Is It Time To Retire The ‘Arab-Israeli Conflict’? Hostilities Now Extend Beyond Those Boundaries

BY NADER HABIBI

HENRY J. LEIR PROFESSOR PRACTICE

IN ECONOMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

The current phase of fighting in the Middle East began almost a year ago, with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas and the subsequent pummeling of Gaza by Israel. But to many academics, foreign policy experts and international observers, what is taking place is also the latest episode in the decadeslong conflict commonly referred to as the “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

The experience of the past 11 months has led many experts on the region like myself to reassess that term. Is “Arab-Israeli conflict” an accurate reflection, given that the active participants are no longer just Arabs and Israelis? Should we retire that term for good now that the conflict has widened, drawing in the United States and Iran – and potentially Turkey and others in the coming years?

How it all began

The Arab-Israeli conflict began after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922. In what is now Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, but was then the Palestine mandate under British rule, sporadic disputes over land ownership led to violence between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab communities.

When Israel declared independence in 1948, the conflict expanded into an interstate war between Israel and several Arab countries – Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Hence it was named the Arab-Israeli War by both the media and political leaders at the time.

This name remained accurate for several decades as the conflict remained geopolitically and geographically confined to the Arab countries and Israel.

After the initial 1948 war, the unresolved conflict resulted in several other wars between Israel and Arab countries. Some oil-exporting Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also became indirectly involved by providing financial support for the front-line Arab states and declared oil embargoes against the West during the 1967 and 1973 wars.

Iraq was also directly affected by this prolonged conflict in the 1980s when Israel destroyed its nuclear facilities. Subsequently Iraq targeted Israel with missiles several times in 1991 during the first Gulf War.

Going beyond the Arab world

The phrase “Arab-Israeli conflict” isn’t heard as much these days, but it’s still commonly in use, including by the United Nations, the United States government, media outlets and many scholars of the region.

However, reference to “Arab-Israeli conflict” obscures the active role of several other participants, particularly in recent decades.

The U.S. diplomatic support for Israel began with President Harry Truman’s decision to be the first to recognize the new state in May 1948. This was followed in the 1960s by an increase in U.S. military and financial support during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency.

Substantial U.S. arms transfers to Israel also occurred in September 1970 when, at President Richard Nixon’s request, Israel mobilized its forces to save King Hussein of Jordan from a Palestinian uprising aided by Syrian forces.

In the following decades, however, the role of the U.S. has expanded into direct involvement in air defense operations against missile and drone attacks against Israel. The U.S. Army air defense units, for example, were used to defend Israel against Iraq’s scud missile attacks as early as the 1990-91 Gulf War.

This U.S. participation has been in evidence since the Oct. 7 attacks, too. In the months after the attacks, U.S. operations have been conducted against missile and drone attacks launched toward Israel by the Houthis in Yemen and by Iran.

By all accounts, the U.S. military support for Israel has played a crucial role in Israel’s military superiority over its neighbors. Therefore, an appropriate name for the broader conflict, I would argue, should reflect this active U.S. participation.

On the “Arab” side of the conflict, too, the adversaries of Israel are no longer limited to Arab nations. Iran is now an active participant; Tehran not only provides military support for groups hostile to Israel, including Hamas, Houthis and Hezbollah, but it has had direct military exchanges with Israel during the current Gaza war.

Furthermore, Iran and Israel have been involved in covert operations and cyberwars against each other for the past 15 years, which have only intensified since the Israel-Hamas war.

Risk of Turkish involvement?

And with no resolution to the current fighting in sight, the chances of widening the conflict further shouldn’t be dismissed. Two possible scenarios that can widen this conflict are a serious escalation between Israel and Iran, and the active participation of Turkey.

The intense Israeli bombardment of Gaza and the resulting high casualties have escalated tensions between Israel and Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and politicians from various Turkish political parties have been very vocal in their criticism of Israel’s military operations.

Public anger and anti-Israeli sentiments in Turkey have reached high levels, partly as a result of the extensive coverage of the carnage and human suffering in Gaza. There is even a small possibility that an unexpected event, such as an encounter between the Israeli navy and a Turkish ship approaching Gaza to defy Israel’s naval blockade, might lead to a military exchange between Turkey and Israel. While the likelihood of such an exchange remains small, a military escalation between Israel and Turkey could also be triggered by a major Israeli operation in Lebanon, according to some experts.

