Washington Killed An ISIS Commander In Nigeria, But Has More To Do In West Africa

BY SAMUEL BEN-UR

Nigeria’s Christians are among the most persecuted in the world. They face threats from Muslim Fulani herdsmen who have raided villages and killed hundreds of believers. They also face threats from terror groups known around the world for their brutality, such as Islamic State (ISIS), against which a significant victory was recently achieved.

In a joint operation on May 16, U.S. and Nigerian forces killed Abu Musab al-Minuki, a key figure in ISIS and its affiliate, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The Nigerian military described the raid as a “meticulously planned and highly complex precision air-land operation.” President Donald Trump called al-Minuki “the most active terrorist in the world,” and “second-in-command of ISIS globally.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put the matter in a different light: U.S. forces had hunted an ISIS leader “who was killing Christians.”

Al-Minuki’s death represents a major achievement in Washington’s ongoing campaign to stem the growing tide of Christian persecution and instability in Nigeria. While ISWAP is neither the only nor the most pervasive threat facing Abuja’s Christian community, killing al-Minuki represents tangible progress. To capitalize on this success, Washington should attend to all threats making Nigeria unsafe for Christians and other citizens alike.

Analysts dispute whether al-Minuki was truly ISIS’s global No. 2. What is not in doubt is that one of ISWAP’s most important commanders is dead. His network has helped make Nigeria one of the deadliest countries in the world for Christians.

Nigerian reporting tied al-Minuki to the February 2018 Dapchi schoolgirls kidnapping, when ISWAP terrorists abducted more than 100 students from the Government Girls’ Science and Technical College in Yobe State. Leah Sharibu, a Christian girl who reportedly refused to renounce her faith, remains in captivity and has become a symbol of Nigeria’s persecution crisis.

In December 2019, ISWAP released a video of its terrorists executing 11 blindfolded Christians in northeast Nigeria. The killers called the murders “a message to Christians all over the world.” The next year, ISWAP abducted and executed Ropvil Daciya Dalep, a Christian university student, declaring that Christians “must know that we will never forget their atrocities against us.”

ISWAP also carried out the Pentecost Sunday massacre at St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in 2022. Gunmen disguised as worshippers detonated explosives and opened fire during Mass, killing at least 40 people and wounding more than 100. In 2026 testimony before the Federal High Court in Abuja, a witness identified the attackers as members of an ISWAP-linked cell based in Kogi State, operating under the alias “Al-Shabaab,” and tied to the broader command network al-Minuki helped oversee.

To describe all this merely as “insecurity” is to miss the point. Nigeria’s Christians are not the only victims of jihadist violence. Muslims in the northeast and northwest have also suffered grievously at the hands of Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits, and other armed groups.

While organized Islamic terrorists may make headlines, they are not the greatest threat to Christians in Nigeria. Instead, the greatest threats facing Nigerian Christians are from militant gangs of Fulani herdsmen.

This is especially true in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where armed Fulani militant networks have attacked Christian communities in Benue, Plateau, and surrounding states. The Fulani are an ethnic group of about 25-40 million in West Africa, historically defined by cattle-herding. While many of them no longer practice pastoralism as a way of life, their group identity is still strongly associated with raising livestock. Land, water, grazing routes, and criminality all contribute to the anti-Christian violence perpetrated by some Fulani militants, and yet these factors do not tell the whole story.

Instead, as scholars of international religious liberty such as Baylor’s Paul Marshall have shown, there is a significant element of anti-Christian violence inexplicable by material explanations alone, something a commonly used phrase like “farmer-herder conflict” works to obscure.

In the case of the Plateau State Massacre in 2023, Fulani gangs killed nearly 200 Christian men, women, and children on Christmas Eve while reportedly shouting, “Allahu Akbar, we will destroy all Christians.” Policymakers and journalists should not hide behind sociological euphemisms to explain away attacks that have clear religious motivations.

The Nigerian government’s response has also often been a mix of incapacity and denial. Abuja resists the “Christian persecution” label even as it often fails to prevent attacks on communities and subsequently lies about the scale of and motivations behind massacres and kidnappings. Village communities complain that security forces arrive late or not at all.

In the northeast, ISWAP survives because it exploits weak governance, borderland sanctuaries, and inconsistent intelligence coverage. The result is a state that can sometimes strike terrorists but often fails to protect Christians from slaughter.

Increased cooperation between Washington and Abuja is a start, but Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s government must publicly and accurately diagnose the challenges facing its people. Killing al-Minuki wasn’t significant purely because he was an archterrorist. He also perpetrated atrocities, including the massacre of hundreds of Christians, though Abuja has yet to highlight this fact.

