Despite Massive US Attack And Death Of Ayatollah, Regime Change In Iran Is Unlikely

A group of demonstrators in Tehran wave Iranian flags in support of the government on Feb. 28, 2026. AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

BY DONALD HEFLIN

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE EDWARD

R. MURROW CENTER AND SENIOR 

FELLOW OF DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, THE

FLETCHER SCHOOL, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran. Iranian media reported Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Khamenei was attacked.

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran. The regime has enough depth to survive the death of several of its leaders. The thing to watch will be who winds up in the top jobs, hardliners or realists. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

This article was updated on Feb 28, 2026, to include confirmation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Ruled Iran With Defiance And Brutality For 36 Years. For Many Iranians, He Will Not Be Revered

A man walks past a mural depicting Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (left) and late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (right) during a funeral ceremony for security personnel killed during anti-government protests, in Tehran, Iran, January 14 2026. Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA

BY ANDREW THOMAS

LECTURER IN MIDDLE EAST STUDIES,

DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, Iranian state media reported.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei was almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

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The Greatest Risk Of AI In Higher Education Isn’t Cheating – It’s The Erosion Of Learning Itself

Growing sophistication and autonomy of technology systems means that scientific research can increasingly be automated, potentially leaving people with fewer opportunities to gain skills practicing research methods. NurPhoto/Getty Images

BY NIR EISIKOVITS AND JACOB BURLEY

Public debate about artificial intelligence in higher education has largely orbited a familiar worry: cheating. Will students use chatbots to write essays? Can instructors tell? Should universities ban the tech? Embrace it?

These concerns are understandable. But focusing so much on cheating misses the larger transformation already underway, one that extends far beyond student misconduct and even the classroom.

Universities are adopting AI across many areas of institutional life. Some uses are largely invisible, like systems that help allocate resources, flag “at-risk” students, optimize course scheduling or automate routine administrative decisions. Other uses are more noticeable. Students use AI tools to summarize and study, instructors use them to build assignments and syllabuses and researchers use them to write code, scan literature and compress hours of tedious work into minutes.

People may use AI to cheat or skip out on work assignments. But the many uses of AI in higher education, and the changes they portend, beg a much deeper question: As machines become more capable of doing the labor of research and learning, what happens to higher education? What purpose does the university serve?

Over the past eight years, we’ve been studying the moral implications of pervasive engagement with AI as part of a joint research project between the Applied Ethics Center at UMass Boston and the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. In a recent white paper, we argue that as AI systems become more autonomous, the ethical stakes of AI use in higher ed rise, as do its potential consequences.

As these technologies become better at producing knowledge work – designing classes, writing papers, suggesting experiments and summarizing difficult texts – they don’t just make universities more productive. They risk hollowing out the ecosystem of learning and mentorship upon which these institutions are built, and on which they depend.

Nonautonomous AI

Consider three kinds of AI systems and their respective impacts on university life:

AI-powered software is already being used throughout higher education in admissions review, purchasing, academic advising and institutional risk assessment. These are considered “nonautonomous” systems because they automate tasks, but a person is “in the loop” and using these systems as tools.

These technologies can pose a risk to students’ privacy and data security. They also can be biased. And they often lack sufficient transparency to determine the sources of these problems. Who has access to student data? How are “risk scores” generated? How do we prevent systems from reproducing inequities or treating certain students as problems to be managed?

These questions are serious, but they are not conceptually new, at least within the field of computer science. Universities typically have compliance offices, institutional review boards and governance mechanisms that are designed to help address or mitigate these risks, even if they sometimes fall short of these objectives.

Hybrid AI

Hybrid systems encompass a range of tools, including AI-assisted tutoring chatbots, personalized feedback tools and automated writing support. They often rely on generative AI technologies, especially large language models. While human users set the overall goals, the intermediate steps the system takes to meet them are often not specified.

Hybrid systems are increasingly shaping day-to-day academic work. Students use them as writing companions, tutors, brainstorming partners and on-demand explainers. Faculty use them to generate rubrics, draft lectures and design syllabuses. Researchers use them to summarize papers, comment on drafts, design experiments and generate code.

This is where the “cheating” conversation belongs. With students and faculty alike increasingly leaning on technology for help, it is reasonable to wonder what kinds of learning might get lost along the way. But hybrid systems also raise more complex ethical questions.

One has to do with transparency. AI chatbots offer natural-language interfaces that make it hard to tell when you’re interacting with a human and when you’re interacting with an automated agent. That can be alienating and distracting for those who interact with them. A student reviewing material for a test should be able to tell if they are talking with their teaching assistant or with a robot. A student reading feedback on a term paper needs to know whether it was written by their instructor. Anything less than complete transparency in such cases will be alienating to everyone involved and will shift the focus of academic interactions from learning to the means or the technology of learning. University of Pittsburgh researchers have shown that these dynamics bring forth feelings of uncertainty, anxiety and distrust for students. These are problematic outcomes.

