Washington Killed An ISIS Commander In Nigeria, But Has More To Do In West Africa

BY SAMUEL BEN-UR

Nigeria’s Christians are among the most persecuted in the world. They face threats from Muslim Fulani herdsmen who have raided villages and killed hundreds of believers. They also face threats from terror groups known around the world for their brutality, such as Islamic State (ISIS), against which a significant victory was recently achieved.

In a joint operation on May 16, U.S. and Nigerian forces killed Abu Musab al-Minuki, a key figure in ISIS and its affiliate, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The Nigerian military described the raid as a “meticulously planned and highly complex precision air-land operation.” President Donald Trump called al-Minuki “the most active terrorist in the world,” and “second-in-command of ISIS globally.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put the matter in a different light: U.S. forces had hunted an ISIS leader “who was killing Christians.”

Al-Minuki’s death represents a major achievement in Washington’s ongoing campaign to stem the growing tide of Christian persecution and instability in Nigeria. While ISWAP is neither the only nor the most pervasive threat facing Abuja’s Christian community, killing al-Minuki represents tangible progress. To capitalize on this success, Washington should attend to all threats making Nigeria unsafe for Christians and other citizens alike.

Analysts dispute whether al-Minuki was truly ISIS’s global No. 2. What is not in doubt is that one of ISWAP’s most important commanders is dead. His network has helped make Nigeria one of the deadliest countries in the world for Christians.

Nigerian reporting tied al-Minuki to the February 2018 Dapchi schoolgirls kidnapping, when ISWAP terrorists abducted more than 100 students from the Government Girls’ Science and Technical College in Yobe State. Leah Sharibu, a Christian girl who reportedly refused to renounce her faith, remains in captivity and has become a symbol of Nigeria’s persecution crisis.

In December 2019, ISWAP released a video of its terrorists executing 11 blindfolded Christians in northeast Nigeria. The killers called the murders “a message to Christians all over the world.” The next year, ISWAP abducted and executed Ropvil Daciya Dalep, a Christian university student, declaring that Christians “must know that we will never forget their atrocities against us.”

ISWAP also carried out the Pentecost Sunday massacre at St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in 2022. Gunmen disguised as worshippers detonated explosives and opened fire during Mass, killing at least 40 people and wounding more than 100. In 2026 testimony before the Federal High Court in Abuja, a witness identified the attackers as members of an ISWAP-linked cell based in Kogi State, operating under the alias “Al-Shabaab,” and tied to the broader command network al-Minuki helped oversee.

To describe all this merely as “insecurity” is to miss the point. Nigeria’s Christians are not the only victims of jihadist violence. Muslims in the northeast and northwest have also suffered grievously at the hands of Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits, and other armed groups.

While organized Islamic terrorists may make headlines, they are not the greatest threat to Christians in Nigeria. Instead, the greatest threats facing Nigerian Christians are from militant gangs of Fulani herdsmen.

This is especially true in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where armed Fulani militant networks have attacked Christian communities in Benue, Plateau, and surrounding states. The Fulani are an ethnic group of about 25-40 million in West Africa, historically defined by cattle-herding. While many of them no longer practice pastoralism as a way of life, their group identity is still strongly associated with raising livestock. Land, water, grazing routes, and criminality all contribute to the anti-Christian violence perpetrated by some Fulani militants, and yet these factors do not tell the whole story.

Instead, as scholars of international religious liberty such as Baylor’s Paul Marshall have shown, there is a significant element of anti-Christian violence inexplicable by material explanations alone, something a commonly used phrase like “farmer-herder conflict” works to obscure.

In the case of the Plateau State Massacre in 2023, Fulani gangs killed nearly 200 Christian men, women, and children on Christmas Eve while reportedly shouting, “Allahu Akbar, we will destroy all Christians.” Policymakers and journalists should not hide behind sociological euphemisms to explain away attacks that have clear religious motivations.

The Nigerian government’s response has also often been a mix of incapacity and denial. Abuja resists the “Christian persecution” label even as it often fails to prevent attacks on communities and subsequently lies about the scale of and motivations behind massacres and kidnappings. Village communities complain that security forces arrive late or not at all.

In the northeast, ISWAP survives because it exploits weak governance, borderland sanctuaries, and inconsistent intelligence coverage. The result is a state that can sometimes strike terrorists but often fails to protect Christians from slaughter.

Increased cooperation between Washington and Abuja is a start, but Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s government must publicly and accurately diagnose the challenges facing its people. Killing al-Minuki wasn’t significant purely because he was an archterrorist. He also perpetrated atrocities, including the massacre of hundreds of Christians, though Abuja has yet to highlight this fact.

Nigeria’s Christians need a government willing to name their persecutors, protect their villages, rescue their children, prosecute their attackers, and accept help when its own capabilities fall short. The United States cannot solve Nigeria’s religious violence for Nigeria. But it can make clear that anti-Christian persecution is not a peripheral humanitarian concern; it is central to Nigeria’s security crisis and to America’s counterterrorism interests.

The United States should create a Nigeria religious-violence targeting cell inside the embassy in Abuja, linking State, Defense, Treasury, and intelligence officials working with trusted Nigerian civil society groups and church networks. Its job should be to map ISWAP, Boko Haram, Fulani militant, and bandit networks that attack religious communities. It can then identify commanders, financiers, arms suppliers, cattle-rustling facilitators, ransom brokers, and corrupt local officials, and feed that evidence into Treasury and State sanctions packages.

The State Department should also make any major expansion of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation contingent on Abuja producing a public, incident-level accounting of attacks on Christian communities, including listing the perpetrators, the religious identity of victims where relevant, security response times, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

Al-Minuki’s death will not bring Leah Sharibu home or rebuild every burned church. But it proves the men who organize this violence can be found. The question is whether Washington and Abuja will treat that success as final—or as the beginning of a serious campaign to defend Nigeria’s most vulnerable communities.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

The Sahel Region Is Less Secure Than Ever: Foreign Forces Just Add To The Cycle Of Violence

French soldiers on patrol in Diabaly, Mali, 2013. Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images

BY NINA LILEN

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

LUND UNIVERSITY

Several of Mali’s major cities experienced coordinated attacks in April by a new coalition of jihadists and separatist groups.

As the coalition took over the town of Kidal in the north of Mali, images of Russian troops being escorted out of the town after negotiations were cabled out across global media.

Russia, now in the shape of Africa Corps and previously the Wagner Group, has been the Malian military’s external security partner since the beginning of 2022. It replaced French and European troops from the counter-terrorism operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. France had deployed a force of 5,000 troops from 2014 to 2022. European special forces numbered 1,000 between 2020 and 2022. Both missions were forced to leave as relations between France and the Malian junta grew tense.

The strategic realignment, from western and multilateral forces to Russian troops, expanded in the region. In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the French troops were expelled at the start of 2023, as 200 Russian troops moved in.

In the summer of 2023, the Malian authorities also kicked out the decade-old 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Niger’s junta, which took power the same year, followed suit and expelled the EU’s operations in the country six months later, before accepting a few hundred Russian troops.

During the past decade I have researched external security interventions in the Sahel and analysed their justifications, development on the ground, and consequences for political and security environments.