Nigeria’s Christians need a government willing to name their persecutors, protect their villages, rescue their children, prosecute their attackers, and accept help when its own capabilities fall short. The United States cannot solve Nigeria’s religious violence for Nigeria. But it can make clear that anti-Christian persecution is not a peripheral humanitarian concern; it is central to Nigeria’s security crisis and to America’s counterterrorism interests.

The United States should create a Nigeria religious-violence targeting cell inside the embassy in Abuja, linking State, Defense, Treasury, and intelligence officials working with trusted Nigerian civil society groups and church networks. Its job should be to map ISWAP, Boko Haram, Fulani militant, and bandit networks that attack religious communities. It can then identify commanders, financiers, arms suppliers, cattle-rustling facilitators, ransom brokers, and corrupt local officials, and feed that evidence into Treasury and State sanctions packages.

The State Department should also make any major expansion of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation contingent on Abuja producing a public, incident-level accounting of attacks on Christian communities, including listing the perpetrators, the religious identity of victims where relevant, security response times, arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

Al-Minuki’s death will not bring Leah Sharibu home or rebuild every burned church. But it proves the men who organize this violence can be found. The question is whether Washington and Abuja will treat that success as final—or as the beginning of a serious campaign to defend Nigeria’s most vulnerable communities.

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The Sahel Region Is Less Secure Than Ever: Foreign Forces Just Add To The Cycle Of Violence

French soldiers on patrol in Diabaly, Mali, 2013. Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images

BY NINA LILEN

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

LUND UNIVERSITY

Several of Mali’s major cities experienced coordinated attacks in April by a new coalition of jihadists and separatist groups.

As the coalition took over the town of Kidal in the north of Mali, images of Russian troops being escorted out of the town after negotiations were cabled out across global media.

Russia, now in the shape of Africa Corps and previously the Wagner Group, has been the Malian military’s external security partner since the beginning of 2022. It replaced French and European troops from the counter-terrorism operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. France had deployed a force of 5,000 troops from 2014 to 2022. European special forces numbered 1,000 between 2020 and 2022. Both missions were forced to leave as relations between France and the Malian junta grew tense.

The strategic realignment, from western and multilateral forces to Russian troops, expanded in the region. In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the French troops were expelled at the start of 2023, as 200 Russian troops moved in.

In the summer of 2023, the Malian authorities also kicked out the decade-old 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Niger’s junta, which took power the same year, followed suit and expelled the EU’s operations in the country six months later, before accepting a few hundred Russian troops.

During the past decade I have researched external security interventions in the Sahel and analysed their justifications, development on the ground, and consequences for political and security environments.

I conclude from my research that the external interventions have not stabilised the region. More than a decade after the first major interventions, the Sahel is more fragmented, militarised and violent than before.

Yet the persistence of insecurity also serves political purposes.

For military juntas, the jihadist threat justifies continued rule and repression. For Russia, the region has become a showcase for anti-western influence and security partnerships in Africa. For western actors, jihadist expansion, migration concerns and fears of regional instability are used as reasons for security engagement despite repeated failures.

The complex interactions between these actors have resulted in a continuous, strategic circle of violence, where civilians are the first victims.

On the ground

On the ground, interventions have often evolved in unpredictable ways through ad hoc decisions and informal interactions between local and external actors.

For example, they have shared logistical and medical assistance and intelligence.

More broadly, the external interventions strengthened militaries as political actors, reinforcing an already biased civil-military balance across the region.

“Security in the Sahel” became the moniker that framed the western and multilateral interventions in the region from 2013 onwards. Improving the capacities, capabilities and professionalism of the national security forces became the official objectives of these interventions, closely linked to the broader aim of defeating the jihadist insurgencies.

Framing the intersecting crises in the Sahel as a security issue also meant that security actors had the task of resolving it. The importance, status and budgets of the national militaries thus increased as the security situation deteriorated. A heavily tilted civil-military imbalance was the result.

As military officers took over power through coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a strategic realignment towards Russia began, to maintain military rule.

The Russian Wagner group allowed the newly installed juntas to entrench their power, while “deprofessionalising” the forces through harassment, attacks and massacres of civilians.

Research shows for example that civilian targeting accounted for 71% of the Wagner Group’s involvement in political violence in Mali between December 2021 and July 2022. This strategy of attacking civilians has made recruitment easier for jihadist groups. They could increase their ranks by exploiting grievances.

The latest attacks in Mali in April 2026 demonstrate the military junta’s failure, together with its Russian security partners, to contain the jihadist groups’ expansion.

They also reveal that Russia is in the country mainly to keep the military junta in power. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, reconfirmed the partnership with Russia after the attacks in spite of their failure on the battlefield.