A second ethical question relates to accountability and intellectual credit. If an instructor uses AI to draft an assignment and a student uses AI to draft a response, who is doing the evaluating, and what exactly is being evaluated? If feedback is partly machine-generated, who is responsible when it misleads, discourages or embeds hidden assumptions? And when AI contributes substantially to research synthesis or writing, universities will need clearer norms around authorship and responsibility – not only for students, but also for faculty.

Finally, there is the critical question of cognitive offloading. AI can reduce drudgery, and that’s not inherently bad. But it can also shift users away from the parts of learning that build competence, such as generating ideas, struggling through confusion, revising a clumsy draft and learning to spot one’s own mistakes.

Autonomous agents

The most consequential changes may come with systems that look less like assistants and more like agents. While truly autonomous technologies remain aspirational, the dream of a researcher “in a box” – an agentic AI system that can perform studies on its own – is becoming increasingly realistic.

Agentic tools are anticipated to “free up time” for work that focuses on more human capacities like empathy and problem-solving. In teaching, this may mean that faculty may still teach in the headline sense, but more of the day-to-day labor of instruction can be handed off to systems optimized for efficiency and scale. Similarly, in research, the trajectory points toward systems that can increasingly automate the research cycle. In some domains, that already looks like robotic laboratories that run continuously, automate large portions of experimentation and even select new tests based on prior results.

At first glance, this may sound like a welcome boost to productivity. But universities are not information factories; they are systems of practice. They rely on a pipeline of graduate students and early-career academics who learn to teach and research by participating in that same work. If autonomous agents absorb more of the “routine” responsibilities that historically served as on-ramps into academic life, the university may keep producing courses and publications while quietly thinning the opportunity structures that sustain expertise over time.

The same dynamic applies to undergraduates, albeit in a different register. When AI systems can supply explanations, drafts, solutions and study plans on demand, the temptation is to offload the most challenging parts of learning. To the industry that is pushing AI into universities, it may seem as if this type of work is “inefficient” and that students will be better off letting a machine handle it. But it is the very nature of that struggle that builds durable understanding. Cognitive psychology has shown that students grow intellectually through doing the work of drafting, revising, failing, trying again, grappling with confusion and revising weak arguments. This is the work of learning how to learn.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the greatest risk posed by automation in higher education is not simply the replacement of particular tasks by machines, but the erosion of the broader ecosystem of practice that has long sustained teaching, research and learning.

An uncomfortable inflection point

So what purpose do universities serve in a world in which knowledge work is increasingly automated?

One possible answer treats the university primarily as an engine for producing credentials and knowledge. There, the core question is output: Are students graduating with degrees? Are papers and discoveries being generated? If autonomous systems can deliver those outputs more efficiently, then the institution has every reason to adopt them.

But another answer treats the university as something more than an output machine, acknowledging that the value of higher education lies partly in the ecosystem itself. This model assigns intrinsic value to the pipeline of opportunities through which novices become experts, the mentorship structures through which judgment and responsibility are cultivated, and the educational design that encourages productive struggle rather than optimizing it away. Here, what matters is not only whether knowledge and degrees are produced, but how they are produced and what kinds of people, capacities and communities are formed in the process. In this version, the university is meant to serve as no less than an ecosystem that reliably forms human expertise and judgment.

In a world where knowledge work itself is increasingly automated, we think universities must ask what higher education owes its students, its early-career scholars and the society it serves. The answers will determine not only how AI is adopted, but also what the modern university becomes.

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Why The ‘Streets Of Minneapolis’ Have Echoed With Public Support – Unlike The Campus Of Kent State In 1970

Ohio National Guardsmen on the Kent State University campus prepare to disperse student protesters on May 4, 1970. Troops later opened fire on students, killing four. Howard Ruffner/Getty Images

BY GREGORY P. MAGARIAN

THOMAS AND KAROLE GREEN

PROFESSOR OF LAW, WASHINGTON 

UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

The president announces an aggressive, controversial policy. Large groups of protesters take to the streets. Government agents open fire and kill protesters.

All of these events, familiar from Minneapolis in 2026, also played out at Ohio’s Kent State University in 1970. In my academic writing about the First Amendment, I have described Kent State as a key moment when the government silenced free speech.

In Minneapolis, free speech has weathered the crisis better, as seen in the protests themselves, the public’s responses – and even the protest songs the two events inspired.

Protests and shootings, then and now

In 1970, President Richard Nixon announced he had expanded the Vietnam War by bombing Cambodia. Student anti-war protests, already fervent, intensified.

In Ohio, Gov. James Rhodes deployed the National Guard to quell protests at Kent State University. Monday, May 4, saw a large midday protest on the main campus commons. Students exercised their First Amendment rights by chanting and shouting at the Guard troops, who dispersed protesters with tear gas before regrouping on a nearby hill.

With the nearest remaining protesters 20 yards from the Guard troops and most more than 60 yards away, 28 guardsmen inexplicably fired on students, killing four students and wounding nine others.

After the killings, the government sought to shift blame to the slain students. Nixon stated: “When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy.”

Minneapolis in 2026 presents vivid parallels.

