The US’ West Africa And Sahel Challenge

 

BY LIAM KARR

Washington needs to counter Russian propaganda in the region, and highlight that a US partnership is a win-win for the Sahel and West Africa.

The Trump administration’s push for greater US engagement with West Africa is a smart move. The region is a focal point for geopolitical competition with China and Russia, counterterrorism efforts that bolster US security, and business potential for American investors.

However, the United States will face obstacles from within and without as it works to grow partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea, which lies along Africa’s western coast, and the Sahel, which includes neighboring landlocked countries in the lower reaches of the Sahara Desert. American officials should develop a framework that balances competing US priorities on defense, democracy, human rights, and immigration with the needs of regional partners.

To address counterterrorism interests, US officials have traveled to the Sahel to re-engage with the Alliance of Sahel States, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In this region, defense is a top priority, as the United States and African partners seek to degrade rapidly strengthening Al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. American military officials describe the Sahel as the “epicenter” of global terrorism and warn that these groups could develop the ability to attack the US homeland.

The military juntas that control the three countries distanced themselves from the West after taking power and turned to Russia for support. Niger’s junta kicked out 1,000 US troops who were helping fight the terror groups and assumed control over a $110 million US-built drone base in 2024. Russian private military corporation Wagner Group has troops in all three countries.

Russia’s failures have left these countries in need, but the military regimes’ poor democratic and human rights track records limit possible US assistance. US law restricts most foreign and military aid to coup governments until a democratically elected government retakes office. US law also prohibits government assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross human rights violations. These laws exist to align US aid with American strategic interests by avoiding American support for abusive security forces that can create anti-American sentiment and agitate insurgencies.

To bridge this gap, US officials should encourage their Sahelian counterparts to take credible steps to address these issues, thereby qualifying for waivers that would enable greater US aid. This will be a challenge, as Burkinabe and Malian security forces have perpetrated several atrocities that violate US laws, and all three junta leaders have repeatedly extended their stay in power.

How American officials frame the issue will be critical. US officials should focus on discussing human rights abuses as a shared security concern, given their counterproductive nature, instead of overemphasizing US values. Until then, US officials should focus on providing non-lethal assistance and intelligence sharing as legally allowed. This cooperation will facilitate more effective counterinsurgency operations, save lives, and rebuild trust with these partners.

Greater cooperation could unlock future opportunities for critical mineral access, although this is highly unlikely in the short term. While gold, lithium, and uranium deposits can be found across the Sahel, US companies are highly unlikely to invest given the precarious security situation. This authoritarian shift has also created a hostile business environment, further limiting US private investment.

Counterterrorism is also on the agenda in the Gulf of Guinea. Countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have sought to grow defense ties with the United States to help confront insurgents. They are seeking to distance themselves from France, and the United States can help ensure Russia does not further fill the void. All three countries receive funding from America’s Global Fragility Act and are becoming increasingly important US defense partners. Congress and the administration should ensure this trajectory continues.

Through strengthened ties, the United States can also open economic opportunities. The Togolese port of Lomé—partially owned by a multinational shipping company with US stakeholders—is poised to become a regional shipping hub and gateway. Côte d’Ivoire ranks among the top ten countries on the continent in terms of GDP and GDP growth, and can serve as a conduit for American investment across the region.

A clear approach is key to preventing Russia, which is playing a zero-sum game and seeks to lock the United States out, from playing spoiler. The Kremlin views its Sahel alliance as a strategic project to help strengthen Russian influence on the continent. Russia’s position in Libya and the Sahel creates a suite of opportunities—ranging from conventional threats to irregular tools, such as weaponizing migration—for Russia to destabilize Europe. The Kremlin’s growing inroads into coastal West Africa threaten US partnerships and strengthen Russia’s ability to project power into the Atlantic, posing a long-term risk for NATO and ultimately the United States.

Moscow’s favored strategy is to use pro-Russian politicians, civil society actors, and media to falsely portray America as an exploitative power—a tactic that consistent messaging and engagement from the United States can stymie. The Trump administration is well-positioned to speak the sovereigntist, “Africa First” language prevalent in West Africa, and capitalize on it by highlighting how a US partnership is a win-win for all involved. This framing can make clear—to African officials and the public—that any anti-US Russian activities are for Moscow’s benefit, not the region’s gain.

The United States will have to balance its immigration priorities as it works with these countries, having already restricted the entry of Nigerien and Togolese citizens due to high visa overstay rates. Benin, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire could also face a travel ban—a move that has recently drawn backlash from African leaders.

The opportunities for the Trump administration in West Africa are numerous and go beyond efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel to include Trump’s summit with leaders of five other coastal West African countries in early July. However, the challenges in the Gulf of Guinea and Sahel are unique, and US officials must be prepared to deftly navigate internal obstacles while standing strong against Russia to make serious headway.

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Rise In al Qaeda Attacks Revives Spectre Of West African Caliphate

Iyad Ag Ghali (R), the leader of Ansar Dine, an al Qaeda-linked Islamist group in northern Mali, meets with Burkina Faso foreign minister Djibril Bassole in Kidal, northern Mali, August 7, 2012. Ag Ghaly has positioned himself as the leader of a new Islamist coalition in West Africa, JNIM, formed in 2017. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

BY ANAIT MIRIDZHANIAN AND MOUSSA AKSAR

DAKAR, SENEGAL (REUTERS) - At dawn on June 1, gunfire shattered the stillness of Mali's military base in Boulkessi. Waves of jihadist insurgents from an al-Qaeda-linked group stormed the camp, catching newly deployed soldiers off guard.

Some troops, unfamiliar with the base, which lies near Mali's southern border with Burkina Faso, scrambled to find cover while others fled into the arid brush, according to one soldier, who spoke to survivors of the attack.

The soldier, who had completed a tour at the camp a week before, requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to journalists.

Hours after the attack, videos circulated online showing jubilant fighters from Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), stepping over the bodies of fallen soldiers.

JNIM claimed it had killed more than 100 troops and showed around 20 soldiers who said they were captured at the base. Reuters was unable to verify the claims independently.

The Boulkessi assault was one of more than a dozen deadly attacks by JNIM on military outposts and towns across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May and June. The insurgents claimed to have killed more than 400 soldiers in those attacks. Mali's military government has not commented on the toll.
Reuters spoke to five analysts, a security expert and a community leader in the region who said the surge in violence reflects a strategic shift by JNIM - a group founded by a veteran Islamist who rose to prominence by briefly seizing northern MJNIM is moving from rural guerrilla tactics to a campaign aimed at controlling territory around urban centres and asserting political dominance in the Sahel, they said.

"The recent attacks point a concrete effort to encircle Sahelian capitals, aiming for a parallel state stretching from western Mali to southern Niger and northern Benin," said Mucahid Durmaz, senior Africa analyst at risk intelligence group Verisk Maplecroft.

Attacks by JNIM left more 850 people dead across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May, a rise from the average rate of killings of around 600 in previous months, according to data from U.S. crisis-monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

The surge in attacks in May and June marks one of the deadliest periods in the Sahel's recent history and underscores the threat posed by jihadist groups at a time when regional governments are estranged from former Western military allies, analysts say.