The military leader needs regime maintenance more than ever, and the Russians need to be in the country for continued geopolitical influence on the African continent.

Conclusion

The result is that while all external actors claim to fight instability, the current regional order depends on continuing insecurity.

Stabilisation risks becoming less about resolving conflict than about managing insecurity in ways that sustain regimes, partnerships and geopolitical influence.

Foreign interventions, in combination with national actors’ ambitions, have helped to transform the region into a space of militarised regime survival, jihadist expansion and geopolitical competition between Russia and western democracies.

As military approaches have repeatedly proven insufficient to solve the intersecting crises in the Sahel, pressured military juntas may now be forced to negotiate with jihadist groups. That is likely to result in new, hybrid spaces of power and governance.

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Despite Massive US Attack And Death Of Ayatollah, Regime Change In Iran Is Unlikely

A group of demonstrators in Tehran wave Iranian flags in support of the government on Feb. 28, 2026. AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

BY DONALD HEFLIN

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE EDWARD

R. MURROW CENTER AND SENIOR 

FELLOW OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, THE

FLETCHER SCHOOL, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran. Iranian media reported Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Khamenei was attacked.

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran. The regime has enough depth to survive the death of several of its leaders. The thing to watch will be who winds up in the top jobs, hardliners or realists. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

This article was updated on Feb 28, 2026, to include confirmation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Ruled Iran With Defiance And Brutality For 36 Years. For Many Iranians, He Will Not Be Revered

A man walks past a mural depicting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (left) and late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (right) during a funeral ceremony for security personnel killed during anti-government protests, in Tehran, Iran, January 14 2026. Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA

BY ANDREW THOMAS

LECTURER IN MIDDLE EAST STUDIES,

DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, Iranian state media reported.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei was almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

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How Off-The-Shelf Drones Are Changing Jihadist Warfare In West Africa

BY MAKUOCHI OKAFOR

Jihadist groups are increasingly carrying out drone strikes in West Africa, raising alarm that they are building the capacity to wage a "war from the skies".

A leading violence monitoring organisation, Acled, has recorded at least 69 drone strikes by an al-Qaeda affiliate in Burkina Faso and Mali since 2023, while two Islamic State (IS) affiliates have carried out around 20 - mostly in Nigeria, which has been battling numerous insurgent groups for almost 25 years.

The latest drone attack took place in Nigeria's north-eastern Borno state on 29 January, when jihadists carried out a two-pronged assault - with multiple armed drones and ground fighters - on a military base.

The military said nine of its soldiers were killed in the attack by the Islamic State of West Africa Province (Iswap) - identified by Acled as the "most prolific" IS African affiliate in "drone warfare".

The jihadists tended to carry out strikes with "commercially available, relatively inexpensive quadcopter [unmanned] drones" that were "rigged with explosives", while also using them for reconnaissance and surveillance missions in preparation for ground attacks, Acled senior Africa analyst Ladd Serwat told the BBC.

Despite the fact that Nigeria's government tightly controls the import of commercial and hobby drones and prohibits their use without official permission, the jihadists were able to obtain them through their smuggling networks across the region's porous borders, said a Nigeria-based senior researcher at the Good Governance Africa think-tank, Malik Samuel.

"The growing use of armed and surveillance drones by violent extremist groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad region is deeply concerning, and it marks a significant shift," security analyst Audu Bulama Bukarti told the BBC.

"Drones lower the cost of conducting attacks, allow militants to gather intelligence with minimal risk and enable strikes on military targets that were previously harder to reach," he added.

According to Serwat, Iswap has carried out 10 drone strikes since 2024 in north-eastern Nigeria as well as in northern Cameroon, southern Niger, and southern Chad - all countries affected by the insurgency in Nigeria.

A similar number of drone attacks were carried out by another IS affiliate, the Islamic State of Sahel Province (ISSP), in West Africa, Acled data shows.

In its latest attack, ISSP carried out an assault on the international airport in Niger's capital, Niamey, and nearby military bases, also on 29 January, with the defence ministry saying that four military personnel were injured and 20 of the assailants were killed.

Serwat said that while some reports claim ISSP used mortars and RPGs, others suggest that the militants carried out a drone strike.

"If a drone was used, this represents the first time ISSP used an explosive-laden drone in Niger," he added.

The jihadist group that has used drones the most is the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Acled says it has carried 69 strikes in neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso, and one across the border in Togo.

"JNIM's drone programme has developed rapidly and spread across interconnected networks in Mali and Burkina," Acled's senior West Africa analyst Héni Nsaibia said.