As part of a sweeping campaign to deport undocumented immigrants, President Donald Trump in early January 2026 deployed armed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection agents to Minneapolis.

With the nearest remaining protesters 20 yards from the Guard troops and most more than 60 yards away, 28 guardsmen inexplicably fired on students, killing four students and wounding nine others.

After the killings, the government sought to shift blame to the slain students. Nixon stated: “When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy.”

Minneapolis in 2026 presents vivid parallels.

As part of a sweeping campaign to deport undocumented immigrants, President Donald Trump in early January 2026 deployed armed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection agents to Minneapolis.

Many residents protested, exercising their First Amendment rights by using smartphones and whistles to record and call out what they saw as ICE and CBP abuses. On Jan. 7, 2026, an ICE agent shot and killed activist Renee Good in her car. On Jan. 24, two CBP agents shot and killed protester Alex Pretti on the street.

The government sought to blame Good and Pretti for their own killings.

Different public reactions

After Kent State, amid bitter conservative opposition to student protesters, most Americans blamed the fallen students for their deaths. When students in New York City protested the Kent State shootings, construction workers attacked and beat the students in what became known as the “hard hat riot.” Afterward, Nixon hosted construction union leaders at the White House, where they gave him an honorary hard hat.

In contrast, most Americans believe the Trump administration has used excessive force in Minneapolis. Majorities both oppose the federal agents’ actions against protesters and approve of protesting and recording the agents.

The public response to Minneapolis has made a difference. The Trump administration has announced an end to its immigration crackdown in the Twin Cities. Trump has backed off attacks on Good and Pretti. Congressional opposition to ICE funding has grown. Overall public support for Trump and his policies has fallen.

Free speech in protests, recordings and songs

What has caused people to view the killings in Minneapolis so differently from Kent State? One big factor, I believe, is how free speech has shaped the public response.

The Minneapolis protests themselves have sent the public a more focused message than what emerged from the student protests against the Vietnam War.

Anti-war protests in 1970 targeted military action on the other side of the world. Organizers had to plan and coordinate through in-person meetings and word of mouth. Student protesters needed the institutional news media to convey their views to the public.

In contrast, the anti-ICE protests in Minneapolis target government action at the protesters’ doorsteps. Organizers can use local networks and social media to plan, coordinate and communicate directly with the public. The protests have succeeded in deepening public opposition to ICE.

In addition, the American people have witnessed the Minneapolis shootings.

Kent State produced a famous photograph of a surviving student’s anguish but only hazy, chaotic video of the shootings.

In contrast, widely circulated video evidence showed the Minneapolis killings in horrifying detail. Within days of each shooting, news organizations had compiled detailed visual timelines, often based on recordings by protesters and observers, that sharply contradicted government accounts of what happened to Good and Pretti.

Finally, consider two popular protest songs that emerged from Kent State and Minneapolis: Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young’s “Ohio” and Bruce Springsteen’s “Streets of Minneapolis.”

Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young recorded, pressed and released “Ohio” with remarkable speed for 1970. The vinyl single reached record stores and radio stations on June 4, a month after the Kent State shootings. The song peaked at No. 14 on the Billboard chart two months later.

Neil Young’s lyrics described the Kent State events in mythic terms, warning of “tin soldiers” and telling young Americans: “We’re finally on our own.” Young did not describe the shootings in detail. The song does not name Kent State, the National Guard or the fallen students. Instead, it presents the events as symbolic of a broader generational conflict over the Vietnam War.

Springsteen released “Streets of Minneapolis” on Jan. 28, 2026 – just four days after CBP agents killed Pretti. Two days later, the song topped streaming charts worldwide.

The internet and social media let Springsteen document Minneapolis, almost in real time, for a mass audience. Springsteen’s lyrics balance symbolism with specificity, naming not just “King Trump” but also victims Pretti and Good, key Trump officials Stephen Miller and Kristi Noem, main Minneapolis artery Nicollet Avenue, and the protesters’ “whistles and phones,” before fading on a chant of “ICE out!”

Critics offer compelling arguments that 21st-century mass communication degrades social relationships, elections and culture. In Minneapolis, disinformation has muddied crucial facts about the protests and killings.

At the same time, Minneapolis has shown how networked communication can promote free speech. Through focused protests, recordings of government action, and viral popular culture, today’s public can get fuller, clearer information to help critically assess government actions.

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What Causes Depression? What We Know, Don’t Know And Suspect

BY CAROLINE GURVICH, DEVELINE MU AND JAYASHRI KULKARNI

Depression is a complex and deeply personal experience. While almost everyone has periods of sadness, low mood or grief, depression is different. Major depressive disorder is persistent, interferes with day-to-day activities, and can affect work, life and relationships.

One in five people will experience depression in their lifetime. Women are nearly twice as likely as men to develop it – a disparity that emerges around puberty and persists into adulthood.

But what causes it? The short answer is: many different things.

While there are various theories, we know brain chemistry, genes, hormones, stress, lifestyle and personality can all play a role. How these interact can vary greatly from one person to another.

An imbalance of brain chemicals?

