Francophone Africa And French Military Bases At Bay: The Polemological Definienda And Implications

BY BOLA  A. AKINTERINWA

Francophone Africa and French military bases have been two critical foreign policy challenges for Nigeria since 1960. The administration of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa had to formulate exceptions to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention as provided for under Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as a result. The Article prohibits all forms of intervention in whatever falls under the domestic preserve of other sovereign nations. Nigeria is not averse to this provision but considered that under no circumstance should apartheid be considered the domestic preserve of South Africa, because Black people were subjected to brutalities, segregation, oppression and Nigeria could not be an onlooker. In the eyes of Nigeria, any form of indignity meted out to Africans and black people in the world is also an indignity meted out to every Nigerian who was therefore required to fight apartheid with every available means in his hands. This was why it was clearly stated in the inner back cover of the old Nigerian passport that the holder of the passport was obligated to fight apartheid with whatever means available to him or her.

In the same vein, when President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was brutally assassinated during a foreign mercenary invasion reportedly sponsored by the French, Nigeria again said she could not be expected to fold her arms and not support a friendly Togo of President Olympio. Nigeria therefore formulated exceptions to apartheid and intervention of foreign mercenaries in Africa. Explained differently, Africa was made the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy, requiring the defence and protection of African and Black dignity the world over. The misunderstanding between Nigeria and France over France’s atomic bomb tests in the Reggane area of the Sahara in February, April and December 1960, which led to diplomatic rupture in January 1961, should be understood in this context. This is why France in Nigeria’s foreign policy calculations has always been a critical issue. It is against this background that Francophone Africa’s new attitude towards French military bases in their countries needs special investigation, especially from a polemological perspective.

French Military Bases at Bay

To begin with, why the hostility against French military bases at this material time? Is the termination of France’s defence pacts with Francophone Africa a re-strategy? If it is a re-strategy, who is the initiator? If the initiator is France, does it also mean that the ECOWAS the military junta are fighting is also being used by France to enable France to come back in a new guise? Is it an old wine in a new bottle? Are the protesting Francophone African countries truly mature and capable of self-reliance in the maintenance of their national security? Determination to be self-reliant is commendable but what about the means?

The supposed most reliable partners of France are declaring France non grata. After Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad have strained their military entente with France, it is now again the turn of the Côte d’Ivoire to slap France in the face. Is it a problem of France’s foreign policy miscalculation under President Emmanuel Macron? Is it a manifestation of Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s theory of ‘every empire shall perish’?

At the level of Nigeria, can President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) manage the complexity of the new relationship between France and her former colonies in light of Nigeria’s existing foreign policy principles? If France and the Côte d’Ivoire of President Alassane Ouattara were reportedly instrumental to the election of PBAT as Chairman of the ECOWAS and the same President Ouattara is also reportedly now asking the French soldiers to quit, how do we explain the new anti-French virus? Is France encouraging the Francophone leaders to ask for withdrawal of her troops in order to enable France to come back in a smarter way?

This question is prompted by the fact that Chad, Niger, and the Côte d’Ivoire are notable reliable confidants of France. They are countries heavily relied upon by the West in the terrorism-containment efforts. If the countries are now, one after the other, asking the French to check out of their countries, what really are the polemological definienda? Are Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges not being made more complex, especially in light of the breaking news of PBAT’s official submission of the request for the extradition of Simon Ekpa, the pro-Biafran agitator, who proclaimed himself the Prime Minister of the United States of Biafran Government in Exile?

The quest for extradition of Simon Ekpa cannot but be another dimension of Francophone Africa’s emerging policy attitude towards Nigeria. Which Francophone country will or will not support a sovereign State of Biafra? What will be the new policy of France and the Côte d’Ivoire which gave political asylum to the Biafrans following the 1967-1970 civil war of national unity in Nigeria? To what extent can France still claim to be the representative of the NATO or the Western world in Africa? The deliberately kept cold rivalry between France and the United States or, put lato sensu, between the European Union and the United States, especially in terms of being the global centre of power and leadership of the world, cannot but be impacted upon in the making of or fighting the sovereign State of Biafra.

States have the potential to take side as there are pointers to a military strife between Nigeria and the Biafran soldiers in the foreseeable future. Simon Ekpa, the chief Biafra agitator in Finland is currently under detention. His deputy, Ngozi Orabueze, has reportedly placed an advert for the recruitment of Biafran soldiers, implying that the request for the extradition of Simon Ekpa to Nigeria may not be a quick end to the agitation of a State of Biafra. Besides, the detention of Nnamdi Kanu for long in Nigeria has not prevented his supporters from militating against the Tinubu government. The challenge here is determining what will happen if there is a real shooting war between Nigeria and Biafra again: will the war not prompt having a French military in support of either side? Will that not conflict with Nigeria’s foreign policy of no military base in Africa? Or should a foreign military base be accepted because it is about military hostilities?

Under General Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, made it clear that under no circumstance would Nigeria accept the use of Africa simply as a source of raw material for the development of Europe and to the detriment of Africa. Additionally, Nigeria vehemently opposed French military bases in Africa but France not only argued that she was in Africa by the kind invitation of other sovereign countries like Nigeria, but was also actively supported by Francophone Africa.

What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that when France carried out her atomic bomb tests before eventually continuing further tests in the Pacific, the Francophone African countries expressed much joy, and saw the success of the tests as a ‘French Community feat’. The French Community to which Francophone Africans belong on the basis of the principle of assimilation prompted unnecessary division of Africa on linguistic basis and destructive rivalry between the English and French speaking countries.

Without whiff of doubt, Africa is a major problem and challenge unto itself. By definition, Africa is geo-politically ambiguous. On the one hand, the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community divided Africa into five regions, contrarily to the UN classification of the whole of Africa as a region of the world. On the other hand, under each region, there are linguistic differentiations. For example, in the West African region, there are the Anglophone, Arabophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries. When discussing Francophone Africa, some of them also have other affinities. Mauritania speaks French but still remains Arabophone, a major reason for opting out of the ECOWAS and preferring to join the Maghreb Union in the North Africa region.

When the foregoing issues are explicated in terms of downsizing military entente with France, it is clear that Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges cannot but become more complicated for various reasons: more theatres of conflict, increased funding of conflicts, deepened political instability, more agitations for self-determination which can take advantage of the deterioration of the conflict, etc. In sum, the complication cannot but begin with an extending environmental conditioning of insecurity and how Nigeria can constructively respond particularly to the new developments in Francophone Africa.

In this regard, by kicking out France, who is to fill the vacuum created? Are Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad now capable of playing France’s roles in the containment of the terrorists? Do they want to simply replace France with another foreign power? Are they really the ones asking for the withdrawal of French troops or it is France engaging in a back-door diplomacy to negotiate for withdrawal that will enable the opportunity of returning under a new renegotiated guise? Whatever is the case, the politics of the French withdrawal is quite interesting, the polemological definienda are more thought-provoking, and the implications for Nigeria have the potential to be more domestically destabilizing.

Polemological Definienda and Impact on Nigeria

The polemological definiendum is basically the discontentment with France in the conduct and management of strategic mineral resources of the aggrieved countries and the inability of France to contain the advancement of terrorism and killing of innocent civilians. The contents of each definiendum vary from one country to the other. Grosso modo, at the epicenter of the dispute is a conflict of national interests. France’s approach to the protection of her interests in the Sahel is not consistent with the approaches of the States in the Sahel.

As explained by Dr. Bakary Sambe, the Director of the Timbuktu Institute, West Africa is considered to be ‘a space of natural deployment and influence’ and that the more than 30 French direct military interventions in Africa between 1964 and 1995 were ‘to perpetuate and safeguard the stability and durability of certain regimes.’ Professor Bruno Charbonneau of the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean in Canada says ‘the French military presence in Africa has always allowed France to be at the heart of conflict resolution and management mechanisms in French-speaking Africa, particularly at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’.

Another causal factor for not only seeking to establish military bases in Africa, but also for people’s opposition to them, is to contain and prevent terrorism from being imported back home in Europe. It is against this background, for instance, that the RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme) was established in the late 1990s by France, the United Kingdom and the United States with the objective of training soldiers and boosting their capacities not only to combat the Al Qaeda and ISIL terrorists, but also to protect the land borders and the maritime territory.