I conclude from my research that the external interventions have not stabilised the region. More than a decade after the first major interventions, the Sahel is more fragmented, militarised and violent than before.

Yet the persistence of insecurity also serves political purposes.

For military juntas, the jihadist threat justifies continued rule and repression. For Russia, the region has become a showcase for anti-western influence and security partnerships in Africa. For western actors, jihadist expansion, migration concerns and fears of regional instability are used as reasons for security engagement despite repeated failures.

The complex interactions between these actors have resulted in a continuous, strategic circle of violence, where civilians are the first victims.

On the ground

On the ground, interventions have often evolved in unpredictable ways through ad hoc decisions and informal interactions between local and external actors.

For example, they have shared logistical and medical assistance and intelligence.

More broadly, the external interventions strengthened militaries as political actors, reinforcing an already biased civil-military balance across the region.

“Security in the Sahel” became the moniker that framed the western and multilateral interventions in the region from 2013 onwards. Improving the capacities, capabilities and professionalism of the national security forces became the official objectives of these interventions, closely linked to the broader aim of defeating the jihadist insurgencies.

Framing the intersecting crises in the Sahel as a security issue also meant that security actors had the task of resolving it. The importance, status and budgets of the national militaries thus increased as the security situation deteriorated. A heavily tilted civil-military imbalance was the result.

As military officers took over power through coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a strategic realignment towards Russia began, to maintain military rule.

The Russian Wagner group allowed the newly installed juntas to entrench their power, while “deprofessionalising” the forces through harassment, attacks and massacres of civilians.

Research shows for example that civilian targeting accounted for 71% of the Wagner Group’s involvement in political violence in Mali between December 2021 and July 2022. This strategy of attacking civilians has made recruitment easier for jihadist groups. They could increase their ranks by exploiting grievances.

The latest attacks in Mali in April 2026 demonstrate the military junta’s failure, together with its Russian security partners, to contain the jihadist groups’ expansion.

They also reveal that Russia is in the country mainly to keep the military junta in power. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, reconfirmed the partnership with Russia after the attacks in spite of their failure on the battlefield.

The military leader needs regime maintenance more than ever, and the Russians need to be in the country for continued geopolitical influence on the African continent.

Conclusion

The result is that while all external actors claim to fight instability, the current regional order depends on continuing insecurity.

Stabilisation risks becoming less about resolving conflict than about managing insecurity in ways that sustain regimes, partnerships and geopolitical influence.

Foreign interventions, in combination with national actors’ ambitions, have helped to transform the region into a space of militarised regime survival, jihadist expansion and geopolitical competition between Russia and western democracies.

As military approaches have repeatedly proven insufficient to solve the intersecting crises in the Sahel, pressured military juntas may now be forced to negotiate with jihadist groups. That is likely to result in new, hybrid spaces of power and governance.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Senator Ted Cruz Slams US Officials For Avoiding Reference To Polisario Terror Links

BY SAFAA KASRAOUI

RABAT, MOROCCO  – US Senator Ted Cruz has sharply criticized administration officials for repeatedly avoiding any direct reference to the Polisario Front, despite documented links to the separatist group instigating terror activities that destabilize the region.

Cruz made his remarks during a Senate hearing on counterterrorism efforts in North Africa and the Sahel this week.

During the hearing, he pointed a rebuke to US officials for what he described as a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the Polisario and its links to terrorism.

He also noted a contradiction between praising Algeria as a “critical pillar of stability in the region” and vaguely warning of terrorist activity in the Sahel without naming the parties involved.

Algeria’s regime has been hosting, financing, arming, and sheltering the Polisario Front, a separatist group claiming independence in Western Sahara.

Several reports link Polisario’s involvement in terrorist activities.

In 2017, Morocco’s security services identified 100 Polisario members who are associated with ISIS.

In 2021, French authorities killed Adnan Abdu Walid al-Sahrawi, the leader of a terror group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

Al Sahrawi was also a former member of the Polisario Front.

Cruz also pointed out Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’s collusion with Polisiario.

“Iran is trying to turn the Polisario Front into the Houthis for West Africa, a proxy force capable of waging war to threaten regional stability and pressure US partners wherever Iran wants leverage,” the senator said.

He recalled Polisario’s work with Iranian “terrorist groups,” taking drones from the IRGC and moving weapons and resources around the region, including to other groups instigating terrorist acts.

“I believe they should be designated as a terrorist group, and I’ve drafted a bill to do so if there is no change in their behavior,” Cruz added.
For Cruz, the officials delivered nothing of substance

Senior Bureau Official Robert Palladino responded to Cruz’s question by repeatedly steering away from directly addressing the senator’s question.

Instead, he shifted to broader diplomatic language, conveying US’ commitment to achieve a lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

When Cruz pressed the official about the possibility of designating Polisario as a terrorist group, Palladino made similar remarks – stating the US is “constantly assessing threats to the American homeland.”

Cruz responded to Palladino’s remarks, insinuating that they were merely talking points that were “positively Shakespearean, full of sound and fury and yet signifying nothing.”

Another US official also made an indirect answer to Cruz’s questions, causing the senator to address the situation head-on.

Cruz also asked both officials if they received any instructions not to say anything negative about the Polisario Front, with both officials denying receiving such guidance.

“So you just decided to go down that road for the heck of it,” Cruz responded.
A history of Iran-Polisario links

Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, emphasizing that it received evidence about the collision.

It accused Tehran of providing Polisario with logistical support.

Iran and Algeria’s regimes denied the collusion, but Moroccan officials emphasized they received indications and satellite proof of training and equipment provision links between Tehran and the separatist group.

The situation prompted concerns in the international community, with officials from across the world urging their countries to designate Polisario as a terrorist group.

In September last year, US Congressman Joe Wilson described the separatist Polisario Front as a “terrorist organization” that destabilizes peace and security worldwide.

“In fact, the Polisario is a terrorist organization, and I have introduced a bill to recognize it as such, because the existence of these terrorist groups contributes to destabilizing the world,” Wilson told reporters Tuesday on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly.

In June, the lawmaker submitted a bipartisan bill in June urging the US to officially classify the Algeria-based and backed group as a foreign terrorist organization.

The bill details the group’s ties with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah, its involvement in violent attacks against Moroccan forces, and its role in destabilizing both the Maghreb and the Sahel.

----------- MOROCCO WORLD NEWS

Rise In al Qaeda Attacks Revives Spectre Of West African Caliphate

Iyad Ag Ghali (R), the leader of Ansar Dine, an al Qaeda-linked Islamist group in northern Mali, meets with Burkina Faso foreign minister Djibril Bassole in Kidal, northern Mali, August 7, 2012. Ag Ghaly has positioned himself as the leader of a new Islamist coalition in West Africa, JNIM, formed in 2017. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

BY ANAIT MIRIDZHANIAN AND MOUSSA AKSAR

DAKAR, SENEGAL (REUTERS) - At dawn on June 1, gunfire shattered the stillness of Mali's military base in Boulkessi. Waves of jihadist insurgents from an al-Qaeda-linked group stormed the camp, catching newly deployed soldiers off guard.

