democratic governance and leaders who understand their needs. ECOWAS stands at a critical juncture where bold decisions must be taken for its survival. The persistent reluctance among some of its leaders to adhere to democratic principles, particularly regarding term limits and the suppression of political dissent, poses an existential threat to its long-term viability and moral authority.

The situation in Togo serves as a blunt reminder of this looming danger. The recent constitutional amendment—which effectively transfers the power to elect the president from universal suffrage to a legislature dominated by the ruling party—coupled with the creation of the post of the council of the ministers for the current president reveals the regime’s absolute determination to perpetuate its hold on power indefinitely. ECOWAS’ complicity in this blatant disregard for citizens’ rights to universal suffrage sends a negative signal across the region.

Furthermore, the recent exclusion of prominent opposition figures, such as Charles Blé Goudé, president of the Pan-African Congress for Justice and Equality of Peoples, and Tidjane Thiam, president of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire, from the upcoming presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire poses a risk to the country’s stability. Lack of a significant declaration from ECOWAS raises serious questions about the institution’s efficacy and commitment to democratic principles and the future of Cote d’Ivoire, while similar issues led to two civil wars in the country in 2002 and 2011.

After fifty years of existence, ECOWAS is at risk of disappearing if many of its current leaders continue to turn a deaf ear to the rightful desires of their people. Without any real support from its constituents, the West African bloc risks suffering the fate of many empires, kingdoms, and organizations before it.

The only way ECOWAS can escape this fate is the adoption of a radical and comprehensive strategy. This strategy should include a mandate for all presidents who have exceeded their terms to step down and constitutional amendments across the region establishing firm term limits. This is likely to be difficult, since many of the region’s leaders refuse to embrace democratic values honestly. The consequences of failing to take some action, however, are dire. First, there is the growing influence of ASS in the region, despite its inherent challenges and uncertainties. The ASS can potentially supplant the established but seemingly nonchalant regional bloc. Second, there might be new military coups in the coming months with an alarming expansion of the influence of Russian and Islamist groups.

Such a trajectory would undoubtedly bury ECOWAS. By 2030, West Africans may chant, “Vive ECOWAS, ECOWAS est mort.”

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

ECOWAS @ 50: The Mythology, Reality And The So What?

BY CHUKWUEMEKA B. EZE, DESIRE ASSOGBOVI AND MALICK FALL

Background

By May 28, 2025, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will be 50 years old. In its five decades of existence, the regional bloc has navigated through the complexities of institutionalising democratic ethos, integration and development. A reflection on the myth and realities of its establishment, accomplishments, and challenges has shown that through resilience and unity of purpose among the region’s leaders, ECOWAS has remained an important voice both in Africa and global affairs.

According to experts, the regional group has exceeded the expectations of its founding fathers. Today, the organization is recognized globally as a revered regional body. ECOWAS, despite its challenges can be seen now as a model of integration and regional co-existence. As an umbrella organization for economic development and integration, ECOWAS weighs US$630 billion, representing the world’s 21st largest GDP. The vision of ECOWAS is the creation of a borderless region where the population has access to its abundant resources and can exploit them through the creation of opportunities under a sustainable environment. In this bloc, the population enjoys free movement, have access to efficient education and health systems and engage in economic and commercial activities while living in dignity in an atmosphere of peace and security.

According to Damtien Tchintchibidja, Vice-President of the ECOWAS Commission, major achievements in energy sector distribution to member states, food security, and human capital development have strengthened the Commission’s contribution to the region’s economic growth. It’s effort towards enhancing cooperative resilience to violent extremism and countering transnational organized crime highlights ECOWAS multilateral vision and continued attempt to foster regional stability.

Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas adds that the fundamentals of ECOWAS, as a supranational organization, lies in the strict compliance to its protocols especially on free movement of persons and goods as well as its obligation to protocols and instruments relating to democracy and good governance.

According to Amb. Musa Fatau, commitment to multilateralism by regional organisations such as ECOWAS should constitute a key driver for mutual economic development in Member states. Although a regional introspection indicate progress from trade and exports across the regional bloc since the establishment of the treaty in 1975, there is weak obligation to such treaties leading to lower impact of tariff agreements and economic growth when compared to other regional blocs in the continent. This is exemplified in high transaction costs, excessive checkpoints extortion by custom controls at the border, and ultimately severe cross-border smuggling. From all indication, ECOWAS investment in tackling complex regional security and political challenges it faces constitutes a diversionary shift to its primary mandate as an economic community.

50 years after its establishment, ECOWAS stands as a testament to the power of regional cooperation amid significant challenges and evolving geopolitical landscapes. The organization’s commitment to fostering peace, security, and democratic governance has undeniably laid a robust foundation for economic collaboration. Moving forward, it is crucial for member states to reaffirm their obligation to the principles that underpin ECOWAS vision while addressing the barriers to trade and economic development. By harnessing the potential of its youth and addressing existing transformative gaps, ECOWAS can achieve its goal of becoming a true economic powerhouse as well as fulfilling its mission of creating a borderless, prosperous, and secure West Africa.

State of Play

A historical reflection of the region since the formation of ECOWAS highlights that though strides has been made in line with the vision of the body, challenges abound. While these challenges may differ from one member state to another, a broad relationship has been linked to structural and systemic interconnected factors such as poverty, bad governance, corruption, and mismanagement of resources. Also, the process of state formation and nation building occasioned by the assemblage of disparate groups under a single unit threatens social cohesion with diverse groups constantly seeking autonomy on grounds of perceived exclusion and marginalization leading to several violent conflicts in the region

ECOWAS’s vision of having a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts, whose leaders and people place a high premium on peace and collective regional security has subsequently remained a very daunting task due to these challenges and obstacles that continue to affect accelerated development and integration of the region. These challenges have become transnational in nature, inter-connected and further complicated by violent extremism/terrorism, drug, human and arms-trafficking. Other security threats include infectious diseases and pandemics, impacts of climate change, natural disasters, food insecurity, communal and ethnic conflicts, youth unemployment, weak state institutions, election violence, maritime piracy, anti-immigrant sentiments, inter-state tensions, rapid urbanization, demographic changes and irregular migration and geopolitics impacts on ECOWAS integration and development agenda.