The traditional “monoamine hypothesis” of depression was proposed more than half a century ago, in the 1950s. This theory suggests the root cause of depression is a deficiency in certain brain chemicals (or neurotransmitters) called monoamines – serotonin, dopamine and norepinephrine.

Several antidepressants have been developed based on this. They primarily work by increasing levels of monoamines such as serotonin.

However, it has become clear that the “chemical imbalance” explanation is an oversimplification.

Research over the past few decades has not found consistent evidence that individuals with depression always have lower levels of serotonin, or any single neurotransmitter.

And while antidepressants can increase serotonin levels within hours, improvements in mood typically take days or weeks to emerge. This delay suggests depression cannot be explained by neurotransmitter levels alone.

Current understanding recognises depression as a complex condition influenced by multiple interacting factors, including genetics, trauma, medications, diet, sleep patterns and social interactions.

Genetic factors can increase your risk

According to one 2021 review, around 30 to 50% of the risk someone will develop depression may be inherited.

No single “depression gene” has been found. But large studies have identified over 100 genetic risk markers on chromosomes.

The genetic risk of depression is also thought to be “polygenic”. This means multiple genetic variants (each carrying a small effect) interact and collectively contribute to someone’s genetic risk.

One important and longstanding research question has been whether there is a genetic reason women are more likely than men to develop depression.

In 2025, a large study revealed substantial overlap between men and women’s genetic risk. However, on average, women with depression tend to carry more of the genetic variants linked to depression.

This suggests that there may be a greater genetic risk for depression in women and perhaps a stronger environmental influence on depression risk in men.

Still, carrying a genetic risk does not mean someone will necessarily develop depression. The interplay between genetic and non-genetic factors is complex.

Hormones and biological sex

Hormones – the body’s chemical messengers – also play an important role in mood and wellbeing.

In women, estrogen and progesterone levels naturally fluctuate across different life stages, including the menstrual cycle, pregnancy, the period after childbirth and menopause.

Our 2025 review found some women are more sensitive to these normal hormonal shifts, and more vulnerable to mood disturbances.

For instance, in the premenstrual phase of their cycle, around 8% of women experience a severe depression, with intense mood swings and irritability, called premenstrual dysphoric disorder.

Similarly, the dramatic hormonal changes during pregnancy and after childbirth (combined with sleep loss and stress) can contribute to postnatal depression.

Later in life, fluctuating and falling estrogen levels during the menopause transition years may also increase the risk of developing depressive symptoms or intensify existing ones.

Hormonal contraceptives – which contain synthetic forms of estrogen and progesterone – have also been linked to mood changes and depression symptoms. In fact, these are some of the most common reasons women stop taking them.

These effects appear to depend on the specific type and amount of progesterone used in the formulation.

These findings show how hormones can act as biological triggers, and help explain why women are statistically more likely to experience depression at certain stages of life.

The effect of hormones on depression in men has predominantly focused on the protective role of testosterone, but findings remain inconclusive.

Stress is another important factor

Chronic or repeated stress can have lasting effects on both the brain and body.

When we experience stress, our bodies activate the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis, also known as the “stress-response system”. This helps us cope by maintaining balance in our body – what scientists call physiological homeostasis.

But when stress is constant or overwhelming, this system can become dysregulated. Stressful or traumatic experiences in childhood – such as neglect, abuse or severe adversity – can also disrupt the stress-response system.

As a result, we overproduce the stress hormone cortisol. High or persistent cortisol levels can alter the structure and functioning of key brain areas (the hippocampus and pre-frontal cortex) which are important for regulating mood and memory.

Cortisol can also trigger the release of inflammatory chemicals, which then cross into the brain or influence neural signals, leading to mood changes and depressive symptoms.

Importantly though, not everyone who experiences stressful life events becomes depressed.

Some people may be more vulnerable due to genetic factors, early life adversity or differences in brain chemistry. Others might cope with the same stress without developing depression or other conditions.

Does personality play a role?

Personality traits also influence how people respond to stress and may affect their risk of developing depression.

People who tend to experience anxiety, sadness and self-doubt are more likely to develop depressive symptoms, especially after stressful events. In contrast, traits such as resilience, optimism, and emotional stability seem to protect against depression.

This suggests that personality plays an important role in shaping both vulnerability and resilience to depression.

Lifestyle choices can help lower your risk

These include not smoking, limiting alcohol use, eating a balanced diet, staying physically active, getting enough sleep, maintaining a healthy body weight and having social supports.

Research shows these healthy habits and lifestyle factors can have a protective effect on mental health. They may even reduce the impact of genetic risk factors for depression.

There’s no single cause – and no universal treatment

Depression arises from a mix of factors – biological (genes and hormones), psychological (personality and thoughts) and social (stress and life events).

Treatment options are based on all of these factors, as well as considering how severe the depression is and whether a person has responded to previous treatments.

While science has made some progress in understanding depression, what underpins each person’s experience is unique.

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How Off-The-Shelf Drones Are Changing Jihadist Warfare In West Africa

BY MAKUOCHI OKAFOR

Jihadist groups are increasingly carrying out drone strikes in West Africa, raising alarm that they are building the capacity to wage a "war from the skies".