Some troops, unfamiliar with the base, which lies near Mali's southern border with Burkina Faso, scrambled to find cover while others fled into the arid brush, according to one soldier, who spoke to survivors of the attack.

The soldier, who had completed a tour at the camp a week before, requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to journalists.

Hours after the attack, videos circulated online showing jubilant fighters from Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), stepping over the bodies of fallen soldiers.

JNIM claimed it had killed more than 100 troops and showed around 20 soldiers who said they were captured at the base. Reuters was unable to verify the claims independently.

The Boulkessi assault was one of more than a dozen deadly attacks by JNIM on military outposts and towns across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May and June. The insurgents claimed to have killed more than 400 soldiers in those attacks. Mali's military government has not commented on the toll.
Reuters spoke to five analysts, a security expert and a community leader in the region who said the surge in violence reflects a strategic shift by JNIM - a group founded by a veteran Islamist who rose to prominence by briefly seizing northern MJNIM is moving from rural guerrilla tactics to a campaign aimed at controlling territory around urban centres and asserting political dominance in the Sahel, they said.

"The recent attacks point a concrete effort to encircle Sahelian capitals, aiming for a parallel state stretching from western Mali to southern Niger and northern Benin," said Mucahid Durmaz, senior Africa analyst at risk intelligence group Verisk Maplecroft.

Attacks by JNIM left more 850 people dead across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in May, a rise from the average rate of killings of around 600 in previous months, according to data from U.S. crisis-monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

The surge in attacks in May and June marks one of the deadliest periods in the Sahel's recent history and underscores the threat posed by jihadist groups at a time when regional governments are estranged from former Western military allies, analysts say.

More than a decade of insurgencies in the Sahel has caused mass displacement and economic collapse. The violence has steadily spread towards coastal West Africa, straining regional stability and fuelling migration toward Europe.

On July 1, JNIM carried out simultaneous attacks on army camps and positions in seven towns in central and western Mali, according to an army statement and claims by the insurgents.

The army said 80 militants were killed. Reuters was unable to reach JNIM for comment. The group releases its statements and videos on social media, and has no media spokesperson.

Mali's army did not respond to Reuters requests for comments about the wave of JNIM attacks. It said in a statement after the Boulkessi assault that troops responded "vigorously" before retreating.
"Many soldiers fought, some to their last breath," the statement said.

STRATEGIC PIVOT

JNIM's leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, has been instrumental in its transformation.
A former rebel leader in Mali's Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s, Ag Ghaly led the fundamentalist group Ansar Dine that was part of a coalition of groups that briefly occupied northern Mali in 2012.
The militants imposed a harsh version of sharia law - banning music, imposing mutilations as punishment for crimes, and holding public executions and floggings.

Thousands fled, and cultural sites were destroyed, leaving lasting trauma in the region before the rebels were driven out by a French military intervention the following year. Ag Ghaly is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, who seized power between 2020 and 2023 on the back of the prolonged insurgencies, promise to restore security before returning their countries to democratic rule.

They've cut ties with Western nations and expelled their forces, blaming them for failing to end the insurgencies and turning instead to Russia for military support.

After deploying mercenaries, the Russians have also suffered setbacks and been unable to contain the uprisings.

In Burkina Faso — a country about half the size of France — militants exert influence or control over an estimated 60% of the territory, according to ACLED.

Ag Ghaly, who has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, has positioned himself as the leader of a jihadist coalition that includes al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina after they merged into JNIM in 2017.

A Western security source, who requested anonymity because he is not authorised to speak publicly, told Reuters that JNIM has emerged as the region's strongest militant group, with an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 fighters.

Ag Ghaly's goal, the analysts said, is to impose Islamic rule across the Sahel and extend its influence to coastal West Africa, a region twice the size of Western Europe, with a population of around 430 million people, many of them Christian.

In a rare video released in December 2023, he denounced the military governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and called on Muslims to mobilize against them and their Russian allies.
Ag Ghaly could not be reached for comment. The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger did not respond to requests for comment.

SOPHISTICATED TACTICS, LOCAL OUTREACH

JNIM's battlefield tactics have grown increasingly sophisticated, including the use of anti-aircraft weapons and drones for surveillance and precision strikes, Durmaz said.

It has amassed substantial resources, meanwhile, through raids, cattle rustling, hijacking of goods, kidnappings and taxes on local communities, the five analysts said.

While it has not appointed local administrators in areas under its control, JNIM has imposed a tax known as 'Zakat' for protection, according to two residents and a former militia fighter.

They have quelled some inter-communal conflicts and imposed a form of Sharia law, requiring women to wear veils and men to grow beards. But they have refrained from severe punishments, such as amputating the hands of thieves.

Heni Nsaibia, Senior West Africa analyst at ACLED, described its recent activity as a "step change".
He said JNIM seizing Burkina Faso's northern provincial capital Djibo, a town of over 60,000 people, on May 11 and Diapaga, an eastern provincial capital of around 15,000, two days later was unprecedented.

"In Djibo they stayed for 11 hours or plus. In Diapaga they remained for two-three days even. And that is very much something that we haven't seen before," Nsaibia said.
According to Nsaibia, the group has captured an estimated $3 million worth of munitions in Djibo alone.

The repeated attacks have left the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso unsettled, and idea of JNIM taking over Bamako or Ouagadougou, once considered far-fetched, is a plausible threat, according to Nsaibia.
JNIM's outreach to marginalized communities, particularly the Fulani, a widely dispersed pastoralist group, has been central to recruitment, the analysts said.

"JNIM is advancing its narrative as a defender of marginalised communities," Durmaz said. "They are not just fighting for territory — they're fighting for legitimacy."

Fulani have increasingly found themselves targeted by authorities across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso under the banner of counter-terrorism, a Fulani community leader told Reuters, requesting anonymity for safety reasons.

While not all Fulani are involved in armed groups, their presence is significant among insurgents in rural areas, driven more by frustration and lack of opportunity than ideology, the leader said.

JNIM's ambitions now stretch beyond the Sahel. The group has expanded its operations into northern Benin and Togo, and are threatening Gulf of Guinea states which they use as a rear base, according to analysts.

Both countries have deployed more security forces in the northern regions as insurgents ramp up attacks.
"Togo and Benin are the most vulnerable due to their limited counterterrorism capabilities, existing local grievances in their northern regions, and porous borders with Burkina Faso," Durmaz said.
($1 = 554.9000 CFA francs)

Additional reporting Robbie Corey-Boulet and Bate Felix Writing by Bate Felix

West Africa’s Worrying Albatross: ISWAP’s Emergence As Epicentre Of The Islamic State’s Jihadism

BY MALIK SAMUEL,
VANGUARD NIGERIA

A new infographic released by ISIS’s Amaq Agency over the weekend paints a revealing picture of the group’s global operations during the first half of the year. The data, drawn from across ISIS’s various wilayat (provinces), confirms a trend that has been developing over the past few years: the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has become the most active and lethal of all ISIS affiliates. With 215 reported attacks and 734 casualties inflicted, ISWAP’s attacks in Nigeria alone accounted for nearly 35 percent of all ISIS operations globally, and approximately 23 percent of all deaths and injuries attributed to ISIS during this period.

