Coup Contagion? A Rash Of African Power Grabs Suggests Copycats Are Taking Note Of Others’ Success

Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, center left, became an inspiration for other would-be coup leaders. Ronald Startup/Picture Post/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

BY SALAH BEN HAMMOU AND JONATHAN POWELL

In a scene that has become familiar across parts of Africa of late, a group of armed men in military garb appeared on state TV on Dec. 7, 2025, to announce that they had suspended the constitution and seized control.

This time it was the West African nation of Benin, and the coup was relatively short-lived, with the government regaining full control a day later. But a week before, senior military officers in Guinea-Bissau had more success, deposing President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and effectively annulling the Nov. 23 election in which both Embaló and the main opposition leader had claimed victory. A month earlier it was Madagascar, where a mass Gen-Z uprising led to the elite CAPSAT unit of the Malagasy military ousting President Andry Rajoelina and installing Colonel Michael Randrianirina as leader.

The cluster of coup attempts follows a broader pattern. Since 2020, there have been 11 successful military takeovers in Africa: one each in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Madagascar and Gabon; and two each in Burkina Faso and Mali. Benin represents the fifth failed coup over the same period.

The prevalence of military takeovers led United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres to warn as far back as 2021 of a coup “epidemic.”

But can coups, like the pathogens of many epidemics, be contagious? Certainly observers around the world continue to ask whether a military takeover in one country can influence the likelihood of another one happening elsewhere.

Do coups spread?

Cross-national research offers little firm evidence that a coup in one country directly increases the chances of another. And some scholars remain skeptical that such a phenomenon exists. Political scientist Naunihal Singh, for instance, argues that the recent wave’s coup plotters are drawing less from contemporary events than from their own countries’ long histories of military intervention.

In addition, he suggests that any observed regional cluster mostly reflects shared underlying conditions. For example, the countries across the Sahel region that have been the center of post-2020 African coups share a common set of coup-prone pressures: chronic insecurity driven by insurgencies, weak state capacity and widespread frustration over quality of governance.

Likewise, Michael Miller and colleagues at George Washington University, in a broader analysis, contend that would-be plotters pay closer attention to domestic dynamics than to foreign coups when deciding whether to move against their own governments.

As scholars of military coups, we recently explored the phenomenon and have come to a different conclusion.

Our forthcoming study argues that would-be plotters do indeed pay close attention when contemporaries seize power. A number of dynamics, however, could keep a statistical trend from being realized.

For one, statistical modeling typically requires contagion to occur within a tight temporal window, often 1 to 3 years.

Our findings challenge this approach. A wave of so-called “Free Officers” coups – military takeovers led by junior or mid-ranking nationalist officers, inspired by Egypt’s 1952 Free Officers movement – is a widely invoked example of contagion. The original Free Officers ousted King Farouk and went on to abolish the monarchy and end British influence in Egypt.

However, it took a full six years before a second “Free Officers” coup occurred in the region, in Iraq in 1958.

Rather than blindly follow the lead of Egypt’s coupists, would-be copycats watched closely, took notes and moved only when two factors lined up: the rewards appeared to be worth the risk, and they obtained the ability to make a takeover possible.

In the case of the post-1952 Middle East, the potential “rewards” of emulating Egypt’s Free Officers were not immediately apparent, even in countries with circumstances very similar to Egypt’s.

It wasn’t until the original Free Officers Movement’s leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged as a revolutionary icon in the region that others attempted to emulate his success. Nasser’s status grew further through his anti-colonial sentiments and victories, like his handling of the Suez Crisis of 1956.

As Nasser’s influence grew, the perceived value of a military takeover increased, and Free Officers-inspired plots quickly proliferated against the region’s monarchies. Six years after the Egyptian coup, the first copycat coup succeeded in Iraq, followed by additional successes in Yemen, Libya and Sudan between 1962 and 1969.

A further complication to establishing a firm trend is that the success of one takeover may actually hinder the immediate progress of another. After all, would-be copycats are not the only observers.

Vulnerable leaders and their allies can take cues from coups in other countries to try to mitigate their spread at home.

Thwarted conspiracies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which were uncovered between 1955 and 1969, demonstrated that while the sentiment to emulate Egypt’s coup was widespread, not all plotters had the capacity to act. Some governments were better prepared to block these attempts. Foreign partners like the United States and Great Britain also played no small role in helping shore up their monarchical allies against coup plots.

Africa’s coup wave

The case of the Free Officers Movement shows that plotters wait for clear signals that a coup is worth the risk. In Africa today, those signals are more immediate, even without a monumental figure like Egypt’s Nasser.

Coupists now see visible domestic support for military takeovers and muted international consequences for those who seize power.

It is increasingly clear to us that the region has seen a large increase in public support for military rule during this post-2020 wave.

Military coupists like Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré and Mali’s Assimi Goïta have not only attracted domestic support but also regional popularity, lauded for their anti-colonial rhetoric against France and their willingness to confront the Economic Community of West Africa States.

Data from Afrobarometer, which has regularly asked about respondents’ positions on having military rule, illustrate this shift clearly.

Support for army rule in Benin has grown

In the survey wave that ended in 2013, less than 11% of respondents in Benin said they supported or strongly supported army rule. This nearly doubled to 19% by 2021 and has now tripled, with 1 in 3 people in Benin expressing support for military rule. While a majority still opposes military rule, the direction of this change is significant.

These attitudes are reinforced by military leaders’ promises to “clean up” corrupt or ineffective governments. In Madagascar, for example, over 60% of citizens in 2024 said it was permissible for the armed forces to remove leaders who abuse power.

Highly visible images of cheering pro-military crowds in countries like Niger and Gabon further signal that a takeover can gain public support.

International indifference

The international signals are just as important. From the near-absent reaction to the Zimbabwean military’s removal of Robert Mugabe in 2017 to the lukewarm response to Chad’s military takeover in 2021, these cases suggest that international punishment can be temporary or even nonexistent.