More importantly, until the recent political crisis in Mali, Niger, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) by the military had become unpopular as the region have embraced democracy as the only form of acceptable political system. However, the past two decades highlights dwindling success of democratic structures and systems to yield the desired development for West Africa citizens in terms of human, social, political, and economic wellbeing which has shifted populist interests, widespread insecurity and clamour for UCGs. Electoral management and democracy in West Africa, continue to face several challenges such as institutional weaknesses, lack of independence, poor political leadership, politization amongst others.

Faced with this increasing political threat, ECOWAS as represented by its highest organ of the Authority of Heads of State and Government continues to take far reaching decisions to respond to democracy, peace and security challenges in the region. Member States of ECOWAS understand that economic prosperity; cooperation and integration can only be achieved in an environment that is peaceful, stable, and secure (Diarra 2002). In other words, peace and security are prerequisites for sustainable economic development and human security advancement in the short term, whereas in the long-term human-centred economic development that will eradicate extreme poverty is necessary for durable peace.

During the evolution of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture, an elaborate structure was laid out to guide and serve as the reference for response efforts to crises and violent conflicts. The structure is the outcome of the operational functions of the 1999 Protocols relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The structure is also a preventive mechanism, in which the actions that should be deployed in the event of crises, or where there is evidence of a crisis or violent incident escalating, have been negotiated and agreed to in the protocols.

Between the Myth and Reality

One of the notable developments within the ECOWAS region in the last 50 years is the increased level of awareness and commitment to regional integration among its member states and citizens. Over the years, the concept of regional integration has evolved from a primarily governmental agenda to one that is increasingly recognized and supported by a broader segment of society, including civil society organizations, businesses, and the public. This growing awareness is crucial for the successful implementation of ECOWAS’s goals and objectives.

Assumed to have subsided following the democratisation of all the ECOWAS Member States, especially in the late 90s, Mali, Guinea, Niger and Burkina Faso have re-ignited the debate on the implications for democracy and citizens’ role in political transitions. It is equally telling that in several of the recent military and unconstitutional changes in Government, jubilant citizens out on the streets to welcome the coup plotters suggest that there is more to these changes than research and evidence have revealed. The apparent rejection sometimes, of elected officials in preference for the coup plotters seems to show that there is a need to redefine and deeply reflect on these changes with an eye on sustainable governance systems that are inclusive, participatory, and transformative. More than any other means of measuring the impact of governance, some of these actions provide a clear picture of why these coups might take place in the first place and why coup leaders are perceived as messiahs by some segments of society.

To make an already bad situation worse, at the beginning of 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, organised under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), announced their withdrawal ECOWAS. According to the states, the withdrawal is immediate, but this took one year to be effective on the 29th of January 2025, based on the provisions of Article 91 of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty. Prior to the summit of the ECOWAS Heads of States on 7th July 2024, the three military junta leaders of the AES gathered for the first joint summit where they formed a “Confederation of Sahel States “. The treaty that establishes the Confederation, signed by the heads of transitional governments in the three countries, represents an initiative for a greater integration between the three Sahel states.

The Confederation signifies a step forward in the interstate cooperation and a diplomatic initiative that guarantees the independence of the three countries in relation to regional or international bodies and aims for collective defence against terrorism, organised crime, armed rebellion or other threats to the founding states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since ECOWAS member countries enjoy numerous benefits of membership, including economic cooperation through joint production enterprises, common market, liberalised custom policies, free movement of persons, goods, and capital as well as security-related cooperation through the ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF), exiting the Community implies numerous consequences both for the three countries and the regional bloc. It is therefore more of a myth to imagine that ECOWAS is able to deal decisively with member states that contravene the ECOWAS protocol on democracy and good governance through unconstitutional changes of government. Such challenges leaves ECOWAS in a legal and political quandary especially when there is a contradiction between national and regional legal frameworks.

ECOWAS has been adjudged inefficient in assisting member states in addressing terrorism in the Sahel, despite its efforts to coordinate regional security responses. The response has been hampered by a lack of a unified military force, delays in deploying the planned ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), and insufficient funding for counterterrorism operations. Additionally, overlapping security initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and international interventions, have created coordination challenges. It has been one of the factors which urged some countries to seek alternative alliances in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

The myth is also entertained by the popular perception of ECOWAS being subordinated to or influenced by external actors such as France, European Union, the UA and international Financial Institutions. The perception is reinforced by the alignment with western sanction instead of stronger solidarity efforts to deal with the root causes, the reliance on western funding for peacekeeping and antiterrorism efforts. The principle of consensus in decision making is often a limitation to progressive policies such in the case of delaying the ECO currency and the reform for term limit. The need for unanimous agreement often leads to watered down policies, reluctance to act and lack of agility.

Another reality to the 50 years of ECOWAS existence is its approaches is how it reacts to the early warning information emanating from its well-advanced early warning system which serves to collect and analyse information early enough to determine suitable responses to threats that are identified within member countries. The early warning system was borne out of the experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the conflict relapsed after their initial resolution despite the considerable investment in human and financial resources, yet conflicts continue to ravage the region even in situations where it has garnered considerable warning.

Another visible gap is the lack of strong emphasis on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development, which relates to efforts to address the root causes of violence and conflicts. ECOWAS has been strong at peacekeeping, but not at peacebuilding although it is making some efforts in Guinea Bissau and The Gambia.

The principle of state sovereignty remains a significant obstacle to deeper political integration within ECOWAS. Member states often prioritize their national interests over regional objectives, leading to reluctance in implementing ECOWAS protocols and agreements. This is particularly evident in areas such as economic policy harmonization, security cooperation, and the enforcement of democratic norms. The tension between regional commitments and national sovereignty hampers collective action and weakens the organization’s effectiveness.