In Cameroon, ISWAP carried out 18 attacks that resulted in 135 casualties, while in Niger, ISWAP and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) were jointly responsible for 21 attacks that led to 233 casualties.

ISWAP’s emergence as the leading battlefield force within ISIS’s global network is not new or incidental. It reflects a calculated shift in ISIS’s operational geography and a strategic recalibration following the territorial collapse of the so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria. While the central command in the Levant has weakened, West Africa’s Lake Chad region has become an epicenter of insurgent vitality. In ISWAP-controlled spaces, ISIS has found fertile ground not only to conduct military operations, but also to project relevance, assert ideological continuity, and re-establish itself as a transnational movement capable of adapting to local conditions while staying loyal to global jihadist ideals.

The Amaq data shows that ISWAP not only conducted the highest number of attacks but also inflicted the most casualties by a single affiliate, outpacing affiliates in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This sustained tempo of violence underscores ISWAP’s advanced operational capabilities, which include coordinated raids, ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and strategic cross-border attacks into Cameroon and Niger. Since February 2025, ISWAP has been waging a coordinated campaign known as “The Camp Inferno”, aimed at targeting military bases across the Lake Chad Basin, particularly in Nigeria. Over the past five months, the group has successfully overrun 17 Nigerian military bases in Borno and Yobe states, inflicting significant casualties on government forces, destroying critical military infrastructure, and seizing a substantial cache of weapons and equipment.

Unlike ISIS remnants in the Middle East, ISWAP operates in an expansive theatre with access to cross-border sanctuaries, expansive local funding sources, and a large pool of foot soldiers drawn from diverse ethnic and national backgrounds across the Sahel.

A comparative review of the infographics from ISIS’s Amaq Agency for the first halves of 2024 and 2025 shows that while ISIS’s global operational output has declined, ISWAP has sustained a high tempo of attacks and lethality. ISIS recorded 788 attacks and 3,749 casualties globally in the first half of 2024, compared to 620 attacks and 3,193 casualties in the same period in 2025. Despite this drop, ISWAP carried out at least 246 attacks and inflicted 758 casualties in 2024, and at least 233 attacks with 869 casualties in 2025. These figures, drawn from Nigeria and Cameroon, where ISWAP is the sole ISIS affiliate, suggest the group’s performance has remained steady and even more lethal over time.

ISWAP’s share of global ISIS activity has continued to rise, accounting for 38% of all ISIS attacks and 27% of casualties in the first half of 2025. While attacks in Niger were also reported, ISIS did not distinguish between those carried out by ISWAP or the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), making attribution difficult. This means ISWAP’s real numbers may be higher than reported. The group’s ability to retain its operational momentum amid pressure from national militaries underscores its entrenched capabilities, cross-border coordination, and access to local recruitment channels and funding streams. Its cross-border activity, especially in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, marks the Lake Chad Basin as a centre of gravity in ISIS’s current global structure.

ISWAP’s consistent performance makes it the most active and strategically significant ISIS affiliate globally. Its attacks are not only militarily disruptive but are also critical to ISIS’s propaganda apparatus, feeding the narrative of an enduring jihadist movement. The group’s success further reinforces its role as a model for other affiliates across the Sahel and highlights West Africa’s transformation into the epicentre of global jihadist activity. This shift has profound implications for regional stability and demands a sustained and coordinated international response.

ISWAP’s battlefield prominence enables ISIS to maintain the appearance of a global jihadist force, even as it suffers attrition elsewhere. Every ISWAP operation is amplified by ISIS media outlets to show that the caliphate’s military machine is still active and potent. These visuals and statistics are not merely retrospective records; they are propaganda assets, carefully curated to boost morale, attract foreign recruits, and secure the allegiance of splinter groups or dormant cells in other regions. Through ISWAP, ISIS manages to bridge its declining core in the Middle East with a dynamic periphery in Africa.

Regional insurgency, global implications

The implications of ISWAP’s leading role extend beyond ISIS’s internal balance of power. For Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and the wider Lake Chad Basin, the group’s operational dominance represents an ongoing threat to national and regional stability. ISWAP’s attacks are no longer confined to military outposts; they increasingly target civilian infrastructure, disrupt local economies, and assert political authority in rural zones through taxation and shadow governance that portray it as the best alternative government. This sustained insurgency not only weakens state control, but also entrenches ISWAP’s legitimacy among vulnerable populations who see the group as a more reliable source of order or livelihood.

In the broader Sahelian context, ISWAP’s strength reinforces jihadist momentum across West Africa. Its successes over the years have served as a model for other ISIS affiliates, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and parts of Niger, where governance vacuums and security fragmentation provide fertile ground for expansion. Already, JNIM and the ISSP have entrenched themselves at the primary purveyors of insecurity in the Sahel. Furthermore, ISWAP’s role in projecting ISIS globally means that military victories against ISWAP are not only of local importance, but of global strategic significance.

As the Amaq infographics reveal, ISWAP is not just a regional actor. It has become the spearhead of ISIS’s global narrative, its operational vanguard, and the most important contributor to its survival as a transnational insurgency. This may help explain the influx of foreign fighters into the region, particularly into Nigeria, from a range of countries including Syria, Chechnya, Morocco, Algeria, and others. This reality demands a recalibrated international response, one that recognises West Africa and the Sahel not as a peripheral theatre, but as a central front in the fight against global jihadism. The response must go beyond military efforts to include disrupting ISWAP’s financial networks, blocking cross-border movements and the influx of foreign fighters, and preventing the recruitment of new combatants, particularly young boys, into the group’s ranks.

West Africa Terror: Why Attacks On Military Bases Are Rising – And Four Ways To Respond

A Senegalese peacekeeper and a UN armoured vehicle in Mali, 2021. Amaury Hauchard/AFP via Getty Images

BY OLAYINKA AJALA

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN POLITICS

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

LEEDS BECKETT UNIVERSITY

More than 40 Malian soldiers were killed and one of the country’s military bases was taken over in early June 2025 in a major attack by an al-Qaeda linked group, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), on the town of Boulikessi.

The same group launched an attack on the historic city of Timbuktu. The Malian army claimed it repelled the Timbuktu attack and killed 14 terrorists.

Terrorist groups have attacked Boulikessi in large numbers before. In October 2019, 25 Malian soldiers were killed. The target was a G5 Sahel force military camp.

Timbuktu has been in the sights of terrorist groups since 2012. JNIM laid siege to the city for several months in 2023. Timbuktu has a major airport and a key military base.

In neighbouring Burkina Faso, there have been running battles in recent months between the military and terrorist groups. About 40% of the country is under the control of groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Military bases in the country have also been targeted.

Mali and Burkina Faso are under military rule. Insecurity, especially increasing terrorist attacks, were key reasons the military juntas gave for seizing power in both countries.

I have been researching terrorism and the formation of insurgent groups in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. What I am observing is that the terrorist groups are becoming more daring and constantly changing tactics, with increased attacks on military camps across the region.

Military camps are attacked to lower the morale of the soldiers and steal ammunition. It also sends a message to locals that military forces are incapable of protecting civilians.