The ‘MENA-ISRAME conflict’?

Almost a year into the latest phase of fighting in the Middle East, it is clear that the label “Arab-Israeli conflict” no longer reflects the facts on the ground. But “Israeli-Palestinian” or “Gaza-Israeli” fail to take into account the growing number of countries that have a stake – or an active role – in the fighting.

Indeed, in the course of the current Gaza conflict, people have been killed in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Similarly, the list of belligerents includes Hamas and Israel, but also a plethora of Iran-backed militias across the Middle East and the Arab Peninsula.

So where does that leave us?

A more accurate title for the ongoing hostilities needs to better reflect all the major participants.

On one side, we have several nonstate actors and governments from across the Middle East and North Africa, or “MENA,” as the region is commonly called. On the other side we have an Israel heavily reliant on the U.S. for its military prowess and protection, and a United States that is fully committed to the security of Israel. I believe any name for the conflict should acknowledge the U.S. participation.

So, in my opinion, it is better to call this the “MENA-ISRAME conflict” – in which “ISRAME” is constructed by combining the first three letters of “Israel” and “America.”

I acknowledge that it is a bit of a mouthful and unlikely to catch on. But a name that reflects the larger set of participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict is nonetheless needed. It will increase awareness of the destruction, suffering and financial burden that it has inflicted on all the involved countries over its lifetime.

By doing so, it might increase the willingness of the world community, especially the active participants, to put more efforts toward finding a solution that can bring the MENA-ISRAME conflict to an end.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Elon Musk’s Feud With Brazilian Judge Is Much More Than A Personal Spat − It’s About National Sovereignty, Freedom Of Speech And The Rule Of Law

Elon Musk

BY YASMIN CURZI DE MENDONCA

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

It is easy to get distracted by the barbs, swipes and bluster of the ongoing and very public spat between the world’s richest man and a fierce justice on Brazil’s highest court. Elon Musk, the billionaire owner of X, posts regularly of his contempt for Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes – a man Musk has labeled a “dictator” and “Brazil’s Darth Vader.” He makes these comments on a social media platform that Moraes has banned in Latin America’s most populous country as part of a lengthy campaign against disinformation.

But as an expert on Brazilian digital law, I see this as more than just a bitter personal feud. X’s legal battle with Brazil’s Supreme Court raises important questions about platform regulation and how to combat disinformation while protecting free speech. And while the focus is on Brazil and Musk, it is a debate being echoed around the world.

Countdown to the big fight

Things came to a head between Musk and Moraes in August 2024, but the battle has been years in the making.

In 2014, Brazil passed the “Marco Civil da Internet” or the “Internet Bill of Rights,” as it is commonly known. Backed by bipartisan support, this framework for internet regulation outlined principles for protecting user privacy and free speech while also creating penalties for platforms that break the rules.

It included a “judicial notice and takedown” system under which internet platforms are liable for harmful user-generated content only if they fail to remove the content after receiving a specific court order.

The approach was designed to strike a balance between protecting free speech and ensuring that illegal and harmful content can be removed. It prevents social media platforms, messaging apps and online forums from being held automatically responsible for users’ posts, while empowering courts to intervene when necessary.

But the 2014 law stops short of creating detailed rules for content moderation, leaving much of the responsibility in the hands of platforms such as Facebook and X.

And the rise of disinformation in recent years, especially around Brazil’s 2022 presidential elections, exposed the limitations of the framework.

The president at the time, far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro, and his supporters were accused of using social media platforms such as X to spread falsehoods, sow doubts about the integrity of Brazil’s electoral system and incite violence. When Bolsonaro was defeated at the ballot by the leftist Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, an online campaign of election denialism flourished. It culminated in the Jan. 8, 2023, storming of the Brazilian Congress, Supreme Court and the presidential palace by Bolsonaro’s supporters – an event similar to the U.S. Capitol riots two years earlier.

The fight gets personal …

In response to the disinformation campaigns and the attacks, Brazil’s Supreme Court initiated two inquiries – the digital militias inquiry and the antidemocratic acts inquiry – to investigate groups involved in the plot.