Most unfortunately, this objective of enablement of security, first at the level of the Sahel and secondly back at the European level, has not been achieved. The non-achievement has been explained severally by anti-French protesters in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and the Côte d’Ivoire. In Mali, France is perceived as an obstacle to the political stability of the military junta who enjoyed the people’s support. France made it clear that she did not recognize the government of Mali which led to the declaration of the French ambassador unwanted. Besides, France’s Operation Serval only succeeded relatively while the Operation Barkhane which followed it failed woefully. Both Operations did not stop the jihadist terrorism of the Al Qaeda and the ISIL. French troops were therefore seen to be ineffective.

Besides, France was not happy with the Malian government’s rapprochement with Russia. France cannot see how she can be in any alliance with Russia in Mali. In the eyes of the Malian military junta, the decision of rapprochement with Russia is a matter of national sovereignty. In an attempt to avoid a situation of order and counter-order amounting to an encounter and disorder, the Malian government ordered the exit of the French troops.

Secondly, Burkina Faso, who put an end to the defence pact with France in January 2023, prefers to take the battle of security directly to the doorsteps of the terrorists by itself within the framework of its national sovereignty. The Burkinabé are much dissatisfied with the presence of the French military and had to engage in public protests against France, burning the French National Flag. As rightly revealed in an Inside Story discussion programme of Al Jazeera in which Alex Vines of the Chatham House, London, Niagale Bagayoko, and Ovigwe Eguegu participated, Bagayoko said the need for protection of national sovereignty which dates back to the time of Thomas Sankara was a major definiendum in the anti-French sentiments. She added that Operation Serval was more operational outside, rather than inside, of Burkina Faso. In fact, Burkina Faso before declaring the French soldiers unwanted, tried to diversify the country’s international partnerships, especially fraternizing with Russia for one reason that is not far-fetched: 40% of the Burkinabé territory is under the control of the ISIL and Al Qaeda, thousands of people had been killed while about 3 million Burkinabé had been internally displaced. This cannot but call for the withdrawal of French troops.

Third is Niger whose perception of French military presence undermines Niger’s sovereignty and an unnecessary recolonization in a new form. Like in Mali and Burkina Faso, anti-French sentiments are very stiff. Like in Mali, France did not recognize the Abdurahamane Tiani regime in Niger. Whereas the people are more concerned about France’s exploitation of their uranium resources without a reciprocal fair benefits for the people. This generated much political tension which has led to the declaration of French soldiers unwanted.

Fourth is Chad. The Chadian Foreign Minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, said France is ‘an essential partner’ who must admit that ‘Chad has grown up, matured and is a sovereign state that is very jealous of its sovereignty,’ meaning that the quest for sovereignty is one of the definienda for the call for withdrawal of French troops. As told by www.rfi.fr, France was given a deadline of six weeks, beginning from 20 December, 2024 and ending on 31 January, 2025 to withdraw France’s 1000 soldiers and their equipment. In the eyes of the French military, the deadline was a ‘pressure tactic from the hardline faction of Chad’s inner circle of power.’

Even though the Chadian government of Mahamat Idris Déby Itno said the withdrawal does not imply a breakdown in ties with France of Emmanuel Macron, there is no disputing the fact that Chad unilaterally broke the defence accord with France, probably as a result of the protracted long time of negotiations with France on the need to withdraw her troops. Apart from this, there are other four definienda making the withdrawal a desideratum. The deadline was also given at a time preparations for parliamentary and local elections were on. This means trying to satisfy the people’s anti-French sentiments.

There are also the issue of alleged France’s unsupportive policy for President Mahamat Itno, the reality of Chad being a landlocked country, being bordered by the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, and Niger all of which play host to paramilitary forces from Russia’s Africa Corps that replaced the Wagner mercenaries group in Africa. Chad appears to have considered the domino effect of the Alliance of Sahel States and the fear of not being left alone.

Fifth is Senegal where there are about 350 French soldiers. As reported by Chris Ewokor of the BBC News, on 31 December, 2024, Senegalese President Bassirou Dioumaye Faye ‘instructed the Minister for the Armed Forces to propose a new doctrine for cooperation in defence and security, involving among other consequences, the end of all foreign military presences in Senegal from 2025.’

www.lemonde.fr reports further that the Senegalese president was elected largely because of his promise to make Senegal fully sovereign and because, on 28 November, 2024 he said in his address to the AFP that ‘Senegal is an independent country. It is a sovereign country and sovereignty does not accept the presence of military bases in a sovereign country.’ Similarly as noted by other countries, Senegalese president said his policy stand does not mean a rupture in Franco-Senegalese relations. As he put it, ‘France remains an important partner for Senegal for the investment for Senegal and the presence of French companies and even French citizens who are in Senegal.’ Thus the definiendum for the call for withdrawal is again basically the need for full sovereignty of Senegal.

Sixth and most recent is the case of Côte d’Ivoire who asked last Tuesday, 31 December, 2024 the French troops to leave the country and that the pull out would begin in January 2025. Is the decision negotiated or an ultimatum? It appears to be a negotiated one because of the nature of entente cordiale between the two countries.

Toussaint N’Gotta quoted Alassane Ouattara on January 1, 2025 as follows: ‘we have decided on the concerted and organized withdrawal of French forces in Ivory Coast.’ N’Gotta added that ‘the military infantry battalion of Port Bouét that is run by the French army will be handed over to Ivorian troops’ (vide AP News). The reason given is that Ivory Coast is modernizing its armed forces. Besides, at the economic policy level, Côte d’Ivoire is still much dependent on France in the use of the CFA franc which is pegged to the Euro and guaranteed by France, a situation that sustains recolonization in different ramifications.

The issue of unequal trade and resource exploitation to the detriment of the Ivoiriens is another definiendum. The people want France’s political interference to stop in the spirit of national sovereignty. They want to promote their cultural independence by reducing the dominance of French language. Indeed, the developments in the AES countries have their own impact on the younger generations in the country. This is why about 600 French troops are being kicked out of the Côte d’Ivoire. In the words of Alassane Ouattara, ‘we can be proud of our army, whose modernization is now effective. It is in this context that we have decided on the concerted and organized withdrawal of French forces’ from Ivory Coast.

In sum, what are the lessons from the various causal factors for declaring French soldiers and military bases non-grata? First, Nigeria’s foreign policy of 4-Ds, considered as a doctrine or diplomacy, cannot meaningfully resolve the definienda of why France is kicked out of five Francophone West and Central African regions. Second, of the many reasons given for declaring French troops non-grata, six of them are noteworthy: perception of French performance in the anti-Al Qaeda and ISIL terrorist war as unsatisfactory; Francophone people’s quest for the exercise of full sovereignty; belief of the people that France only takes them ‘as idiots;’ Alpha Blondy, the Ivoirian reggae star’s anthem that ‘French armies, Go Away,’ rendered in the 1990s; perpetuating and safeguarding the stability of some regimes friendly with France; use of Africa as means to sustain the middle-power status of France in international politics; and West Africa and the Sahel as a space for natural influence making. Put interrogatively, can Nigeria stop the people’s perceptions of France? Can Nigeria stop the people’s agitation for the right to full sovereignty? What can Nigeria do to stop France from seeking to safeguard the stability of regimes that are pro-France? Africa enables France to be an African power and a Power in Africa. What can Nigeria do about this? These are some of the challenges and implications for Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa. The diplomacy of 4-Ds has to be re-conceptualised to accommodate the new direction of Francophone Africa. A giant leader should not rest in the face of mounting challenges.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

France’s Military Is Being Ousted From More African Countries

France's influence on Africa faces its biggest challenge in decades. Here, French soldiers secure the area of a 2013 suicide bomber attack in northern Mali. (Jerome Delay/AP)

BY MONIKA PRONCZUK AND SYLVIE CORBET

DAKAR, SENEGAL (THE ASSOCIATED PRESS) — It’s been a tumultuous month for France and its relationship with former colonies in Africa, as its influence on the continent faces the biggest challenge in decades.

As Paris was devising a new military strategy that would sharply reduce its permanent troop presence in Africa, two of its closest allies struck a double blow.

The government of Chad, considered France’s most stable and loyal partner in Africa, announced on its Independence Day it was ending defense cooperation to redefine its sovereignty.

And in an interview published hours later by Le Monde, Senegal’s new president said it was “obvious” that soon French soldiers wouldn’t be on Senegalese soil.

“Just because the French have been here since the slavery period doesn’t mean it’s impossible to do otherwise,” President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said.

The announcements came as France was making efforts to revive waning influence on the continent. Foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot was completing a visit to Chad and Ethiopia, and President Emmanuel Macron for the first time had recognized the killing of as many as 400 West African soldiers by the French Army in 1944.