Military Africa, an online defence industry source, reported that last February, JNIM had also used what are known as first-person view (FPV) drones - when the pilot has a live feed from the drone - to drop improvised explosive devices, made from plastic bottles, onto military positions in Burkina Faso's Djibo town.

"This marked a significant escalation, as FPV drones - small, agile, and often used in Ukraine - allow precise targeting," Military Africa reported.

Samuel said the jihadist groups were influenced and trained by foreign fighters to constantly adopt new methods - from making roadside bombs and suicide belts, they had now learned to turn "off-the-shelf" drones into weapons.

Drone attacks could reduce casualties among jihadists, while achieving greater "effectiveness" in hitting targets, Samuel said.

Acled analyst Nsaibia told the BBC that while the majority of JNIM's drone attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso had targeted the military and allied militias, some had also hit civilians, including markets in communities perceived as being aligned with government forces.

As for Iswap, it was known to have carried out only one drone attack that hit civilians - in June 2025, when two pastoralists were killed and one injured in northern Cameroon, Nsaibia said.

In a report last year, a researcher at the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies, Taiwo Adebayo, wrote that to combat the threat, West African armies needed to carry out "preemptive strikes" to destroy drone assembly and launch sites, and acquire more counter-drone technology, including jamming devices and air defence systems.

Otherwise, he warned, the jihadists could enhance their drone warfare capabilities and carry out "high-impact assaults" that could worsen instability in West Africa.

Senator Ted Cruz Slams US Officials For Avoiding Reference To Polisario Terror Links

BY SAFAA KASRAOUI

RABAT, MOROCCO  – US Senator Ted Cruz has sharply criticized administration officials for repeatedly avoiding any direct reference to the Polisario Front, despite documented links to the separatist group instigating terror activities that destabilize the region.

Cruz made his remarks during a Senate hearing on counterterrorism efforts in North Africa and the Sahel this week.

During the hearing, he pointed a rebuke to US officials for what he described as a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the Polisario and its links to terrorism.

He also noted a contradiction between praising Algeria as a “critical pillar of stability in the region” and vaguely warning of terrorist activity in the Sahel without naming the parties involved.

Algeria’s regime has been hosting, financing, arming, and sheltering the Polisario Front, a separatist group claiming independence in Western Sahara.

Several reports link Polisario’s involvement in terrorist activities.

In 2017, Morocco’s security services identified 100 Polisario members who are associated with ISIS.

In 2021, French authorities killed Adnan Abdu Walid al-Sahrawi, the leader of a terror group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

Al Sahrawi was also a former member of the Polisario Front.

Cruz also pointed out Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’s collusion with Polisiario.

“Iran is trying to turn the Polisario Front into the Houthis for West Africa, a proxy force capable of waging war to threaten regional stability and pressure US partners wherever Iran wants leverage,” the senator said.

He recalled Polisario’s work with Iranian “terrorist groups,” taking drones from the IRGC and moving weapons and resources around the region, including to other groups instigating terrorist acts.

“I believe they should be designated as a terrorist group, and I’ve drafted a bill to do so if there is no change in their behavior,” Cruz added.
For Cruz, the officials delivered nothing of substance

Senior Bureau Official Robert Palladino responded to Cruz’s question by repeatedly steering away from directly addressing the senator’s question.

Instead, he shifted to broader diplomatic language, conveying US’ commitment to achieve a lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

When Cruz pressed the official about the possibility of designating Polisario as a terrorist group, Palladino made similar remarks – stating the US is “constantly assessing threats to the American homeland.”

Cruz responded to Palladino’s remarks, insinuating that they were merely talking points that were “positively Shakespearean, full of sound and fury and yet signifying nothing.”

Another US official also made an indirect answer to Cruz’s questions, causing the senator to address the situation head-on.

Cruz also asked both officials if they received any instructions not to say anything negative about the Polisario Front, with both officials denying receiving such guidance.

“So you just decided to go down that road for the heck of it,” Cruz responded.
A history of Iran-Polisario links

Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, emphasizing that it received evidence about the collision.

It accused Tehran of providing Polisario with logistical support.

Iran and Algeria’s regimes denied the collusion, but Moroccan officials emphasized they received indications and satellite proof of training and equipment provision links between Tehran and the separatist group.

The situation prompted concerns in the international community, with officials from across the world urging their countries to designate Polisario as a terrorist group.

In September last year, US Congressman Joe Wilson described the separatist Polisario Front as a “terrorist organization” that destabilizes peace and security worldwide.

“In fact, the Polisario is a terrorist organization, and I have introduced a bill to recognize it as such, because the existence of these terrorist groups contributes to destabilizing the world,” Wilson told reporters Tuesday on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly.

In June, the lawmaker submitted a bipartisan bill in June urging the US to officially classify the Algeria-based and backed group as a foreign terrorist organization.