The proliferation of multiple external actors and regional coalition forces has also overshadowed ECOWAS leadership and ownership in addressing security threats in the region. The situation in Mali and the Sahel region is a typical case in point – UN, EU, AU, France, USA, G5 Sahel, etc. This influence can sometimes exacerbate internal divisions within ECOWAS, as member states may align with different international partners based on their own political and economic interests.

And so, what?

ECOWAS needs to Improve its responses to early warning recommendations as well as national and local stakeholders’ responses to violence triggers in the region. Thus, there is the need to better link early warning to early response. ECOWAS leaders must learn how to navigate the diplomacy of handling military regimes in the sub-region. The recent event which has led to the suspension of three members (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) who are under military government must be revisited immediately. The Organization must set up a high-powered mediation team to deal with such sensitive matters, if it must continue to be seen as relevant. The hasty and unprofessional diplomatic moves by the Organization in this matter have led the three countries to form a parallel organization to the ECOWAS which does not bring unity to the sub-region. The organization must imbibe the spirit of tolerance which it presently lacks.

Further, ECOWAS needs to build strong regional consensus to address the governance challenges relating to unconstitutional changes of government especially on the phenomenon of Third Termism. Term limits should not be left as a sovereign matter as the consequences affects the entire region. It may be necessary to revisit the issues of outlawing presidents remaining in power for longer than two terms which was discussed during the 47th ECOWAS Summit in Ghana in 2015 and ensure that it is in conformity with national laws. Similarly, Political leaders in West Africa should strengthen democratic structures through the enactment of proactive electoral laws that will guarantee free and fair elections in the region. The region’s democratic institutions should be made stronger like the western world where the system withstands democratic shocks as experienced during elections. A typical example is the recent election that produced the present forty-year-old President of Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye. The ability of ECOWAS leaders to get rid of the sit-tight mentality within its fold, will go a long way to preserve democracy and provide the needed economic prosperity to its people.

There is the urgent need to Strengthen the peacebuilding dimension of responses to crisis in the region to refocus attention from peacekeeping to addressing the root causes of conflicts and the pervasive threats to human security problems. A robust regional framework for peacebuilding and human capacity enhancement/skills may be necessary to achieve this. ECOWAS needs to improve its engagements beyond the state level actors with civil society and community level actors to increase the involvement of ECOWAS Citizens in the Community’s conflict prevention, and mitigation activities.

ECOWAS should reimagine and reorganise its partnerships and collaboration with the AU, UN, EU and other actors at the strategic level and across sectors which is necessary to prevent duplication of efforts, minimize competition, working in silos, clinging onto spaces to the detriment of collective efforts to ensure sustained integrated approaches to promoting peace and stability. ECOWAS needs to define a clear responsibility for its partnership with all these actors and ensure that such partnerships are based on mutual trust, respect and comparative advantages.

ECOWAS integration agenda will inevitably be impacted by the structural changes at the global level and the geopolitics in West Africa. Therefore, it may be necessary for ECOWAS to begin strategizing on how to respond to the rise of ‘developing powers’ that are challenging the influence of Western/former colonial powers which impacts on crisis manifestation, preparedness and response in the region. ECOWAS should set up an Organ that must deal with insecurity and other forms of threat in the sub-region. This organ will have the responsibility of coordinating any military action that is needed to safeguard the sub-region. This can come in the form of collaborative border military force with a mandate to deal with any insurrection within the sub-region. A case study can be derived from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established by the European Union and its allies. The region’s dependence on primary commodities, coupled with the rise of security threats such as terrorism, banditry and kidnapping has further complicated the economic and political landscape. This also needs attention if the organization must be a going-concern.

On the front of economic integration, work with countries on the concretization of the ECO single regional currency project. The roadmap adopted by Heads of States in 2021, is targeting 2027, with a convergence criteria which maintain the deficit within 3% of the GDP, inflation below 10% and debt to GDP not exceeding 70%. This should be a major project for the community in the coming years.

ECOWAS must try to reinvigorate it financial resources and institutional capacity. Due to the limited fund and lack of political will, ECOWAS struggled to implement its policies effectively and faced problems in attracting investment and support for regional projects. In addition, the organizations lack the necessary infrastructure and experience to efficiently manage its operations, leading to ineffective coordination and implementation of regional programs. This inefficiency can be greatly improved through sincere collaboration by member states.

To achieve these goals and truly fulfill its potential as a leading regional bloc, ECOWAS must implement essential reforms that tackle emerging challenges and strengthen its institutional framework. The upcoming 50th anniversary of the organization provides a valuable opportunity to convene an inclusive multistakeholder dialogue—a West Africa “indaba”—aimed at developing a comprehensive proposal that will elevate the organization to new heights.

In addition, transitioning to a more people-driven ECOWAS and enhancing representation within the ECOWAS Parliament are essential steps toward fulfilling the vision of a prosperous and integrated West African community. By implementing direct elections, ensuring equitable representation, fostering grassroots consultations, strengthening civil society partnerships, and raising public awareness, ECOWAS can enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness in addressing the needs of its citizens. The golden anniversary presents a unique opportunity to embrace a new way that prioritizes people’s voices, ultimately leading to a more democratic, responsive, and vibrant regional bloc. The time has come for ECOWAS to embody the aspirations of its people and truly represent the diverse communities it serves

In Conclusion

In light of the above, there is need for a policy-orientation and overhaul weaving in prior learning and lessons learned along the way in this five-decade journey. Regional integration and the underlying national interests should be based on substantive implementation of the agreed upon economic and trade provisions that effectively capture the dimensions of economic development and investments in the region which will in no small measure deescalate the empire of conflicts, democratic backsliding and economic retrogression.

The road ahead will require commitment and collaboration from all member states with the effective participation of all other segments of our society, but the potential rewards are immense, creating a stable, prosperous, and inclusive region for generations to come.

What's Ahead For A 50-Year-Old West African Bloc After 3 Junta-Led Countries Left The Group?