The message is reinforced when coup leaders who are initially condemned, like Madagascar’s Randrianirina, later gain acceptance from regional organizations like the South African Development Community. In Guinea-Bissau, attention on last month’s coup has somehow seemed to focus more on President Embaló’s alleged involvement in the coup than on the military’s unconstitutional seizure of power.

And the lessons drawn from international responses involve more than just the seizure of power. Contemporary military leaders are staying in power much longer than their predecessors in the early 2000s, either by indefinitely delaying elections or by directly contesting them.

Although the African Union’s framework specifically forbids coup leaders from standing in elections, there has been virtually no consequences for coupists consolidating their rule via elections in places like Chad and Gabon.

This is not lost on would-be plotters, who see their contemporaries seize and legitimize their authority with minimal pushback.

To some degree, the spread of coups depends on how they are received. And in the case of the recent rash of military takeovers in Africa, the international community and domestic policymakers have done little in the way of stemming that spread.

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Science Has Always Been Marketed, From 18th-Century Coffeehouse Demos Of Newton’s Ideas To Today’s TikTok Explainers

People didn’t need to read Isaac Newton’s indecipherable Latin or understand his incomprehensible mathematics; they could just watch the live demonstrations, as in this depiction of an 18th-century nighttime scientific lecture on pneumatics. Joseph Wright of Derby/Science & Society Picture Library via Getty Images

BY BETH DEFAULT

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF MARKETING,

UNIVERSITY OF PORTLAND

People often see science as a world apart: cool, rational and untouched by persuasion or performance. In this view, scientists simply discover truth, and truth speaks for itself.

But history tells a different story. Scientific theories do not simply reveal themselves; they compete for attention, credibility and uptake. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once suggested that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” a line that helped popularize the metaphor of a “marketplace of ideas.”

In this view, science is not outside the market, but inside a public arena where claims vie for audiences, resources and belief – and where power, persuasion and social position shape which ideas are heard, trusted or forgotten.

As a marketing scholar trained in economic sociology, I study how institutions that are supposedly above or apart from market logics – such as science, religion, medicine and education – use marketing tools to sustain credibility and build or keep moral authority.

When I tell people that one of the areas I study is the marketing of science, they are often surprised at the concept. Yet persuasion is an integral part of the scientific process.

From Isaac Newton’s followers and their coffeehouse demonstrations of physics wonders to today’s TED Talks and TikTok explainers, scientists have long relied on storytelling and demonstration to make invisible truths visible. For scientific theories to supplant other plausible theories, to challenge existing theories and win acceptance, they must be correct – but they must also be convincing.

The original science influencers

In the early 1700s, Isaac Newton’s followers turned abstract theory into public performance and cultural fashion.

At the time, Cartesian philosophy dominated intellectual life. Newton’s 1687 book “Principia Mathematica” proposed a new worldview of gravity, optics and motion, but the mathematics was so dense that few could grasp it.

Although Newton himself was a recluse, a circle of zealous Newtonian men of science, described by historians as devoted disciples and even evangelists for Newton’s natural philosophy, took his new theories on the road. These itinerant lecturers performed experiments and spectaculars in London coffeehouses and aristocratic salons, demonstrating Newtonian physics. They sold tickets, pamphlets and even branded scientific instruments so audiences could reproduce these marvels at home.

Historian of science Jeff Wigelsworth showed that Newton’s evangelizers built what today might be called a brand: experiences, artifacts and emotions that linked scientific authority to Enlightenment ideals of reason and progress, and to their own personalities.

My own research finds that these men of science also used a suite of early marketing activities. Besides developing products to sell to promote Newtonian science, they came up with promotions that targeted different audiences, adjusted their pricing and used varied distribution strategies.

Along with their pure entertainment value, these public demonstrations were integrally entwined with Newtonian scientific viewpoints and helped these ideas gain popularity and legitimacy in public life.

As in our own time, where one’s stance on various scientific debates often signals one’s political ideology or religious beliefs, aligning in support of Newton’s theories over, say, René Descartes’ or Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz’s in discussion and by practice also came to indicate a certain stance on theology and politics, and to be Newtonian became a social signal of a desirable style and social status.

From coffeehouses to TikTok

Three centuries later, the marketing of science is more visible, and more complicated, than ever.

Scientists can now promote their work on social media platforms like Bluesky, YouTube and TikTok, crafting personal brands and cultivating audiences. Influencer-scientists use storytelling, humor and design to reach millions. If scientists don’t do this themselves, their proponents, just like Newton’s disciples, may do it for them.

I call this process the marketization of moral authority: when historically sacred or ostensibly impartial institutions such as science, religion and education increasingly organize themselves as markets, adopting promotional, pricing and product logics to secure their legitimacy, authority, appeal and funding.

None of this effort is inherently bad. As in Newton’s time, effective marketing communications can make complex work accessible and even inspiring. It can publicize and defend important theoretical and practical findings in a competitive, skeptical world.

But it raises questions.

Value of recognizing that science gets marketed

You might wonder why anyone beyond academia should care whether science is marketed. After all, every field uses communication and outreach.

It matters because science is one of the few institutions people still rely on to anchor truth claims in evidence. And when the boundary between scientific fact and promotion blurs, it becomes easy to confuse confidence with credibility, or charisma with responsible consensus.

Scientific rhetoric can easily be co-opted. Think of wellness influencers using “quantum” jargon to sell supplements; AI companies invoking neuroscience to legitimatize untested technologies; charlatans mimicking the language of peer review to sow doubt.

But awareness is a form of protection. When you recognize that scientific authority can be built through persuasion, you become more discerning consumers of it. Faced with a message involving science, you can consider:

Who is framing this message, and why?

What evidence supports it? Is this evidence vetted and validated by rigorous studies?

Is it appealing to emotion or identity, rather than objective logic?

This process can help you become more scientifically literate.