A leading violence monitoring organisation, Acled, has recorded at least 69 drone strikes by an al-Qaeda affiliate in Burkina Faso and Mali since 2023, while two Islamic State (IS) affiliates have carried out around 20 - mostly in Nigeria, which has been battling numerous insurgent groups for almost 25 years.

The latest drone attack took place in Nigeria's north-eastern Borno state on 29 January, when jihadists carried out a two-pronged assault - with multiple armed drones and ground fighters - on a military base.

The military said nine of its soldiers were killed in the attack by the Islamic State of West Africa Province (Iswap) - identified by Acled as the "most prolific" IS African affiliate in "drone warfare".

The jihadists tended to carry out strikes with "commercially available, relatively inexpensive quadcopter [unmanned] drones" that were "rigged with explosives", while also using them for reconnaissance and surveillance missions in preparation for ground attacks, Acled senior Africa analyst Ladd Serwat told the BBC.

Despite the fact that Nigeria's government tightly controls the import of commercial and hobby drones and prohibits their use without official permission, the jihadists were able to obtain them through their smuggling networks across the region's porous borders, said a Nigeria-based senior researcher at the Good Governance Africa think-tank, Malik Samuel.

"The growing use of armed and surveillance drones by violent extremist groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad region is deeply concerning, and it marks a significant shift," security analyst Audu Bulama Bukarti told the BBC.

"Drones lower the cost of conducting attacks, allow militants to gather intelligence with minimal risk and enable strikes on military targets that were previously harder to reach," he added.

According to Serwat, Iswap has carried out 10 drone strikes since 2024 in north-eastern Nigeria as well as in northern Cameroon, southern Niger, and southern Chad - all countries affected by the insurgency in Nigeria.

A similar number of drone attacks were carried out by another IS affiliate, the Islamic State of Sahel Province (ISSP), in West Africa, Acled data shows.

In its latest attack, ISSP carried out an assault on the international airport in Niger's capital, Niamey, and nearby military bases, also on 29 January, with the defence ministry saying that four military personnel were injured and 20 of the assailants were killed.

Serwat said that while some reports claim ISSP used mortars and RPGs, others suggest that the militants carried out a drone strike.

"If a drone was used, this represents the first time ISSP used an explosive-laden drone in Niger," he added.

The jihadist group that has used drones the most is the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Acled says it has carried 69 strikes in neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso, and one across the border in Togo.

"JNIM's drone programme has developed rapidly and spread across interconnected networks in Mali and Burkina," Acled's senior West Africa analyst Héni Nsaibia said.

Military Africa, an online defence industry source, reported that last February, JNIM had also used what are known as first-person view (FPV) drones - when the pilot has a live feed from the drone - to drop improvised explosive devices, made from plastic bottles, onto military positions in Burkina Faso's Djibo town.

"This marked a significant escalation, as FPV drones - small, agile, and often used in Ukraine - allow precise targeting," Military Africa reported.

Samuel said the jihadist groups were influenced and trained by foreign fighters to constantly adopt new methods - from making roadside bombs and suicide belts, they had now learned to turn "off-the-shelf" drones into weapons.

Drone attacks could reduce casualties among jihadists, while achieving greater "effectiveness" in hitting targets, Samuel said.

Acled analyst Nsaibia told the BBC that while the majority of JNIM's drone attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso had targeted the military and allied militias, some had also hit civilians, including markets in communities perceived as being aligned with government forces.

As for Iswap, it was known to have carried out only one drone attack that hit civilians - in June 2025, when two pastoralists were killed and one injured in northern Cameroon, Nsaibia said.

In a report last year, a researcher at the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies, Taiwo Adebayo, wrote that to combat the threat, West African armies needed to carry out "preemptive strikes" to destroy drone assembly and launch sites, and acquire more counter-drone technology, including jamming devices and air defence systems.

Otherwise, he warned, the jihadists could enhance their drone warfare capabilities and carry out "high-impact assaults" that could worsen instability in West Africa.

Historically Black Colleges And Universities Do More Than Offer Black Youths A Pathway To Opportunity And Success...

Spelman College graduates arrive at their commencement ceremony in May 2025 in College Park, Ga. Paras Griffin/Getty Images

BY ANDREA HAGAN

INSTRUCTOR OF CRIMINOLOGY

& JUSTICE, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

NEW ORLEANS

Historically Black colleges and universities, often known as HBCUs, are well known for their deep roots in U.S. higher education and proven effectiveness at graduating Black students who go on to become professionally successful.

HBCUs are colleges and universities that were established before 1964, with the mission of educating Black Americans, though now anyone can attend.

As a criminology instructor who has spent 13 years studying the relationship between educational trajectories and criminal justice – and a Black woman who grew up in the South and attended an HBCU – I believe that HBCUs offer another often overlooked benefit.

They give young people, especially Black people, a pathway in higher education that they might not otherwise receive. By opening doors to education, jobs and mentorship, HBCUs disrupt the conditions that can cause young people – especially Black people – to get lost in the criminal justice system.