I believe there are four main reasons for an increase in large scale attacks on military bases in the region:

the loss of the US drone base in Niger, which has made surveillance difficult

an increase in human rights abuses carried out in the name of counter terrorism

a lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism

constant changes of tactics by the terrorists.

Identifying and addressing these issues are important to counter the trend.

Why are the attacks increasing?

First is the loss of the US drone base in Agadez, Republic of Niger, in 2024 after the military seized power in the country.

I was initially sceptical when the drone base was commissioned in 2019. But it has in fact acted as a deterrent to terrorist groups.

Terrorist organisations operating in the Sahel knew they were being watched by drones operating from the base. They were aware surveillance information was shared with member states. The loss of the base has reduced reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the region.

Second, an increase in human rights abuse in the fight against terrorism in the region is dividing communities and increasing recruitment into terrorist groups. A report by Human Rights Watch in May 2025 accused the Burkina Faso military and allied militias of killing more than 130 civilians during counter-terrorism operations.

The report argued that members of the Fulani ethnic group were targeted in the operations because they were perceived to have relationships with terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to use such incidents to win the hearts and minds of local populations.

Third, the lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism in the region is reversing the gains made in the last decade. Major developments have included the dissolving of the G5 Sahel. This grouping was created in 2014 to enhance security coordination between members. The members were Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Niger. The organisation launched joint counter-terrorism missions across member states but was dissolved in December 2023 after Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew.

The weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force due to the military coup in Niger and the countries’ strategic repositioning is undermining counter-terrorism initiatives. Task force members were Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin.

The mandate of the task force is to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating around the Lake Chad basin. After its establishment in 2015 the task force achieved significant progress. In January 2025, Niger suspended its membership, putting the fight against terrorism in the region in jeopardy.

Fourth, terrorist groups in the region are becoming more sophisticated in their approach. In April 2025, JNIM terrorists were suspected of launching a suicide drone attack on Togolese military positions.

For its part, the military in the Sahelian countries are struggling to adapt to the terrorists’ new tactics. In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of drones in Africa by states and non-state actors.

Halting the trend

To combat the increasing attacks by terrorist groups, especially large-scale attacks on military positions, four immediate steps are necessary.

First, nation states need to invest in surveillance capabilities. The loss of the drone base in Niger means Sahelian states must urgently find new ways of gathering and sharing intelligence. The topography of the region, which is mainly flat, with scattered vegetation, is an advantage as reconnaissance drones can easily detect suspicious movements, terrorist camps and travel routes.

There is also a need to regulate the use of drones in the region to prevent use by non-state actors.

In addition, countries fighting terrorism must find a way to improve the relationship between the military (and allied militias) and people affected by terrorism. My latest publication on the issue shows that vigilante groups engaged by the military forces are sometimes complicit in human rights abuse.

Training on human rights is essential for military forces and allied militias.

Terrorism funding avenues must be identified and blocked. Large scale terrorist attacks involve planning, training and resources. Funding from illegal mining, trafficking and kidnapping must be identified and eradicated. This will also include intelligence sharing between nation states.

Finally, the Sahelian countries must find a mechanism to work with the Economic Community of West African States.

As the numbers and intensity of terrorist activities are increasing across the Sahel, immediate action is necessary to combat this trend.

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At 10-Year Mark, US And Allies Weigh Future Of Islamic State Mission

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin listens to remarks by US President Joe Biden during a Cabinet meeting inside the West Wing at the White House in Washington, US, on 20th September, 2024. PICTURE: Reuters/Tom Brenner/File photo

BY PHIL STEWARD

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM (REUTERS) - Ten years to the day after the formal launch of the US-led operation against the Islamic State, the United States and its NATO allies gathered in Brussels on Thursday to discuss the future of a mission facing increasing headwinds.

Niger kicked out the US military from its counter-terrorism base in West Africa this summer. Afghanistan has been largely off-limits since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover. And Iraq wants the Pentagon to start reducing its personnel and end coalition operations there.

At the same time, American officials warn the global threat from Islamic State is growing in Africa and elsewhere, even as public attention has shifted to Russia’s war in Ukraine and expanding conflicts in the Middle East.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who helped launch the US-led coalition against Islamic State a decade ago as a four-star general, cautioned allies at NATO headquarters in Brussels that Islamic State was still a threat that required international attention.

“We’re tackling a range of key challenges, including bullying from the People’s Republic of China and Russia’s reckless invasion of Ukraine,” Austin said.

“But as we do so, we must not lose sight of the threat that ISIS still poses.”

Attacks in Russia, Iran

At the height of its powers, Islamic State claimed control over swathes of the combined territories of Iraq and Syria. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared his cross-border caliphate from the pulpit of Iraq’s historic al-Nuri mosque in 2014 and vowed to rule it.

Although territorially defeated in Syria five years ago, and seven years ago in Iraq, Islamic State has managed some high-profile attacks while trying to rebuild.

Most recently, those include an assault on a Russian concert hall in March that killed at least 143 people and two explosions in the Iranian city of Kerman in January that killed nearly 100 people

A 19-year-old Austrian suspected of masterminding a planned suicide attack on a Taylor Swift concert in August had vowed allegiance to the Islamic State militant group’s leader.

“It is a threat that is evolving,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said at the talks.

“There is an increase in lone-wolf attacks. Terrorists are increasingly using new technologies and the epicenter is moving southwards into the Sahel, a region which is now accounting for almost half of all deaths from terrorism.”

In Africa, jihadist groups with links to al-Qaeda or Islamic State have killed thousands of civilians and displaced millions in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

Experts say these conflicts in the Sahel are contributing to a sharp rise in migration towards Europe at a time when anti-immigrant far-right parties are on the rise and some EU states are tightening their borders.

“There’s been deliberate efforts [by Islamic State] to try to diversify not only their leadership but some of their combat power to Africa, to Central Asia,” a senior US defence official said.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the US strategy was to ensure the Sahel-based threat doesn’t spread south to Ghana, Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo and other countries in coastal West Africa.

It will not be easy. The United States is searching for a Plan B in West Africa after Niger’s ruling junta in April ordered the US to withdraw its nearly 1,000 military personnel.

In Iraq, an agreement between Washington and Baghdad will see the US-led coalition’s military mission end by September 2025, as Iraq turns to more traditional bilateral security partnerships.

The US defence official said the details were being worked out but “all expectations are the footprint will shrink” over the next year. But it is unclear what kind of US presence will remain in Iraq to support operations in Syria, which will continue.

Why West Africa Is Now The World's Terrorism Hotspot

Map shows violent attacks by jihadi groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2024. Burkina Faso appears as a hotspot, with the most attacks so far this year.