The bill details the group’s ties with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah, its involvement in violent attacks against Moroccan forces, and its role in destabilizing both the Maghreb and the Sahel.

----------- MOROCCO WORLD NEWS

Trump’s Framing Of Nigeria Insurgency As A War On Christians Risks Undermining Interfaith Peacebuilding

AILI MARI TRIPP

VILAS RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY

OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Nigeria “must do more to protect Christians,” a senior U.S. State Department official demanded on Jan. 22, 2026, during a high-level security meeting in the African nation’s capital, Abuja.

The comment followed an attack just days earlier in which more than 160 worshipers were kidnapped from three churches in Nigeria’s northern Kaduna state.

The security meeting came a month after the United States, in cooperation with the Nigerian government, launched an airstrike from a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf of Guinea on the northwest Sokoto state. During the Christmas Day incident, 16 Tomahawk missiles costing around US$32 million hit several locations the U.S. claimed were being used by extremist groups.

There were no verifiable casualties, although the strike did send a signal that the U.S. administration is willing to take military action when it is deemed necessary. President Donald Trump heralded the attack a “Christmas present” to Christians and later warned that there would be more strikes if the killings of Christians continued.

As a scholar of African politics, I know that calling the insurgency in Nigeria a persecution of Christians – as the U.S. administration has repeatedly done – is simplistic and ill-informed. Yes, Christians have been killed and kidnapped as part of the prolonged terrorism campaign by Boko Haram and other extremist groups. But so too have other groups in the country, including Muslims. Moreover, the religious identity of the victims masks other motives of the militant groups involved.

I recently carried out interviews in Maiduguri, Borno State – the epicenter of Boko Haram activities in northeast Nigeria – as part of research into interfaith efforts to counter threats from Islamic extremists. For many of those interviewed, the insurgency and violence have often served to unite Nigerians with different religious identities against a common enemy: the groups making their life a misery. The danger of Trump’s narrative of this being a war on Christians is that it could undermine such efforts to build cross-community trust.

A complex conflict

Since 2009 there have been 54,000 deaths related to the violence in Nigeria and the surrounding Lake Chad region, according to independent violence monitor ACLED.

The Christmas airstrike by the U.S. was in northwest Nigeria, targeting a small group of Lakurawa militants. But 85% of all incidents related to Islamic fighters in 2025 were in northeast Nigeria, according to ACLED.

Northern Nigeria is primarily populated by Muslims, in contrast to the whole of the country, whose 240 million people are split roughly 56%-43% between Muslims and Christians.

Many of those killed and abducted in the insurgency in the north have been Christian. But the exclusive focus on Christians by the U.S. administration overlooks the complex realities behind the violence in Nigeria, which incorporates not just extremist groups but also farmer-herder tensions, land and water disputes exacerbated by climate change, ethnic rivalries, poverty and organized criminal gangs referred to as “bandits.”

Boko Haram, which regards the Nigerian state as its main target, has killed both Christians and Muslims, as has the Ansaru, an al-Qaida affiliate. The Islamic State – West Africa Province, another major insurgency group, targets state forces and Christians.

While the most recent high-profile attacks have been on churches, Boko Haram also targets markets, mosques and homes. They are opportunistic attacks that don’t discriminate between Muslims and Christians.

To be sure, the Nigerian government’s response to the insurgency has been inadequate. But again, the reasons are complex and the result of a confluence of factors, including corruption in the security sector, negligence and the difficulty of targeting groups that employ guerrilla tactics outside of government control, which make them especially elusive. Political factors may also be at play, since elements within the Nigerian government may be complicit with northern politicians backing some of the land-grabbing and kidnapping bandits.

Even with these barriers, some progress has been made. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Boko Haram attacks have declined by 50% since 2014-2016, when they were most active, although rates have been increasing again since 2023.

Interfaith efforts

The Nigerian government itself has welcomed assistance from the U.S. targeting insurgents, but with the proviso that Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity be respected.

The concern is that military action on the part of the U.S. under the guise of protecting Christians in Nigeria could make matters worse. It risks exacerbating tensions within the country and giving credence to those in Nigeria and abroad who focus only on the killing of Christians for their own narrow purposes.

At the same time, it could undermine the efforts of civil society organizations and women’s associations, in particular, that have worked hard to build interfaith trust between Muslims and Christians to tackle the insurgency threat.

Some of these organizations, such as the Women of Faith Peacebuilding Network, have been at the forefront of the fight against militant groups. An interfaith movement founded in 2011, it now comprises over 10,000 Christian and Muslim women. It carries out vocational training and promotes interfaith dialogue and strategies to reduce conflict.