As part of those inquiries, the Supreme Court requested social media platforms – such as Facebook, Instagram and X – to hand over the IP addresses and suspend accounts linked to those illegal activities.

But by this time, Musk, who has described himself as a free-speech fundamentalist, had acquired the platform, promising to support free speech, reinstate banned accounts and decrease significantly the platform’s content moderation policy.

As a result, Musk has been openly defying the Supreme Court’s orders since the beginning. In April 2024, X’s global government affairs team began sharing information with the public on what it deemed as “illegal” demands from the Supreme Court.

The feud escalated in late August when X’s legal representative in Brazil resigned and Musk refused to name a new legal representation – a move that was interpreted by Moraes as an attempt to evade the law. In response, Moraes ordered the platform’s ban on Aug. 31, 2024.

The move was accompanied by heavy penalties for Brazilians attempting to circumvent the ban. Anyone using virtual private networks, or VPNs, to access X faces daily fines of nearly US$9,000 – more than the average annual income of many Brazilians. Those decisions were confirmed by a panel consisting of five Supreme Court justices on Sept. 2, 2024. Amid criticism of judicial overreach, however, the full court of 11 justices will discuss and potentially revisit this part of Moraes’ decision.

… then turns political

The X v. Brazil Supreme Court fight has become deeply politicized. On Sept. 7, thousands of Bolsonaro supporters took part in a “pro-free speech” protest. Lula’s administration and the Supreme Court have become targets, with the opposition and right-wing factions framing the platform’s suspension as a symbol of state overreach.

The rhetoric contrasts sharply with the more balanced, deliberative efforts to regulate platforms that began over a decade ago with the Marco Civil da Internet. It also highlights the challenge of finding a balance between free speech and combating disinformation in a deeply polarized environment – an issue that Brazil is far from alone in grappling with.

The political heat surrounding the banning of X doesn’t bode well for Brazil’s ongoing efforts to counter online disinformation and hold platforms accountable for harmful content.

A “fake news bill,” as it has been dubbed by Brazilian media, was introduced by the country’s Congress in 2020. It seeks to create oversight mechanisms and increase transparency around political advertising and content moderation policies.

But despite its good intentions and a very light “regulated self-regulation” approach, the last version of the draft bill was blocked in the Brazilian Congress after three years of debate.

It follows a campaign by right-wing politicians and Big Tech lobbyists who labeled the legislation a “censorship bill,” arguing that it would infringe on free speech and stifle political discourse. As of now, the fate of the bill looks uncertain.

Meanwhile, on Aug. 23, the Supreme Court announced that it will look at two key parts of the Marco Civil as part of a judicial review taking place in November.

The first is the “judicial notice and takedown” process that critics complain is too slow and allows platforms to choose not to adopt more robust content moderation mechanisms. Supporters, however, maintain that judicial oversight is necessary to prevent platforms from arbitrarily removing content, which could lead to censorship.

The second area under review is the part of the Marco Civil that outlines the penalties for companies that fail to follow the rules. The debate centers on whether the current penalties, particularly service suspensions, are proportionate and constitutional. Critics argue that suspending an entire platform violates users’ rights to free speech and access to information, while proponents insist that it is a necessary tool to ensure compliance with Brazilian law and safeguard sovereignty.

The fate of both the “fake news bill” and the Supreme Court’s review could set in place new legal standards for platforms in Brazil and determine how far the country can go in enforcing its laws against global tech companies as it seeks to battle disinformation.

And while the Supreme Court did not directly link the review to the ongoing feud with X, the fight with Musk forms the unavoidable political backdrop to discussions over the future direction of Brazil’s experiment in platform regulation. As such, the fallout of this seemingly personal spat could have major regulatory consequences for Brazil and potentially other countries.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

‘Equivalent To Winning A World Cup!’ Did Cristiano Ronaldo Issue A Message To Lionel Messi After Scoring 900th Career Goal?

Christiano Ronaldo (Facebook)

BY RITAYAN BASU

Cristiano Ronaldo had a message for Lionel Messi after reaching 900 career goals. The five-time Ballon d’Or winner made history after scoring against Croatia in the UEFA Nations League. The landmark goal also enabled Portugal to win the fixture 2-1 against Croatia. After the match, Ronaldo was asked about the prospect of playing in the upcoming edition of the FIFA World Cup. The former Real Madrid and Manchester United footballer insisted that the World Cup did not bother him much since he had already lifted the European Championship in 2016. “Portugal winning Euros is equivalent to winning a World Cup,” Ronaldo said, as per multiple outlets.