French authorities stayed silent for almost 24 hours after Chad’s announcement, finally saying they were in “close dialogue” on the future of the partnership.

“Chad’s decision marks the final nail in the coffin of France’s post-colonial military dominance in the entire Sahel region,” said Mucahid Durmaz, a senior analyst at global risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft, referring to the arid region south of the Sahara.

The decisions by Senegal and Chad “are part of the wider structural transformation in the region’s engagement with France, in which Paris political and military influence continues to diminish,” Durmaz added.

They follow the ousting of French forces in recent years by military-led governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, where local sentiments turned sour following years of French forces fighting alongside local ones in the face of stubborn Islamic extremist insurgencies.
What is France’s new strategy in Africa?

Jean-Marie Bockel, Macron’s personal envoy for Africa, last month presented to Macron his report on the evolution of the French military presence in Africa.

It was part of the “renewal of our partnership with African countries” that Macron announced in a 2017 speech in Burkina Faso in the early days of his presidency.

The details of Bockel’s report have not been made public. But three French top officials, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive talks with the concerned countries, said France aimed for a sharp reduction of its military in all its bases in Africa except the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti — where Macron is expected to travel in the coming days.

The officials said it doesn’t mean France would necessarily reduce military cooperation but instead would respond to needs expressed by countries. It could mean providing more specific training in airspace surveillance or drones and other aircraft. France also could deploy troops on a temporary basis.

The officials declined to confirm numbers of troop reductions but called it significant.

The French army earlier this year also set up a command for Africa, similar to the U.S. AFRICOM. Newly appointed commander Pascal Ianni specializes in influence and information warfare — a need highlighted by Russia’s growing presence in Africa.

“You can carry on your military cooperation like many countries do. But the idea of having permanent military bases, which then can be used as political ammunition against you and spun up in kind of a disinformation war, is maybe not the best way of going about things," said Will Brown, a senior policy fellow at the European Center for Foreign Relations.

Meanwhile, France is trying to boost its economic presence in Africa’s anglophone countries like Nigeria, analysts said. Already, its two biggest trading partners on the continent are Nigeria and South Africa.

At the time of Chad’s announcement, Macron was hosting talks with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu.
Where does France have troops in West Africa, and why?

Since the independence of French colonies in Africa, France has maintained a policy of economic, political and military sway dubbed Françafrique, which included having thousands of permanent troops in the region.

France still has 600 troops in Ivory Coast, 350 in Senegal and 350 in Gabon, as well as around 1,500 in Djibouti. It has had 1,000 troops in Chad.

France’s defense ministry said the role of French troops in Africa is to train local soldiers and reinforce their capacities to fight extremism, mainly in peacekeeping, intelligence and logistics. But critics say keeping boots on the ground also has allowed Paris to retain influence and protect political regimes favorable to France.

“The countries of Francophone Africa want a change in the nature of this relationship," said Gilles Yabi, head of the West Africa Citizen Think Tank.
Why are West African countries expelling French troops?

Growing anti-French sentiment has led to street protests in several West and North African countries, while governments that gained power on pledges of redefining relationships with the West say ties with France have not benefited the population. They want to explore options with Russia, China, Turkey and other powers.

Chad’s President Mahamat Deby “would not have made this decision if he did not have security guarantees from another actor,” Brown said. “We know he’s received serious support from the United Arab Emirates, who are very interested in what’s going on in neighboring Sudan and Darfur. We know that Turkey also made some outreach.”

Chad borders four countries with Russian military presence. In January, Deby traveled to Moscow to reinforce relations with the “partner country.”

Military leaders of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso who expelled the French military have moved closer to Russia, which has mercenaries deployed across the Sahel who have been accused of abuses against civilians.

But the security situation has worsened in those countries, with increasing numbers of extremist attacks and civilian deaths from both armed groups and government forces. Over the first six months of this year, 3,064 civilians were killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a 25% increase over the previous six months.

It is impossible to say whether the departure of French forces led to the increased violence. But it created a “huge security vacuum,” said analyst Shaantanu Shankar with the Economist Intelligence Unit, adding that it cannot be filled by Russia. Troops from the Russian private military company Wagner are being financed by the junta governments with fewer financial resources, he said.

Regional Analysts Suggest Caution As Nigeria Signs New Deals With France

BY TIMOTHY OBIEZU

ABUJA, NIGERIA (VOA) — Political analysts in Nigeria say the country needs to be careful after signing a series of agreements with France during President Bola Tinubu’s three-day visit to the European country last week.

Tinubu’s three-day visit to France was the first official state visit to Paris by a Nigerian leader in more than two decades.

During the visit, Nigeria and France signed two major deals, including a $300 million pact to develop critical infrastructure, renewable energy, transportation, agriculture and health care in Nigeria.

Both nations also signed an agreement to increase food security and develop Nigeria's solid minerals sector.

Tinubu has been trying to attract investments to boost Nigeria's ailing economy. While many praise his latest deals with France, some critics are urging caution.

The deals come as France looks for friends in West Africa following a series of military coups in countries where it formerly had strong ties — Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

Ahmed Buhari, a political affairs analyst, criticized the partnership.

"Everybody is trying to look for a new development partner that would seemingly be working in their own interest, but obviously we don't seem to be on the same page,” Buhari said. “We're partnering with France, who [has] been responsible for countries like Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and the likes, and we haven't seen significant developments in those places in the last 100 years."

Abuja-based political analyst Chris Kwaja said France's strained relationships with the Sahelian states do not affect Nigeria.

"That the countries of the Sahel have a fractured relationship with France does not in any way define the future of the Nigeria-France relationship,” Kwaja said. “No country wants to operate as an island. Every country is looking at strategic partnerships and relationships.”

France has a long history of involvement in the Sahel region, including military intervention, economic cooperation and development aid. Critics say the countries associated with France have been grappling with poverty and insecurity.

Eze Onyekpere, economist and founder of the Center for Social Justice, said Nigeria must be wary of any deal before signing.

"It is a little bit disappointing considering the reputation of France in the way they've been exploiting minerals across the Sahel,’ Onyekpere said. “They've been undertaking exploitation in a way and manner that's not in the best interest of those countries. I hope we have good enough checks to make sure that the agreements signed will generally be in the interest of both countries and not a one-sided agreement."

Nigeria is France’s top trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa.

During the president's visit, two Nigerian banks — Zenith and United Bank for Africa — also signed agreements to expand their operations into France.

France Honors African Soldiers Who Helped Liberate The French Riviera From Nazis 80 years Ago

Former Senegalese soldiers pose in Frejus, Southeastern France, Thursday, August 15, 2024 ahead of ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the Allied landings in Provence during World War ll. (Christophe Simon, Pool  via AP)

SAINT-RAPHAEL, FRANCE (AP) — France commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Allied invasion of the French Riviera in World War II to push back the Nazis, with events Thursday that especially honored the many soldiers from Africa, sent from then-French colonies, who took part.

Sometimes called “ the forgotten D-Day,” the occasion was marked by ceremonies presided over by French President Emmanuel Macron. Storm warnings Thursday around the Mediterranean coast forced the cancellation of a seaborne segment of the events.

Macron and Cameroonian President Paul Biya were to give speeches at the Boulouris National Cemetery in the town of Saint-Raphael, which holds the bodies of 464 French soldiers killed in the fighting of August 1944. Other African leaders also took part in the commemorations.

Six World War II veterans — five French and one foreign — were slated to receive the Legion of Honor, the nation’s highest award. An aeronautic demonstration and fireworks were also scheduled.

Starting Aug. 15, 1944, hundreds of thousands of primarily American and French troops landed on the Mediterranean coast for Operation Dragoon. It was intended to coincide with the D-Day invasion of Normandy in June 1944 but was delayed due to a lack of resources.

Africans made up as much as half the French contingent, soldiers from what are now some two dozen independent countries.

There is no definitive Allied death toll, but the French Defense Ministry says 1,300 Allied soldiers died in the operation’s first two days.

Operation Dragoon enabled the Allies to liberate most of southern France in only four weeks. Soldiers from the Normandy landings in northwest France met up with troops from Operation Dragoon on Sept. 12, 1944, in the eastern region of Burgundy.