Following the abduction of over 300 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Chibok, Borno State, in 2014, a coalition of women’s rights organizations – comprising both Christian and Muslim members – mobilized to protest the kidnappings.

The Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria, or FOMWAN, is another organization that is actively engaged in interfaith initiatives nationwide. In a January 2024 interview, a FOMWAN member based in Maiduguri told me that the Boko Haram crisis has united women across religious divides more than ever before.

Maryam, whose name I have changed along with other interviewees to protect their identity, explained: “FOMWAN has been in existence for many years before the insurgency. And in our activities we had been teaching our Muslim women religious tolerance in Borno. But the insurgency has made us put more efforts into making sure there is religious tolerance among Muslims and Christians.”

A Christian evangelist preacher, Mary, told me that working together had significantly reduced the mutual fear and mistrust between Muslims and Christians. Before the rise of Boko Haram, interfaith collaboration between the two groups was low. But today, she noted, it is far higher.

“We came to understand that this set of people doing this killing are neither Christian nor Muslim. They’re working for selfish interests, not for religious interests. We now strategize and come together to work as one. The key issue to (the conflict) is poverty. The only solution is for us is to speak with one voice. That’s the only way for us to survive.”

‘Each other’s keeper’

The U.S. administration would, I believe, do well to listen to the voices of these Christian and Muslim peacebuilders in northern Nigeria who live with the daily threat of violence.

Their lived experience has informed an approach to Nigeria’s insurgency based on shared purpose that cuts across religious divides.

In the words of activist Mama Pro, when asked why she was so keen to build interfaith bridges in Northern Nigeria: “We are always each other’s keeper.”

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Nigerian Christians Respond To US Strike Targeting Terrorists

 

BY INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN CONCERN

Once again, there was a Christmas Day attack in Nigeria. Only this time, the jihadists themselves were targets. This is because the operation, carried out in northwestern Nigeria’s Sokoto state, was undertaken by the U.S. military in coordination with Nigerian authorities.

Indeed, there has been a vast and ongoing slaughter of Christians in Nigeria. And undoubtedly, many think the U.S. should go in “guns-a-blazing” or, at the very least, lay down some crippling economic sanctions.

While this viewpoint is understandable given the extent of atrocity and impunity, the situation is more complicated for many millions of Nigerian Christians who would have to continue living in their country long after the last foreign military strike.

“Truly, we wish we could handle this ourselves,” said “Daniel,” a Catholic in Nigeria’s Middle Belt whose name we changed to protect his identity. But he acknowledged that the authorities in his country, for whatever reasons, have not yet come close to meeting the challenge effectively.

In Daniel’s view, up to 90% of the attacks on Christians in his country are religiously motivated. And citing a recent massacre not far from his home, he said that President Trump’s “concern to assist the people in our region is good news to our region, and we want it as quickly as possible.”

Emmanuel Ochayi, a Christian pastor based in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, said that he has observed a variety of reactions to President Trump’s position on Nigeria.

“A significant number of Nigerian Christians welcome international attention,” said Ochayi, adding that many Nigerian Christians, particularly in rural communities, have “felt unheard and invisible” and that “their suffering does not receive the urgency it deserves.”

The flip side, as Ochayi related, is that “there is also genuine concern among many Christians that overt Western intervention could complicate matters.”

Ochayi believes that much, if not the majority, of year-round violence against Christians in his country “has a strong religious or ideological component, even when attackers frame [it] as land disputes or banditry.” At the same time, though, he described Nigeria’s security challenges as “deeply layered.”

He expressed his concern that “framing the crisis too narrowly in religious terms, especially by foreign powers, could inflame tensions between Christians and Muslims and harden extremist narratives.”

As tempting as it is for many people to bring marauding jihadists to fiery justice, the possibility exists that military strikes initiated by a foreign power could lead more people to Islamic extremism and its ever-present justifications for violence.

Even economic sanctions, if they are not sufficiently targeted, could pose severe problems: Many millions of Nigerians, Christians and Muslims, are already eking out a hand-to-mouth existence. Using sanctions as a blunt-force instrument could make their lives even more precarious.

And, as Ochayi pointed out, there is also the issue of “historical sensitivity to foreign involvement,” considering the nature of Africa’s colonial past.

Foreign intervention does not necessarily have to entail military intervention. It could also take the forms of “diplomatic pressure, human rights monitoring, and urging the Nigerian government to act decisively and impartially in protecting all citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity,” Ochayi said.

“What most Nigerian Christians I know desire is not external control, but responsible engagement,” Ochayi said. “They want the international community to support justice, good governance, intelligence sharing, humanitarian relief, and institutional reform — while respecting Nigeria’s sovereignty.”