Cristiano Ronaldo remained unhinged about the prospect of finishing his career without a FIFA World Cup title. The Portuguese icon would be 41 years old should he choose to compete in the next edition of the FIFA World Cup, scheduled to be held in the United States in 2026. Speaking in the post-match conference after defeating Croatia, Ronaldo did not reveal if he was going to feature in the next edition of the FIFA tournament. But he voiced his contentment in a couple of titles he won with Portugal. “I’ve already won two trophies for Portugal that I really wanted. I’m not motivated by that. I’m motivated by enjoying football and the records come naturally,” he said.

Cristiano Ronaldo also spoke about the landmark 900th goal he scored against Croatia. As per multiple outlets, he said, “Only me, and the people around me know how difficult it is to work daily to be physically and psychologically well and reach goal 900. It’s a unique milestone in my career and it was with a lot of emotion I celebrated that goal. It represents a lot. It was the number I wanted to achieve for a long time and I knew I would achieve it because, as I continue to play, it would happen naturally.”

The FIFA World Cup trophy is a major crown that has eluded Cristiano Ronaldo’s trophy cabinet. The farthest Ronaldo has managed to reach in the tournament was the semi-finals in 2004. They were eventually knocked out by France back then. Portugal failed to crack the Round of 16, in the following edition and lost 0-1 to Spain.

In 2014, Portugal could not get past the group stage whereas Lionel Messi’s Argentina went on to play in the final. Portugal were eliminated by Uruguay in 2018 thanks to a brace from Edinson Cavani. In Qatar, two years back, Portugal conceded a defeat to Morocco in the quarter-finals. Meanwhile, Argentina completed a dream run to win the FIFA World Cup title in 2022.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

2026 World Cup: How Nations From Around The world Can Qualify

BY DALE JOHNSON, GENERAL EDITOR, ESPN FC

Qualifying for the 2026 FIFA World Cup began on Oct. 12, 2023, when minor nations from the Asian confederation played their first round of matches. Myanmar's Lwin Moe Aung scored the very first goal in a 5-1 win over Macau.

Most confederations now have qualifying well underway, but we're a long way from discovering who will join hosts United States, Mexico and Canada.

Here's where we're at around the globe.

EUROPE(UEFA)

12 AUTO + 4 VIA CONFEDERATION PLAYOFF

There are 55 European nations, and qualifying will run from March to November 2025. However, Russia remain suspended due to the invasion of Ukraine and are unlikely to compete, leaving 54 nations.

There will be 12 groups of four or five teams, playing home and away matches. The group winners will qualify directly for the World Cup.

There is no date for the draw as yet, but it's likely to be in November or December. The seeded teams will be the top eight nations from the current edition of the UEFA Nations League, which ends on Nov. 19, plus the top four by FIFA World Ranking who aren't yet seeded. Despite being in Nations League B, England are almost certain to be in Pot 1 on World Ranking.

The final four places at the World Cup will be determined via confederation playoffs, to be played in March 2026. There is no path to the World Cup through FIFA's intercontinental playoffs.

The UEFA playoff involves 16 teams: the 12 runners-up plus the four best-ranked group winners from the UEFA Nations League, who did not finish in the top two in World Cup qualifying. This creates four routes, each with four teams featuring a semifinal and a final for a place at the World Cup.

SOUTH AMERICA (CONMEBOL)

6 AUTO + 1 ENTERS PLAYOFF

As in recent qualifying competitions, all 10 nations play each other home and away. The top six nations qualify directly to the finals. The seventh-placed team will go into the intercontinental playoffs in March 2026.

The first qualifiers took place in September 2023, with the league phase to be completed in September 2025.

NORTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA , CARIBBEAN (CONCACAF)

3 AUTO + 2 ENTER PLAYOFF

Usually, Concacaf would have six automatic places in qualifying -- but for the 2026 finals three of the six are taken up by the hosts. That leaves three places to be won, plus two spots in the intercontinental playoffs.

Concacaf saw 32 nations enter the race to make the finals.