BY DAVID LEWIS, JESSICA DONATI AND KAYLEE KANG

DAKAR, SENEGAL (REUTERS) - Having slipped undetected into Mali's capital weeks ago, the jihadis struck just before dawn prayers. They killed dozens of students at an elite police training academy, stormed Bamako's airport and set the presidential jet on fire.
The Sept. 17 attack was the most brazen since 2016 in a capital city in the Sahel, a vast arid region stretching across sub-Saharan Africa south of the Sahara Desert.
It showed that jihadist groups with links to al Qaeda or Islamic State, whose largely rural insurgency has killed thousands of civilians and displaced millions in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, can also strike at the heart of power.
Overshadowed by wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and Sudan, conflict in the Sahel rarely garners global headlines, yet it is contributing to a sharp rise in migration from the region towards Europe at a time when anti-immigrant far-right parties are on the rise and some EU states are tightening their borders.
According to the U.N.'s International Organization for Migration (IOM), the route to Europe with the steepest rise in numbers this year is via West African coastal nations to Spain's Canary Islands.
IOM data shows the number of migrants arriving in Europe from Sahel countries (Burkina, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal) rose 62% to 17,300 in the first six months of 2024 from 10,700 a year earlier, a rise the U.N. and the IOM have blamed on conflict and climate change.
Fifteen diplomats and experts told Reuters the swathes of territory under jihadist control also risk becoming training grounds and launchpads for more attacks on major cities such as Bamako, or neighbouring states and Western targets, in the region or beyond.
Jihadi violence, especially the heavy toll it has taken on government troops, was a major factor in a wave of military coups since 2020 against Western-backed governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the countries at the heart of the Sahel.
The military juntas that replaced them have since swapped French and U.S. military assistance for Russians, mainly from Wagner's mercenary outfit, but have continued to lose ground.
"I don't really see the regimes in Mali, Niger and Burkina holding on forever. Eventually one of them is going to fall or one of them is going to lose a substantial amount of territory, which Burkina Faso already has," said Caleb Weiss, an editor at the Long War Journal and an expert on jihadist groups.
"Then we're dealing with a jihadi state or multiple jihadi states in the Sahel," he said.
GLOBAL TERRORISM HOTSPOT
Western powers that previously invested in trying to beat back the jihadists have very little capacity left on the ground, especially since the junta in Niger last year ordered the U.S. to leave a sprawling desert drone base in Agadez.
U.S. troops and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used drones to track jihadists and shared intelligence with allies such as the French, who launched air strikes against the militants, and West African armies.
But the Americans were booted out after they angered Niger's coup leaders by refusing to share intelligence and warning them against working with the Russians. The U.S. is still looking for a place to reposition its assets.
"Nobody else filled the gap of providing effective air surveillance or air support, so the jihadis are roaming freely in those three countries," said Wassim Nasr, a senior research fellow at The Soufan Center, a think-tank in New York.
A Reuters analysis of data from U.S. crisis-monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) found that the number of violent events involving jihadi groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has almost doubled since 2021.
Since the start of this year, there have been 224 attacks a month on average, up from 128 in 2021.
Insa Moussa Ba Sane, regional migration and displacement coordinator for the International Federation of the Red Cross, said conflict was a major factor behind the increase in migration from the West African coast, with rising numbers of women and families seen along the route.
"Conflicts are at the root of the problem, combined with the effects of climate change," he said, describing how floods and droughts are both contributing to the violence and driving an exodus from rural to urban areas.
In Burkina Faso, perhaps the worst affected of all, jihadists affiliated with al Qaeda slaughtered hundreds of civilians in a day on Aug. 24 in the town of Barsalogho, two hours from the capital Ouagadougou.
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) in Sydney said Burkina Faso topped its Global Terrorism Index for the first time this year, with fatalities rising 68% to 1,907 - a quarter of all terrorism-linked deaths worldwide.
About half of Burkina Faso is now beyond government control, the U.N. has said, a factor contributing to soaring rates of displacement.
"The two, big veteran terrorist (groups) are gaining ground. The threat is spreading geographically," said Seidik Abba, president of the CIRES think-tank in Paris, referring to al Qaeda and Islamic State.
A U.N. panel of experts that monitors the two organisations' activities estimates that JNIM, the al Qaeda-aligned faction most active in the Sahel, had 5,000-6,000 fighters while 2,000-3,000 militants were linked to Islamic State.
"Their declared goal is to establish Islamic rule," said Nasr of The Soufan Center.
Jihadists use a mixture of coercion and the offer of basic services, including local courts, to install their systems of governance over rural communities that have long complained of neglect by weak, corrupt, central governments.
"Come with us. We will leave your parents, sisters and brothers alone. Come with us and we will help you, we will give you money," said a man from Mali, describing his encounters as a teenager with jihadists who attacked his village. "But you can't trust them, because they kill your friends in front of you."
The young man fled and made it to the Canary Islands last year before moving to Barcelona. He declined to be identified fearing reprisal attacks on family members still in Mali.
LAUNCHPAD SCENARIO
The jihadi groups operate in different areas, at times fighting each other, though they have also struck localised, non-aggression pacts, reports by U.N. experts say.
The groups receive some financial support, training and guidance from their respective global leaderships, but also collect taxes in areas they control and seize weapons after battles with government forces, the reports say.
European governments are divided on how to respond to the conflict. Southern European nations who receive most migrants favour keeping communication with the juntas open, while others object because of human rights and democracy concerns, nine diplomats in the region told Reuters.
One African diplomat said the EU needed to remain engaged as the issue of migration was not going to go away.
Even if Europe were to agree a shared approach, it lacks the military capacity and political relationships to help because the Sahelian countries don't want Western input, the diplomats said.
"We do not have any influence in those countries on extremist groups," said General Ron Smits, head of the Dutch Special Forces.
The other major worry for Western powers is the potential for the Sahel to become a base for global jihad, like Afghanistan or Libya in the past.
"All these violent extremist organisations do have aspirations of attacking the United States," General Michael Langley, head of U.S. Africa Command, told reporters this month.
Other officials and experts, however, say the groups have not declared any interest in carrying out attacks in Europe or the United States as yet.
Will Linder, a retired CIA officer who runs a risk consultancy, said the attacks in Bamako and Barsalogho showed that efforts by the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso to shore up security were failing.
"The leadership of both countries really need new strategies for countering their jihadist insurgencies," he said.

How US Military Planning Has Shifted Away From Fighting Terrorism To Readying For Tensions And Conflict With China And Russia

BY ERIC RODENBACH

SENIOR LECTURER IN PUBLIC POLICY

HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL

President Joe Biden’s recent approval of a major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy highlights the attention the country’s national security officials are paying to Chinese ambitions for influence in the world.

As changes emerge in the types of threats facing the U.S., the American military adjusts its strategic focus, budgets and planning. For instance, after 9/11, the U.S. military refocused away from its Cold War emphasis on preparing for combat against a powerful nation – the Soviet Union – and toward fighting small terrorist and insurgent groups instead.

Over the past decade, the Pentagon’s efforts have shifted back to preparing for what officials call “great power competition” among the U.S., Russia and China.

The most important strategic shift that’s evident in planning for great power competition is a focus on deterrence. In classic military strategy, deterrence focuses on making an adversary believe they can never achieve their goals by military force, because the response would be overwhelming and decisive. The National Defense Strategy released in October 2022 – the document that articulates the nation’s goals, objectives and resource allocation for the next two years – explicitly recognizes the potential risk of tensions and open conflict with Russia or China, and it calls for “integrated deterrence” to prevent it. That means combined efforts from the military, intelligence and diplomatic agencies across the U.S. government.