FILE - The defense chiefs from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries excluding Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Niger, pose for a group photo during their extraordinary meeting in Accra, Ghana, Aug. 17, 2023. (AP Photo/Richard Eshun Nanaresh, File)

BY BABA AHMED AND MARK BANCHEREAU

BAMAKO, MALI (THE ASSOCIATED PRESS) — West Africa’s regional bloc known as ECOWAS is facing significant challenges after three junta-led countries formally quit the group , forming their own alliance and weakening the bloc’s standing and political authority.

The withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso from the bloc — now left with 12 member countries — was the culmination of a yearlong period of talks and diplomatic efforts aimed at trying to get them to reverse their decision, announced in January 2024.

The departures were the first of its kind in the bloc’s 50-year historys and analysts warn that a weaker ECOWAS could further undermine the increasingly fragile region.

What is ECOWAS and what does it do?

Widely seen as West Africa’s leading political and regional authority, the 15-nation bloc was formed in 1975 to “promote economic integration” among its member states. The bloc has also often collaborated with members to solve domestic challenges, from politics to economics and security.

The bloc guarantees its members visa-free travel and access to a more than $700 billion market for a population of around 400 million people.

However, in parts of West Africa, analysts say ECOWAS suffers from a legitimacy crisis, with citizens seeing it as representing only the interests of leaders and not theirs.

Why did the 3 junta-led countries leave?

Relations between ECOWAS and the coup-hit Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso began to deteriorate after the bloc imposed stringent sanctions on Niger to pressure its military to reverse the coup it had staged.

The bloc has long used sanctions as a key tool in trying to reverse coups but those imposed on Niger were the harshest yet. Neighbors shut borders with the country, cut off more than 70% of Niger’s electricity supply, suspended financial transactions and froze Niger’s assets held by the bloc.

The three countries called the sanctions “inhumane” and accused ECOWAS of “moving away from the ideals of its founding fathers and pan-Africanism.”

What changed after the three nations left?

After leaving ECOWAS, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso created their own alliance known as the Alliance of Sahel States , or AES, named after the vast southern fringe of the Sahara Desert region.

The three severed military ties with longstanding Western partners, including the United States and France, and turned to Russia for military support .

ECOWAS has attempted to ease tensions with the AES, reversing last February the sanctions that the bloc had imposed and trying to revamp talks, which the AES rebuffed.

What happens now?

Although ECOWAS has said it would leave the doors open for the three nations to continue to enjoy benefits as other bloc members do, the three junta-led countries are launching their own travel documents for their citizens.

The bloc has also said that trade would continue as usual. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are still members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union — meaning trade and free movement of goods should continue among its eight-nation members. The monetary union includes the three junta-led countries as well as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Togo and Benin.

Officially, a six-month extension for talks between ECOWAS and the three countries expires in July, said Babacar Ndiaye, a political analyst at the West Africa-focused Wathi think tank. But there is little expectation that the AES countries would “reconsider their withdrawal,” Ndiaye said.

There are concerns a weakened ECOWAS would be unable to handle security crises spreading from the conflict-battered Sahel to coastal West African nations.

ECOWAS is also unlikely to be in a position to try and reverse the military takeovers in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. There will also likely be fewer investments in the three countries, which are among the region’s poorest, said Charlie Robertson, chief economist at Renaissance Capital.

ECOWAS Partners Media To Combat Disinformation About West Africa

Abdou Kolley (Facebook)

BY MICHAEL OLUGBODE

ABUJA, NIGERIA (THIS DAY) -- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in order to enhance its image and showcase its contributions to the socioeconomic development of West Africa has launched a collaboration with media across the region.

Speaking at the inaugural session which brought government-owned media outfits across the region together in Abuja on Thursday, the Chief of Staff in the Office of the President of ECOWAS Commission, Hon. Abdou Kolley, said the initiative was created in order to promote an accurate reporting of ECOWAS activities and tackling the growing issue of disinformation.

Kolley said the event themed: ‘Strategic Engagement with Public Media Actors in Our Member States to Strengthen Collaboration and Positive Coverage of ECOWAS Programmes and to Combat Disinformation in West Africa’ is also timed to prepare ground for the forthcoming ECOWAS’s 50th-anniversary celebrations and to bring information to the people of the region on the contributions of the bloc to the socioeconomic well-being and humanitarian interventions in the last half century.

He said that the programme was organised in partnership with the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), noting that the two-day event is part of a broader push to ensure media outlets serve as key partners in promoting ECOWAS’s mission of regional integration, peace and development.
ECOWAS President, Dr. Omar Touray, whose address was delivered by Kolley, stressed the critical role that media plays in shaping public opinion and influencing the socio-political landscape.
Touray noted that misinformation, particularly on social media, remains a significant challenge for the organisation, maintaining that accurate media coverage is essential.

“The ECOWAS Commission recognises the media as one of our indispensable and critical stakeholders.

“As gatekeepers and purveyors of information, we are fully aware of the important role of the media in creating and maintaining goodwill and mutual understanding between the commission and its people.

“This explains why the commission has convened this important stakeholders’ meeting with the heads of government-owned broadcast stations as part of our ongoing efforts to proactively broaden our engagement and strengthen our collaboration with the media towards achieving our common and shared vision as encapsulated by our vision 2050, this on the eve of the celebration of 50 years of existence of our institution.”

He noted that the media’s role in countering false narratives and raising awareness about ECOWAS’s achievements is crucial for fostering regional unity and public trust.

According to him, the meeting is coming up at a time when West Africa is facing multiple challenges, including political instability, economic pressures, and a surge in misinformation across digital platforms.

He revealed that the partnership between ECOWAS and the MFWA, formalised in December 2023, aims to build media capacity in tackling these challenges, adding that the collaboration will focus on promoting democratic values, countering disinformation, and fostering peace in the region.

He shared highlights from the 2024 Interim Report on the state of ECOWAS institutions, pointing out progress made in economic integration, peacebuilding efforts, and humanitarian responses.

He however noted that misinformation often overshadows these achievements, which is why ECOWAS is keen to deepen its media partnerships.

“The summary presentation of the results recorded during the first half of 2024 shows that ECOWAS is making a definite effort to support its Member States.