More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel has caused mass displacement and economic collapse. The violence has steadily spread towards coastal West Africa, straining regional stability and fuelling migration toward Europe.

On July 1, JNIM carried out simultaneous attacks on army camps and positions in seven towns in central and western Mali, according to an army statement and claims by the insurgents.

The army said 80 militants were killed. Reuters was unable to reach JNIM for comment. The group releases its statements and videos on social media, and has no media spokesperson.

Mali's army did not respond to Reuters requests for comments about the wave of JNIM attacks. It said in a statement after the Boulkessi assault that troops responded "vigorously" before retreating.
"Many soldiers fought, some to their last breath," the statement said.

STRATEGIC PIVOT

JNIM's leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, has been instrumental in its transformation.
A former rebel leader in Mali's Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s, Ag Ghaly led the fundamentalist group Ansar Dine that was part of a coalition of groups that briefly occupied northern Mali in 2012.
The militants imposed a harsh version of sharia law - banning music, imposing mutilations as punishment for crimes, and holding public executions and floggings.

Thousands fled, and cultural sites were destroyed, leaving lasting trauma in the region before the rebels were driven out by a French military intervention the following year. Ag Ghaly is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, who seized power between 2020 and 2023 on the back of the prolonged insurgencies, promise to restore security before returning their countries to democratic rule.

They've cut ties with Western nations and expelled their forces, blaming them for failing to end the insurgencies and turning instead to Russia for military support.

After deploying mercenaries, the Russians have also suffered setbacks and been unable to contain the uprisings.

In Burkina Faso — a country about half the size of France — militants exert influence or control over an estimated 60% of the territory, according to ACLED.

Ag Ghaly, who has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, has positioned himself as the leader of a jihadist coalition that includes al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina after they merged into JNIM in 2017.

A Western security source, who requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak publicly, told Reuters that JNIM has emerged as the region's strongest militant group, with an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters.

Ag Ghaly's goal, the analysts said, is to impose Islamic rule across the Sahel and extend its influence to coastal West Africa, a region twice the size of Western Europe, with a population of around 430 million people, many of them Christian.

In a rare video released in December 2023, he denounced the military governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and called on Muslims to mobilize against them and their Russian allies.
Ag Ghaly could not be reached for comment. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger did not respond to requests for comment.

SOPHISTICATED TACTICS, LOCAL OUTREACH

JNIM's battlefield tactics have grown increasingly sophisticated, including the use of anti-aircraft weapons and drones for surveillance and precision strikes, Durmaz said.

It has amassed substantial resources, meanwhile, through raids, cattle rustling, hijacking of goods, kidnappings and taxes on local communities, the five analysts said.

While it has not appointed local administrators in areas under its control, JNIM has imposed a tax known as 'Zakat' for protection, according to two residents and a former militia fighter.

They have quelled some inter-communal conflicts and imposed a form of Sharia law, requiring women to wear veils and men to grow beards. But they have refrained from severe punishments, such as amputating the hands of thieves.

Heni Nsaibia, Senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, described its recent activity as a "step change".
He said JNIM seizing Burkina Faso's northern provincial capital Djibo, a town of over 60,000 people, on May 11 and Diapaga, an eastern provincial capital of around 15,000, two days later was unprecedented.

"In Djibo they stayed for 11 hours or plus. In Diapaga they remained for two-three days even. And that is very much something that we haven't seen before," Nsaibia said.
According to Nsaibia, the group has captured an estimated $3 million worth of munitions in Djibo alone.

The repeated attacks have left the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso unsettled, and idea of JNIM taking over Bamako or Ouagadougou, once considered far-fetched, is a plausible threat, according to Nsaibia.
JNIM's outreach to marginalized communities, particularly the Fulani, a widely dispersed pastoralist group, has been central to recruitment, the analysts said.

"JNIM is advancing its narrative as a defender of marginalised communities," Durmaz said. "They are not just fighting for territory — they're fighting for legitimacy."

Fulani have increasingly found themselves targeted by authorities across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso under the banner of counter-terrorism, a Fulani community leader told Reuters, requesting anonymity for safety reasons.

While not all Fulani are involved in armed groups, their presence is significant among insurgents in rural areas, driven more by frustration and lack of opportunity than ideology, the leader said.

JNIM's ambitions now stretch beyond the Sahel. The group has expanded its operations into northern Benin and Togo, and are threatening Gulf of Guinea states which they use as a rear base, according to analysts.

Both countries have deployed more security forces in the northern regions as insurgents ramp up attacks.
"Togo and Benin are the most vulnerable due to their limited counterterrorism capabilities, existing local grievances in their northern regions, and porous borders with Burkina Faso," Durmaz said.
($1 = 554.9000 CFA francs)

Additional reporting Robbie Corey-Boulet and Bate Felix Writing by Bate Felix

Groups Linked To Al-Qaida And The Islamic State Take Root On The Coast Of West Africa

Community members sit in Materi town, Benin, Sunday, Oct. 8, 2023, waiting for a distribution of small portable stoves. Groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group have been spreading for years from the vast arid expanse south of the Sahara Desert — the Sahel — into wealthier West African coastal states like Benin. (AP Photo/Sam Mednick)

BY SAM MEDNICK

ATACORA, BENIN (AP) — The insurgents pressured Zackari to join their movement, and he turned them down.

Now he’s frightened of their revenge. He has been on the run from the jihadi fighters for more than a year. They regularly call the 33-year-old, warning: “We haven’t forgotten about you.”

Groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group have been spreading for years from the vast arid expanse south of the Sahara Desert — the Sahel — into wealthier West African coastal states like Benin. Militants once were believed to want to use coastal nations like Benin, Togo and Ghana as bases for attacks on Sahel governments. Now militancy is taking root.

Benin has been the hardest hit. This year it had more than ten times the number of violent incidents involving jihadis than Togo did, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.

Attacks by jihadis against civilians in Benin nearly tripled from last year, from more than 30 to approximately 80. The overall number of incidents involving jihadi groups rose by more than 70%.

“There’s full expansion, regular preaching. They’re establishing cells, they have a lot of presence,” said Kars de Bruijne, senior research fellow and head of the Sahel program at the Clingendael Institute.

The jihadis’ activity in Benin is concentrated in the north of the country, where they try to recruit people or get them to be informants, creating division within local populations. Residents of one small town tucked behind lush hills and windy unpaved roads told The Associated Press last month that civilians can no longer move freely.

People in Materi live in constant fear because of the jihadi threat. The fighters are planting explosives and carrying out abductions in the area, instilling fear among the population while eroding state legitimacy. The government has imposed a curfew and a ban on gatherings.

“I can’t sleep at night, we’re not free to travel, to move,” Materi resident Florence Bati said. “People are too afraid.”

Kidnappings by jihadis in Benin surged from zero in 2021 to 33 this year, according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, which analyzed the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and other sources. Explosions have also increased, residents say.

Several months ago, a woman was killed by an explosive while fetching wood, said locals. Women have stopped going into the forest, instead finding kindling closer to home, they said. In October, one aid group distributed portable ovens, which require less wood.

People are being displaced from their homes as attacks increase, sparking concerns of a humanitarian crisis.