The U.S. incarcerates approximately 1.6 million people. Black Americans are locked up at five times the rate of white Americans. This disparity starts young: Black teenagers are 5.6 times more likely to be placed in juvenile detention than white teenagers, and people who are incarcerated as juveniles are nearly four times more likely to be incarcerated as adults. Overall, the vast majority of Black people are not incarcerated.

Attending a HBCU, or any other university, does not guarantee a stable financial future. And not graduating from high school or college certainly does not not mean that someone will become incarcerated.

But research shows that education, especially a college degree, is closely linked to lower crime rates. College graduates who do commit crimes reoffend at rates below 6%, while people who drop out of high school return to prison at rates around 75%.

This is why I believe HBCUs in particular have an important role to play in helping young Black people avoid this path.

Understanding HBCUs

Today, there are roughly 100 HBCUs in 19 states, as well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The schools are a mix of public schools and private, nonprofit colleges and universities.

HBCUs make up just 3% of the country’s colleges and universities. But their graduates include 40% of Black engineers, 50% of Black lawyers and 70% of Black doctors in the United States.

Most HBCUs are located in Southern and mid-Atlantic states – a legacy of when segregation barred Black students from attending most colleges and universities.

Many HBCUs are also located in rural Southern communities, in particular. Residents of these areas tend to live in poverty and have limited educational opportunities.

Attending a local HBCU is often one of the most practical ways these prospective students can get a degree – in part because HBCUs are often more affordable than other four-year college options.

The average annual tuition for an in-state student at a public HBCU is roughly US$7,700 per year – well below the national average, which ranges from $12,000 at public schools to $45,000 at private schools. Some public HBCUs charge as little as $1,000 in annual tuition for in-state students.

Schools like Coppin State University in Baltimore and the University of Maryland Eastern Shore also offer in-state rates to out-of-state students from places that do not have HBCUs nearby.

Despite their focus on Black students, HBCUs are increasingly diverse.

In 2022, non-Black students made up 24% of the student population at HBCUs. By comparison, 15% of non-Black students made up HBCU populations in 1976.

HBCUs also enroll low-income students, regardless of race, at three times the rate that predominantly white colleges do.

Upward mobility

Research shows completing high school reduces arrest rates by 11% to 12% for both property and violent crimes, regardless of race or economic background.

College takes this effect further.

Studies have found that college enrollment helps young people with histories of delinquency to stop committing crimes. Completing a four-year degree reduces the likelihood of criminal behavior by 43% to 48%, compared to those who started college but did not finish.

A few long-recognized reasons help explain this pattern. Education increases earning potential, making crime a riskier and less attractive option for people with a degree. Education also encourages long-term thinking, strengthens ties to employers and communities, and builds problem-solving skills that help people navigate challenges.

I have seen firsthand, through my own experiences growing up in the South and teaching students, how HBCUs can help move Black students out of poverty. These schools stand out among other colleges in terms of how effectively they graduate low-income Black students and move them into the middle class, outcomes that research links to reduced criminal behavior.

When researchers rank colleges by whether and how their students improve their socioeconomic status, income and wealth over time, more than half of the highest-performing schools are HBCUs.

Black students who attend HBCUs are 30% more likely to earn a degree than Black students who attend colleges that are not HBCUs. Black HBCU graduates are also likely to earn more money than Black non-HBCU college graduates.

This matters because poverty is one of the strongest predictors of whether someone will commit a crime.

When colleges and universities graduate students who earn middle-class incomes, they help break what researchers call the cycle of intergenerational poverty and incarceration. This pattern describes how children of incarcerated parents are six times more likely to end up in the justice system.

An ongoing money problem

Despite their benefits, HBCUs have chronically struggled with funding. In recent decades, state governments have not given Black land-grant universities – meaning public colleges originally created through federal legislation to serve Black students during segregation – at least $12.8 billion the federal government said they were owed.

Recent federal support for HBCUs has been mixed, as the Trump administration has made widespread cuts to many universities and colleges.

In April 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order renewing the White House Initiative on HBCUs, a federal effort to help support these schools. At the time, he said that Black colleges had no reason to fear cuts.

But days later, Trump’s proposed 2026 budget included $64 million in cuts to Howard University, one of the oldest HBCUs.

In September 2025, the Trump administration redirected $435 million to HBCUs by cutting funds from grant programs that had supported Hispanic-serving institutions and other colleges that have a large proportion of Hispanic or other minority students.

The context that matters

The U.S. criminal justice system disproportionately affects Black people at every stage – from arrests to incarceration. Black Americans make up about 13% of the U.S. population but account for roughly 37% of all people in U.S. jails and prisons.

According to the National Academies of Sciences, the lifetime risk of imprisonment for Black men born between 1975 and 1979, and with less than a high school education, was about 68% – meaning nearly 7 in 10 in that group experienced incarceration at least once.

I have seen firsthand that when Black students from low-income backgrounds enroll at HBCUs, they become more likely to complete a degree and achieve the kind of financial stability that research shows helps reduce the risk of becoming caught up in the criminal justice system.