“Unfortunately, however, our populations are not very well informed about these efforts. Instead, they are inundated with false information deliberately disseminated by certain vile individuals via social media with the aim of destroying our common institution.

“Indeed, as is often said, the absence of credible information is a breeding ground for disinformation.”

READ ORINAL STORY HERE

Senegal’s Leader Wasn’t Born When ECOWAS Was Founded. He’s Asked To Reunite The Bloc Split By Coups

FILE - Senegal’s President Basirou Diomaye Faye prior to the start of the ECOWAS meeting, in Abuja, Nigeria, Sunday, July 7, 2024. Senegal’s President Basirou Diomaye Faye is five years younger than West Africa’s regional bloc, which he has been tasked to reunite after three of its 15 member states left to form their own union. (AP Photo/Olamikan Gbemiga, File)

BY CHINEDU ASADU

ABUJA, NIGERIA (AP) — Senegal’s President Basirou Diomaye Faye, Africa’s youngest, is suddenly faced with a huge challenge of reuniting a weakened regional bloc that is older than him.

The 44-year-old Faye was tasked on Sunday with getting the military junta-ruled Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso back to ECOWAS at the bloc’s summit in Nigeria’s capital Abuja. The three nations left ECOWAS and formed their own alliance after the military takeovers fractured their relations with West African neighbors.

As a peace envoy supported by Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe, Faye is seen as possibly the best among heads of state for a mission to try to woo the three nations back to the fold of regional cooperation.

Beyond the appeal of security and economic collaboration, ECOWAS’s goodwill has waned in recent years, said Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, a research analyst with the West Africa-focused Centre for Democracy and Development. But the new role offers Faye an opportunity to possibly seek reforms for “a more sustainable and self-reliant” ECOWAS, Adekaiyaoja said.

Faye also represents the opposite of what the three military leaders claim they are against.

He had not been elected when ECOWAS, founded in 1975, imposed the severe sanctions on Niger following a coup last July. Niger cited the sanctions as one of the reasons for leaving the bloc. Also, Faye’s victory in this year’s election that was certified as credible stood in contrast to rigged polls in the region.

At home, Faye is reviewing the old ties that the junta leaders claim have stifled West Africa’s development, though Senegal remains a key ally for the West. Under Faye’s leadership, Senegalese officials are renegotiating contracts with foreign operators in the country and, according to Finance Minister Abdourahmane Sarr, are “aiming to free ourselves from the ties of dependency in our public policies.”

It is exactly what the junta wants to hear, analysts say. Since ousting the democratic governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the generals have severed military and economic ties with traditional Western partners such as the U.S. and France, saying they had not benefited their countries. The shift has opened the window for Russia to expand its footprint in the region.

“Like the other heads of state, he (Faye) claims sovereignty and a break with the old order,” said Seidik Abba, a Sahel specialist and president of the International Center for Reflection for Studies.

Age is also not just a number in the case of Faye, a former tax inspector. Even as the youngest president in Africa, he is still older than three of the four current military leaders in the region.

At Sunday’s ECOWAS meeting in Nigeria, Faye was still among the youngest. Sitting across him was Ghana President Nana Akufo-Addo, who at 80 is just four years younger than Faye’s father.

When he visited Nigeria in May, the Senegalese leader touted his age as an “asset” that can help open a window for dialogue with the neighbors.

Faye’s task to dialogue with the three countries would still not be easy, according to Abba, the Sahel specialist. He said the three have wider concerns about the operations of ECOWAS, which they say faces interference from foreign countries like France, their former colonial ruler.

There is also a question of how much freedom Faye and the Togolese president would have in their role as envoys under an ECOWAS that has just reelected Nigerian President Bola Tinubu as its chairman.

Their success would depend on “how best the different leaders can coordinate and agree” on the issues, said Adekaiyaoja from the Centre for Democracy and Development.

ECOWAS NEEDS TO HAVE A FACE

BY TOLU ASADE

In 2000, the launch of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) passport, which enables the free movement of people across West Africa, became one of ECOWAS’s first achievements towards larger integration amongst member nations. This action was meant to be the first of multiple changes towards creating a borderless West Africa, and harmonizing policies, shipping laws, through a single currency to create a monetary union. After the launch of the passport, the first element toward creating a customs union with a common external tariff was meant to be implemented by 2019, 19 years after the announcement in Bamako.

This simple element underlies the role and effectiveness of ECOWAS. It is an organization with a weak secretariat that is only propped up by state-to-state relations. It is unable to achieve the goals it has set, and this has led to multiple challenges to its goal of creating a borderless West Africa.

Politically, ECOWAS is yet to achieve significant integration. Over the last six months, three countries under military occupation (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) have threatened to pull out from the union due to poor management of the situation by its member states. Even before the rise of coups, countries like Benin, have gone out of the union to Rwanda to ask for military support as opposed to members in the region.

Economically, ECOWAS member states—with notable exceptions—have been performing poorly. While there have been concerted efforts by individual economies to become more service-oriented, they are still resource dependent nations and have mostly faced limited growth. West African countries are seeing slower growth with exceptions in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin. Countries like Nigeria and Ghana, who account for over two-thirds of ECOWAS’s GDP, have been facing significant currency crises. Both the naira and the cedi have lost over 30 per cent of their value, with Nigeria also battling inflation.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING ECOWAS MODEL

Although West African countries collectively account for 400 million people with significant dynamism, foreign direct investments (FDI) in each country, outside of resource extraction, remains low. Investments are restricted due to a single concern: the markets are small.

West Africa’s cumulative GDP is $761 billion, which, if allotted to a single country, does not make the cut of the largest 20 economies in the world. When you adjust for Nigeria, which accounts for 62 per cent of the region’s GDP, each member state possesses small markets, with about eleven of the 16 countries having a GDP less than $20 billion, while five have a GDP less than $5 billion. These numbers cannot justify large players investing in these markets, given their size. Despite individual markets like Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire seeing sustained economic growth or Nigeria with its large population, investors that must choose between emerging markets would opt for India, Indonesia, China and Ethiopia with larger markets and sustained economic growth.