Science has never been the pristine, market-free ideal many imagine. It has always lived – sometimes uneasily – within a marketplace of ideas, competing for belief, attention and authority.

Recognizing that reality humanizes science and reminds us that truth must be discovered, communicated and, ultimately, accepted.

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From Hiding To Nobel Laureate: María Corina Machado’s Continues Fight For Venezuela’s Democracy

Opposition leader Maria Corina Machado displays vote tally sheet during a protest against the reelection of Nocolas Maduro one month after the disputed presidential vote which she says the opposition won by a landslide, in Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, August 24, 2024. (AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos, file)

BY REGINA GARCIA CANO

CARACAS, VENEZUELA (AP) — María Corina Machado has long been the face of resistance to Venezuela’s 26-year ruling party. Now, she is also a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Machado, the Venezuelan opposition leader who prompted millions of Venezuelans to reject President Nicolás Maduro in last year’s election, appeared in public for the first time in 11 months on Thursday, following her arrival in Norway, where her daughter received the award on her behalf the previous day.

Machado had been in hiding since Jan. 9, when she was briefly detained after joining supporters during an anti-government protest in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas.

Her Nobel win for her struggle to achieve a democratic transition in her South American nation was announced on Oct. 10. Hours after waving from the balcony of a hotel to a cheering crowd gathered outside on Thursday, Machado told reporters that she would continue the fight for her homeland’s democracy and promised to return soon.

“My return will be when we believe the security conditions are right, and it won’t depend on whether or not the regime leaves,” she said. “It will be as soon as possible.”

Engineer-turned-politician

Machado, an industrial engineer and daughter of a steel magnate, began challenging the ruling party in 2004, when the nongovernmental organization she co-founded, Súmate, promoted a referendum to recall then President Hugo Chávez. The initiative failed, and Machado and other Súmate executives were charged with conspiracy.

She drew the anger of Chávez and his allies the following year for her Oval Office meeting with then U.S. President George W. Bush. Chávez considered Bush an adversary.

Her full transformation into a politician would come in 2010, when she was elected to a seat in the National Assembly, receiving more votes than any aspiring lawmaker ever. It was from this position that she boldly interrupted Chávez as he addressed the legislature and called his expropriation of businesses theft.

“An eagle does not hunt a fly,” he responded. The exchange is seared in voters’ memories.

She drew the anger of Chávez and his allies the following year for her Oval Office meeting with then U.S. President George W. Bush. Chávez considered Bush an adversary.

Her full transformation into a politician would come in 2010, when she was elected to a seat in the National Assembly, receiving more votes than any aspiring lawmaker ever. It was from this position that she boldly interrupted Chávez as he addressed the legislature and called his expropriation of businesses theft.

“An eagle does not hunt a fly,” he responded. The exchange is seared in voters’ memories.

Presidential aspirations

Machado, 58, sought Venezuela’s presidency for the first time in 2012, but she finished third in the primary race to be the presidential candidate for the Democratic Unity Roundtable.

The ruling party-controlled National Assembly ousted Machado in 2014 and, months later, the Comptroller General’s Office barred her from public office for a year, citing an alleged omission on her asset declaration form. That same year, the government accused her of being involved in an alleged plot to kill Maduro, who succeeded Chávez after his 2013 death.

Machado, a free-market firebrand, denied the charge, calling it an attempt to silence her and opposition members who had called tens of thousands of people to the streets in anti-government protests that at times turned violent.

She kept a low profile for the next nine years, supporting some anti-Maduro initiatives and election boycotts and criticizing opposition efforts to negotiate with the government. By the time she announced a new bid for the presidency in 2023, her careful messaging had softened her image as an elitist hard-liner, allowing her to connect with skeptics on both sides.

She won the opposition’s presidential primary with more than 90% of the vote, unifying the faction — as noted by the Nobel Prize committee. But ruling party loyalists who control the country’s judiciary kept her from appearing on the ballot, which forced her to throw her support behind former diplomat Edmundo González.

She hiked on overpasses, walked highways, rode motorcycles, sought shelter in supporters’ homes and saw her closest collaborators be arrested as she kept campaigning across Venezuela. She repeatedly joined thousands of supporters chanting in unison “Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!” in rallies and asked them to vote for González, a virtual unknown who had never run for office.
Brutal repression

González crushed Maduro by a more than a two-to-one margin, according to voting machine records collected by the opposition and validated by international observers. Still, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, loyal to the ruling party, declared Maduro the winner of the July 28, 2024, contest.

People protested the results across the country, and the government responded with full force, arresting more than 2,000 people and accusing them of plotting to oust Maduro and sow chaos. Most were released over the following months, but the government simultaneously arrested dozens of people who actively participated in Machado’s efforts last year.

Some of Machado’s closest collaborators, including her campaign manager, avoided prison by sheltering for more than a year at a diplomatic compound in Caracas, where they remained until May, when they fled to the U.S. She reunited with them, her family and González on Thursday.

González went into exile in Spain last year after he became the subject of an arrest warrant, and Machado hadn’t been seen in public since January, when she joined people protesting Maduro’s planned swearing-in ceremony. Her and González’s inability to stop Maduro from taking the oath of office led to a decline in support.

People’s trust has diminished since then, primarily over Machado’s unquestionable support for Trump, including the large U.S. maritime deployment in the Caribbean that has carried out deadly strikes off the coast of Venezuela. This has led to new divisions within the opposition, but she remains undeterred in her efforts to oust Maduro.

Machado told reporters Thursday that Venezuelans have “given everything for an orderly and peaceful transition to democracy” and now need “action,” not just statements, from other governments to meet their goal.

“The one who has declared war on Venezuelans is the Maduro regime,” she said. “In criminal systems, we need the world’s democracies to support our citizens.”

Netflix Is Buying Warner Brothers. Is This The End Of The Cinema?