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Why Christian Clergy See Risk As Part Of Their Moral Calling

A large group of protesters, including clergy, gathered outside St. Paul International Airport in St. Paul, Minn., on Jan. 23, 2026, to demonstrate against the immigration crackdown. Elizabeth Flores/The Minnesota Star Tribune via Getty Image

BY LAURA E. ALEXANDER

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS 

STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

OMAHA

As Christian clergy across the United States participate in ongoing protests against harsh immigration enforcement actions and further funding for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, many are still pondering the words of Rob Hirschfeld. On Jan. 18, 2026, Hirschfeld, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire, encouraged clergy in his diocese to “prepare for a new era of martyrdom” and put their wills and affairs in order.

He asserted that “it may be that now is no longer the time for statements, but for us with our bodies to stand between the powers of this world and the most vulnerable.”

Hirschfeld’s words attracted a lot of attention, with clergy generally responding positively, though at least one priest argued that he “did not sign up to be a martyr” and had a family and church relying on him.

Other clergy have willingly faced arrest for their advocacy on behalf of immigrants, seeing it as a moral calling. Rev. Karen Larson was arrested while protesting at the Minneapolis airport. She stated that when people are being separated from their families and taken to unknown detention centers, “this is our call” to protest on their behalf.

As a scholar of religious ethics, I am interested in how Christian clergy and thinkers consider personal risk when they feel called to engage in social action.

Ethics of risk

There are many examples of Christian leaders who have taken on risks out of a religious and moral obligation to provide spiritual care for people in need or advocate for oppressed communities.

Most data on the risks that clergy face in their roles as religious leaders comes from studies of religious leaders in institutional settings, such as hospitals or prisons.

Scholarship on clergy and chaplains in medical settings points to a professional obligation to take on risks. Similar to medical providers who often see risking exposure to infection as part of their professional responsibility, many clergy and chaplains in medical settings understand their vocation to include such a risk.

Questions about professional risks became particularly acute during the early years of the HIV/AIDS crisis, when researchers were uncertain exactly how the disease was spread and caregivers feared they might acquire HIV through their bedside work.

In her memoir about chaplaincy with HIV patients, Audrey Elisa Kerr notes that Riverside Church in New York continued to organize funerals, ministries and support groups for HIV/AIDS patients despite “terror” in the wider community about contagion.

As a chaplain herself, Kerr says this story of “radical hospitality” inspired her to set aside her own fears and embrace her professional role caring for people who were ill and dying.

Priests and nuns of the Catholic Church who cared for HIV/AIDS patients in the 1980s risked both the fear of contagion and the disapproval of their bishops and communities, since many of the people they cared for were men who had sex with men.

Some felt, however, that they must care for those at the margins as part of their role in the church or their monastic order. Sister Carol of the Hospital Sisters of Saint Francis felt that it was simply her moral duty as a sister to “go where she was needed,” despite potential risk.

Examination of the ethical obligations of chaplains and clergy ramped up during the COVID-19 pandemic when at least some priest, pastors and hospital chaplains felt an obligation to continue visiting patients for spiritual care.

In a reflection from 2020, Rev. David Hottinger, then working at Hennepin Healthcare in Minneapolis, noted that chaplains “felt privileged” to use their professional skills, even though they took on extra risk because they did not always have access to adequate protective equipment.

Risks in other institutional settings are not such a matter of life and death. Because of their professional preaching function, however, clergy in church settings do accept the risk of alienating church members when they feel religiously called to speak about social issues. Rev. Teri McDowell Ott has written about taking risks when discussing LGBTQ+ inclusion and starting a prison ministry.

Risk-taking during social protest

For many clergy, religious and ethical obligations extend beyond their work in institutions like churches and hospitals and include their witness in public life.

Many feel an obligation to preach on issues of moral importance, even topics that are considered controversial and might elicit strong disagreement. It is common for priests and pastors in conservative churches to include messages against legalized abortion in their sermons.

Tom Ascol of the Center for Baptist Leadership urged Baptist pastors to preach about abortion in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election.

Rev. Leah Schade, a Lutheran minister and scholar, has argued that since 2017, mainline pastors have preached more often on issues like racism, environmental justice or gun violence. Schade says pastors are inspired to speak more bluntly about social issues because of their religious concern for people who are at risk of harm from injustice or government policies.

Some clergy view their moral obligations as going beyond preaching and leading them to on-the-ground advocacy and protest. Rev. Brandy Daniels of the Disciples of Christ denomination examines these obligations in an article on her participation in a group of interfaith clergy in Portland, Oregon. The group was convened by a local rabbi and supported protesters for racial justice in Portland in 2017. In Daniels’ analysis, clergy took on the risk of staying in the middle of protests and facing a violent police response in order to “bear moral witness,” something they were both empowered and obligated to do as religious leaders.

Risking their lives

There are more extreme cases in which clergy who challenged government leaders or policies were killed for their words and actions of protest.

