The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa
Russia has expanded its footprint in Africa in recent years. In the wake of a wave of coups since 2020, Russia used social media disinformation to stoke anti-French sentiment and offer military aid to become the security partner of choice for a number of regimes, most notably the members of the new Sahel Alliance formed in 2023 by juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. By 2024, Russian mercenary forces had established a clear presence in six countries.
As 2025 draws to a close, it is easy to be pessimistic about the future of democracy, counter-terrorism, and Western influence in Africa. In July, French forces withdrew from Senegal, marking the end of France’s permanent military presence in West Africa. French forces had already been kicked out of Mali (August 2022), Burkina Faso (February 2023), Niger (December 2023), Chad (January 2025), and the Ivory Coast (February 2025). France’s new Command for Africa (CPA) only has a military base in Djibouti, and some forces in Gabon have left the continent. Likewise, European-manned UN peacekeepers in Mali left in December 2023, while U.S. forces were forced to withdraw from expensive and recently U.S.-constructed bases in Niger by September 2024.
However, we may already be nearing “peak Russia” in Africa. If it took over a decade for most of the Sahel region to reject Western — and especially French — security assistance amidst rising post-Arab Spring insurgencies, it may take much less time to expose the failure of Russia’s growing mercenary forces in Africa and the costs of relying on Russia as a security guarantor.
Not only have Russian forces proved unable to quell domestic instability in most places they operate, but they have also left a trail of human rights abuses and exacerbated local grievances in the process. Africa is now the global epicenter of jihadist terrorism, accounting for over half of all terrorist casualties globally. With most Western forces expelled, it will become harder over time to blame Western ‘neo-colonial’ failures – above all dependence and alleged exploitation by former Western colonizers – for tomorrow’s sorry state of security.
Russian clients in the region appear shaky. In Mali, an ongoing blockade is threatening stability and testing the staying power of the military junta. Moscow’s image as a credible alternative to Western partners has already suffered. Russia’s popularity in the region will likely continue to drop in coming years as it struggles to resource operations and effectively counter terrorism.
The real question is not whether but how quickly Russia’s weaknesses as a primary security partner will be exposed. With Russia’s economy under pressure and a costly stalemate in Ukraine continuing, how long can Russia’s Africa Corps sustain its efforts? To gain insight into these questions, we briefly survey Russia’s recent growing military footprint in Africa, and then offer policymakers signposts or indicators that Russian forces may be ripe to fail in Africa.
The Evolution of Russia’s Footprint in Africa
Russia’s security influence in Africa has waxed and waned over time. According to our calculations using the formal bilateral influence capacity (FBIC) dataset, the Soviet Union saw its security influence capacity increase mightily during the first three decades of the Cold War. It then declined sharply in the 1980s as Soviet forces were exhausted in Afghanistan and collapsed with the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. In the decades since, Russian security influence has partially rebounded (see Figure 1A). By 2024, Russia had the least economic influence capacity in Africa among major powers (see Figure 1). However, Russia and China had the most significant security influence capacity on the continent – a function of arms sales and military aid (FBIC data also underestimates Russian influence due to mercenary deployments).
Russia’s unbalanced engagement in Africa reflects its state capture strategy, whereby regime protection services are offered in exchange for access to illicit markets and natural resources. Whereas China has made significant economic investments in Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s engagement is far more transparently extractive and is a source of revenue. For example, Russia’s exploitation of gold mines, particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), has helped Moscow weather Western sanctions and help fund its conflict in Ukraine.
The Wagner Group was first observed in eastern Ukraine in 2014, fighting alongside pro-Russian separatists, but its intervention in Africa was still a few years away. Wagner’s initial endeavors into Africa can be traced to the Central African Republic, Libya, and Sudan—conflicts that Moscow exploited to test its reach and capabilities on the continent, starting as early as 2017.