In August, more than 12,000 people were displaced from their homes in the Atacora and neighboring Alibori departments, up from about 5,000 in March, according to the United Nations. Violence is also pushing people from their farms. The U.N. estimates that tens of thousands of people could face crisis levels of food insecurity.

The government is trying to stem the problem by reinforcing the military along the borders and recruiting thousands of soldiers. Locals in the north say they’ve seen a surge of soldiers but say the army is underequipped and sometimes responds hours late when called about an attack.

The government denies that.

The military is well-equipped, able to respond to the incursions that occur and is conducting advanced training while trying to acquire more ground and airborne resources, said Col. Faizou Gomina, commander of the Mirador operation, which is dedicated to fighting the jihadis.

Unlike neighboring Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, which are being overrun by violence, and which ousted French troops after undergoing military coups and seeing surging anti-French sentiment, Benin is still open to help from its former colonial power, which left in 1960. The French don’t have a permanent base in the country, but at the behest of Benin, its troops deployed in the region can participate in training programs with Beninese soldiers, French military spokesman Col. Pierre Gaudilliere said.

While Benin’s government is shoring up its borders, it’s also trying to conceal the scale of the crisis to maintain its image, say residents in the north. It’s cracked down on freedom of speech and arrested journalists who report on insecurity.

Local officials insist the problem doesn’t extend beyond the border with Burkina Faso.

“There is no terrorist, no movement, no organization, no group that has settled or tried to settle in our department,” said Robert Wimbo Kassa, the mayor of Materi.

An agricultural nation of 13 million people, Benin has invested billions of dollars in propping up culture and tourism and is building a $1.5 billion industrial zone 27 miles (45 kilometers) outside of the city of Cotonou aimed at creating 300,000 jobs by 2030.

The information gap has left people in other parts of the country unaware of the security issues in the north. People in Cotonou said that they didn’t know about the jihadi problem, believed it was fake news, or that it was a problem limited to neighboring countries.

Rights groups say the government’s attempts to control the information space, while arbitrarily arresting people believed to be working with the jihadis, is pushing people into the militants’ hands.

“The jihadists live with the populations, the citizens know them, but they refuse to denounce them because the government doesn’t encourage people to do so,” said Bertin Assogba, coordinator for Durable and Develop Reference, a local aid group focused on defending human rights.

The international community is trying to implement lessons from the Sahel by sensitizing people into not joining the jihadis, and organizing community dialogues with officials to foster trust. Diplomats and aid groups also say there’s been a rush of investment.

Last year, the World Bank invested $450 million in a five-year project aimed at reaching some 4,600 border communities in northern Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togo. It will be focused on preventing the spread of conflict by strengthening local institutions and economic opportunities. But residents say development projects take too much time to materialize.

In the meantime, militants are winning in the realm of public perception.

Jihadis enter impoverished villages promising to build roads and hospitals if they come to power, residents say.

“(The government) should hurry and bring infrastructure. It’s important because jihadists are around and their message is very clear: They want to change things,” said Raoufou Bandele, the coordinator for Action for Mutual Aid and Development, a local group. “Some families give their sons the blessing to go with the jihadists because of frustration with the government.”

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Al-Qaida Chief In 9/11 Speech Calls For Attacks On West

In this in this 1998 file photo made available Friday, March 19, 2004, Ayman al-Zawahri speaks to the press in Khost, Afghanistan. On Wednesday, Sept, 11, 2019, Al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahri called on all Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli and Russian targets in a speech on the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks. SITE Intelligence Group reports that in a video released by the militant group, al-Zawahri also criticized "backtrackers" from jihad. (AP Photo/Mazhar Ali Khan, File)

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

CAIRO (AP) — Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri called Wednesday on Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli and Russian targets in a speech on the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks.

SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks online activity of jihadist groups, reported that in a video released by the militant group, the 68-year-old al-Zawahri also criticizes “backtrackers” from jihad, referring to former jihadis who changed their views in prison and called the 9/11 attacks unacceptable because innocent civilians were harmed.

“If you want Jihad to be focused solely on military targets, the American military has presence all over the world, from the East to the West,” he said. “Your countries are littered with American bases, with all the infidels therein and the corruption they spread.”

The coordinated al-Qaida hijackings on Sept. 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 people, when airliners slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and another crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

Al-Zawahri’s speech was recorded in a 33-minute, 28-second video produced by the group’s as-Sahab Media Foundation.

As an indicator of when the speech may have been recorded, al-Zawahri references President Donald Trump’s recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, which was announced on March 25. He calls on Palestinians to seek “martyrdom” by attacking Israelis with a suicide vest in response.

Al-Zawahri, an Egyptian, became leader of al-Qaida following the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan by U.S. Navy SEALs. He is believed to be hiding somewhere in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions. A July report by the U.N. cited reports that he is “in poor health” but provided no details.

Over recent years, al-Qaida has been engaged in fending off competition in jihadi circles from its rival, the Islamic State group. IS exploded into prominence by seizing large swaths of Iraq and Syria in 2014, declaring a “caliphate” and extending affiliates in multiple countries across the region.

IS’s physical “caliphate” was crushed in Iraq and Syria, though its militants are still active and carrying out attacks.

The U.N. report said the “immediate global threat posed by al-Qaida remains unclear” but warned that some would-be IS recruits could turn to older organization.

Al-Qaida militants, meanwhile, have taken a lower profile, using regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen to entrench themselves. The Yemen branch has been the most active, exploiting the chaos of the civil war to carry out bombings, shootings and assassinations in an effort to expand its footprint.

Osama bin Laden’s son Hamza bin Laden had been viewed as an eventual heir to the leadership of al-Qaida but was killed in a military operation, U.S. officials have said. Al-Zawahri lauded Hamza in a 2015 video that appeared on jihadi websites, calling him a “lion from the den of al-Qaida.”

11 Killed, 25 Hurt As Explosions Rock Somalia's Capital

Security forces stand near the wreckage of three-wheeled vehicles destroyed in a bomb attack in the capital Mogadishu, Somalia Saturday, June 15, 2019. (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh)

BY ABDI GULED

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA(AP) — A pair of explosions rocked Somalia’s capital and left 11 people dead, the country’s police chief said Saturday, as the al-Qaida-linked extremist group al-Shabab claimed responsibility.

Another 25 people were wounded, Gen. Bashir Abdi Mohamed told reporters in Mogadishu. He said the first car bomb went off near a security checkpoint for the presidential palace and was responsible for nine deaths.

The second car bomb killed the driver and his accomplice near a checkpoint on the road to the heavily fortified airport, he said.

Al-Shabab, which often targets the capital, said the blasts were meant to strike the first line of security checkpoints for the airport and palace. The airport is home to a number of diplomatic offices. The palace is a frequent al-Shabab target.

“I was at a short distance from the blast and I saw several people dead including two women, a passenger and two men, some of whom were elderly,” witness Hussein Mohamed told the AP. “This is really very terrible.”

Al-Shabab was responsible for the horrific truck bombing in Mogadishu in October 2017 that killed more than 500 people in one of the world’s deadliest extremist attacks since 9/11 .

The United States military has dramatically increased the number of airstrikes against al-Shabab in the past couple of years, seeking to limit the territory the group controls in central and southern Somalia and make it more difficult for fighters to circulate.