Round 1: The four lowest-ranked Concacaf nations battled it out in two-legged ties. Anguilla and British Virgin Islands eliminated Turks and Caicos Islands and U.S. Virgin Islands respectively, both on penalties.

Round 2: The top 28-ranked nations, plus the two winners from Round 1, were drawn into six groups of five teams. The six group winners and six group runners-up will move on to Round 3. This stage will be played in two blocks, with the first held in June 2024 and the second in June 2025.

Round 3: The 12 remaining teams will be drawn into three groups of four teams. The group winners will qualify for the World Cup, with the two runners-up with the best record going on to take part in the intercontinental playoffs. This phase will be played in September, October and November 2025.

AFRICA (CAF)

9 AUTO + 1 ENTERS PLAYOFF

There were 54 FIFA-affiliated nations in the draw, but Eritrea subsequently withdrew.

Round 1: The 53 teams are in eight groups of six nations, and one group of five. The nine group winners qualify for the World Cup,

This stage began in November 2023 and will be completed in October 2025.

Round 2: The four best runners-up will enter playoffs (two semifinals and a final) to decide which one country will go to the intercontinental playoffs. This stage will be played in November 2025.

ASIA (AFC)

8 AUTO + 1 ENTERS PLAYOFF

This is by some distance the most complicated route to the World Cup, with a layered qualifying process which creates a dual group stage to find the eight automatic qualifiers.

Round 1: The 20 lowest-ranked nations played two-legged ties in October 2023. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore and Yemen advanced.

Round 2: Those 10 winners joined the 26 best-ranked nations. The 36 teams were drawn into nine groups of four teams, with the top two nations going through to Round 3. This stage began in November 2023 and was completed in June 2024.

Advanced: Australia, Bahrain, China, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan

Round 3: We're now left with 18 nations, who have been drawn into three groups of six teams. Matches began in September 2024 and will run through to June 2025

The group winners and runners-up will take the first six places at the 2026 World Cup.

The six nations who finished in third and fourth move on to round 4.

Round 4: The six teams in this stage will be drawn into two groups of three. They will play each other once, so two matches, on neutral ground in October 2025.

The group winners take the final two automatic places at the World Cup.

The runners-up continue on to Round 5.

Round 5: The two runners-up will play a two-legged tie in November 2025 to earn the place in the intercontinental playoffs.

OCEANIA (OFC)

1 AUTO + 1 ENTERS PLAYOFF

All 11 members of the OFC region take part.

Round 1: The four lowest-ranked nations play a knockout format (two semis and a final) in September 2024 for a place in round two. The games will be played in Samoa.

American Samoa, Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga are in this round.

Samoa beat Tonga 2-1 in the final to move on to Round 2.

Round 2: Samoa join the seven top-ranked nations.

The eight nations have been drawn into two groups of four nations, with matches played in October and November 2024. Games will be held in New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.

Group A: Solomon Islands, Fiji, New Caledonia and Papua New Guinea
Group B: New Zealand, Tahiti, Vanuatu and Samoa

The top two countries in each group go on to Round 3.

Round 3: Four countries remain, and will play a knockout format (two semis and a final) in March 2025.

The winners of the final qualifies for the World Cup, with the losers playing in the intercontinental playoff.

INTERCONTINENTAL PLAYOFFS (2 PLACES)

The playoffs, to be held in March 2026, will determine the final two qualifiers.

Six countries will take part. Each of the five confederations (apart from UEFA) will have one country in the playoffs. The host confederation (so for this edition Concacaf) receives a second slot.

1 Africa
1 Asia
2 Concacaf
1 Oceania
1 South America

The two nations with the best FIFA World Ranking will be seeded and go straight into one of the two finals.

The four other countries will be drawn to play a semifinal, feeding through to play a seed for one of the two places at the World Cup.

The playoffs are due to be held in one of the World Cup host nations as a test event.

Politicians Often Warn Of American Decline – And Voters Often Buy It

BY JONATHAN SCHULMAN

Presidential candidates talk about national decline while campaigning. A lot. This was front and center during the June 2024 debate between former President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden.

“Throughout the entire world, we’re no longer respected as a country,” Trump said, as he has repeatedly.

Trump continued by saying that if the United States had a president that Vladimir Putin respected, “he would have never invaded Ukraine.” Trump said “we’re laughed at” and that “the United States’ reputation under this man’s leadership is horrible.”