The current state of ECOWAS does not offer significant solutions to improving the investor outlook of this market. It is quite difficult for a potential investor to see this market as an integrated region like the European Union (EU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Outside the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), countries have implemented different tariff systems despite ECOWAS’ common economic tariff zone that was due for implementation by member states in 2019.

Each market has significant regulatory differences in multiple areas. The first is in technical barriers to trade in terms of technical regulations for goods and services and conformity assessment. The second area involves procedures, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures that make it difficult to move across West Africa. These Non-Tariff Measures or ‘NTMs’ limit easier access to other markets.

There are significant infrastructural challenges as well. There are no rail or road networks linking West Africa, so the region is left without an efficient mechanism of moving people and goods. In addition, there are no singular local players that offer air routes across West Africa at competitive prices. As a result, the region lacks physical infrastructure that supports free trade of goods and services.

It leads to a challenge where, for instance, investing in Guinea Bissau’s markets does not give you preferential access to expand across West Africa. Non-tariff measures that pose challenges to players outside the market are similar to those experienced by players within the market. Simply put, there are no physical infrastructure benefits of being in the West African market. As a result, countries face the significant challenge of attracting investors to sectors outside traditionally large sectors like extraction and telecommunication. Of the $7.7 billion invested in Africa by private equity players (<2 per cent of total market size) in 2022, West Africa only attracted 18 per cent. In 2023, this figure fell to 11 per cent, of which the majority was captured by Nigeria and Côte D’Ivoire alone.

These challenges are evident in the realities of West African firms. For instance, when Nigerian payment giant, Flutterwave, expanded its African operations in 2023, it opted for the Kenyan market as opposed to other West Africa countries. Similar barriers faced by external investors are faced by local West African firms. Regulations by countries in the region does not encourage intra-regional trade. For instance, goods imported into Nigeria cannot be distributed or sold to other countries. So, a business that distributes solar products in Lagos and wants to expand its offerings to Benin, Niger and Chad, cannot use its stock imported in Lagos within those markets. It must forgo economies of scale, treat each market individually, and receive those stocks individually.

This reality is reflected in intra-regional trade in West Africa, which is one of the lowest of any economic union globally (see exhibit 2).

There is significant value available to business operators within ECOWAS from trading regionally, and potential value for investors with a market of 400 million people and a GDP size of $761 billion. Such value is, however, lost due to the presence of regulations disincentivizing connections, the high number of NTM’s and the absence of any physical infrastructure linking the regions.

WHY ECOWAS NEEDS TO RE-ENGINEER ITS ECONOMIES

Despite all these issues, ECOWAS is at an inflection point, where general macro-economic conditions have aligned to create significant opportunities for West Africa. Regions across the world are seeing slow growth in their population size, with Europe and China, expected to decline. From its current population of 400 million, ECOWAS is expected to grow to over 900 million by 2050. While Africa in general is expected to see the largest growth in population among continents, over 60 per cent of that growth will be in West African countries alone. This creates an opportunity to service the global talent shortage expected in the next 30 years through initiatives such as services outsourcing. A large market of 900 million can also draw in sizeable funding, investments and innovation.

However, if not partnered with economic opportunities, this projected population increase, will quickly turn from strength to liability. Increasing populations will mean increased demand of public services such as healthcare, access to transportation and welfare. If the economies or government do not match this demand, these countries will face a humanitarian crisis. This is a credible concern as eight of the 15 ECOWAS countries currently have a GDP per capita below the poverty rate of $1,036.

From Nigeria to Cape Verde, West African economies are at an inflection point, both politically and economically. The region is behind emerging markets and even other African regions like the East African Community. However, given the general decline in global population growth and the increasing aging populations of the Global North, West Africa has the opportunity to leverage its youth to drive innovation, growth and gain specialization. This creates the opportunity that leaders saw in Bamako in 2000 to create a borderless West Africa that can become a regional power and improve member states economic outcome.

A ‘REAL’ ECONOMIC UNION

Creating a real economic union will involve creating a common market with similar tariff rules, eliminating non-tariff measures, and driving economic integration. It would also involve providing the physical infrastructure to support the free trade of goods and services. A great example of a functioning economic union, irrespective of its challenges is the ASEAN, which has eleven member states, a combined population of 662 million, and a GDP of $3.2 trillion.

Creating a common economic market means creating free trade agreements with large countries or large economic unions. The largest free trade agreement globally, was made by the ASEAN with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, giving members access to a population of 2.3 billion people and a GDP size of $38.8 trillion.

With a strong ECOWAS union, it will be easier to negotiate free trade agreements with regional superpowers or other economic unions. The presence of a potentially integrated market, as seen in both Europe and Asia. would create an avenue for increased investments and access to more favourable deals. These opportunities would not be available to a single ECOWAS economy given their limited size.

The state of FDIs across ECOWAS will also see significant increase if investors see the possibility of accessing the regional market through a singular country. This makes it easier to justify investments into smaller economies or to see possibilities for expansion. Countries like Switzerland and Liechtenstein in Europe have seen increased investments from FinTech firms because of the launchpad these firms see in accessing the European markets. At the very least, a more active economic union would see the case for investments into the region to support West Africa’s sizable energy, and its rail and road needs.

Internally, there are benefits ECOWAS would receive from a stronger economic union. Intra-regional FDIs are often overlooked for developing economies but are often a sizable contribution across economies. It also opens markets to existing entrepreneurs, where strong retail firms in Côte D’Ivoire would be able to operate in local markets in West African cities like Niamey, Lagos and Dakar.

Additionally, there is the larger possibility of seeing increased regional trade across markets as a catalyst for economic growth. Considerable value in agricultural processing is lost to economies in Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire and Nigeria. Potential value in extraction of gold and oil is lost to economies in Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. Economic integration, however, will provide opportunity for specialization as it becomes easy for large operators to source materials in the region, process them in a singular country, and export the proceeds. A good example where this has happened has been Slovakia’s automotive industry benefitting from the EU’s regional value chain, despite being one of the smaller economies in Europe.