In a report to the United Nations Security Council circulated last month, U.N. chief Antonio Guterres noted an increase in security operations “and a large number of airstrikes targeting al-Shabab training bases and assembly points” that were deemed to have degraded its operating capability and freedom of movement.

“They have also led, however, to increased al-Shabab movement into urban centers, in particular Mogadishu, where their forces are less likely to be targeted from the air,” he said.

Guterres added that Somalia is making progress toward building a functioning state after three decades of civil war, extremist attacks and famine but that insecurity, political instability and corruption remain major challenges.

The multinational African Union force in Somalia continues to gradually withdraw personnel in preparation for Somali government forces to assume responsibility for the country’s security. Those forces, however, have been described by U.S. military officials and others as not yet ready for the job.

Associated Press video journalist Mohamed Sheikh Nor in Mogadishu contributed.

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Kenya, Tanzania Mark Bombings Which Introduced Al- Qaeda

20th anniversary of the attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

20th anniversary of the attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. Image: Kun Tian/AFP

BY FRAN BLANDY

NAIROBI, KENYA (AFP) - Kenya and Tanzania on Tuesday mark 20 years since the devastating US embassy bombings that thrust Al-Qaeda onto the global stage and went on to shape how a generation thinks about personal security.

It was mid-morning on August 7, 1998, when the first massive blast hit the US embassy in downtown Nairobi, followed minutes later by an explosion in Dar es Salaam, killing a total of 224 people and injuring around 5,000 -- almost all of them Africans.

With two monster bombs loaded onto the back of trucks and a trail of carnage in east Africa, the world was introduced to Osama bin Laden three years before the September 11 attacks in New York would make him a household name.

"It wasn't the first time Al-Qaeda had carried out an attack, but in terms of the spectacular, catastrophic nature of the incident, they really announced their entry onto the world stage," said Martin Kimani, head of Kenya's National Counter Terrorism Centre.

"When 9/11 happened it was shocking and surprising, but a precedent had been set here in east Africa."

According to "The Looming Tower", a Pulitzer Prize-winning book on the rise of Al-Qaeda, bin Laden gave various reasons for targeting the embassies, such as the deployment of American troops to Somalia and a US plan to partition Sudan, where he had lived for five years until being expelled in 1996.

However, author Lawrence Wright concluded that the main goal was to "lure the United States into Afghanistan".

- Boosting Al-Qaeda's image -

This aim was achieved, in the aftermath of the attacks, with the US launching strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan that were "largely seen as ineffective", said Daniel Byman, a counterterrorism expert at the Brookings Institution.

The strikes led the Taliban in Afghanistan to "embrace the group more closely", he said, and also boosted the image of a group seen as standing up to the United States in the Muslim world.

Byman said the attack was the first to show that Al-Qaeda "had tremendous reach and it can do sophisticated operations".

"It showed Al-Qaeda that international terrorism could generate tremendous attention, and not just attention from its adversaries... it was a form of advertising in a way."

The years since 9/11 have been shaped by the so-called "war on terror" and the proliferation of American military operations -- notably in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.

At the same time, Al-Qaeda went on to inspire affiliates around the globe, carrying out attacks across the Middle East as well as from Bali to Madrid, London and Paris.

Islamist insurgencies have wreaked havoc in the Sahel, Nigeria and Somalia, and -- on several bloody occasions since the 1998 bombings -- Kenya.

"Kenya itself was not primarily the target but of course we ended up with the majority of fatalities and consequences of that attack," said Kimani.

"We continue to be on the frontlines of this struggle."

- 'Dealing with terrorism' -

Two years after Kenya sent troops across the border into Somalia to fight the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab -- which had been carrying out attacks on its soil -- the group killed 67 people in an attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi in 2013.

Then in 2015, a Shabaab attack on the Garissa University in eastern Kenya left 148 dead.

However, Kimani said counterterrorism efforts by Kenya had proved successful, confining Shabaab attacks to remote areas in recent years as a result of new anti-terror legislation and improved co-ordination between different security forces.

He said efforts to build trust with communities where jihadists hide out, and understanding how recruitment happens to nip it in the bud has also been key.

"The threat is still there, believe me, but 20 years later we have become much better at dealing with terrorism than we used to be," he said.

"Globally terrorism has left a deep, deep social imprint. It has changed the way people think about security. Here in Kenya there are guards at malls and hotels and that is replicated in many parts of the world."

Kimani said governments need to focus on improving livelihoods and providing basic services to erase the "pockets of desperation" that prove so fruitful for recruitment.

In recent years, attention has swung away from Al-Qaeda to its rival Islamic State (IS) group which formed in 2013, captured swathes of territory and inspired numerous so-called "lone wolf" attacks from afar.

However, experts warn that while IS has since lost its territory and reach, Al-Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding.

"Their ideological ability to be grafted onto local grievances continues to make them a threat," said Kimani.

U.S., Nigerien Troops Killed In Ambush On Patrol In Niger

REUTERS STAFF, OCTOBER 4, 2017

DAKAR/BAMAKO (REUTERS) - Five soldiers from Niger and three U.S. Army Special Forces troops were killed and two wounded in an ambush on a joint patrol in southwest Niger on Wednesday, according to Nigerien and U.S. officials.

The five Green Berets were attacked while on a routine patrol in an area known to have a presence of insurgents, including from al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State, a U.S. official told Reuters.


It was unclear who fired on the U.S. and U.S.-backed forces, the official said. Those forces were not patrolling the area with any specific objective, such as a high-value target or rescuing a hostage, the official added.

A spokesman for U.S. Africa Command confirmed the attack after Radio France International (RFI) reported a lethal ambush near the Niger/Mali border.


“We can confirm reports that a joint U.S. and Nigerien patrol came under hostile fire in southwest Niger,” said the spokesman.

Namatta Abubacar, an official for the region of Tillaberi in Niger, said five Nigerien soldiers were among the dead.

A Niger diplomatic source said the attackers had come from Mali and had killed several soldiers, without saying whether any of the U.S. troops stationed in the West African country were among the victims.

U.S. President Donald Trump was briefed by telephone on the attack by White House Chief of Staff John Kelly while Trump flew back on Air Force One from Las Vegas, where he had been visiting victims and first responders affected by Sunday’s mass shooting.

RFI said earlier on Wednesday a counter-attack was underway.

African security forces backed by Western troops are stepping up efforts to counter jihadist groups forming part of a growing regional insurgency in the poor, sparsely populated deserts of the Sahel.

A relatively new militant group called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has claimed some of the attacks.

Geoff D. Porter, head of North Africa Risk Consulting, said that any confirmation of Islamic State’s role in Wednesday’s strike would lead to a strategic shift from Libya toward the Sahel band, stretching eastwards from Senegal to Chad.

“The emphasis ... will now shift south,” he said.

The U.S. Africa Command has hundreds of soldiers deployed across the region, including at an air facility in Agadez, and offers training and support to Niger’s army in aspects such as intelligence gathering and surveillance.