Paris Closes The Olympics, And Los Angeles Turns To Tom Cruise For Its 2028 Mission

Tom Cruise is lowered into the stadium during the closing 2024 closing ceremony at the Stade de France, Sunday, August 11, 2024, in Saint Denis, France. (AP Photo/Martin Messner)

BY JOHN LEICESTER

SAINT-DENIS, FRANCE (AP) — Setting out to prove that topping Paris isn’t mission impossible, Los Angeles rolled out a skydiving Tom Cruise, Grammy winner Billie Eilish and other stars on Sunday as it took over Olympic hosting duties from the French capital, which closed out its 2024 Games just as they started — with joy and panache.

Capping two and a half extraordinary weeks of Olympic sports and emotion, Paris’ boisterous, star-studded closing ceremony in France’s national stadium mixed unbridled celebration with a somber call for peace from International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach.

Following in Paris’ footsteps in 2028 promises to be a challenge: It made spectacular use of its cityscape for its first Games in 100 years, with the Eiffel Tower and other iconic monuments becoming Olympic stars in their own right as they served as backdrops and venues for medal-winning feats.

But the City of Angels, like the City of Light, showed that it, too, holds some aces.

Cruise — in his Ethan Hunt persona — wowed by descending from the top of the stadium to electric guitar “Mission: Impossible” riffs. Once his feet were back on the ground — and after shaking hands with enthralled athletes — he took the Olympic flag from star gymnast Simone Biles, fixed it to the back of a motorcycle and roared out of the arena.

The appetite-whetting message was clear: Los Angeles 2028 promises to be an eye-opener, too.





Still, this was largely Paris’ night — its opportunity for one final party. And what a party it was. Thousands of athletes danced and sang the night away — reveling in the artistic show that celebrated Olympic themes and its firework flourishes.

Even Bach got the party bug, jokingly calling the Paris Games “Seine-sational” — a nod to the Seine River that, despite water quality concerns, staged Olympic triathlon and marathon swimming and the wacky and wonderful opening ceremony.

At what will be his last Games after announcing his intention to step down next year, Bach also made a somber appeal for ”a culture of peace” in a war-torn world.

“We know that the Olympic Games cannot create peace, but the Olympic Games can create a culture of peace that inspires the world,” he said. “Let us live this culture of peace every single day.”

Cruise then provided a change of gear.

After being lowered on a rope live from the roof’s giddy heights, Cruise drove his bike past the Eiffel Tower in a prerecorded segment, onto a plane and then skydived over the Hollywood Hills. Three circles added to the O’s of the famed Hollywood sign, creating five interlaced Olympic rings.

In the stadium, the athletes’ enthusiasm bubbled over when crowds of them rushed the stage at one point. Stadium announcements urged them to double back. Some stayed, creating an impromptu mosh pit around Grammy-winning French pop-rock band Phoenix as they played, before security and volunteers cleared the stage.

Multiple French athletes crowd-surfed. U.S. team members jumped up and down in their Ralph Lauren jackets.

On the stadium’s giant screens, Eilish, the Red Hot Chili Peppers, rapper Snoop Dogg — wearing pants with the Olympic rings after being a popular feature of the Paris Games — and Dr. Dre kept the party going in an prerecorded show from a California beach.

Each is a California native, including H.E.R., who sang the U.S. national anthem live at the Stade de France, crammed with more than 70,000 people.

The stadium crowd roared as French swimmer Léon Marchand, dressed in a suit and tie instead of the swim trunks he wore to win four golds, first collected the Olympic flame from the Tuileries Gardens in Paris.

Reappearing later in the stadium to spectators’ chants of “Léon, Léon,” Marchand then blew out the flame. The Summer Games were over.

Their next stop: LA in 2028.

The national stadium, France’s largest, was one of the targets of Islamic State gunmen and suicide bombers who killed 130 people in and around Paris on Nov. 13, 2015. The joy and celebrations that swept Paris during the Games as Marchand and other French athletes racked up 64 medals — 16 of them gold — marked a major watershed in the city’s recovery from that night of terror.

“Paris became a party again and France found itself,” said Tony Estanguet, head of the Paris Games organizing committee.

The closing ceremony also saw the awarding of the last medals — each embedded with a chunk of the Eiffel Tower. Fittingly for the first Olympics that aimed for gender parity, they all went to women — the gold, silver and bronze medalists from the women’s marathon earlier Sunday.

The women’s marathon took the spot of the men’s race that traditionally closed out previous Games. The switch was part of efforts in Paris to make the Olympic spotlight shine more brightly on the sporting feats of women. Paris was also where women first made their Olympic debut, at the Games of 1900.

The U.S. team again topped the medal table, with 126 in all and 40 of them gold.

As a delicate pink sunset gave way to night, athletes marched into the stadium waving the flags of their 205 countries and territories — a display of global unity in a world gripped by global tensions and conflicts. The stadium screens carried the words, “Together, united for peace.”

A golden-shrouded figure dropped spider-like from the skies into a darkened world of smoke and swirling stars. Olympic symbols were celebrated, including the flag of Greece, birthplace of the ancient Games, and the five interlaced Olympic rings, lit up in white in the arena where tens of thousands of lights glittered like fireflies.

Now, the lights are out. But the memories of Paris’ special summer won’t dim anytime soon.

“We saw ourselves as a people of incorrigible grumblers,” Estanguet said. “We woke up in a country of wild fans who would not stop singing.”

AP reporters Noreen Nasir, Stephen Whyno, Tom Nouvian, Thomas Adamson and Megan Janetsky contributed from Paris.

AP Summer Olympics: https://apnews.com/hub/2024-paris-olympic-games

The French Baron Who Revived The Olympics Believed They Were More Than Sport – They Were A Religion Of Perfection And Peace

Perre de Coubertin

BY JEFFREY SCHOLES AND TERRY SHOEMAKER

Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympics, always envisioned the Games as much more than the sum of their parts. “Olympism,” as he coined it, was a new type of religion – one shorn of gods, yet transcendent all the same.

To Coubertin, honing an athlete’s body and mind for peak performance in a competition was a way of “realizing perfection.” And if the competition were nation vs. the world, held in varied host cities every four years, individual interest would be subordinated to national pride and a global synergy. Coubertin called this sport in the service of global harmony – nothing short of a new “religio athletae,” or “religion of athletics.”

Just two decades after the Games’ modern revival in 1896, Europe was torn apart by World War I, making the dangers of national rivalries all too apparent. And as Coubertin, a French baron and pacifist, wrote, “unbridled competition engenders even an atmosphere of jealousy, envy, vanity and mistrust.”

He was convinced that these baser instincts could be bridled, however, by a “regulator” that was “grandiose and strong.” Expressed through Olympism, the religion of athletics could regulate sports and national pride in a way that produced global harmony at one site every four years – a goal unachievable through politics or sectarian religion.

But the Games have seen no shortage of challenges over the past 100 years. As researchers who study religion and sport, we wonder whether Coubertin’s lofty ideal of the “religio athletae” is still in play – if it ever was.

Ancient inspiration

Coubertin’s desire to resurrect the Olympic Games after 1,500 years of dormancy was prompted by his concerns about challenges and changes in the early 20th century. He believed, for example, that industrialization was rendering young men physically and morally weak.

Meanwhile, with the rising explanatory power of science, traditional religion was relied on less and less as a panacea for the world’s ills. A new world was dawning, and he hoped Olympism would act as a corrective. A rather obsessed aficionado of ancient Greece since childhood, Coubertin saw the ancient Games as containing ingredients that, if modernized, could uniquely respond to some of the big problems of his day.

Specifically, he looked back to the ancient Greek ideal of mind and body in harmony, which competitors expressed every four years in the Greek town of Olympia, the sanctuary for Zeus. The Games were open to Greek men – women and enslaved people could not participate – and matches could be brutally fierce.

By making this ideal the foundation of the modern Games, Coubertin hoped to infuse them with a sense of balance, proportion and reverence. The Olympics would bring enchantment from ancient Greece into the 20th century – symbolized, to this day, by the relay of the torch from Olympia to the opening ceremony.

Not all of his attitudes about the ancient Games were glowing. Coubertin also believed they had been “chaotic,” “impractical and bothersome,” as well as prone to excess and corruption. He worried that the modern Olympics could end up similarly.

At the same time, he had faith that the spirit of the Games could be a “regulator” on the kinds of excessive behavior that sports can invite. At ancient Olympia, Coubertin wrote, “vulgar competition was transformed and in a sense sanctified” out of respect for bodies and minds working toward the perfection represented in the gods.