Sinners has become the highest grossing original film at the US box office in years. Warner Bros. Pictures via AP

BY LIAM BURKE

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND CINEMA

AND SCREEN STUDIES DISCIPLINE LEADER,

SWINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

The world’s dominant streaming service, Netflix, has announced its planned acquisition of Warner Bros with a deal valued at US$82.7 billion (A$124.5 billion).

The acquisition has provoked criticism from film fans, the creative community and the United States government, including concerns for the future of filmgoing. News of the acquisition was also followed by a hostile bid (a bid that goes directly to shareholders, not the board), from Paramount Skydance.

Jane Fonda described the Netflix deal as “catastrophic”, saying it “threatens the entire entertainment industry”.

Since emerging as the global leader in streaming, Netflix has avoided acquisitions while its competitors have bought up legacy assets, like Amazon’s purchase of MGM in 2022. Rather than buy existing intellectual property, Netflix sought to build new brands such as Stranger Things and Squid Game.

However, it is rare that a 100-year archive like Warner Bros – which ranges from Looney Tunes cartoons to Emmy-magnet The White Lotus – would come up for sale. The deal would bolster Netflix’s library and save expensive licensing costs. There’s no need to pay for ten seasons of Friends if you own the company.

The acquisition raises questions on the consolidation of streaming services. But one of the most immediate concerns is the impact on filmgoing.

Do we still go to the cinema?

Cinema attendance has been falling since the rise of global streaming. This decline was exacerbated by the pandemic: 2025’s global box office will be down 13% from pre-COVID times.

Netflix occasionally releases films in a handful of theatres for extremely limited runs to qualify for awards such as the Oscars, which require a cinematic release. But Netflix co-CEO Ted Sarandos has repeatedly stated Netflix’s priority is at home rather than theatres.

While blockbusters from the Warner Bros studio like Batman and Minecraft are likely to still be released in cinemas under the new super-company, original and mid-budget films may not get the same opportunity.

Ironically, the proposed deal is coming at a time when Warner Bros is having a very successful run of auteur-led films in theatres, such as Ryan Coogler’s Sinners and Paul Thomas Anderson’s One Battle After Another.

Commenting on the deal, Sarandos said Netflix would look to make the time between films being exclusively in cinemas and available at home more “consumer friendly” – meaning the company will look to have short cinema runs and a quick pivot to streaming services.

Theatrical windows have been shrinking. The original Top Gun is often credited with starting the home video revolution when it sold a then-record 2.9 million VHS cassettes in 1987, but that was ten months after it had been a hit in cinemas.

Even in 2010, when the Walt Disney Company sought to shorten the home video release window of Tim Burton’s Alice in Wonderland to 12 weeks, the British theatre chain Odeon threatened not to exhibit the film. Today, blockbusters like Wicked can fly to premium video on demand in a few weeks.

Many theatrical films earn the majority of their box office in the first two weeks of release, and so longer exclusive windows are arguably a case of diminishing returns. However, this doesn’t always hold true.

Earlier this year, Warner Bros’ vampire movie Sinners opened modestly in cinemas. But the film sustained its audience over several weeks on its way to becoming the highest grossing original film at the US box office in years, taking in over US$260 million (A$390 million).

Cinephiles argue original films like Sinners need time to find a cinema audience, and the film’s many musical and horror setpieces are amplified by the communal experience of the theatre.

Challenges ahead

Skydance is also looking to add the studio to its growing portfolio, after its recent purchase of Paramount.

Skydance owner David Ellison has demonstrated his commitment to cinemas by promising Paramount will release 30 films in theatres a year with “healthy traditional windows”.

The deal will also come under regulatory scrutiny due to antitrust concerns. It unites top streamers Netflix and HBO as well as the film studio, removing a significant buyer from the market. Such anti-competitive rationale was used under the Biden administration to successfully block the proposed merger of book publishers Penguin Random House and Simon & Schuster.

One note of optimism is that Netflix has recently demonstrated a willingness to deviate from its founding principles. When the streaming service first launched, it positioned itself in opposition to broadcast and cable television by dropping all episodes of a season at once, not streaming live content or sport, and shunning advertising. Netflix has rolled back these three tenets in recent years in response to the shifting marketplace.

Perhaps the service’s stubborn refusal to embrace filmgoing is another long-held principle it will abandon if audiences are eager.

New research shows young people are craving in-person entertainment, still a novelty for digital natives.

This appetite for experiences has fuelled the recent success in cinemas of A Minecraft Movie, Taylor Swift concert films, and KPop Demon Hunters sing-along – months after it was originally released on Netflix.

If cinema’s reassert themselves as a lively communal space, perhaps this is one experience the newly diversified Netflix will buy a ticket for.

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Benin’s Failed Coup: Three Factors Behind The Takeover Attempt

A newspaper in Benin’s Cotonou reporting the president declaring that the “situation is completely under control” after a thwarted coup attempt. Photo by Olympia de Maismont / AFP via Getty Images

BY JOHN JOSEPH CHIN

ASSISTANT TEACHING PROFESSOR

OF STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY,

CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Military elements attempted to topple Benin’s government in early December 2025. However, unlike other coups across the Sahel and west Africa since 2020, this bid triggered a military response from Benin’s neighbours.

Benin is a west African state of 14.8 million people bordered by Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.

Responding to two requests for assistance from the government of President Patrice Talon, Nigeria deployed fighter jets and the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) deployed elements of its standby force to target and dislodge the pro-coup forces.

Ecowas intervention likely played an important role in undermining the coup’s momentum and restoring order. The dozen or so putschists scored early tactical successes. They captured and broadcast from the national television station, occupied a military camp, and even took the two senior-most army officers hostage. But once Ecowas intervened militarily, any fence-sitters concluded that loyalists would prevail. Rather than a broad-based uprising, only 14 were arrested with a few plotters still at large.

I’m a scholar who maintains the Colpus dataset of coups and I have documented the history of post-second world war coups. As part of this work, I have sought to document the complex causes and effects of Africa’s post-2020 “epidemic of coups”, now entering its fifth year.