Reporting by Cheick Amadou Diouara, Emma Farge, John Irish and David Lewis; Additional reporting by Phil Stewart, Steve Holland, Eric Beech and Eric Walsh in Washington; Editing by James Dalgleish and Peter Cooney

AQIM’s Alliance In Mali: Prospects For Jihadist Preeminence In West Africa

BY JACOB ZENN

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

APRIL 21, 2017

AQIM militant in northern Mali (Source: al-Jazeera)

Trends in the two main theaters of jihadist activity in West Africa have moved in al-Qaeda’s favor in recent months. In the Mali/Sahel region, the formation of a new alliance has consolidated al-Qaeda’s position as the preeminent jihadist force in the region, while in Nigeria/Lake Chad, the faction of Boko Haram loyal to Islamic State (IS) — known formally as West Africa Province — has stayed relatively quiet and even shown continued signs of an ideological and logistical disconnect from its parent organization.

With the IS leadership currently in too much disarray in Libya and too distracted in Syria to consistently focus on West Africa, it is unlikely IS will be able to compete in the long-term with al-Qaeda for supremacy over jihadist groups in West Africa. Instead, al-Qaeda’s strategy of “localization” — which it has employed to a greater or lesser extent successfully in theaters such as Syria and Yemen — is likely to see al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) gaining increasing prominence as jihadism in West Africa becomes both more local and more diffuse.

The establishment of the new alliance, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims), in Mali in March 2017 sees al-Qaeda’s “localization” strategy at its most effective. It also demonstrates how adaptable al-Qaeda can be. The group can continue to exist in the region as an umbrella organization, accepting new members and groups tied to it by interpersonal and strategic bonds, while making open affiliation with IS and the massacre of civilians redlines for membership.

Al-Qaeda Alliance in Mali: JNIM

When the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra merged with Syrian rebel groups to become (or at least appear to become) a more locally rooted organization and reduce its al-Qaeda “branding,” it did so with the approval of a Syria-based deputy of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The al-Qaeda leader himself would have rejected such a merger because many of the groups with which Jabhat al-Nusra merged were too secular or outwardly nationalist for al-Zawahiri’s liking. An al-Qaeda insider has revealed that Jabhat al-Nusra’s localization in Syria was nonetheless consistent with al-Qaeda’s overall philosophy, but this specific merger represented an “organizational dispute” with al-Qaeda leadership that, once undertaken, could not be reversed. As a consequence, al-Qaeda’s leadership has subsequently accepted it (s04.justpaste.it, April 4).

In direct contrast, the formation of JNIM in Mali was welcomed wholeheartedly by AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and al-Qaeda’s General Command, including al-Zawahiri (justpaste.it/14k9a, March 17).

The new alliance brings together leaders of multiple ethnic groups, including: Ag Ghaly, the ethnically Tuareg leader of Ansar Dine who is the overall leader of JNIM; Muhammed Kufa, the ethnically Fulani leader of Ansar Dine sub-affiliate Katiba Macina; Yahia Abu al-Hamam, the ethnically Algerian Arab leader of AQIM’s Sahara Region; the AQIM Islamic law judge Abou Abderrahman al-Senhadji, who is ethnically Berber; and al-Hasan al-Ansari, a Malian Tangara Arab (referring to his clan’s Mauritanian ancestry) who is the deputy leader of al-Mourabitun (al-Masra #42, March 6).

This allows al-Qaeda to portray itself as a pan-Islamic movement unconstrained by tribalism, something particularly important in the context of AQIM’s earlier bias in favor Algerian Arabs.

The inclusion of Kufa’s Katiba Macina group — the name Macina is a reference to a historic Fulani Islamic emirate of central Mali — is a particular boon. Kufa was a leader of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) in 2013 when the group controlled parts of northern Mali and began shifting toward central Mali. By bringing him into the JNIM alliance, AQIM can consolidate its presence among Fulanis in central Mali where in previous years it has had limited operations.

The group has so far seen one setback — a key “sub-faction” that had been expected to join JNIM’s orbit, the relatively new Burkina Faso-based Ansaroul Islam, has openly criticized it. Ansaroul Islam’s leader, Mallam Dicko, may suspect JNIM chief Ag Ghaly is an Algerian agent, or be unimpressed by his Salafist credentials, especially considering Dicko appears to be an even more radical Salafi-jihadist than AQIM members (Alakhbar.info, April 16).

Given Ansaroul Islam’s increasingly high level of operations and impact in a part of the Sahel that formerly experienced almost no jihadist activity, it is likely the group has backing from a larger entity (Lemonde.fr, April 9). Burkina Faso says the group’s supporters are members of the former government deposed in a coup in 2016, but it is also possible that the IS faction in northern Burkina Faso under Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, who was also a MUJWA leader, is working with it (Aib.bf, March 24). Indeed, pro-IS channels on social media have announced that a new pledge of allegiance to IS “from the Sahel” will be forthcoming, although they have not identified Ansaroul Islam by name. Al-Qaeda supporters dismiss the reports as a “myth” intended to embellish IS’ strength in the Sahel.

Strengthened Position in Northern Mali

The emergence of JNIM comes as Mali is attempting to implement the Algiers Accord of 2015, a peace deal agreed between the government and armed groups in northern Mali. AQIM’s sustained attacks — or, since March 2017, JNIM’s attacks — undermine the Malian people’s confidence in the agreement. Moreover, JNIM can portray itself as an indigenously rooted alternative if the new regional government’s attempts at bringing together various former rebels fails (Liberation.fr, March 3). Ag Ghaly, familiar with Mali’s political terrain from his former life as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia, which is where he developed his Salafist worldview, can be expected to exploit any failure in the Algiers Accord’s implementation.

The JNIM alliance represents the most effective employment of al-Qaeda’s localization strategy and puts a nail in the coffin of IS’ hopes to grow its own network in West Africa, even if Ansaroul Islam announces a pledge to IS caliph Abubakr al-Baghdadi.

IS can still count as loyal the faction of Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, whose pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi was aired by IS in October 2016, as well as that of another former MUJWA commander, Hamadou Kheiry. But al-Sahrawi has been quiet for several months, and Kheiry has done little since announcing his loyalty to IS in 2015.

Both factions would seem to benefit from Ansaroul Islam joining IS, although it is unclear what financial or other benefits they could offer Dicko’s group. It may therefore be the case that a link with Ansaroul Islam is mostly ideological, albeit IS propaganda support could significantly upgrade Ansaroul Islam from the platform it currently uses — Facebook. There could also be a latent MUJWA connection, given that Dicko too is a former member.

Islamic State’s Faltering West Africa Network

Further south in the Nigeria/Lake Chad region, IS has a more effective operational presence, but has seen limited success on the propaganda and ideological end. Its West Africa Province — the Abu Musab al-Barnawi-led faction of Boko Haram — is still loyal to al-Baghdadi, but has issued only a single video since Abu Musab al-Barnawi deposed Abubakr Shekau as leader in August 2016. Even then, that video’s narrative was tailored more toward contextualizing events in Nigeria in order to encourage IS sectarian narratives in Syria and Iraq, rather than inspire jihadists in Nigeria or the Lake Chad region (the video portrayed Iranian and Shia influence in Nigeria, for example) (archive.org, February 13).