The Christmas Day strike on jihadists was not a complete surprise. A report from mid-December 2025 said that the Nigerian government had given the U.S. permission to undertake strikes from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on terrorist groups, and that U.S. aircraft had carried out surveillance runs over jihadist strongholds.

“Andrew,” a Christian from northern Nigeria living in the U.K., said the majority of Christians he knows were encouraged by the Christmas Day strike on jihadists.

“I think they will stop attacking Christians if the strike is not just a one-off event,” said Andrew, who believes that “having more of such strikes against the jihadists will go a long way in preventing future attacks” against Christians.

Andrew said most Christians in his region “absolutely want Western intervention.” When asked about the possibility of Western intervention making things worse, he contended the situation was already appalling enough, pointing out that many people in his region have already seen friends and family members “beheaded like chickens” or witnessed “houses set ablaze with the family members all inside.”

“These are not just mere scenarios or fictions. Real people had to go through these things, and a lot are still going through them,” Andrew said, adding that his country’s government “seems to work better when they are under intense pressure.”

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

US Strikes On IS Targets In Nigeria May Only Fan The Flames Of Insurgent Violence

BY ONYEDIKACHI MADUEKE,

THE GUARDIAN

The response of Nigerians to the airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Sokoto state, north-western Nigeria are complicated. The rationale behind them has been widely opposed, but the strikes themselves have been welcomed.

The airstrikes were framed as a response to what have been described as genocidal attacks on Christians in the country. But the Nigerian authorities have consistently rejected this narrative, arguing that armed groups in the country do not discriminate based on religion, and that Christians and Muslims largely coexist peacefully. Ironically, it was Trump’s redesignation of Nigeria as a “country of particular concern” in November that deepened Muslim-Christian tensions. Many northerners, who are predominantly Muslim, blamed southern Nigerians for championing a narrative that ultimately resulted in US sanctions and international stigma.

The geographic and operational focus of the strikes has complicated the “Christian genocide” framing. Sokoto is the spiritual heartland of Islam in Nigeria, but armed violence in the area disproportionately affects Muslim communities. By contrast, attacks against Christian farmers are most prevalent in north-central states such as Benue and Plateau, where violence is often linked to armed Fulani herders rather than explicitly jihadist groups. The strikes targeted IS elements, not herder militias. While some reports suggest tactical collaboration between jihadist groups in the north-west and armed herders, the mismatch between the stated justification and the operational target raises questions about whether Washington fully understands the local drivers of violence it has labelled genocidal.

Despite there being opposition to – and confusion over – the rationale behind the strikes, they have been broadly welcomed, cutting across religious, ethnic and social divides. Earlier fears were shaped by the spectre of the prolonged US occupations in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, cases frequently cited in Nigerian media. By contrast, the Sokoto operation was a limited, targeted precision strike. Moreover, there have so far been no credible reports of civilian casualties, alleviating a major concern in a country where Nigerian air force operations have, on several occasions, accidentally killed hundreds of civilians.

The strikes against IS came at a time of public fatigue with insecurity caused by insurgency, terrorism, banditry and communal violence. Nigerians were ready to accept almost any intervention that promised relief. As terrorist networks become increasingly interconnected across the Sahel and West Africa, Nigerian security forces have become overstretched. Persistent corruption, inadequate training and equipment shortages continue to undermine counterinsurgency efforts. In some theatres, groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter factions now wield more sophisticated weaponry than state forces.

The Nigerian authorities have confirmed that they endorsed the operation. The minister of foreign affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, acknowledged that Abuja provided intelligence that enabled the strikes and Nigerian officials remained in communication with US forces until minutes before execution. This joint counter-terrorism action, rather than a unilateral violation of Nigerian sovereignty, eased concerns about territorial integrity and external military overreach.

Despite the support, Nigeria’s insecurity will not be resolved through airpower alone. Airstrikes may yield short-term tactical gains, but they risk generating longer-term strategic setbacks. Framing the intervention as the defence of persecuted Christians may strengthen extremist narratives of foreign “crusader” aggression, potentially attracting more external funding and support for jihadist groups. Organisations such as Isis-Sahel and emerging groups such as Lakurawa thrive on such symbolism.

The durable solution lies in starving violence of its fuel by addressing its structural drivers: deep socioeconomic inequality (Sokoto has one of the highest numbers of out-of-schoolchildren in Nigeria), desertification and climate stress, weak state presence in rural areas, porous borders and fragile security institutions. Strengthening state capacity to manage grievances, regulate competition over land and resources, and counter extremism remains the only sustainable path to peace.