Though details remain scant on the motives of the coup plotters led by Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri, three structural factors likely contributed to the latest coup attempt:

growing autocracy under Talon since 2016

rising jihadist violence in Benin’s north that is spilling over from Sahel neighbours

deepening coup contagion as Africa’s coup belt now threatens the west African region.

From democratic backsliding to democratic u-turn?

Benin does not have a history of recent coups. It had not suffered a bona fide coup attempt since January 1975.

In the first 15 years after independence from France in 1960, Dahomey (as the country was then called) experienced nine coup attempts, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the early Cold War period.

However, political instability through the early 1970s gave way to the stable and durable personalist regime of Mathieu Kérékou (1972-1990). This was followed by electoral democracy after the Cold War.

Until recently, Benin had been heralded as one of Africa’s “democratic outliers” and success cases of democratic survival despite challenging conditions. Though poor, Benin has seen decades of improving average living standards. Economic growth in 2025 was 7.5%; the latest unrest cannot be blamed on poverty or an economic crisis.

However, data on three key dimensions of democracy shows that although electoral contestation and participation have endured, constraints on the executive (and thus liberal democracy overall) have declined in Benin since Talon’s election as president in 2016.

According to autocratic regime data from US political scientists Barbara Geddes, Joe Wright and Erica Frantz as well as the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (which surveys experts about democracy worldwide), Benin slipped back into an electoral autocracy in 2019. That is when opposition candidates were prevented from competing in parliamentary elections. The polls were marred by repression of mass protests and an internet shutdown.

In 2021, an electoral boycott led to Talon’s easy re-election.

V-Dem data show a very partial and incomplete democratic rebound since 2022. The opposition was allowed to compete in the January 2023 parliamentary elections. And earlier this year Talon confirmed that he would not seek an unconstitutional third term.

The potential for a coup, however, was foreshadowed last fall when the regime alleged that it had uncovered a coup plot involving a presidential hopeful in 2026. Last month, parliament’s vote to create a Senate was condemned by the opposition as allowing Talon a means to influence affairs after he steps down.

With the main opposition party barred from running in next year’s presidential election, Talon is expected to hand off power to his ally and finance minister, Romuald Wadagni.

Though the political leanings of Tigri and coup plotters remain unclear, Tigri claimed to seek to “free the people from dictatorship”.

The coupmakers also presumably sought to block the upcoming 2026 parliamentary and presidential elections.

A growing jihadist threat

Among the coup leaders’ key complaints was Talon’s mismanagement of the country. In particular, they cited “continuing deterioration of the security situation in northern Benin and "the ignorance and neglect of the situation of our brothers in arms who have fallen at the front” due to worsening jihadist violence.

A number of coups in nearby countries since 2020 have been preceded by rising levels of political violence and deepening insecurity born of jihadist insurgencies. That was certainly the case in Mali, Burkina Faso and to a lesser extent Niger.

Since last year, it has been clear that the jihadist violence was spilling over from Sahel neighbours such as Burkina Faso and Niger into the borderlands of west Africa. This included Benin’s north. ACLED data show a major increase in political violence events since 2022. And a spike in political fatalities in 2024:

Much of this increased violence is attributable to the advance of operations by the al-Qaida affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The group also managed to launch its first fatal attack in Nigeria at the end of October.

Russia has become the primary security partner for the Sahel Alliance. The defence pact was signed in 2023 by post-coup juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to defeat jihadists and maintain power.

Nevertheless, Benin has continued to rely on western security partners to aid its counter-insurgency efforts and bolster border security. Notably, Benin continues to welcome military cooperation with France. Since 2022 Paris has pledged greater military aid to combat terrorism.

In September, US Africa Command commander General Dagvin Anderson visited Benin to underscore cooperation to oppose terrorism.

During the coup attempt, Tigri reportedly warned against French intervention and railed against “imperialism”. The speech reportedly ended with the phrase “The Republic or Death”, which echoes the new motto of Burkina Faso’s junta.

This suggests that the coup makers may have been inspired by others in the Sahel.

Risk of the coup belt expanding

The Benin events mark the third coup attempt and first failed coup this year in the Sahel region. There have been 17 coup attempts in Africa since 2020, including 11 successful coups. This makes the African coup belt stretching across the Sahel and west Africa the global epicentre of coups.

West Africa’s latest “copycat” coup attempt was condemned by the African Union, European Union and Ecowas. Yet it was praised by pro-Russian social media accounts, reflecting a growing cleavage between the Russia-aligned juntas of the Sahel Alliance and the remaining Ecowas-aligned civilian regimes of west Africa.

Although Nigeria-led Ecowas threatened military intervention after the coup in Niger in July 2023, the regional body only actually militarily intervened to defeat the coup attempt in Benin. Nigeria, it appears, has drawn a line in the sand to retain a buffer from further instability – including JNIM operations. On the same day of the coup attempt in Benin, it was reported that Nigeria was seeking greater aid from France to combat insecurity.

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Supreme Court’s Decision On Birthright Citizenship Will Depend On Its Interpretation Of One Key Phrase

When the justices weigh the arguments, they will focus on the meaning of the first sentence of the 14th Amendment, known as the citizenship clause. zimmytws/Getty Images

BY MORGAN MARIETTA

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN CIVICS,

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

The Supreme Court on Dec. 5, 2025, agreed to review the long-simmering controversy over birthright citizenship. It will likely hand down a ruling next summer.

In January 2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order removing the recognition of citizenship for the U.S.-born children of both immigrants here illegally and visitors here only temporarily. The new rule is not retroactive. This change in long-standing U.S. policy sparked a wave of litigation culminating in Trump v. Washington, an appeal by Trump to remove the injunction put in place by federal courts.

When the justices weigh the arguments, they will focus on the meaning of the first sentence of the 14th Amendment, known as the citizenship clause: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”

Both sides agree that to be granted birthright citizenship under the Constitution, a child must be born inside U.S. borders and the parents must be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. However, each side will give a very different interpretation of what the second requirement means. Who falls under “the jurisdiction” of the United States in this context?