While some West Africa Province propaganda photos released by IS have shown its hisba (sharia enforcement) patrols in villages around Lake Chad, West Africa Province’s de-facto reign over territories it has held in northern Borno State since 2014 has otherwise rarely been featured in IS propaganda. Indeed, this may be because West Africa Province is barely governing its territory. Unlike IS, which enforces its social provisions, West Africa Province allows the population in areas it controls to live with little interference, as long as they avoid collaborating with the Nigerian government (Naji.com, March 28).

In addition to the apparent disconnect between West Africa Province and the IS media apparatus, which likely reflects a broader disconnect to IS leadership, the group also appears to be coordinating with various cells in Nigeria that are or were part of Ansaru, the now operationally dormant al-Qaeda sub-group in Nigeria.

Such coordination would be unlikely if these Ansaru members believed West Africa Province was behaving toward the population in the same way IS does in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, evidence from conversations between West Africa Province leaders suggests the main area where West Africa Province does respect IS orders is the kidnapping of women, including the Chibok schoolgirls (Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2016).

West Africa Province leaders claim al-Baghdadi has permitted them to take captive only Christian women, not Muslims, even if the Muslim women are “apostates” who participate in democracy. Shekau, by contrast, considers any apostate — whether Muslim or Christian — to be deserving of enslavement and does not trust the West Africa Province leaders’ claims about relaying al-Baghdadi’s orders on the issue of slavery. In all other respects, West Africa Province appears not to take orders from IS on day-to-day affairs.

Developments in Kogi State

The West Africa Province-Ansaru relationship can be seen most prominently in developments in Nigeria’s Kogi State, which, like virtually all states south of Abuja, has been largely free from attacks since the start of the insurgency in 2009. There have, however, been a small number of notable incidents that show Ansaru is the main group to have a presence there, including:
an ambush by Ansaru in late 2012 on Mali-bound Nigerian troops before the French-led intervention that ousted AQIM, MUJWA and Ansar Dine from northern Mali commenced in 2013 (Vanguard, January 20, 2013);
the arrest of Ansaru leader Khalid al-Barnawi in April 2016 (Vanguard, December 28, 2016); and
a series of raids on bomb-making factories and prison breaks in 2012-2013, although these were not claimed by Ansaru or any other faction (Leadership, April 6, 2012).

Kogi State came back into the spotlight in February 2017 when the Nigerian government reported that a Kogi-based group called the Muslim Brotherhood — with no apparent relation to the Egypt-founded global Islamist group of the same name — had sent fighters for training with IS in Libya.

Some of these fighters are now returning to Nigeria. In February, members of the new group attacked police stations in Okehi, Kogi State, killing two people (thecable.ng, February 10; Premium Times, February 10).

A possible explanation for this Kogi State-Libya nexus is that the Salafist extremist cells that have reportedly been brewing in Kogi for years have finally connected with a broader umbrella jihadist movement, such as IS (Newsrescue.com, October 28, 2015).

It may also be the case that Ansaru cells in Kogi have grown impatient with the operational dormancy of Ansaru, left the group to form the Muslim Brotherhood and then traveled to Libya with West Africa Province’s support (al-Risalah, January 10). The overlap between the Muslim Brotherhood sending fighters to Libya and Ansaru can be seen in reports from the Nigerian security forces in northwestern Nigeria, where Ansaru was formed in 2011, that say at least two Ansaru cells there have been sending fighters to train with IS in Libya (Thenewsnigeria.com.ng, August 22, 2016; Premium Times; February 9, 2016).

While some Nigerians traveled to Libya independently to fight with IS, West Africa Province has likely facilitated others — at least five men and one child have featured in IS propaganda in Libya, and several Nigerian women have been recorded as married to IS fighters.

The reason for this coordination is that West Africa Province, Ansaru and presumably the Muslim Brotherhood share a common ideology, history (West Africa Province’s key leaders were former Ansaru members), area of operations and strategic objectives in Nigeria that make experience and training in Libya mutually beneficial. The West Africa Province-planned attack on the U.S. and UK embassies, for example, which was exposed in April, reflects the long-standing “far enemy” targets of Ansaru (Vanguard, April 12).

In sum, the new Muslim Brotherhood group is likely related to Ansaru and both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansaru may be cooperating with West Africa Province for mutual gain, regardless of their affiliations.

The State of Play for JAS

Boko Haram’s faction under the leadership of Abubakr Shekau — known as Jamaat Ahlisunnah Liddaawati Wal-Jihad (JAS) — is neither affiliated to al-Qaeda nor IS and is operating independently but keeping a hand extended to IS.

It still claims to be an Islamic State in West Africa and issues video footage with IS branding, even though its films are not made or promoted by IS, and Shekau still declares al-Baghdadi to be the caliph. That aside, West Africa Province (and mainstream Muslims more generally) criticize JAS for its killing of Muslims civilians who Shekau deems to be “apostates” for not joining his group.

JAS has been engaged in a new narrative campaign targeting Nigeria’s Salafists and Ansaru sympathizers. JAS argues that Nigeria’s largest Islamic group, the Salafist/Wahhabist Izala movement, was wrong to have ultimately rejected the preaching of Boko Haram founder Muhammed Yusuf, whose blood JAS says “is valuable to us, more valuable than the blood of all Nigerians, all Nigerians, starting from [Nigerian President Muhammadu] Buhari, his aides, ministers, judges, military and everyone” (Youtube, April 3).

At the same time, JAS has reaffirmed its commitment to Yusuf’s successor, Shekau, who JAS describes as “the strong, courageous one, feared by the West, who is now the biggest threat to Nigeria.” Two other recent JAS videos have focused specifically on JAS attacks in Cameroon. They also, for the first time in JAS’ media output, highlighted French-speaking fighters, suggesting Shekau is trying to break out of his isolation by targeting Nigerian Salafist/Wahhabist and Cameroonians (Youtube, April 1; Vanguard, February 27).

Despite JAS’s “outreach,” West Africa Province’s Abu Musab al-Barnawi — along with his close allies Mamman Nur and Abu Fatima, both of whom used to operate with Ansaru — continues to criticize Shekau’s killing of fellow Muslims (Sahara Reporters, August 5, 2016). This criticism, which is the same as that al-Qaeda levies against IS, suggests there are ideological differences between the leaders of West Africa Province and the leadership of IS, even if for the time being West Africa Province’s belief in the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi’s position as IS caliph supersedes these differences.

Ansaru, for its part, is leaderless and largely inactive operationally, even if its members or former members still engage in jihadist activities. Some supporters still post on Facebook and criticize Shekau. Historically, Ansaru criticized Shekau not only for his killing of Muslims civilians and his bizarre mannerisms — such as a “crotch-scratching” incident during his video claiming the bombing of the Grand Mosque in Kano in November 2014 – but also his apparent heterodoxy (al-Hiddaya, February 10, 2015). For example, Ansaru supporters in a video posted on Facebook declared Shekau as an apostate for saying that Jesus Christ was not born through the word of God (Zalunci Haram, April 1).

Maintaining Preeminence in West Africa

The jihadist landscape of West Africa is prone to shifting alliances. To maintain its pre-eminence in the region, al-Qaeda will attempt to keep the newly formed JNIM clear of IS infiltration and JNIM is unlikely to openly cooperate with any IS-affiliated group.