Creating a common economic market means creating free trade agreements with large countries or large economic unions. The largest free trade agreement globally, was made by the ASEAN with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, giving members access to a population of 2.3 billion people and a GDP size of $38.8 trillion.

With a strong ECOWAS union, it will be easier to negotiate free trade agreements with regional superpowers or other economic unions. The presence of a potentially integrated market, as seen in both Europe and Asia. would create an avenue for increased investments and access to more favourable deals. These opportunities would not be available to a single ECOWAS economy given their limited size.

The state of FDIs across ECOWAS will also see significant increase if investors see the possibility of accessing the regional market through a singular country. This makes it easier to justify investments into smaller economies or to see possibilities for expansion. Countries like Switzerland and Liechtenstein in Europe have seen increased investments from FinTech firms because of the launchpad these firms see in accessing the European markets. At the very least, a more active economic union would see the case for investments into the region to support West Africa’s sizable energy, and its rail and road needs.

Internally, there are benefits ECOWAS would receive from a stronger economic union. Intra-regional FDIs are often overlooked for developing economies but are often a sizable contribution across economies. It also opens markets to existing entrepreneurs, where strong retail firms in Côte D’Ivoire would be able to operate in local markets in West African cities like Niamey, Lagos and Dakar.

Additionally, there is the larger possibility of seeing increased regional trade across markets as a catalyst for economic growth. Considerable value in agricultural processing is lost to economies in Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire and Nigeria. Potential value in extraction of gold and oil is lost to economies in Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. Economic integration, however, will provide opportunity for specialization as it becomes easy for large operators to source materials in the region, process them in a singular country, and export the proceeds. A good example where this has happened has been Slovakia’s automotive industry benefitting from the EU’s regional value chain, despite being one of the smaller economies in Europe.

ACHIEVING A MORE INTEGRATED ECONOMIC UNION

ECOWAS member states require stronger economic integration by strengthening both secretariat and promoting itself in other member states. There is consensus across the region of the need for West African countries to work together to harness the region’s growth potential. Despite the continued decline in the relevance of ECOWAS, evidenced by its failures both politically in handling coups in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, and economically in achieving its objectives, there remains a consensus among the leadership of each member country that working together as a group is important to improve the economic realities of their nations. To achieve an effective economic union, there are four key things that are required.

Sub-regional organizations within ECOWAS are rampant. There is the L’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), the Accra initiative, a planned Sahel initiative, and the Anglophone ECOWAS. The secretariat is not seen as technically competent to deal with the challenges of the region as it is not being championed by West African leaders. Hence, these four essentials. Firstly, it is important that ECOWAS is championed and promoted by West Africa’s leaders, and given the nature of West Africa, that ECOWAS hold flexibility for political instability. Countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are the regional giants and need to do more by driving member countries to seek solutions via the ECOWAS framework. This, however, requires that ECOWAS be technically competent and regionally capable.

Secondly, it is important to invest in creating strong institutions that are not directly impacted by mercantile presidents. To achieve its overall goals, ECOWAS cannot continue to be led by country presidents, as there is a clear problem of resource management and commitments. The EU has a strong president, the ASEAN union has a strong secretary-general, ECOWAS, on the other hand, has both a president from head of states and a head of commission who ends up deferring to the head of states, ensuring that it is led by a pre-occupied president.

It is important to end this delineation and create a team of strong technical leads voted in by member states; focus country leads should handle ratifying decisions and deciding the focus of the commission. Creating this would involve a stronger ECOWAS secretariat domiciled across each member state, integrated in each sector and focused on achieving a clear purpose for the region. ECOWAS cannot remain driven by state-to-state relations if it is to become more than it currently is.

Thirdly, ECOWAS needs to have a face. No one within West Africa can point to how ECOWAS affects their life, what opportunities it has created or its impacts. It only has face value in Sierra Leone and Liberia from its actions 20 years ago in ending civil wars. Creating a clear story on the impact that ECOWAS has to the 400 million people living within the bloc is needed if ECOWAS is to become a significant institution.

Lastly, ECOWAS needs to integrate the above with developing the physical infrastructure needed to support an economic union. Investment into road, rail and air infrastructure that connect the markets will spur further investment from both foreign and intra-regional players to treat the region of 400 million people as a large market—rather than a collection of small markets—with strong growth potential.

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Senegal Just Saved Its Democracy. That Helps All West Africa.

Senegal's President Bassirou Diomaye Faye

BY JOSEPH SANY

Senegal’s dramatic transfer of presidential power this week highlights that West Africa, routinely seen as a zone of democratic erosion and failure, includes an arc of resilient coastal democracies — from Senegal to Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria. The Senegalese people’s resolute reversal of last month’s constitutional crisis shows that US and international efforts to counter violent extremism and military coups can reinforce a potent West African democratic constituency. Vital next steps include these: supporting Senegal’s democratic forces in shifting from “campaign mode” to inclusive governance; promoting economic investment to bolster youth employment and rule-of-law reforms; and energizing a West African democratic alliance against extremism and coups.

How Democracy Won

Senegal’s orderly inauguration of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye is a victory of the democratic resilience that is needed to reverse Sahelian West Africa’s slide into chaos, and prevent its vastly more disruptive spread to the five-times-more-populous West African coastal states. This peaceful transfer of power, Senegal’s fourth since its independence, serves as a national rejection of former President Macky Sall’s attempt, a month ago, to unconstitutionally postpone the vote and extend his term in power. The March constitutional and political crisis followed years of Sall’s progressive suppression of independent political voices and manipulation of the judiciary and elections.

Senegalese democracy defeated this assault through a reassertion of democratic will that was critically strengthened by quick, well-calibrated support from democracies abroad. Senegalese responded through homebred democratic culture and institutions. Their resistance included young street protesters, religious leaders and civil society. Some 40 civil society groups quickly formed an alliance, called Aar Sunu Election (Protect Our Election), that joined opposition parties to demand adherence to the law. After Sall worked for years to manipulate Senegal’s constitutionally independent judiciary, last month’s national outcry buttressed Senegal’s Constitutional Council in reasserting judicial independence and reversing Sall’s order. Sall backed down, scheduling the election and releasing Faye and other political prisoners just 10 days before the vote.