As a close observer of the court, I anticipate a divided outcome grounded in strong arguments from each side.

Arguments for automatic citizenship

Simply put, the argument against the Trump administration is that the 14th Amendment’s expansion of citizenship after the eradication of slavery was meant to be broad rather than narrow, encompassing not only formerly enslaved Black people but all persons who arrived on U.S. soil under the protection of the Constitution.

The Civil War amendments – the 13th, 14th and 15th – established inherent equality as a constitutional value, which embraced all persons born in the nation without reference to race, ethnicity or origin.

One of the strongest arguments that automatic citizenship is the meaning of the Constitution is long-standing practice. Citizenship by birth regardless of parental status – with few exceptions – has been the effective rule since the time of America’s founding.

Advocates also point to precedent: the landmark case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark in 1898. When an American-born descendant of resident noncitizens sued after being refused re-entry to San Francisco under the Chinese Exclusion Act, the court recognized his natural-born citizenship.

If we read the Constitution in a living fashion – emphasizing the evolution of American beliefs and values over time – the constitutional commitment to broad citizenship grounded in equality, regardless of ethnicity or economic status, seems even more clear.

However, advocates must try to convince the court’s originalists – Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett – who read the Constitution based on its meaning when it was adopted.

The originalist argument in favor of birthright citizenship is that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction” was meant to invoke only a small set of exceptions found in traditional British common law. In the Wong Kim Ark ruling, the court relied on this “customary law of England, brought to America by the colonists.”

One exception to birthright citizenship covered by this line of rulings is the child of a foreign diplomat, whose parents represent the interests of another country. Another exception is the children of invading foreign armies. A third exception discussed explicitly by the framers of the 14th Amendment was Native Americans, who at the time were understood to be under the jurisdiction of their tribal government as a separate sovereign. That category of exclusion faded away after Congress recognized the citizenship of Native Americans in 1924.

The advocates of automatic birthright citizenship conclude that whether the 14th Amendment is interpreted in a living or in an original way, its small set of exceptions do not override its broad message of citizenship grounded in human equality.

Opposition to birthright citizenship

The opposing argument begins with a simple intuition: In a society defined by self-government, as America is, there is no such thing as citizenship without consent. In the same way that an American citizen cannot declare himself a French citizen and vote in French elections without consent from the French government, a foreign national cannot declare himself a U.S. citizen without consent.

This argument emphasizes that citizenship in a democracy means holding equal political power over our collective decisions. That is something only existing citizens hold the right to offer to others, something which must be decided through elections and the lawmaking process.

The court’s ruling in Elk v. Wilkins in 1884 – just 16 years after the ratification of the 14th Amendment – endorses “the principle that no one can become a citizen of a nation without its consent.” By making entry into the United States without approval a federal offense, Congress has effectively denied that consent.

Scholars who support this view argue that the 14th Amendment does not provide this consent. Instead it sets a limitation. To the authors of the 14th Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” conveyed a limit to natural citizenship grounded in mutual allegiance. That means if people are free to deny their old national allegiance, and an independent nation is free to decide its own membership, the recognition of a new national identity must be mutual.

Immigrants living in the United States illegally have not accepted the sovereignty of the nation’s laws. On the other side of the coin, the government has not officially accepted them as residents under its protection.

If mutual recognition of allegiance is the meaning of the 14th Amendment, the Trump administration has not violated it.

The opponents of birthright citizenship argue that the Wong Kim Ark ruling has been misrepresented. In that case, the court only considered permanent legal residents like Wong Kim Ark’s parents, but not residents here illegally or temporarily. The focus on British common law in that ruling is simply misguided because the findings of Calvin’s Case or any other precedents dealing with British subjects were voided by the American Revolution.

In this view, the Declaration of Independence replaced subjects with citizens. The power to determine national membership was taken away from kings and placed in the hands of democratic majorities.

For opponents of birthright citizenship, the 14th Amendment does not take that power away from citizens but instead codifies the rule that mutual consent is the touchstone of admission. The requirement to be “subject to the jurisdiction” provides the mechanism of that consent.

Congress can determine who is accepted as a member of the national community under its jurisdiction. In this view, Congress – and the American people – have spoken: Current federal laws make entry into U.S. borders without permission a crime rather than a forced acceptance of political membership.

What might happen

The court will likely announce a ruling in summer 2026 before early July, just in time for the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The court will ultimately decide whether the Constitution endorses the declaration’s invocation of essential equality or its creation of a sovereign people empowered to determine the boundaries of national membership.

The court’s three Democratic-appointed justices – Ketanji Brown Jackson, Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor – will surely side against the Trump administration. The six Republican-appointed justices seem likely to divide, a symptom of disagreements within the originalist camp.

The liberal justices need at least two of the conservatives to join them to form a majority of five to uphold universal birthright citizenship. This will likely be some combination of Chief Justice John Roberts, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett.

The Trump administration will prevail only if five out of the six conservatives reject the British common law foundations of the Wong Kim Ark ruling in favor of citizenship by consent alone.

America should know by July Fourth.

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Stalin’s Postwar Terror Targeted Soviet Jews – In The Name Of ‘Anti-Cosmopolitanism

A plaque in Russia commemorates the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, whose leaders were executed in August 1952. Adam Baker/Flickr via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

BY WENDY Z. GOLDMAN

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY,

CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Many Americans know of Josef Stalin’s Terror of the late 1930s, during which more than 1 million people were arrested for political crimes, and over 680,000 executed.

Fewer know about the repressions that began after World War II and ended with Stalin’s death in 1953. Much like the repressions of the 1930s, they involved fabricated plots, arrests, coerced confessions and purges. Unlike the Terror of the 1930s, they were accompanied by a wave of state-sponsored antisemitism – including the purge of Jews from multiple occupations and unwritten quotas that limited their professional and educational opportunities.