The National Military Strategy – the military’s section of the overarching National Defense Strategy – lays out how the U.S. armed forces will contribute to that effort. As a former assistant secretary of defense and Pentagon chief of staff, I see that the military is focusing on three main goals to achieve integrated deterrence and prevent a conflict with Russia or China.

New operational plans

For the military, integrated deterrence means the armed forces will depend both on where forces are located and what they can do once they’re in action to influence adversaries’ decisions about when, where, how – and whether – to use military force against the U.S. or its interests.

In the shift away from counterterrorism toward preparation for a great power conflict, the Defense Department has developed new ways to deal with the fact that Russia and China, unlike small terrorist groups, can fight in the air, on land and at sea anywhere around the world – and online and in space, too.

First among those methods is what the Pentagon calls “dynamic force employment,” in which U.S. military forces are deployed rapidly around the world, without predictable rotation schedules. This approach can reassure allies facing threats from Russia or China.

For example, the U.S. has, at times, deployed as many as 10,000 troops to Poland. The troops are not permanently stationed there, but a continuous presence of U.S. forces keeps Russia guessing about the size and capabilities of the force and demonstrates a commitment to support nervous NATO allies in Eastern Europe.

Second is a shift of personnel and capabilities to what is called “multi-domain operations,” in which units with different missions across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace plan and train together. That way, they can be prepared to work closely together in actual conflicts.

This level of collaboration allows the nation to respond to threats in a variety of ways. For instance, challenges to American naval power on the high seas do not have to be met directly with corresponding naval action, but instead could be answered with cyberattacks or from space.

This approach might make the Chinese People’s Liberation Army think twice about launching military operations against Taiwan. Not only would the Chinese potentially face a fierce direct conflict, but U.S. cyber and space operations could also disrupt or destroy Chinese military communications, hindering their attack.

Investments in modernization

Recent research has shown that China’s investments in its military personnel and capabilities – particularly in air, naval and nuclear forces – have grown exponentially over the past two decades, to a level estimated at near parity with the United States. This has prompted the U.S. to modernize its own military’s corresponding capabilities. For the 2024 budget, the Department of Defense allocated a whopping US$234.9 billion for programs to support integrated deterrence, which likely represents a 10% increase over previous spending plans.

Some of this money will go to developing and acquiring F-35 fighter jets and building Columbia-class, nuclear-powered submarines. When the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific region, such as Japan, South Korea and Australia, deploy these planes and submarines, they will remind potential adversaries of American military power – which is itself a deterrent against foreign aggression.

Over the past 10 years, China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear weapon supply has alarmed senior policymakers in the U.S. Although then-President Barack Obama pushed countries to envision a world free of nuclear weapons, he approved the most expensive and significant upgrade ever to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In 2022, the Biden administration renewed a financial commitment to “field a modern, resilient nuclear triad” consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range nuclear bombers.

Advancing technology

In 2019, the Space Force was established as a separate branch of the armed forces and tasked with defending American space-based assets and upholding international law. Because of the importance of satellite communications to military operations and civilian life – including internet connectivity – the Space Force works closely with Cyber Command, the military organization charged with defending the nation against cyberattacks, to prevent malicious hackers from disrupting systems vital to the world, such as the Global Positioning System, widely known as GPS.

Recent intelligence indicates that China plans to conduct destructive cyberattacks against U.S. domestic critical infrastructure, including the electric grid, during any conflict. To counter those plans, Cyber Command continues to enhance its abilities to defend U.S. systems and companies against cyberattacks, as well as to conduct attacks against systems in other countries.

The Pentagon is also seeking to counterbalance China’s rapidly expanding military forces by using artificial intelligence software in a program called the Replicator Initiative. The effort seeks to build thousands of low-cost, AI-directed autonomous aircraft and boats that can be used in combat to “counter the (Chinese military)’s mass with mass of our own,” in the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks.

Integration with allies and partners

The U.S. military has also sought to strengthen alliances with other countries, especially over the past four years of the Biden administration.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine led NATO to expand its membership as well as the numbers and capabilities of troops available to the organization. The U.S. has reinforced its commitment to NATO, increasing troop deployments in Eastern Europe and support for European defense initiatives by committing nearly $3 billion in funding for additional fighter aircraft, air-defense batteries and munitions.

In Asia, around the Indian Ocean and across the Pacific Ocean, a vast region that the government often calls “the Indo-Pacific,” the U.S. has strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines by conducting numerous military exercises and increasing military assistance. Efforts like the annual Marine Aviation Support exercise are aimed at countering Chinese military and political influence.

The U.S. has also sought to strengthen its alliances with the U.K. and Australia, with a commitment to sell up to five conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to the Australian navy by 2030.

Collectively, the U.S. has combined all of these efforts into a coordinated approach seeking to avoid open conflict with China and Russia. But the work is not yet done: The global political and military landscape is ever-changing, and new security challenges are always emerging.

Grace Jones, a master’s student in public policy and research assistant at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, contributed research to this article.

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Why Russia Fears The Emergence Of Tajik Terrorists

BY RICHARD FOLZ

It has emerged that the four gunmen charged in the murder of at least 139 concert-goers at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall theatre were all citizens of the small post-Soviet nation of Tajikistan in Central Asia.

Does their nationality have anything to do with their alleged terrorism? Many Russians probably think so.

Tajikistan, a landlocked country of 10 million sandwiched between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and China, is the most impoverished of the former Soviet republics. Known for its corruption and political repression, it has chafed under the iron-fisted rule of President Emomali Rahmon since 1994.

There are estimated to be well over three million Tajiks living in Russia, about one-third of the total Tajik population. Most of them hold the precarious status of “guest workers,” holding low-paying jobs in construction, produce markets or even cleaning public toilets.

While Russia’s declining population has led to increasing reliance on foreign workers to fill such needs within its labour force, the attitude of Russians towards natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus region is generally negative.

It’s similar to the American stereotype about Mexicans so infamously expressed by Donald Trump in 2015: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”

Non-Slavs are systematically discriminated against in Russia, and since 2022 they have been disproportionately conscripted and sent to Ukraine to serve as cannon fodder at the front.

Tajik exclusion

As I have described in a recent book, few nations in history have seen their standing so dramatically reduced as the Tajiks have over the past 100 years.

For more than a millennium, the Tajiks — Persian-speaking descendants of the ancient Sogdians who dominated the Silk Road — were Central Asia’s cultural elite.

Beginning with what’s known as the New Persian Renaissance of the 10th century when their capital, Bukhara, came to rival Baghdad as a centre of Islamic learning and high culture, Tajiks were the principal scholars and bureaucrats of Central Asia’s major cities right up to the time of the Russian Revolution.

The famous medieval polymath Avicenna was an ethnic Tajik, as were the hadith collector Bukhari, the Sufi poet Rumi, and many others.

But as the most significant purveyors of Central Asia’s Islamic civilization, Tajiks were seen by the Bolsheviks as representing an obsolete legacy that socialism aimed to overcome.

The Tajiks were virtually excluded from the massive social and political restructuring imposed on Central Asia during the early years of the Soviet Union, with most of their historical territory, including the fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, being awarded to the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks who were seen as being more malleable.

Only as late as 1929 were the Tajiks given their own republic, consisting mostly of marginal, mountainous territory and deprived of any major urban centres.