The Games today

The International Olympic Committee has repeated Coubertin’s desires of forging unity and peace through athleticism. Current IOC President Thomas Bach said, “The shared goal of the U.N. and the IOC is to make the world a better and more peaceful place. For the IOC, this means putting sport at the service of the peaceful development of humanity.”

Indeed, it’s nearly impossible to think of another event, other than sports, that brings together as many countries from all over the world to compete under the same rules without the threat of violence.

Every two years billions of people experience this welling of both national and global pride, as the five interlocking, multicolored Olympic rings are meant to symbolize. And while the Greek gods – or any god, for that matter – are not featured, a kind of civil religion still binds athletes and spectators to the “global congregation” that the Olympics is designed to generate.

What Coubertin could not foresee was the role that money and politics would play – hearkening back to the “vulgar competition” that he believed had undermined the ancient Games. Cities vying to host the Olympics often launch projects that damage the environment and local neighborhoods, and countries have been accused of “sportswashing”: using the feel-good publicity of sports to distract from a deplorable human rights record. For example, the Nazi government famously used the 1936 Olympics in Berlin as a showcase for its racial theory of ethnic German superiority.

In other words, the Olympics have been a vehicle for both unethical behavior and international antagonism – in clear violation of Coubertin’s vision.

Perhaps Olympism was always a pipe dream; perhaps sport never possessed the power to craft and sustain a “religio athletae.” We would argue that the episodic rise of healthy national pride and largely unknown amateur athletes is still something for which to admire the Olympics. Yet it’s unclear how the good of the Games can generate an inspiring new “regulator” that transcends individual performance and national medal counts – or whether it’s even possible.

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More Global Confidence In Biden Than Trump Even As Views Of US democracy Decline, Poll Finds

French President Emmanuel Macron , right, and President Joe Biden toast during a state dinner, June 8, 2024 at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France. (AP Photo/Ivan Vucci, File)

BY NICHOLAS RICCARDI

People in 34 countries around the world have more confidence in President Joe Biden than his challenger in November’s election, former President Donald Trump, even as there is increased skepticism that United States democracy provides a good model for the rest of the world to follow, according to a poll from the Pew Research Center released Tuesday.

The poll found a median of 43% in the surveyed countries say they trust Biden to do the right thing in world affairs compared to 28% for Trump. People had a more positive assessment of Biden than Trump in 24 countries, while Trump led in Hungary and Tunisia and the two men were effectively tied in eight other countries.

The greater confidence in Biden comes as faith in U.S. democracy is waning. While a median of 54% in the 34 countries polled have positive views of the U.S., a median of 4 in 10 across the surveyed nations told the pollsters that its democracy used to be a good example for other countries to follow but no longer is.

A median of 21% said U.S. democracy remains a good example for other nations, while an almost identical share, 22%, said it never has been. Since the spring of 2021, the only other time Pew asked the question, the share of those who believe U.S. democracy is a good example has fallen in eight countries, mostly in Europe.

“People just don’t see the U.S. political system as functioning very well,” said Richard Wike, director of global attitudes research for Pew. “People see the U.S. as really divided along partisan lines.”
Read the latest: Follow AP’s complete coverage of this year’s election.

There is far less of a global divide between Trump and Biden. Confidence in the current president to do the right thing in world affairs has dropped since his first year in office but remains well above that of his rival, who had relatively low global ratings during his own presidency. Biden’s lowest confidence ratings were over his handling of the Israel-Hamas war, with a median of 57% saying they had no confidence in it.

A median of 39% in the surveyed countries said they approved of Biden’s handling of the war in Ukraine, with his highest ratings in European nations. And a median of about four in 10 were confident in his handling of China.

Of the five leaders rated in the survey, French President Emmanuel Macron registered the highest level of confidence, just ahead of Biden, while Russian President Vladimir Putin received the lowest.

While confidence in Biden has dwindled in countries ranging from South Africa to Israel to the U.K., it remains steadily higher than that in Trump. The former president received his poorest assessments in Europe — where those expressing no confidence in him included more than eight in 10 adults in France, Germany and Sweden — and Latin America.

Africa, which Wike said tends to have positive views of U.S. presidents, registered some of Trump’s best numbers. Even in the two countries where more confidence was expressed in Trump than Biden, they were down on the former president. In Tunisia, for example, only 17% expressed confidence in him.

Hungary is the other country where adults report higher confidence in Trump than Biden, but even there it’s far from a ringing endorsement. Trump has embraced Hungary and its autocratic prime minister, Viktor Orbán, but only 37% in Hungary say they’re confident in him, compared to 24% for Biden.

The median level of confidence in Trump’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs was only slightly higher across the 34 countries than it was for Chinese President Xi Jinping.

French-Speaking African States Under Kremlin's Politico-Military Influence

BY KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

Russia has noticeably intensified its diplomatic relationship with French-speaking Africa after the second Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg. It has focused on dealing with growing French neo-colonialism which obstructs Russia's desire to expand geopolitical and military influence especially in West African region. The republics of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Mali have come under the stringent control of Kremlin, as leaders frequently shuttle between their capitals and Moscow.
Analysis indicates that Moscow's geopolitical and military inroads is steadily gaining unshakeable grounds. It has tightened its hold across the Sahel-Saharan part of Africa and strategically extending such militarized influence towards to the Gulf coastal West Africa. As well-shown, the Francophones are exhausted of France's exploitative approach and desperately for an alternative to building a more fairer and a more mutual economic relations.

Policy experts and researchers have widely written in their published papers about (i) Russia's alleged involvement in the political changes in these French colonies with the fractured economy and (ii) the fact that the region constitutes a nutritious breeding field for armed Islamic jihadist groups, demonstrates Russia's first drastic step towards combating terrorism and ultimately penetrating into the entire G5 Sahel in West Africa.

Despite this widely published allegation of determining political directions, Moscow officially said it was rather seriously concerned about the economic under-developments and the deepening instability as well as the impoverished population in the region. Moscow has showered humanitarian assistance, described as "delivery at no-cost" and intended to ensure food security during the fourth quarter 2023, on these countries.

While updating the implications of this 'free food' as its strategic part of the soft-power, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Mali have battered their natural resources, in exchange for creating military bases in the respective territories. Russian state-owned arms trader Rosoboronexport, as part of signed military-technical agreements, has delivered Russian-made combat and transport helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, small arms and ammunition to these Sahel-Saharan African countries, the Vedomosti newspaper reported.

Oleg Ozerov, Ambassador-at-Large at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Head of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, spoke in an interview with RIA Novosti and explicitly pointed to the fact that Russia has no military bases nor military troops in Africa. "We don't have a military presence there. There are appeals to the Russian side for help in ensuring security. This is not a military presence. Military presence is when troops are sent. We send instructors at the request of the African states themselves. But all this is not a military presence,” Ozerov said.

From late last year to almost half 2024, the focus has been on West Africa. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recieved almost ten (10) foreign ministers (including Nigeria, Gambia, Gabon, Mali and Sierra Leone) and Kremlin hosted Equatorial Guinean President President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, then Chadian Transitional President Mahamat Idriss Deby in January, followed by Guinea-Bissau leader Umaro Sissoco Embalo. Moscow is moving further down from the Sahel-Saharan region, an elongated landlocked territory located between North Africa (Maghreb) and West Africa, to the Atlantic coast of West Africa.

On May 9, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Guinea Bissau leader Umaro Sissoco Embalo as one of the special guests to the celebrations. It was simultaneously intended to strengthen the relationship. Umaro Sissoco Embalo was already there four times during the past couple of years since the 'special military operation' began, and also as part of the team to discuss peace initiatives with the Kremlin. He was at the second Russia-Africa summit held July 2023.

In a speech on that day, Putin first reminded, among other indelible facts, the successful defeat of Nazism and asserted Russia's independence, and the support it (then Soviet Union) provided others to their anti-colonial struggles and self-determination. Putin stressed "Africa is now building up capacity and aspires to emerging as an effective powerhouse in a multipolar world with its unique identity by making confident strides in nurturing a genuine sense of political and economic sovereignty."

During the exclusive talks with Guinea-Bissau's delegation, including Guinea-Bissau's Chief of the General Staff and army generals, Putin reiterated expanding bilateral partnership in economic, scientific and technological spheres, on grounds that ties between two countries are rooted in long-standing traditions of friendship, as well as the principles of equality and mutual respect. "We have been maintaining effective inter-parliamentary and inter-agency ties too. Today, we have an opportunity to discuss our performance under bilateral agreements in various sectors and further steps to expand our cooperation. I must note that students from your country continue to study in Russia. We are ready to offer Guinea-Bissau an even bigger quota," he told the delegation.