The abolition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee on Nov. 20, 1948, and the arrest and execution of its members was central to this postwar assault. The committee’s elimination was accompanied by an “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign emphasizing Russian nationalism, Soviet patriotism and anti-Westernism. In certain ways, the campaign served as the mirror image of anti-communist and jingoistic propaganda in the United States at the time.

“Rootless cosmopolitan” became code for “Jewish,” and dismissals swept the arts, sciences and media. The Ministry of State Security arrested Jewish industrial leaders for sabotage and, in 1953, fabricated “the Doctor’s Plot,” which accused a group of predominately Jewish doctors who treated Kremlin officials of trying to assassinate Stalin and other party leaders.

The very idea of an antisemitic campaign following the massive Soviet losses in World War II presents an enigma. Of the 6 million Jews murdered in the Holocaust, almost 2 million were murdered by the Nazis on Soviet soil. Why would Soviet leaders, who fought a bitter and costly war to defeat fascism, choose to attack the very group that the Nazis tried to annihilate?

My forthcoming book, “Stalin’s Final Terror: Antisemitism, Nationality Policy, and the Jewish Experience,” addresses this difficult question.

Clashing with the state

The Soviet state created the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in 1942 to aid the war effort at home and abroad. Its chairman, Solomon Mikhoels, was a renowned Yiddish actor and director of the State Yiddish Theater – one of the many cultural and scientific luminaries who led the committee.

The committee made an enormous contribution to the war effort, sending thousands of articles about fascism, the Jewish war experience and the Red Army for publication in the foreign press. Mikhoels and writer Itsik Fefer toured the United States, Mexico, Canada and Great Britain, where they were welcomed by rapturous crowds and raised millions of dollars.

In 1943, as the Red Army began liberating Soviet territories from German occupation, the committee was inundated by letters from surviving and returning Jews. Committee leaders tried to help people reclaim their homes, to distribute foreign aid and to identify and commemorate sites of Nazi war crimes. They wrote to Stalin suggesting the creation of a Jewish national republic in Crimea to replace destroyed communities in Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia.

But the state deemed these unsanctioned activities expressions of “bourgeois Jewish nationalism.” Some Communist Party leaders even insinuated that the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was being used by spies, and advocated its elimination.

The minister of state security, V.S. Abakumov, convinced Stalin that Mikhoels was spying for Jewish organizations in the United States, but Mikhoels was too well known at home and abroad to be arrested. In January 1948, Mikhoels was lured to a house on the outskirts of Minsk, crushed by a truck and dumped on a deserted road.

The murder, disguised as an accident, signaled a turning point in the government’s policy toward Soviet Jews. In November 1948, the government abolished the committee as “a center of anti-Soviet propaganda.” Fifteen of its leaders were arrested over the following months. The state shuttered the Yiddish publishing house, press, theaters, literary journals and writers association, and arrested hundreds of Yiddish cultural figures.

Unbowed in court

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee’s leaders were charged with bourgeois nationalism, treason and espionage. Tortured in prison and kept in cramped, freezing cells, they were forced to confess.

The Ministry of State Security hoped to stage a public show trial, but as soon as the physical coercion stopped, the defendants began to retract their confessions and write letters of protest. The evidence was based on these extracted confessions, and the state feared an international outcry.

After the group had already spent more than two years in prison, the case was reopened. M.D. Riumin, the new head of the investigatory unit, was intent on showing that the defendants directed Jewish nationalist organizations that infiltrated the government at every level. After new interrogations, an indictment was drawn up, sent to Stalin and approved by the Politburo.

A secret trial began in May 1952. Despite being physically broken, the defendants presented a powerful rebuttal.

Solomon Lozovskii, an old revolutionary and former deputy foreign minister, shredded the state’s accusations. Historian Iosif Iuzefovich retracted his confession and told the court that after numerous beatings, “I was ready to confess that I was the pope’s own nephew, acting on his direct personal orders.” Boris Shimeliovich, the director of a leading Moscow hospital, testified that he had received over 2,000 blows to his buttocks and heels. Even the chairman of the court began to doubt the charges.

Yet the defendants were convicted. Thirteen of the 15 were executed on Aug. 12, 1952. The executions were later commemorated as “The Night of the Murdered Poets, though only five of the victims were poets. Solomon Bregman, a labor leader, died in prison; Lina Shtern, a renowned scientist, was sentenced to exile.

After Stalin’s death, the defendants were exonerated. The case only became public, however, in 1988, when the country began a full reckoning with the Stalin era.

The final Terror

How do we explain this final Terror?

Jews had benefited enormously from the revolution in 1917, which eliminated czarist oppression, granted them equal rights and opened new educational and employment opportunities. They entered professions and held leading posts in the Communist Party. They were considered an official nationality, like Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Armenians and hundreds of other groups in the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Yet after the war, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee’s efforts to help Jewish survivors and commemorate the Holocaust were not acceptable to the state, which minimized the singularity of Jewish wartime experiences. The government identified advocacy solely on behalf of Jews, either at home or abroad, as "bourgeois nationalism” or Zionism.

Amid the intensifying Cold War, the government sought to mobilize popular support by resurrecting Russian nationalism, once an anathema to socialist revolutionaries. It reestablished many czarist discriminatory policies, creating obstacles to Jewish advancement and education. Despite the government’s initial support for the new state of Israel, it blocked the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee from participating in Jewish international organizations, which it viewed as a conduit for Western spies and Jewish nationalism.

Some historians believe that Stalin was preparing a larger Terror, including the deportation of the Jewish population, but his plans were disrupted by his death in 1953. Others disagree, asserting a lack of evidence.

Yet one point is worth pondering: Using the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Riumin aimed to build a larger case that would have targeted Jews in every institution for treason. He never succeeded, however, in staging a public trial or launching a wider hunt for enemies throughout the government.

The courage of the defendants thwarted Riumin’s venomous ambition. They testified bravely about their abuse and exposed the falsity of the charges. Revolutionaries committed to the struggle against fascism, they held firm to the end.