Biden countered Trump’s evocative statement with the argument that the U.S. has “the finest military in the history of the world” and that it remains well respected abroad.

“The idea that somehow we are this failing country,” Biden said, “I never heard a president talk like this before.”

Public polls on other countries’ views of the U.S. support Biden’s point.

Yet politicians’ warnings of decline persist because they invoke fear for the country’s security, anxiety about another country gaining more power and anger about the United States’ various problems.

Messages of decline over the years

While Trump’s messages of American carnage are dramatic, exchanges of this sort are not uncommon in U.S. politics.

During the 1960 presidential election, for example, John F. Kennedy, then a U.S. senator from Massachusetts, frequently warned that the U.S. was falling behind the Soviet Union, in everything from space exploration to international respect.

“I don’t want historians, 10 years from now, to say these were the years when the tide ran out for the United States,” Kennedy said during his first televised debate against his Republican opponent, Vice President Richard Nixon, on Sept. 26, 1960.

Warning of national decline has remained a common campaign message ever since, with the challenging party’s side claiming that the country is falling behind or losing respect, forcing the incumbent’s side to play defense.

Pushing back on messages of decline

My research examines the role of perceived threats to national status in domestic and international politics. I ran an experiment in March 2024 with 1,079 Americans, aimed at trying to understand how their concerns about national decline affect their foreign policy opinions.

One-third of respondents were randomly assigned to read a prompt warning that experts and leaders from both parties agreed that the U.S. was declining, relative to its rivals. Another third of respondents read the opposite message, which listed facts from bipartisan experts arguing that concerns about national decline were overblown. The final third read about a topic unrelated to politics.

Those who read about American decline reported increased levels of fear, anger and anxiety than the group who did not read about this topic. One respondent, for example, wrote, “My biggest concern is other countries won’t respect us. Once we show weakness, other countries will try to overtake us.”

However, the text of bipartisan experts arguing that the U.S. was not declining did not assuage Americans’ anxieties.

Approximately 30% of people, both liberal and conservative, who read that experts said the concerns over national decline are overblown outright rejected the premise of the text, compared with just 11% of those who read that U.S. global standing is declining.

Some respondents asked if the text was a joke and said that the U.S. is becoming a “third-world country.” Others pointed to the state of U.S. health care or reproductive rights to question how one could suggest that the country is not falling behind.

Fighting emotion with emotion

When the Democratic ticket changed and Biden announced in July 2024 that he would not run for reelection, the political messaging of Democratic leaders did, too.

Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and her running mate, Tim Walz, have, at times, incited fear about what a second Trump term would look like. But they have also used language and talked about topics that center on joy and excitement, celebrating things like Walz’s tenure as a teacher and football coach and the pride Harris has for her mother’s work and sacrifices.

“Guided by optimism and faith,” Harris said in her nomination speech in August 2024, she encouraged her supporters to “write the next great chapter in the most extraordinary story ever told.”

Harris has also provided an emotionally powerful counter to Trump’s “Make America Great Again,” in the form of “Not Going Back.”

In Walz’s first appearance as the Democratic candidate for vice president on Aug. 6, he thanked Harris for “bringing back the joy.” With rallies filled with boisterous call-and-responses and chanting, Harris has seized on joy and excitement in detailing a vision of America’s future, juxtaposing her rallies with what she described as Trump’s “the-world-is-doomed rallies.”

The subtitle of one Harris campaign press release following a Trump news conference, for example, read: “Split Screen: Joy and Freedom vs. Whatever the Hell That Was.”

US global standing in 2024 campaign

While Harris’ rallies have largely focused on domestic issues like abortion rights and economic inequality, debates over the country’s global standing will reemerge and persist. In an August 2024 poll, the second-most-common reason likely Harris voters said they supported her was because she would strengthen the United States’ status in the world – while the second-most-common reason other voters opposed her was because they thought she would weaken the country on the global stage.

Trump has continued to describe the U.S. as a “nation in decline.” Harris, in her Democratic National Convention speech, countered that she will work to ensure that “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century and that we strengthen, not abdicate, our global leadership.”