Russia has been paying special attention to its relations with African countries and seeking to ease their debt burden. But also for Putin, military-technical cooperation is at the prominent spot during closed-door negotiations. Russia has focused to deal with France in most Francophone countries in West Africa.

Umaro Sissoco Embalo, on his part, expressed gratitude for the support which Russia has been giving to the Government and the people of Guinea-Bissau. Over 70 percent of Guinea-Bissau's servicemen and civilian officials were trained in the Soviet Union. This explains the necessity for the level of close interaction and cooperation with Russia.

Series of conferences and meetings proliferate these years, and Russia has a new dialogue format – the Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, at the level of foreign ministers. Without doubts, Russia is looking to gain political support from African countries on a number of issues, including the 'special military operation' in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. Reports indicate Moscow is seriously working on arrangements for the first meeting of this kind, which is scheduled to take place in November 2024 in Sochi. Notwithstanding that, St Petersburg's late July Russia-Africa summit resulted in the adoption of a solid package of joint documents, including a detailed declaration and a specific plan of action until 2026.

Nonetheless, many experts say Russia has its own distinctive style and approach, set out to battle against exploitation of resources, or better still what is often phrased "the scramble for resources” in Africa.

Samir Bhattacharya, an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order, says Africa, especially the French-speaking West African countries continue to face multiple democratic challenges with a wider negative impact across the region. The narrative that depicts Russia a proactive coup advocate is compelling and seems to hold water. Russian flags being flown in the streets in West Africa. The entire region is experiencing sharp disintegration characterized by differences in political systems, economic structures and cultural norms in member countries. Unfortunately, military takeovers have become a distinctive feature (or accepted norm) of regime change in West Africa.

Bhattacharya said it would be overly generalizing to attribute the coup to neocolonialism alone. With eight coups in three years, the Sahel region in West Africa is most affected by coups. However, a close examination reveals that the Sahel Region has endured violent extremism, civil unrest, and poor governance for a very long period. It unmistakably shows how France and other Western powers are losing ground in this region. Frustration with France and other foreign powers increased fairly naturally as their military intervention failed to stem the Islamist insurgency that was spreading throughout the region.

Therefore, the West cannot address the issue merely by blaming Russia. And Russia can not blame only neocolonialism. There is fear that as many African nations continue to be beset by widespread complaints of poor governance, nepotism, and distress, many more within the region and beyond may eventually see military takeovers of a similar nature. Tracking all these bilateral developments implies that Russia's engagement in Africa definitely requires an in-depth study, according to Bhattacharya.

In another insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia’s diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa.

Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu argued that neo-colonialism in Africa has been a growing reality after the end of the Cold War and reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. More salient cases are the former French colonies, and Russia is focused on uprooting France out of the continent. Vladimir Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union, including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR, Russia didn’t and doesn’t dispose of the financial and logistic resources needed to massively invest in the key-sectors.

That compared, China has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent. And China succeeded in impressing via its investments in the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public buildings and in other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR networks and the Soviet past, and on the other, the direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable African states.
Ultimately, African countries are bound to wake up to a common understanding of the true meaning of their colonial past for the present, and determine their own future existence. And in fact, the leaders and the elites have to engage in development decision-making processes, and at the same time have to play their roles as autonomous actors instead of being pawns in global politics

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France’s Headscarf Ban In The 2024 Summer Olympics Reflects A Narrow View Of National Identity, Writes A Scholar Of European Studies

Basketball player Diaba Konate in the first round of the NCAA women’s basketball tournament at McCarthey Athletic Center in Spokane, Wash. Steph Chambers/Getty Images

BY ARMIN LANGER

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN 

STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

The 2024 Summer Olympics in Paris have sparked a discussion about whether female Muslim athletes who wear a headscarf should be allowed to compete.

In September 2023, the International Olympic Committee, upholding freedom of religious and cultural expression for all athletes, announced that athletes participating in the 2024 Paris Games can wear a hijab without any restriction.

French athletes, however, are bound by France’s strict separation of religion from the state, called laïcité. French Sports Minister Amelie Oudea-Castera said that French athletes would be barred from wearing a hijab during the Paris games to respect this commitment to the principle of laïcité.

Human rights organizations argued that such a ban infringes upon the religious freedoms of Muslim athletes, perpetuating discrimination and marginalization. The United Nations human rights office stated that “no one should impose on a woman what she needs to wear, or not wear.”

This debate highlights the conflict between laïcité and the right to express one’s religious beliefs. As a scholar of European studies, I know about laïcité’s impact on sports, politics and society in general. In my view, laïcité, which historically upheld individual rights and freedoms, increasingly denies minority rights today, as seen in the ban on French athletes wearing hijabs at the 2024 Paris Olympics.

Laïcité yesterday and today

Before the 1789 revolution, France was an absolute monarchy, where religion and the state were deeply intertwined.

The close relationship between the French monarchy and the Catholic Church began when King Charlemagne was crowned by the pope in 800 A.D. Over the centuries, the church became very powerful, owning land and controlling education and health care. It formed strong political alliances, with many nobles holding top positions within the church.

After the French Revolution succeeded and the monarchy was abolished, the revolutionaries still resented religion for its long relationship with the crown. They saw the church as a source of unfairness in society and wanted to reduce religion’s influence in public life and push their ideas of freedom, fairness and unity.

They nationalized church properties and introduced secularism to create a separation between religious and governmental affairs. Since then, France has maintained laïcité as one of the republic’s core values.

The evolution of laïcité in France coincides with significant demographic shifts in the latter half of the 20th century. As France transformed into a diverse nation with various religions and ethnicities, including a significant Muslim population, the interpretation and application of laïcité faced new challenges. With millions migrating from former French colonies in northern and western Africa in search of economic opportunities, France now hosts the largest Muslim community in Europe, comprising about 10% of its population. This demographic change has sparked debates about the role of religion in public life and the extent to which laïcité should accommodate religious diversity.

While laïcité was originally introduced alongside principles such as freedom and equality, as times changed, so did its meaning. Initially, laïcité meant keeping religion separate from the state. Lately, however, it is often interpreted to mean that citizens should refrain from showing their religious identities in public.

This shift has led to bans on religious symbols in public schools and spaces, disproportionately affecting Muslim women who wear veils.

A debate about the Olympics – and beyond

Activists and scholars have argued that today’s laïcité poses a threat to both human rights and religious freedom. In their view, it promotes a narrow view of republican values and national identity, rejecting diversity and unfairly targeting Muslim women who wear headscarves.

Laïcité can be seen as discriminatory because it often treats Christian customs as just part of everyday culture, while it treats visible signs of other religions, such as the hijab worn by some Muslim women, as unacceptable. This means Christian symbols and traditions are more easily accepted, but non-Christian ones are often not allowed.

It is also important to note that Christian traditions focus mostly on beliefs, which are private, while Islamic and Jewish traditions emphasize practices, such as wearing headscarves, that are visible. This means laïcité affects people differently, often more strictly targeting visible signs of non-Christian religion.

A 2023 survey showed that almost 80% of French Muslims believed that their country’s secular laws are discriminatory. Research shows that laïcité disproportionately affects Muslim girls from marginalized communities, perpetuating social inequalities. For example, the ban on headscarves in schools forces Muslim girls to choose between their education and their religious beliefs, leading to feelings of exclusion and isolation. This policy can also hinder their academic performance and personal development, limiting their future opportunities.

Banning hijab for players

French Muslim athletes have faced challenges on the field for a long time. For example, in 2023, the French Soccer Federation decided not to adjust meal and practice timings during Ramadan, even though it occurred during a break when there was no competition.

This decision effectively prevented Muslim players from fasting and led to notable departures, such as Lyon midfielder Mahamadou Diawara leaving the France under-19s camp. Other French players, too, left French professional sports. Basketball player Diaba Konate also opted to pursue her career in the United States because of the French ban on wearing the hijab.

In 2004, France prohibited religious symbols in public schools, including the hijab, Jewish yarmulkes, Sikh turbans and large Christian crosses.

The nonprofit Human Rights Watch criticized it as an unjustified restriction on religious practice. In 2010, France extended the ban to face-covering headgear in public places, including the burqa and niqab, which are garments worn by some Muslim women that cover the face and body. Last year, France banned the abaya in schools.

A ban on cultural pluralism?

The hijab debate extends beyond the realm of sports, touching upon broader issues of identity and belonging in multicultural societies. For many Muslim women, the hijab is not just clothing – it is an expression of religious identity and empowerment.