Alongside Senegal’s democratic culture and institutions, the professionalism and patriotism of its armed forces was essential. Amid rising turmoil under Sall and public discussion about whether they might seize power, Senegal’s soldiers abstained from any such move, meeting the expectations of their fellow citizens and presenting a pro-democracy model for other West African militaries. Also critical was that the officeholder assaulting democratic norms in his bid to retain power was a politician, not a military ruler or a warlord facing trial upon being deposed.

How International Support Helped

While international responses have failed to seriously confront democratic erosions in many African nations, the response on Senegal was fast, firm, united and calibrated. French President Emmanuel Macron, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other foreign officials called Sall to urge a quick return to what the United States pointedly called “Senegal’s strong democratic tradition.” The African Union, European Union and United States all spoke in similar terms, along with West Africa’s regional bloc, ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). In speaking respectfully of Senegal’s own democratic traditions, this modulated diplomacy avoided giving Sall or his supporters a way to stir a nationalist backlash.

Senegal’s preservation of democracy — and the contrasting failures to do so over a decade or more in neighboring, coup-stricken states of Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger — offer lessons for action. The core, long-term policy failure in the coup-damaged states has been to ignore slow erosions of democratic institutions — freedoms of speech, press and assembly — so that when political crisis strikes, neither local citizens nor outside partners have the kind of energetic civil society, press, democratic culture and judiciary that just saved the day in Senegal.

In Guinea, as President Alpha Condé progressively weakened democracy — suppressing free speech and finally manipulating a constitutional referendum to give himself an unprecedented third term in office — African and international democracies failed to respond effectively. The country’s 2021 coup was the result. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the spread of jihadist violence — and the military-led responses supported and funded by Western democracies — corroded democratic institutions, including civil societies, opening the path to armed coups d’état. Notably in Niger, African and international democracies failed to actively oppose the narrowing of civic spaces and imprisonment of journalists that opened paths for a coup. And when it struck last year, Niger’s democratic forces and partners in the region and beyond — the United States, France and ECOWAS — failed to act in concert as they just have done in Senegal.

Build a West Africa “Democratic Alliance”

While policymaking and public discourse must stay focused on the four West African states (and their more than 85 million people) under military rule, failed democracies are not West Africa’s only reality. Democracies that have shown significant resilience — Senegal, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria (as well as the island nation of Cape Verde) — govern three times as many West Africans, more than 274 million, who represent fully 65% of those in the 15-nation ECOWAS bloc. Each of these democracies faces daunting challenges to its democratic systems: unemployed, desperate youth; corruption; lack of investment; climate shocks and others.

Independent analyses of their quality of governance, democratic freedoms and levels of violence show their varied strengths and weaknesses. But Senegal’s democratic victory this week buttresses this group and offers a new opportunity to help it consolidate into a potent, pro-democracy alliance.

At home, Senegal must strengthen democratic institutions. The most urgent need is better opportunities and livelihoods for millions of citizens, most of them young, who are unemployed, economically impoverished, under-educated — and desperate. Over 60% of Senegalese are 25 or younger; 20% of youth are unemployed; 90% of citizens depend on “informal” work with no social protections; and Senegalese increasingly risk death in dangerous Saharan or ocean crossings, fleeing toward to any hope for their lives in Europe.

To leverage Senegal’s emergence from constitutional crisis in favor of West African democracy, U.S., international and African partners must weigh policy initiatives that include three vectors:

Energetically support vital political dialogue and problem-solving in Senegal. Faye and Senegal’s democratic forces now must shift from populist mobilizing to democratic problem-solving. International partners should quietly campaign with all Senegalese political elites to build on the accommodating post-election discourse among Faye, his chief rival (and Sall’s ally) in the election, and Sall. They should support Senegal’s civic and democracy activists in leveraging their recent alliance with political parties, notably Faye’s coalition, to pass government reforms to better prevent democratic erosions.

Build an initiative, with Senegalese, African and international business sectors, to seek new investments in Senegal as part of bolstering youth employment, strengthening the rule of law and advancing anti-corruption reforms. Democracy advocacy in Africa has too often overlooked the power of investment to drive such reforms. Following economic shocks from COVID and Russia’s war on Ukraine, Sall’s government invested heavily in railways, roads and other infrastructure, but those steps, while needed, did not improve immediate economic conditions for poor citizens. Senegal is on the cusp of opening oil and gas fields that will boost its gross domestic product; a vital question for Faye’s government, businesses and Senegal’s marginalized millions will be how that new income is distributed. Faye has sought to balance his appeal for deep reforms to help impoverished Senegalese, particularly youth, with assurances to investors of a stable investment environment. In a very real way, Senegal’s youth saved their democracy. To keep it, now democracy has to deliver for them.

Leverage Senegal’s success in supporting a focused alliance of West African democracies to lead ECOWAS and the region. For Africans and international partners, democracy support requires a “long game” that meets each country where it is, not where we wish it were. A bipartisan study group convened by USIP recommended in January a strategy to partner with local and regional actors more broadly than in the narrower stabilization efforts so far that have focused heavily on security. One lesson of the Senegal-vs.-Guinea contrast is that investment in civil society is vital — and cost-effective in the long run. African and international partners need to match this “long game” of democracy-building with a sophisticated “short game” of crisis response. In the case of Senegal, they applied the needed steps for that “short game,” helping to avoid disaster. Senegal’s survival of a constitutional crisis reaffirms it as a potent partner and example in building democracy across West Africa. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s victory signals that young leaders can win power through ballot boxes and not through bullets. Many Africans hope that others in the region will follow his example.

Dr. Joseph Sany joins USIP as the vice president of the newly established Africa Center. Dr. Sany has been working at the forefront of peacebuilding with civil society, governments, businesses, and international organizations in Africa for over 20 years.

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