Harris also remarked in her acceptance speech: “You know, our opponents in this race are out there every day denigrating America, talking about how terrible everything is. Well, my mother had another lesson she used to teach: Never let anyone tell you who you are. You show them who you are.”

Campaign rhetoric warning of American decline has been common since at least 1960, and it isn’t going away anytime soon. But with a new Democratic ticket and a transformed race, Democrats are now fighting emotion with emotion. And that is more likely to resonate than informing people that things are not as bad as they fear.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

How Democrats Are Making A Mistake In Rural America – By Not Showing Up

BY JEFF BLOODWORTH

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY

GANNON UNIVERSITY

Rickey Cole, 58, is a farmer and the former two-term chair of Mississippi’s Democratic Party. If anyone understands rural Mississippi voters – and their shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party – it’s Cole.

“You learn from losing,” the lifelong Democrat said.

He should hope so.

In 2001, when Cole first served as party chair, Democrats controlled 7 of 8 statewide offices, including governor and attorney general, and both state legislative chambers. Twenty years later, Republicans hold all eight statewide offices and a massive 79-41 majority in the state House and 36-16 majority in the state Senate.

Mississippi, the nation’s fourth-most rural state, defines “rural” as any county with fewer than 50,000 residents or a town with a population of 15,000 or less. In the 2023 election, 51% of Mississippians lived in communities meeting this criteria.

Though Democrats still have an edge in urban centers such as Jackson and Vicksburg, the slow and repeated loss of rural voters is the cause of Cole’s woes.

“Losing them is the motif of my entire career,” he told me.

A losing tide

Cole and Mississippi are not alone.

Democrats have been losing rural voters across the U.S. since the 1960s. But the party has hemorrhaged these voters since 2000.

In 1992 and 1996, Democrat Bill Clinton won 49% of the rural vote in both elections. But by 2008, that number had declined when Barack Obama only took 43% of rural voters.

Four years ago, that number collapsed even more. In 2020, Joe Biden captured about 35% of the rural vote.

The Democratic Party’s collapse in rural America has fueled support for Donald Trump and his “Make America Great Again” movement.

Trump took 65% of the rural vote in 2020, up from 59% in 2016, according to the Pew Research Center.

In all, Republicans won 71% of rural white voters in 2020, a 9-point improvement over 2016.

Though only 1 in 5 Americans live in rural towns, Trump’s apparent monopoly automatically puts nearly two dozen states across the South, Midwest and Great Plains out of reach for Democrats.

One of them is Mississippi. In 2016, Trump earned 59.3% of the vote, soundly beating Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, who got 39.7%. Though Trump still won the state in 2020, his percentage dropped slightly to 57.6%, while the Democratic candidate, Biden, earned 41.1%, a little more than Clinton had in 2016.

Only themselves to blame

As the owner of MLB Research Associates, Matt Barron specializes in rural Democratic races and is considered one of the nation’s leading political strategists on the rural vote.

Beyond the policy debates, Barron said the blame falls on the Democrats.

“They don’t even try to compete in rural America,” he told me.

Cole, the former Mississippi state Democratic Party chair, agrees.

In rural America, he explained, Democrats have stopped grassroots organizing and party-building.

As Barron tells the story, in the hotly contested 2023 Mississippi governor’s race, for instance, the Democratic National Committee ignored local organizers and sent national campaign staffers from Michigan and Ohio to canvass rural Mississippi for votes.

As outsiders unfamiliar with the local terrain, the staffers needed a GPS to navigate the back roads. Lost geographically, they were even more adrift strategically, Barron said.

The Northern urbanites lacked any knowledge of how to push Democratic voters to the polls. The result was lower-than-expected turnout in an election that saw the incumbent, Tate Reeves, a Republican, beat Democrat Brandon Presley by 26,619 votes, or 3.2% of the 820,000 votes cast.

Cole said Presley’s loss is an example of a much larger issue.

“Our politics became nationalized by a cadre of professional operatives,” he told me. “It has become a big industry.”

Cole explained that media consultants earn a percentage of all campaign advertising spending. It maximizes their profits when they spend money in pricey urban markets and ignore rural media. Predictably, Democrats get shellacked in rural America, and the same strategists then blame rural voters for being unreachable.

A grassroots campaign

Ty Pinkins is trying to reverse the Democrats’ failure.