Banning it from the Olympics could be seen as limiting their freedom of expression and denying their right to fully engage in society while staying true to their religious and cultural backgrounds.

France’s ban on religious symbols in official sports activities highlights the struggle to balance religious freedom with national values. This becomes especially complicated in the Olympics, where athletes’ individual expressions clash with their roles as representatives of their countries.

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Rise Of Empires: France And Russia In West Africa Amid The Ukraine War

BY NICHOLAS KABLAK

The string of recent military coups in West Africa over the last few years has caused the region to become engrossed in competition between France and Russia. The two European powers’ struggle in the region adds crucial context to current events in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

France historically owned the majority of the territory in West Africa as colonies, having officially decolonized the region starting in 1959. However, the decolonization process was complicated. The presence of French domination in the region has continued into the modern era.

The French have maintained very strong economic, diplomatic and military ties with the governments of West Africa.

“France has always been at the side of Africa whenever its stability has been jeopardized,” French President Emmanuel Macron said.

France has kept thousands of troops stationed in West Africa to fulfill a multitude of roles, notably counter-terror operations. It has also instituted a number of economic ties, most notably pegging the CFA Franc, the currency used in many West African nations, to its own currency.

These economic ties in the region have enabled France to access African markets in ways no other nation can. The French military presence has helped ensure that pro-French governments stay in power and allows France to maintain global prestige as a power broker.

However, in recent years, a string of military coups have taken place in Francophone nations leading, in many cases, to the removal of French military forces and pro-French governments. However, the regimes still need military backing for a guarantee of power— with the French gone they turn to the Russians.

The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group with direct ties to the Kremlin, already has a reported presence in the Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso. The Wagner Group has help requested by Niger. All these nations have recently had military coups, and have removed the presence of French troops from their respective countries.

But what does Russia have to gain from these arrangements? The answer is gold.

According to The Blood Gold Report, Wagner Group has earned Russia 2.5 billion dollars in African gold. Wagner Group has been able to get mining rights and agreements from these new African governments in return for keeping the regimes in power.

The French have noticed these changes in West Africa as a trend and a pull away from Paris and toward Moscow.

“In the Central African Republic, or elsewhere, to see that the Russian project on the way there, when France is pushed aside, is a predatory project,” Macron said.

These comments are made in light of supposed human rights violations committed by the Wagner Group.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has denied the idea of Russia purposefully engaging in Africa, highlighting the independent nature of the Wagner Group and the African governments.

“We’re not inciting anyone there, we’re not setting anyone up against France,” Putin said.

Despite this, the economic efforts of the Wagner Group have been good for Russia, considering the war in Ukraine and the sanctions that the West has levied against Russia. These events in Africa reveal the complexities of the geopolitical circumstances in relation to the Ukraine war.

Macron has recently refused to rule out the possibility of French boots in Ukraine. A decision that some relate to the realities that are developing in Africa, and the growing negative realities in Ukraine.

In their bid against Russia, France has made blatant efforts to curb Russian expansion and power. Is Paris concerned with the actions of Moscow and the Wagner group, or are they trying to settle a score with Russia?

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President Macron Says France And Its Allies ‘Could Have Stopped’ The 1994 Rwanda Genocide

French President Emmanuel Macron speaks next to the visitor's book at the genocide memorial site at the capital Kigali, Rwanda, Thursday, May 27, 2021. (AP Photo/Muhuzi Olivier, File)

BY SYLVIE CORBET

PARIS (AP) — French President Emmanuel Macron said Thursday that France and its allies could have stopped the 1994 Rwanda genocide but lacked the will to do so, a strong declaration ahead of the African country’s 30th anniversary of the slaughter that left over 800,000 people dead.

Macron’s office said in a statement that the French president will release a video on social media on Sunday as Rwanda marks the solemn commemoration of the genocide.

In the video, Macron says that “France, which could have stopped the genocide with its Western and African allies, lacked the will to do so.”

In 2021 during a visit to the central African country, Macron acknowledged France’s “responsibility” in the genocide that left over 800,000 people dead, mainly ethnic Tutsis and the Hutus who tried to protect them.

He stopped short of an apology, but Rwandan President Paul Kagame signaled that a page had been turned in France-Rwanda ties, following a series of French efforts to repair ties between the two countries.

The Rwandan government has long accused France of “enabling” the genocide.

Since he was first elected in 2017, Macron notably commissioned a report about France’s role before and during the genocide and decided to open the country’s archives from this period to the public.

In Sunday’s video, Macron will recall that when the genocide started, “the international community had the means to know and to take actions” based on the knowledge about genocides that had been revealed by survivors of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, his office said.

Macron will reaffirm that “France stands by Rwanda and the Rwandan people, in memory of the one million children, women and men martyred because they were born Tutsi,” according to his office.

Macron’s office said France will be represented by Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné at the commemoration of the genocide scheduled on Sunday in Kigali, the French president himself being held back in France by World War II commemorations that day.

n recent years, France has also increased efforts to arrest genocide suspects and send them to trial.

A Rwandan doctor was sentenced in December by a Paris court to 24 years in prison in what was the sixth case related to the Rwandan genocide that came to court in France, all of them in the past decade.

Requiem For Macron’s African policy

BY VICTOR GONCHAROV

On July 26, 2023, senior members of Niger’s presidential guard, normally tasked with protecting president Mohamed Bazoum, announced that they had ousted him from power, holding him hostage inside his official residence.

Subsequently, on July 28, General Abdourahamane Tiani, the commander of the presidential guard, declared himself the head of the military-run National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, and the former chief of army staff, General Salifou Mody, who was dismissed by president Bazoum in March, was appointed his deputy.

The military coup in one of the world’s poorest countries took many people by surprise, including Western experts who saw it as a key ally of the United States and France in the fight against the growing jihadist movement in the Sahel zone and believed that it was on a stable development trajectory. Moreover, US secretary of state Antony Blinken called Niger ‘a model of democracy’ in Africa at a press conference during a March visit. Therefore, according to the New York Times, this coup was a serious setback for the West’s interests, whose policy of imposing ‘liberal democracy’ in Africa suffered a crushing defeat. However, France, Niger’s former colonial power, took a particularly hard hit politically. According to former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl, the military takeover in Niger, following similar events in Mali and Burkina Faso, marks the end of the so-called ‘France-Afrique’ policy. She also added that African countries are currently choosing China, Russia, India and Turkey as partners instead of France.

One of the fundamental reasons behind the coup was rivalry within the country’s ruling political elite. It should be noted that Mohamed Bazoum belongs to the Arab community, which accounts for a mere 1.5 per cent of the country’s population, while his predecessor Mahamadou Issoufou is from the Hausa ethnic group is a majority in the Sahel zone. Therefore, when the elected President Bazoum, who promised to follow the political course of his predecessor, reshuffled the highest bodies of state power soon after coming to power, replacing the chief of the General Staff and the Gendarmerie and dismissing six army generals, this caused a split within the ruling elite and intensified the inter-clan struggle for power.

At the same time, he began an anti-corruption campaign directed chiefly against supporters of the previous president, who in his time made Abdourahamane Tiani the head of the presidential guard. During his ten years in office, the latter transformed the guard into a force structure equipped with modern weapons and equipment, exceeding the level of combat training of the regular army. However, President Bazoum significantly reduced its staff and funding in the final months before the coup. According to some sources, these measures taken by the President gave rise to Tiani’s suspicions that he could be the next on the list of candidates for dismissal. At the same time, he informed several army commanders about his plans to overthrow president Bazoum.

The military takeover was roundly condemned by the United States, the EU, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and several international organizations. However, France was one of the most vocal opponents of the new regime, declaring that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the military leaders and demanding the restoration of ousted president Bazoum to power.

The 15-nation ECOWAS has suspended all commercial transactions with Niger, freezing its assets in the community’s banks, and Nigeria, which supplies 70 per cent of Niger’s electricity needs, has cut off its supply. It also warned that if the ousted President is not reinstated within two weeks, the organization will take all necessary measures, including military ones, to restore constitutional order in the country. Meanwhile, some experts believe that the community leadership made this statement under pressure from Paris through its proxies in the ranks of this regional organization.

In response, Abdourahamane Tiani, Niger’s military leader, said that Niger was ready to defend itself against any military intervention and if it happened, ‘it would not be an easy ride for those involved.’