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Guinea-Bissau’s Military Takeover Highlights The Nation’s Sorry History Of Coups And A Deepening Crisis Across The Region

Soldiers patrol the streets in Guinea-Bissau on Nov. 26, 2025. Patrick Meinhardt/AFP via Getty Images

BY JOHN JOSEPH CHIN

ASSISTANT TEACHING PROFESSOR OF 

STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY,

CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Army generals in Guinea-Bissau seized power on Nov. 26, 2025 – the eve of a scheduled official declaration of the winner in the West African nation’s presidential election.

Alleging a destabilization plot by unnamed politicians and drug lords, the military suspended the electoral process and blocked the results of a contest that both the now former president, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, and the opposition candidate had claimed victory in.

General Horta Inta-a, the head of the presidential guard, was subsequently sworn in as “transitional” leader and Ilídio Vieira Té, a close Embaló ally, was appointed prime minister. The timing of the development and Embaló’s connection to the new government figures have led domestic opposition groups and some West African political leaders to claim the coup was staged to facilitate Embaló’s continued rule by proxy.

Whatever the veracity of such claims, the events point to both a deepening regional crisis of democracy and the inability of Guinea-Bissau to escape its coup-prone history. Indeed, as a scholar who has compiled and updated a dataset of coup types and documented their history in Guinea-Bissau since its independence from Portugal in 1974, I believe the country is caught in a classic coup trap whereby poverty and coups d’etat are mutually reinforcing.

The Sahel coup belt keeps expanding

The events in Guinea-Bissau reflect a so-called polycrisis for countries in and around the Sahel belt, sandwiched between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. This region has, since 2020, become the global epicenter of both terrorism and coups – so much so that it is sometimes dubbed the Sahel “coup belt”.

The events in Guinea-Bissau, which is located just south of the Sahel region, represent the 11th successful coup in Africa since 2020 – and the second successful one in 2025 after the military takeover in Madagascar in October following a wave of Gen Z protests.

Indeed, nearly three-quarters of all coup attempts in the world since 2020 have taken place in West Africa or the Sahel. The region accounts for an even higher share of successful coups since 2020. This unprecedented cluster of coups comes in a region that accounts for less than 10% of both Africa’s population and the number of states in the world.

The Sahel region is responsible for around 75% of recent coups

There have been many reasons for the various coups in the Sahel since 2020. Takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, for example, were driven in part by growing terrorist insurgencies, Russian disinformation and rising anti-French sentiment.

By contrast, data from the conflict monitoring organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, or ACLED, shows very little conflict or protest in Guinea-Bissau leading up to the coup. Instead, events appear to lie in political opportunism in the wake of an election marred by flaws and allegations of illegitimacy.

Guinea-Bissau’s ‘coup trap’

Before the latest military takeover, Guinea-Bissau was already the fourth-most coup-prone state in sub-Saharan Africa, having suffered five failed coup attempts and three successful ones since 1974. Coups toppled the single-party regime of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde in 1980, the authoritarian regime of Kumba Yala in 2003 and overthrew democracy and installed an indirect military regime in 2012. Meanwhile, a failed coup attempt in 1998 sparked the country’s only civil war.

Since 2020, Guinea-Bissau had suffered one bona fide coup attempt, in February 2022, in addition to a mutiny in late 2022 that Embaló condemned as a coup attempt. The coup of November 2025 was itself foreshadowed by an alleged coup plot that was revealed at the end of October, when a number of senior officers were arrested.

All of that suggests a feature of this type of instability: Coups beget more coups. In fact, seven of the nine nations that have suffered successful coups since 2020 had already suffered a successful coup within the previous 20 years.

And whereas nearly 30% of nations with coups since 2005 suffered a coup again between 2020 and 2025, states that lacked a recent coup history – even poor countries in Africa – were much less likely to suffer a coup after 2020.

Coup as a feature, not a bug

Following the 2022 coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau, Embaló had moved to consolidate the government under his leadership and reduce constraints on the executive. Indeed, data on three key dimensions of democracy shows that electoral contestation, voter participation and executive constraints have all declined significantly in Guinea-Bissau since.

The Varieties of Democracy project, which surveys experts to measure different levels of democracy, declared in 2022 that Guinea-Bissau had become an “electoral autocracy” – a term to denote governments that are elected through unfair and fraudulent means and go on to rule in an authoritarian manner.

The nation has continued to slide into autocracy since then.

Embaló used an alleged coup plot in December 2023 as a pretext to dissolve the opposition-dominated legislature. The country has not had a sitting legislature since.

Earlier in 2025, Embaló went back on his promise to step down at the end of his first term and instead announced he was running for a second term. Given that Embaló had barred the main opposition party from running, many feared he might try to steal the election, if necessary, much like Paul Biya is alleged to have done in nearby Cameroon in October 2025.

Not a ‘good coup,‘ but a ‘veto coup’

When asked about recent coups in Africa, Rwandan President Paul Kagame insisted that some coups – those that oppose corruption and bad governance – are “good coups.” Though scholars have debated how frequent so-called good coups have been in Africa, there is little doubt that the recent case better fits the classic pattern of a so-called “veto coup,” meant to prevent the winner of the election from taking office.

Indeed, the presence of prominent Embaló allies in the interim Guinea-Bissau government lends credence to opposition cries of foul play. The new government’s promise of democratic elections in a year should likewise be treated with skepticism. The promised electoral timetable has not been kept in any other recent coup case in the Sahel, where juntas remain entrenched.

As such, even if Guinea-Bissau was becoming increasingly autocratic already, the latest takeover is likely a cure worse than the disease. Whether the international community that has condemned the coup – from the United Nations to the African Union to the Economic Community of West African Nations – is willing or able to take credible steps to help guide Guinea-Bissau back to constitutional rule looks uncertain, given the recent example of other coup-hit nations across the continent.

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