Impoverished

Throughout the 20th century, the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was the most impoverished and underdeveloped region of the former Soviet Union, and it has retained that unfortunate status since independence in 1991.

From 1992-1997, the country was plunged into a devastating civil war that destroyed what infrastructure remained from the Soviet period. Since that time, Rahmon has used the threat of renewed civil conflict to vindicate his absolute rule.

The spectre of radical Islam emanating from neighbouring Afghanistan — where the Tajik population considerably outnumbers that of Tajikistan — has provided additional justification for Rahmon’s repressive policies.

In today’s Tajikistan even those with a university education find it almost impossible to earn a salary that would enable them to build a normal family life.

Disempowered and humiliated by the system, they are easy prey for radical Islamic preachers who give them a sense of value and purpose.

The added backdrop of financial desperation makes for an explosive cocktail: one of the suspects in the recent Moscow attacks reportedly told his Russian interrogators that he was promised a cash reward of half a million Russian rubles (about US$5,300) to carry out his alleged atrocities..

Terrorism as desperation?

Normal, sane human beings everywhere are horrified by terrorist acts regardless of how they are justified by their perpetrators, and the long-suffering people of Tajikistan are no exception.

But unfortunately, the conditions under which a small number of extremists can perceive the psychopathic murder of innocent civilians for cash or ideology as an attractive option show no signs of abating.

Russia’s laughable attempt to somehow link the Moscow attacks to Ukraine is a clumsy diversion from the consequences of its relations with Central Asia.

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How Moscow Terror Attack Fits ISIS-K Strategy To Widen Agenda, Take Fight To Its Perceived Enemies

BY SARAH HAMOUCH AND AMIRA JADOON

Russia is reeling from the worst terror strike on its soil in a generation following an attack on March 22, 2024, that killed at least 137 concertgoers in Moscow.

The attack has been claimed by the Islamic State group. And despite Russian authorities expressing doubt over the claim, U.S. officials told The Associated Press that they believed ISIS-K, a South and Central Asian affiliate of the terrorist organization, was behind the assault.

It comes amid heightened concern over the scope of ISIS-K activities following recent terrorist operations in countries including Iran and Pakistan. The Conversation turned to Clemson University’s Amira Jadoon and Sara Harmouch of American University – terrorism experts who have tracked the activities of ISIS-K – to explain what this latest deadly attack tells us about the organization’s strengths and agenda.

What is ISIS-K?

ISIS-K, short for Islamic State Khorasan Province, is a regional affiliate of the larger Islamic State group.

The affiliate group operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, although it has presence throughout the historical “Khorasan” – a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, along with other Central Asian countries.

Established in 2015, ISIS-K aims to establish a physical “caliphate” – a system of governing a society under strict Islamic Sharia law and under religious leadership – in the South and Central Asian region.

ISIS-K’s beliefs follow the ideology of its parent organization, the Islamic State group, which promotes an extreme interpretation of Islam and sees secular government actors, as well as non-Muslim and Muslim minority civilian populations, as legitimate targets.

The group is known for its extreme brutality and for targeting both government institutions and civilians, including mosques, educational institutions and public spaces.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K’s key objectives have been to diminish the now-ruling Taliban’s legitimacy in the war-ravaged nation, assert itself as the rightful leader of the Muslim community and emerge as the principal regional adversary to regimes it deems oppressive.

Moreover, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency group to a governing entity left numerous militant factions in Afghanistan without a unifying force – a gap that ISIS-K has aimed to fill.

Why was Russia targeted by ISIS-K?

ISIS-K has long framed Russia as one of its main adversaries. It has heavily featured anti-Russian rhetoric in its propaganda and has attacked Russia’s presence within Afghanistan. This includes a suicide attack on Russia’s embassy in Kabul in 2022 that left two Russian Embassy staff and six Afghans dead.

The broader Islamic State group has targeted Russia for several reasons.

They include long-standing grievances relating to Moscow’s historical interventions in Muslim-majority regions like Chechnya and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Russia’s partnerships with regimes opposed by the Islamic State group, notably Syria and Iran, have positioned Russia as a primary adversary in the eyes of the terrorist organization and its affiliates.

In particular, Russia has been a key ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, providing military support to the Assad regime against various opposition groups, including the Islamic State group.

This direct opposition to the terrorist group and its caliphate ambitions has rendered Russia as a prime target for retaliation.

Moreover, Russia’s cooperation with the Taliban – ISIS-K’s key nemesis in Afghanistan – adds another layer of animosity. The Islamic State group views countries and groups that oppose its ideology or military objectives as enemies of Islam, including actors who seek to establish relations with the Taliban.

By attacking Russian targets, ISIS-K in part seeks to deter further Russian involvement in the Middle East. But also, such attacks provide high publicity for its cause and aim to inspire its supporters worldwide.

As such, for the Islamic State brand, the Moscow attack serves as retribution for perceived grievances held against Russia, while also projecting global reach. This approach can provide significant dividends, especially for its South and Central Asian affiliate, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadist spectrum.

What does the attack tell us about ISIS-K capabilities?

The mere association of ISIS-K with this attack, whether it was directly or indirectly involved, bolsters the group’s reputation.

Overall, the attack signals ISIS-K’s growing influence and its determination to make its presence felt on the global stage.

Being linked to a high-profile attack in a major city far from its base in Afghanistan indicates that ISIS-K can extend its operational reach either directly or through collaboration with like-minded militant factions.

The scale and sophistication of the attack reflect advanced planning, coordination and execution capabilities. This only reaffirms unequivocally ISIS-K’s intent, adaptability and determination to internationalize its agenda.

Similar to ISIS-K’s attack in Iran in January 2024 that left over 100 dead, this latest atrocity serves to reinforce ISIS-K’s stated commitment to the broader global jihadist agenda of the Islamic State group, and helps broaden the appeal of its ideology and recruitment campaign.

How does this fit ISIS-K’s strategy?

The attack in Moscow serves as a powerful recruitment and propaganda tool by attracting international media attention to the group. This allows it to remain politically relevant to its audiences across South and Central Asia, and beyond.

But it also helps divert attention from local setbacks for ISIS-K. Like its parent organization Islamic State group, ISIS-K has been confronted with military defeats, loss of territory and leadership and diminishing resources.

In the face of such challenges, ISIS-K’s potential links to the attack in Moscow remind observers of its persistent threat and adaptability.

By targeting a major power like Russia, ISIS-K aims to project a broader message of intimidation aimed at other states involved in anti-Islamic State group operations and undermine the public’s sense of security.

Additionally, operations such as the Moscow attack seek to solidify ISIS-K’s position within the broader Islamic State group network, potentially securing more support and resources.

More broadly, the strategy follows a process of “internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda – something it has pursued with renewed vigor since 2021 by targeting the countries with a presence in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia, marking a deliberate expansion of its operational focus beyond local borders.

The Moscow attack, following the January assault in Iran, suggests that ISIS-K is intensifying efforts to export its ideological fight directly to the territories of sovereign nations.

It is a calculated strategy and, as the Moscow attack has exemplified, one that has the potential to strike fear in capitals far beyond ISIS-K’s traditional base.

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