In a well-known historical example, Bishop Oscar Romero, canonized as a martyred saint by the Roman Catholic Church in 2018, was assassinated in 1980 after speaking out against human rights violations against poor and Indigenous communities committed by the government of El Salvador. Romero viewed himself, in his priestly role, as a representative of God who was obliged to “give voice to the voiceless.”

During recent protests against ICE in Minneapolis and elsewhere, many clergy risked arrest and bodily harm. Rev. Kenny Callaghan, a Metropolitan Community Church pastor, who says that ICE agents in Minneapolis pointed a gun in his face and handcuffed him as he tried to help a woman they were questioning, said, “It’s in my DNA; I have to speak up for marginalized people.”

On Jan. 23, 2026, over 100 clergy were arrested at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport as they protested and prayed against ICE actions. Rev. Mariah Furness Tollgaard said that she and others accepted being arrested as a way of demonstrating public support for migrants who are afraid to leave their homes.

In Chicago, ministers have been hit with projectiles and violently arrested. Presbyterian pastor David Black was shot in the head with a pepper spray projectile while protesting outside an immigration detention center in October 2025.

The clergy have told reporters that they feel a particular call to be out in public and to protect and support their vulnerable neighbors against ICE raids, at a time when families are afraid to go to school or work and U.S. citizens have been swept up in enforcement tactics as well.

As I see it, for these and many Christian clergy and ethicists, the call to ministry includes an obligation to express their values of care for vulnerable neighbors precisely through a public willingness to accept personal risk.

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Senator Ted Cruz Slams US Officials For Avoiding Reference To Polisario Terror Links

BY SAFAA KASRAOUI

RABAT, MOROCCO  – US Senator Ted Cruz has sharply criticized administration officials for repeatedly avoiding any direct reference to the Polisario Front, despite documented links to the separatist group instigating terror activities that destabilize the region.

Cruz made his remarks during a Senate hearing on counterterrorism efforts in North Africa and the Sahel this week.

During the hearing, he pointed a rebuke to US officials for what he described as a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the Polisario and its links to terrorism.

He also noted a contradiction between praising Algeria as a “critical pillar of stability in the region” and vaguely warning of terrorist activity in the Sahel without naming the parties involved.

Algeria’s regime has been hosting, financing, arming, and sheltering the Polisario Front, a separatist group claiming independence in Western Sahara.

Several reports link Polisario’s involvement in terrorist activities.

In 2017, Morocco’s security services identified 100 Polisario members who are associated with ISIS.

In 2021, French authorities killed Adnan Abdu Walid al-Sahrawi, the leader of a terror group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

Al Sahrawi was also a former member of the Polisario Front.

Cruz also pointed out Iran’s proxy Hezbollah’s collusion with Polisiario.

“Iran is trying to turn the Polisario Front into the Houthis for West Africa, a proxy force capable of waging war to threaten regional stability and pressure US partners wherever Iran wants leverage,” the senator said.

He recalled Polisario’s work with Iranian “terrorist groups,” taking drones from the IRGC and moving weapons and resources around the region, including to other groups instigating terrorist acts.

“I believe they should be designated as a terrorist group, and I’ve drafted a bill to do so if there is no change in their behavior,” Cruz added.
For Cruz, the officials delivered nothing of substance

Senior Bureau Official Robert Palladino responded to Cruz’s question by repeatedly steering away from directly addressing the senator’s question.

Instead, he shifted to broader diplomatic language, conveying US’ commitment to achieve a lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

When Cruz pressed the official about the possibility of designating Polisario as a terrorist group, Palladino made similar remarks – stating the US is “constantly assessing threats to the American homeland.”

Cruz responded to Palladino’s remarks, insinuating that they were merely talking points that were “positively Shakespearean, full of sound and fury and yet signifying nothing.”

Another US official also made an indirect answer to Cruz’s questions, causing the senator to address the situation head-on.

Cruz also asked both officials if they received any instructions not to say anything negative about the Polisario Front, with both officials denying receiving such guidance.

“So you just decided to go down that road for the heck of it,” Cruz responded.
A history of Iran-Polisario links

Morocco cut ties with Iran in 2018, emphasizing that it received evidence about the collision.

It accused Tehran of providing Polisario with logistical support.

Iran and Algeria’s regimes denied the collusion, but Moroccan officials emphasized they received indications and satellite proof of training and equipment provision links between Tehran and the separatist group.

The situation prompted concerns in the international community, with officials from across the world urging their countries to designate Polisario as a terrorist group.

In September last year, US Congressman Joe Wilson described the separatist Polisario Front as a “terrorist organization” that destabilizes peace and security worldwide.

“In fact, the Polisario is a terrorist organization, and I have introduced a bill to recognize it as such, because the existence of these terrorist groups contributes to destabilizing the world,” Wilson told reporters Tuesday on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly.

In June, the lawmaker submitted a bipartisan bill in June urging the US to officially classify the Algeria-based and backed group as a foreign terrorist organization.

The bill details the group’s ties with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah, its involvement in violent attacks against Moroccan forces, and its role in destabilizing both the Maghreb and the Sahel.

----------- MOROCCO WORLD NEWS