Nigerian Christians Afraid To Gather As Attacks By Islamist Herders Mount

BY TONY ONYULO

LAGOS, NIGERIA (RNS) — Ruth Abah, 28, no longer walks to her local church, St. Paul’s, which now lies in ashes. Instead, the mother of two locks her doors and prays with her children, fearful the next attack could come at any moment.

On Aug. 11, suspected Fulani herdsmen stormed the compound of the Catholic church in the village of Aye-Twar, in central Nigeria, setting the church, rectory and parish offices ablaze along with vehicles and other property. Earlier raids had already forced the parish’s 26 outstations to shut down.

The latest assaults have sent the remaining residents fleeing into the bush, leaving the parish grounds and surrounding community eerily deserted.

The destruction of St. Paul’s is a stark sign of how attacks by Fulani “jihadists” is hollowing out once-thriving Christian communities across the region. Known as Nigeria’s “food basket,” Benue state has become a center of the violence that has left thousands dead this year.

“I used to be in church every Sunday, singing in the choir,” Abah said in a phone interview. “Now I keep the doors locked. If I hear voices shouting at night, I pray silently. If they see me walking to church with a Bible, they could kill me.”

A new report by the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law, known as Intersociety, paints a grim picture. In the first seven months of 2025 alone, Islamist groups killed 7,087 Christians and abducted 7,800 others because of their faith. The country now sees an average of 30 Christians killed every day, making Nigeria the most dangerous place in the world to be a Christian.

Emeka Umeagbalasi, lead researcher and chair of Intersociety, described the situation as a “brutal massacre” of “defenseless Christians” and warned that unchecked killings and abductions are wiping out entire communities.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation with more than 236 million people, has been plagued by Islamist violence for more than a decade, particularly in its northern and central regions. The insurgency began with Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group that launched an armed campaign in 2009 to establish a caliphate and enforce a strict interpretation of Shariah.

The group gained international notoriety in 2014 after abducting 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, sparking the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign. Though weakened by military offensives, Boko Haram splintered, and its more brutal faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province, continues to carry out mass killings, kidnappings and church burnings.

Christians, who make up about half of Nigeria’s population, have borne the brunt of the violence, especially in the region called the Middle Belt, where Muslim herders and largely Christian farming communities clash over land and resources. Armed Fulani militias — some linked to jihadist groups — increasingly target villages, pastors and churches, displacing communities and leaving farmlands abandoned.

“The attacks are strategic,” said Peter Akachukwu, a security analyst in Lagos. “Targeting Christians sows fear, displaces communities and opens up land for occupation. It destabilizes the state and undermines faith in government protection.”

Across Nigeria’s Middle Belt and northern states, congregations at Sunday services are shrinking. Families who once filled pews now pray quietly at home, afraid of becoming the next victims. Some travel long distances to find safer congregations; others have stopped attending altogether.

Pastor Emmanuel Ochefu, who leads a small Pentecostal church outside Makurdi in Benue state, said in a phone interview that attendance has dropped by more than half this year.

“People call me during the week asking if the service will be safe, if the roads are clear,” he said. “Some decide to stay home rather than risk being kidnapped or attacked. I preach hope, I preach courage, but fear is stronger than my words right now.”

To keep worship alive, Ochefu has shortened services, started holding them earlier in the day and shifted some meetings to private homes. He sends recorded sermons and Bible verses by phone to members too scared to attend. “But church is meant to be together,” he said. “You can’t hug someone through a phone.”

Church leaders say the Aug. 11 assault was not just an attack on property but an assault on faith itself.

In a statement, the Nigeria Catholic Diocesan Priests’ Association condemned the attack as “barbaric” and “an attack on the Church,” saying it led to the “desecration and destruction of the Parish Church, the Parish Secretariat, the Father’s House and many other valuable items.”

They urged the government to rebuild the parish and its outstations and to deploy security forces to protect vulnerable communities, warning that continued inaction could lead to more deaths and displacements, further weakening Christian presence in the region.

The violence is reshaping what it means to be Christian in Nigeria. Believers now hide crosses, avoid public prayer and strip Christian symbols from their cars and homes.

“If I stopped being Christian, maybe my life would be easier,” Abah said. “But I cannot. My mother taught me this faith, and my children sleep under crosses. Faith is everything, but faith is heavy now.”

The Nigerian government insists the violence is driven by ethnic and land-use conflicts rather than religion alone, but human rights groups argue Christians are targeted specifically for their faith and are urging stronger protections, faster response times and accountability for perpetrators.

For now, pastors like Ochefu keep showing up, even if only a handful gather. “Even if just 10 people come next Sunday, I will preach,” he said. “The church is not just a building. As long as one believer remains, there is hope.”