In the long-term, if West Africa Province withdraws its support for IS — especially if al-Baghdadi dies, or IS loses its territory and there are doubts over the legitimacy of the caliphate — then JNIM could be further strengthened. An IS collapse could see West Africa Province, together with former Ansaru members and Muslim Brotherhood members, re-integrate into al-Qaeda structures and ultimately join JNIM.

Issues such as Ansaroul Islam’s current rejection of JNIM are manageable for JNIM. It seems unlikely that even if the Burkina Faso-based group pledges allegiance to IS it can overshadow JNIM’s operational tempo, even if allied with the other IS factions operating around Burkina Faso.

In Nigeria, JAS is unlikely to re-integrate into al-Qaeda structures unless Shekau is killed. But even that scenario is not so difficult to imagine — an assassination could come at the hands of West Africa Province or by former Ansaru members who tend to know the location of his hideouts. Shekau now refuses to meet with West Africa Province leaders for fear they will plant a tracking device on him (Vanguard, February 24).

The best-case scenario for JNIM — and as such for al-Qaeda — would be if al-Baghdadi dies, the IS caliphate folds and Shekau is killed. In that situation, it would not be inconceivable that JNIM could pull a newly united West Africa Province, JAS, Ansaru and the Muslim Brotherhood into the JNIM fold, likely under new names.

In such a case, Ansroul Islam or any other pro-IS leaning factions would be left marginal and obsolete, and would likely eventually fall into JNIM’s orbit.

Al-Qaeda Fighters Push Offensive In Northern Syria

Provided by the U.S. Navy, an F-18 lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the Persian Gulf. The aircraft carrier and aircraft are deployed as part of operations targeting Islamic State group 

BEIRUT (ASSOCIATED PRESS) Al-Qaida-linked militants pressed an offensive Monday against Western-backed rebels in northern Syria, closing in on a vital border crossing with Turkey and exposing the weakness of mainstream opposition groups that the U.S. hopes to forge into a fighting force to take on Islamic extremists.

The Nusra Front's recent surge has overrun strongholds in Syria's Idlib province of two prominent rebel factions that proved unable to repel the assault despite getting arms and training from the U.S. The opposition groups' collapse marks a significant setback to Washington's plan of partnering with more moderate brigades to fight the Islamic State group and other radicals.

The Nusra Front — a bitter and bloody rival of the Islamic State group despite their shared extremist ideology — was massing its fighters Monday in the town of Sarmada near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing after sweeping through rebel-held towns and villages over the weekend. As the extent of the rout became apparent, reports also emerged that some rebels had pledged allegiance to the al-Qaida affiliate.

The fighting takes place against the backdrop of U.S.-led airstrikes to roll back and destroy the Islamic State group, which has seized huge chunks of territory spanning Syria and Iraq. That effort has recently focused on the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border, where fighting has raged since September.

The two primary targets of the Nusra Front's attack are the Syria Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm. While both rebel groups have received U.S. support, it never reached the levels that either deemed necessary to make significant advances against President Bashar Assad's forces in Syria's 3½-year-old civil war. At the same time, the link to the Americans also earned them the enmity of radical groups.

"The Nusra Front is deeply suspicious of both the SRF and Harakat Hazm because they receive support from the U.S.," said Aron Lund, editor of Syria in Crisis, a website run by the Carnegie Endowment. "The U.S. is also quite open about training rebels to take on both the Islamic State and al-Qaida, to which the Nusra Front belongs. So from the Nusra Front's perspective, these groups aren't just troublesome rivals, they're a pro-Western fifth column that are slowly being readied for a purge of jihadis."

Tensions between the groups worsened after the U.S. bombed Nusra Front bases in Idlib province on the opening night of its air campaign focused primarily on the Islamic State group. Those airstrikes won the Nusra Front, which has largely focused on fighting Assad's forces, the sympathy of many in opposition-held areas.

Mainstream rebel groups maintain a presence in parts of northern Syria and are also active in the south along the Jordanian border. But the quick defeat of two groups previously considered among the stronger factions in Idlib province "shows that ... the moderates are weaker than what we have been led to believe, despite increased funding from the West," said Charles Lister, a visiting fellow the Brookings Doha Center.

It was unclear how far the Nusra Front intended to take its offensive in Idlib. In recent days, the group's fighters have been gathering in the town of Sarmada in northern Idlib province, about 4 miles (6 kilometers) from Bab al-Hawa, said Assad Kanjo, an anti-Assad activist based in the province.

Rami Abdurrahman of the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also said Nusra fighters had flowed into Sarmada, but said there was no indication they had advanced on the crossing, which is held by a rebel alliance known as the Islamic Front. Bab al-Hawa serves as an important supply route for Western-backed fighters as well as aid groups in northern Syria.

Lister said he did not believe Nusra fighters would attack the crossing, saying they were unlikely to directly challenge the Islamic Front, a collection of hard-line and moderate Muslim groups. He said that likely would create new, unnecessary enemies for the group.

"Most likely, they will seek to consolidate their influence in the area around Bab al-Hawa," he said. Either way, the group's advances have dealt a sharp blow to Harakat Hazm and the Syria Revolutionaries Front.

Harakat Hazm emerged earlier this year, and online videos have showed its fighters using Western-donated weapons, including U.S. anti-tank weapons in the spring. It has made modest advances in Idlib. The Syria Revolutionaries Front, meanwhile, has sought to present itself as a force against extremists like the Islamic State. The group's leader, Jamal Maarouf, has emerged as a wily commander who has gotten the support of Western backers. He presents himself as a moderate but has used sharp sectarian language to refer to the Syrian army.

In an online video posted Saturday after his forces were pushed out of parts of Idlib, Maarouf accused Nusra fighters of "occupying" Idlib and compared them to Assad's forces. In the messy alliances that have characterized the Syrian war, the Nusra Front has fought alongside other rebel groups against Assad's forces. But it has particularly poor relations with Maarouf's men. They had fought in summer over what appeared to be the rights to smuggling Syrian fuel to Turkey.

Car Bomb In Somalia's Capital Kills 11

Somalis carry away a body from the scene of a car bomb attack in the capital Mogadishu, Somalia Sunday, Oct. 12, 2014. A car bomb exploded outside the popular Aroma cafe in Somalia's capital killing at least 11 people and wounding a number of others, a senior police official said Sunday, adding that the bomb was believed to have been detonated by remote control.

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA (ASSOCIATED PRESS) — A car bomb exploded outside a popular cafe in Somalia's capital on Sunday, killing 11 people and wounding eight others, a senior police official said.

The blast struck the Aroma cafe in Mogadishu and the bomb was believed to have been detonated by remote control, senior police official Mohammed Hussein said. Most of those who died were sitting outside the cafe, he said.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but suspicion has fallen on the al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab militants who have vowed to avenge the death of their leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in early September in a U.S. airstrike. Godane has been replaced by Ahmed Omar, also known as Abu Ubeid.

Al-Shabab has continued to carry out attacks on Somalia's capital despite being pushed out of Mogadishu by African Union forces supporting Somalia's weak U.N.-backed government in August 2011. The Somali government troops backed by AU forces are making progress in capturing the remaining al-Shabab strongholds. Last week, they captured the port town of Barawe.