Over the next several years, the Wagner Group made a name for itself as it offered African countries security assistance and an alternative to Western partners (principally France and secondarily the U.S.). Eventually, the Wagner Group grew its clientele to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, countries fighting extremism that have rebuffed Western assistance in exchange for military support from the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps. Moscow is actively deepening relationships with Chad and Senegal and trying to court other regimes.
After years of denials, in 2023, Putin admitted Wagner forces had operated at Moscow’s behest. The Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s subsequent death triggered Wagner’s rebrand and partial replacement with Africa Corps, now supervised by Russian military intelligence, with 70-80% of staff being Wagner veterans. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria briefly imperiled Russia’s access to the base at Khmeimim in Latakia, which is a crucial refueling hub for Russian supply lines to its forces in Africa, as well as its naval base at Tartus. However, flights resumed last month, and Russia is negotiating to keep access to the two bases.
In 2025, the Russian Wagner Group, or the Africa Corps armed forces are deployed in the CAR, Libya, Sudan, the Sahel Alliance states, and Equatorial Guinea. At the same time, African citizens – motivated by higher pay and bonuses – are being recruited to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
Central African Republic
In the CAR, Russia provided an elite security service to keep the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadera afloat. Wagner forces waged a violent war that also killed civilians and non-combatants, but entrenched information operations convinced many Central Africans that Russia brought stability and peace. Last December, a bronze statue of now-deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin and his right-hand man, Dmitry Utkin, was unveiled in Bangui. In return, Moscow inserted itself into an illicit fuel supply chain in the CAR and earned practically exclusive rights to the gold mines. Russia was able to extract $2.5 billion from gold mines alone in 2022. This early success led to additional invitations from other actors seeking armed Russian muscle.
Libya
In Libya, the Wagner Group has supported Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The Wagner Group, among other ventures, provided intelligence, advised security forces, and helped Haftar build credibility throughout the country—in part, likely because Wagner is behind a massive media effort to glorify him. Earlier this year, Russia transferred military equipment to al-Khadim and Matan al-Sarra bases in Libya when access to its Syrian bases was in doubt. Yet continued Russian access is predicated on the continued power of Libya’s eastern warlord, and would be undermined by moves towards political and national reconciliation.
Sudan
In Sudan, Wagner had trained troops for both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since 2018. After civil war erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, the group initially backed the RSF, which had been instrumental in enabling access to gold mines for smuggling. However, in the spring of 2024, Wagner shifted its support to the SAF in exchange for weapons for the ability to establish a naval base on the geopolitically valuable Red Sea coast. The United States has accused Wagner of avoiding exclusive support and funding both warring groups. In November 2025, the Kremlin announced the suspension of its prior plan for a naval base in Port Sudan due to increasing domestic instability, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service.
The Sahel Alliance Countries
Since 2020, Russia has continued to ride the populist anti-colonial sentiment that is being driven by “opportunistic illiberal regimes” in the Sahel. In particular, the post-coup regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have used Russian forces as a form of regime-proofing.
Mali. In 2019, Mali’s government signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia, which saw Bamako receive several attack helicopters and weapons as part of the deal, opening the door for Russia’s involvement in the Sahelian nation. Following a coup in 2020, the Wagner Group arrived in Mali at the new junta’s request. Since its arrival, Wagner has built up its presence near the airport in Bamako. By summer 2025, the Wagner Group announced its mission in Mali was coming to an end, as the first Africa Corps units arrived in January 2025 and assumed more responsibilities. Despite keeping the junta afloat, resentment within Mali’s military reportedly grows in part due to preferential treatment for Russian mercenaries. Popular unrest grows at the inability of the Africa Corps to reliably break a terrorist fuel blockade into Bamako in recent months.
Burkina Faso. After coming to power in a September 2022 coup, the new Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré’ forced French forces out and hailed Russia as a “strategic ally.” The former junta leader, Lt. Col. Paul Henri Sandaogo, had reportedly resisted recommendations to ally with Russia. The first Africa Corps personnel arrived in late 2023. Despite Africa Corps’ presence, terrorist violence has only escalated, with the country becoming the world’s worst-hit country according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. Some 60% of the country remains under the control of jihadists, whom some worry may be able to conquer Ouagadougou.