According to POLITICO, Bazoum’s overthrow was another Macron’s major policy setback in Africa. After the withdrawal of French troops from Mali and Burkina Faso, Paris stationed 1,500 of its military personnel in Niger to fight terrorism with Bazoum’s approval based on the concluded military agreement. It was assumed that this country would become a kind of ‘laboratory’ for testing a new model of Franco-African relations, based on equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation instead of the discredited so-called ‘France-Afrique’ policy.

Shortly after France suspended all its cooperation with the new authorities, Niger’s military leaders announced the introduction of retaliatory measures and denounced the military cooperation agreement between the two countries on August 3, demanding to withdraw French troops from the country, and then declared the French ambassador persona non grata, giving him 48 hours to leave the country. Paris, however, refused to meet these demands, arguing that they were not legitimate, and stated that it regarded the ousted President Bazoum as the country’s sole legitimate leader.

Relations between the two countries soon became so tense that during a protest in front of the base hosting French military forces in Niamey, attended by a New York Times reporter, demonstrators carried a coffin they said was meant for the French president and brandished signs reading ‘Death to France’. As the newspaper notes, president Macron’s refusal to heed the calls of Niger’s new leaders to recall his ambassador and withdraw his troops from the country is considered untenable and unacceptable by most analysts and even some European and French diplomats.

On September 24, after two months of anti-French demonstrations in Niger, president Macron announced that France would withdraw its ambassador and its troops from the country. Many experts considered this a serious blow to France’s prestige. According to Al Jazeera, France’s withdrawal from Niger is ‘undoubtedly a victory’ for the country’s new rulers and ‘a disgrace for France’.

The Nigerian Vanguard Newspaper, describing the unsavoury role of the French president in resolving this conflict, notes that in this situation, being a statesman, he has sunk to the level of a petty swindler who distorts the true essence of the real events. Thus, after a two-month standoff, president Macron, having previously ordered his ambassador in Niamey not to leave his residence, despite the ultimatum to leave the country within 48 hours, accused the military rulers of holding his ambassador and his embassy staff hostages to the military regime. President Macron’s statement that his decision to withdraw French troops from Niger was motivated by the alleged reluctance on the part of the Nigerian troops to continue the fight against terrorism is also beneath all criticism.

However, the British weekly the Economist states that the real reason for this move by Macron is Paris’s understanding that despite all the threats from ECOWAS against Niger, these community countries will not be able to launch a military operation against the military regime in this country due to disagreements among its members and that it has no chance of restoring his former protégé Mohamed Bazoum to power. The Nigerian newspaper The Nation agrees with the British weekly and emphasizes that neither Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, who is the head of ECOWAS, nor the community itself can do anything to resolve this crisis in the near future, since it is based on the serious economic problems of these states that cannot be ‘resolved overnight due to the plunderous activities perpetuated by the French metropolis for more than a hundred years’. Therefore, according to Dr François Heisbourg, (Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris) France, relying on the weakness of Niamey’s position, has largely bluffed its relations with the local military over the past two months rather than seeking mutually acceptable solutions.

The Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, assessed the vicissitudes of the Niger-French confrontation associated with the demands of the Nigerian military authorities to withdraw the French military contingent and the French ambassador, and also the refusal of France to do so, due to non-recognition of the ‘legitimacy’ of the military leaders, sees in Paris’s actions ‘lack of logic and a complete loss of sense of reality’, which could ultimately lead to new military coups in former French possessions, strengthen the position of terrorists on the continent and increase African migration to Europe, which will ultimately harm the interests of France itself.

The neocolonial nature of France’s policy in Africa is criticized not only outside its borders. Increasingly, its effectiveness is being questioned in the French media and research centres. For example, France 24 arrived at a conclusion, rather gloomy for French people, which sounds like a funeral prayer for Paris’s policy in Africa, admitting that Macron’s policy had brought the country to a state where its former colonies, expressing their dissatisfaction with the French military presence, kicked Paris out. After the Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso, Paris ‘received this honour’ in Niger.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies believes that this kind of failure occurred due to Paris’s uncontrollable desire to play a leading role in the Sahel zone without taking into account the changes taking place in the region associated with the growth of anti-French sentiment, as well as due to excessive paternalism and open interference in the affairs of African states. Moreover, according to The New York Times, these failures of Paris policy in Africa, which is ‘tired of the ignorance and arrogance of president Emmanuel Macron’, are leading to increased Russian influence on the continent.

The Middle East Monitor, published in London and financed by Qatar, notes that the current situation in Niger is another convincing evidence of the African population’s rejection of the French colonial legacy. Africans, especially young people who make up the vast majority of the population across the continent, with an average age of 14.8 in Niger, have become increasingly critical of French policies. This concerns the generation of Africans who were born after their countries gained independence and did not experience all the “charm” of French colonization, but today they suffer from the continued plundering of their countries’ natural resources.

Amid growing dissatisfaction among Africans with western policies, ECOWAS Parliament Speaker Sidi Tunis told the Nigerian newspaper Premium Times that ‘in our quest for democracy, we (ECOWAS) must reconsider our relations with the West, especially between the French-speaking countries and France’. According to him, the coup in Niger highlighted in stark detail the problem of neocolonialism in Africa, when the country’s mineral wealth is mercilessly exploited while its population barely makes ends meet.

Poverty is indeed one of the most pressing problems in modern Niger. More than 40 per cent of its twenty-five million population, roughly 10 million people, live below the poverty line with an income of less than $1.90 a day. About 50 per cent of school-age children have difficulties in gaining access to education due to the lack of schools or the inability to attend them due to the jihadist threat in many parts of the country. And this is even though Niger, in addition to copper, niobium, lithium, manganese, cobalt, and nickel, has the world’s largest uranium deposits, which have been developed by the French company Orano (formerly Arewa) over the past 50 years, receiving huge profits due to the low-income tax of the host country. However, the share of uranium in Niger’s GDP is only 5 per cent. As for the country’s budget, 40 per cent of it is financed by foreign aid in the amount of $2.2 billion per year. Therefore, apparently, the African online publication The Elephant, assessing the existing system of French-African relations, qualifies the coup in Niger as an indictment of French neocolonialism.

In the language of the American publication POLITICO, ‘the expulsion of France from Niger’ showed the need for Paris to urgently review its relations with African countries, primarily by reducing its military presence on the continent as a whole, which, according to experts from Queen Mary University of London, ‘has begun to have a counterproductive effect, and if Paris wants to preserve it, it must be integrated into the EU structures, which will enable France to free itself from the label of the gendarme of Africa.’

According to the American source, this solution is also supported by the French Foreign Ministry, where, in contrast to the presidential leadership, they have concluded that ‘our military presence is no longer accepted in African countries.’ According to one diplomat: ‘We have been kicked out of several African countries, and we do not need to wait to be shown the door in other African states.’

However, it should be understood that there are currently 6,700 French troops still stationed in Africa, particularly in Chad, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. But according to Kenyan newspaper The East African, anti-French sentiment is also on the rise in these countries. In Senegal, for example, Ousmane Sonko, the opposition contender in next February’s presidential elections, has made criticism of France’s neocolonial policy a central part of his campaign platform, which is particularly supported by young people. The Economist, citing public opinion polls, regarding France’s reputation in Côte d’Ivoire and the stronghold of French influence in Africa, notes that less than half of Ivorians trust the former colonial power. 65 percent of them believe that France can win them over if it withdraws all its troops from West Africa.

Despite the fact that Paris suffered a diplomatic setback in the confrontation with Niamey, we should not think that it will so easily accept the role of the victim and will not seek revenge. In this regard, president Macron’s statement at the annual French ambassador’s meeting held at the end of August in Paris particularly attracts attention, in which he promised to take measures to ‘defend democracy’ in Niger. But he did not say what exactly he intended to do. He apparently adopted this manner from president Joe Biden, who once grinned and declared that Nord Stream 2 would never take place. And there are grounds for this kind of reasoning. As recently as September 26, according to Reuters, a coup attempt was foiled in Burkina Faso. Several army officers and civilians were arrested. Earlier it was reported that the authorities expelled the military attaché of the French embassy, Emmanuel Pasquier, from the country on suspicion of subversive activities.

It is possible that the attempt at a new coup in Niger may be postponed to a later date, since with the current intensity of anti-French sentiment, this could cause an uncontrollable wave of anger in response to the actions taken by Paris with unpredictable consequences throughout Africa. But after some time, it will be easier for the French intelligence services to justify the next coup by internal squabbles in military circles, which, unfortunately, is very common in Africa.

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