Earlier Sunday, gunmen shot and seriously wounded a Somali television reporter, officials said. The African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, condemned the attack on the reporter, who was shot three times while fleeing from the gunmen.

The attack is the third targeting journalists in Somalia this year, AMISOM said. Somalia remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist. Last year, 18 journalists were killed in Somalia.

Iraq Air Force To Back Kurds Fighting Islamists

Iraqis people from the Yazidi community arriving in Irbil in northern Iraq after Islamic militants attacked the towns of Sinjar and Zunmar. Around 40 thousand people crossed the bridge of Shela in Fishkhabur into the Northern Kurdish Region of Iraq, after being given an ultimatum by Islamic militants to either convert to Islam, pay a security tax, leave their homes, or die.

BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has called upon his country's armed forces to help the Kurdish military battle a Sunni militant offensive in northern Iraq that has caused tens of thousands of people from the minority Yazidi community to flee their homes.

It was the first sign of cooperation between Baghdad and Irbil, the capital of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, since Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, was taken over by the Islamic State group in June, signaling a degree of rapprochement in the face of the country's deteriorating security crisis.

Iraq's military spokesman Lt. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said Monday that al-Maliki has commanded the air force to provide aerial support to the Kurds in the first sign of cooperation between the two militaries since Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, was captured by the militants on June 10.

Iraq is facing its worst crisis since the 2006 civil war when the Islamic State group captured large swaths of land straddling the Syria-Iraq border with the goal of establishing a self-styled caliphate.

When it overran the cities of Mosul and Tikrit in June, Iraqi security forces virtually collapsed, with police and soldiers abandoning arsenals of heavy weapons. The Islamic State captured the northern towns of Sinjar and Zumar on Saturday, prompting an estimated 40,000 from the minority Yazidi sect to flee, said Jawhar Ali Begg, a spokesman for the community.

The Sunni militants have targeted minority communities in areas they have conquered. "Their towns are now controlled by (Islamic State) and their shrine has been blown up," Begg told The Associated Press. The militant group gave the Yazidis, who follow an ancient religion with links to Zoroastrianism, an ultimatum to convert to Islam, pay a tax or face death, Begg added.

The United Nations said last month that more than 500,000 people have been displaced by the violence since June, bringing the total this year to 1.4 million, including more than 230,000 Syrian refugees. The group drove ethnic and religious minorities out of Mosul, and attacked mosques and shrines, claiming they contradicted strict Islamic teachings.

Kurdish forces have been battling with the militants for control of several towns stretching between the province of Nineveh and the Kurdish Iraqi province of Dahuk. At least 25 Kurdish fighters were killed in clashes with the militants on Sunday, and another 120 were wounded, according to Muhssin Mohamed, a Dahuk-based doctor.

A statement Monday by the Islamic State said it had captured dozens of Kurdish prisoners during the clashes and seized "large number" of weapons. The authenticity of the statement could not be verified, but it was posted on a website used by the group.

Kurdish state-media reported late Monday that peshmerga units surrounded the town of Shangal and were able to capture it from militants seeking refuge there.

Janssen reported from Dahuk, Iraq. Associated Press reporter Vivian Salama in Baghdad contributed to this report.

How Obama Decided On Airstrikes In Iraq

President Barack Obama meets with the National Security Council in the Situation Room of the White House, Thursday morning, Aug. 7, 2014, in Washington.

WASHINGTON (AP) — For much of the summer, President Barack Obama had watched with alarm as a brutal, al-Qaida-linked insurgency seized more and more territory in northern Iraq. But it wasn't until Thursday, when Obama learned that genocide could be imminent, that the president decided the U.S. military had to act.

The vivid reports streaming into the Situation Room that morning from U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials were unsettling, to say the least: Stories of mass executions, women being enslaved as child brides, members of a small religious group trapped on a mountain and potentially dying of thirst. The situation was falling apart — fast.

Then the president, for the first time, was given an assessment that thrust the crisis into an entirely new category. As one top official put it: "I had not heard the word 'genocide' used in the Situation Room before."

By the time 90-minute meeting ended, it was clear Obama planned to order humanitarian aid to be airdropped to the Yazidis, a religious minority being targeted by the Islamic State militant group. But advisers were still unsure whether Obama would go one step further: airstrikes in Iraq, just three years after the U.S. pulled out from a war that Obama never liked.

As a fast-growing Sunni rebellion overran major Iraqi cities in early June, Obama began weighing his options. A U.S. aircraft carrier was ordered into the Persian Gulf, and Obama began dispatching hundreds of special forces to advise Iraqis and protect U.S. personnel.

On one point, Obama was firm: No ground troops would return to Iraq. Yet the prospect of airstrikes hung in the air like an unpleasant smell — Obama was clearly reluctant to take that step, but it could prove critical to preventing a security collapse in Iraq.

As the thermometer climbed in July, temperatures were also rising in Washington, where some lawmakers were demanding immediate drone strikes while others were urging the opposite. A top senator threatened to block arms sales to Iraq, and House lawmakers easily passed a resolution to bar Obama from sending forces into Iraq long-term without their go-ahead.

Pentagon leaders were reviewing what assistance might help Iraq's beleaguered military, while diplomats pressed Iraqi leaders for a political transition that would enfranchise Sunnis and Kurds.

Wednesday was a major tipping point. Obama was engrossed in three days of meeting with dozens of African presidents he'd invited to Washington. But roughly 6,000 miles away, the Yazidis were in trouble, having fled to the mountains to escape the extremists.

With Obama at the summit, his team met throughout the day at the White House, where they learned that the Iraqis had tried — and failed — to resupply the Yazidis, who were in dire need of food and water.

The Kurds, America's closest allies in Iraq, had sought to hold off the extremists. But on Wednesday, the Kurdish militia started falling back, moving precipitously away from Iraq's largest hydroelectric dam as they sought to consolidate their forces to protect Irbil.

Eventually, insurgents took the dam. If fully breached, the dam could flood major swaths of land, endangering the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, joined Obama for the limo ride back to the White House, where Obama said he knew the Yazidis' humanitarian crisis must be addressed. Obama had plans to join the first lady at an Italian restaurant, but the Oval Office meeting dragged on. Dinner would have to wait.

By Thursday morning, things had only gotten worse. People were fleeing Irbil. Obama made clear he was inclined to approve military action, officials said, but held off on the final decision as he left to sign a veterans bill at a nearby army base. The officials discussed Obama's decision-making on the condition they not be identified.

Upon his return, Obama met for two hours with his team in the Situation Room, where Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, both abroad, were linked by videoconference. Obama announced he was authorizing two missions: airdrops for the Yazidis, and military strikes in the event Americans were in danger.

As dusk fell in Washington, cable news and Twitter were abuzz with reports about U.S. military action in Iraq. Though many were false, the White House didn't comment, fearing it could jeopardize the first humanitarian drop, which was underway under the cover of night.

Just after 9 p.m., reporters were hastily summoned to the State Dining Room, where a stoic Obama spoke to the nation.

"When many thousands of innocent civilians are faced with the danger of being wiped out, and we have the capacity to do something about it, we will take action," Obama said.

Reach Josh Lederman on Twitter at http://twitter.com/joshledermanAP