Niger. Following a coup in July 2023, members of Africa Corps deployed in Niger in December 2023, the same month that French forces departed the country. The following year, U.S. forces left Niger after extensive discussions with the junta, leaving behind its $110 million base. After Niger’s junta called for US troops to leave, Russian troops, in low numbers, were deployed in May 2024 to an airbase that previously saw American personnel. Niger now ranks fifth in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, just one spot behind Mali.
Equatorial Guinea
In November 2024, approximately 200 Africa Corps troops deployed to Equatorial Guinea to help defend the regime of long-time personalist strongman Teodoro Obiang. The first public demonstration of Russian military force in the country occurred on 9 May 2025 as part of Victory Day celebrations in Malabo, with over 40 Russian soldiers participating.
Three Signposts for Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa
How will we know when the tide has turned against Russia in Africa? These three signposts will be signals for Western democracies that they may have opportunities to re-engage and seek to restore security cooperation conditional on basic commitments to human rights and democracy.
Signpost 1: Anti-Russian/regime protest and regime change in client states.
Popular support for military rule in the Sahel alliance from Mali to Niger can only decline as these Russian-backed regimes fail to tame the insurgencies that are their raison d’être, continue to perpetrate human rights abuses (and endorse abuses by Russian forces), and refuse to hold elections or return to civilian rule. Despite democratic backsliding in the region, support for democracy continues to be robust across most of Africa. This is unlikely to change. Rising mobilization against repression in the Sahel of the kind seen in Latin America, protesting military abuses during the “dirty wars” in the late 1970s and 1980s, is the first sign of Russian trouble.
These earliest warning signs are already starting to appear. This past April, in the CAR, thousands protestedagainst Touadera’s plans to run for a third presidential term with Wagner backing. Pro-democracy protests broke in Mali this past May, even before the recent blockade has only revealed the growing fecklessness of the Russian-backed junta led by Assimi Goita. Russian-backed regimes may become new targets of Gen Z protests spreading on the continent.
Signpost 2: Russia is asked to draw down troops or is forced to give pressure outside Africa.
This would be a more concrete sign of imminent Russian failure, though whether it occurs voluntarily or is compelled (like the French before them) remains to be seen. The Russian economy may continue to cool in 2026. Given mounting losses in Ukraine and uncertainty over whether U.S.-brokered peace diplomacy will be successful, Russia may be forced to retrench some of its global commitments going forward. This is precisely what happened in the 1980s as Soviet economy faltered and resources were depleted in a stalemated war in Afghanistan; the Soviets were forced to reduce economic and military aid to clients from Angola to Ethiopia.
As the Russian forces’ ruthless image crumbles (as it has recently in Mali), tottering regimes may seek to bring in more Russian forces, not less. That escalatory cycle in the short run cannot and won’t last forever. As the imbalance of power between Moscow and its partners begins to level (at least to some degree), this raises the possibility that various countries, currently in the pocket of Moscow, will become more discriminating in their view of Russian support.
Signpost 3: Openness to Western terms of cooperation increases.
Western setbacks may be temporary, particularly outside the Sahel alliance. Though U.S. forces had to withdraw from Chad briefly in 2024, they returned last September. Some West African littoral countries remain open to cooperation with Western security partners. For example, Nigeria has recently announced that it will seek France’s, not Russia’s, counter-insurgency aid.
Whatever the proximate cause, the Wagner memorial statues will come down eventually, and with them, Russian influence across the continent. The United States and its allies must be patient, but must move quickly when the opportunity presents itself to cooperate with re-democratizing partners. Only once pro-Russian regimes die or show a willingness to reform should a containment strategy in the African Sahel shift to one of active engagement and partnership.
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