Slim and youthful, the 50-year-old African American army veteran is the Democratic nominee for a U.S. Senate seat in Mississippi. To defeat his Republican opponent, incumbent Roger Wicker, Pinkins is working with Cole to “build a grassroots pyramid.”

The Bronze Star recipient has put 70,000 miles on his Chevy Tahoe canvassing 67 of the state’s 82 counties. His goal is to have a campaign leader in every county and all 1,762 state precincts.

As Cole sees it, Pinkins’ grassroots campaign will last beyond the November 2024 election – and provide the key to a revived state Democratic Party.

But grassroots campaigning is not easy _ and getting lost in rural Mississippi is is not always what one expects.

On a hot summer day, Pinkins took a wrong turn and found himself at a crossroads next to a rickety old house. After he knocked on the screened door several times, the 85-year-old Miss Maggie finally came out.

When Pinkins told her that he was running for the U.S. Senate, she smiled and laughed. Soon, the two shared steaming plates of fried chicken, brown gravy and sweet potatoes. She told the candidate, “Baby, now tell me about yourself.”

Once Pinkins finished, it was Miss Maggie’s turn, and the two talked until dusk. Before he could leave, Miss Maggie went back inside. She returned with a sack of coins.

“I don’t have much time left,” she told Pinkins. “I’m 85 years old. This is all I’ve got, and I’m giving it to you.”

For Pinkins, reaching rural voters is not an impossible dream – though sometimes it takes getting lost and hours of conversation to earn one vote.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

How Russia Employs ‘Hard Soft Power’ To Influence Overseas Media And Sow Dissent And Fear Among Foreign Populations

BY CATHERINE LUTHER AND BRANDON PRINS

Public diplomacy – the art of rallying a foreign audience behind a nation’s interests – used to be about attracting support through charm, values and cultural exports. It is what political scientist Joseph Nye first referred to as “soft power.”

But our peer-reviewed study of Russian attempts to use foreign media as a diplomacy tool in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 highlights that the art has been adapted into what we call “hard soft power.”

Under this form of public diplomacy, governments mix in subtle threats to make the citizens of targeted countries feel unsafe. The overarching goals of such a strategy are to sow or exacerbate existing divisions, promote social chaos and extend the geopolitical reach of the responsible country.

Our study explored Russia’s use of hard soft power to win over Russian-speaking populations in the former Soviet countries of Ukraine and Georgia, while undermining democratic institutions and social trust in the United States and its NATO allies.

A content analysis of over 2,700 news stories from media sources from February to July 2021 showed that the Russian-language media based in Georgia and Ukraine consistently presented anti-Western narratives. The prominent framing included portraying NATO and the European Union as being existential threats to both countries.

These findings correspond with the Vladimir Putin-era expansion of Russia’s global news media networks, including RT, formerly Russia Today, and Sputnik, designed to influence populations and media outside of Russia. The results of the study also reflect the close ties that exist between the Kremlin and pro-Russian politicians or local business tycoons who run pro-Russian news media outlets.

Russia’s hard soft power could be considered as forming part of Russia’s “gray zone” tactics, which entail a broader range of coercive or manipulative activities, such as the issuing of false narratives and altering images.

It also complements Russia’s hard power – the use of military and economic measures to exert pressure on other countries.

Russian-speaking populations in former Soviet countries have been especially targeted by the Kremlin’s soft power campaigns in the post-Soviet years. This tactic aligns with Moscow’s goal of nurturing the allegiances of Russian diasporas and strengthening the idea of a “Russian World” or “Russkiy Mir.”

As countries bordering Russia, both Georgia and Ukraine have been targets of Moscow’s soft power diplomacy as well as its military aggression. During the period of our survey, Russia conducted a precursory buildup of its military forces in Crimea and around the eastern border of Ukraine, prior to the full invasion of February 2022.

Our study found that during this period, a narrative emerged among Russia-based media, local Ukrainian media and local Georgian media that emphasized Russia’s capacity to defy the military might of Western countries.

Why it matters

Our research illustrates how domestic media can be used as a tool in Russia’s propaganda playbook.

As the U.S. approaches the presidential election, the Kremlin and its proxies appear once again to be amplifying narratives around hot-button issues such as immigration, race and the Ukraine War. On Sept. 5, 2024, U.S. prosecutors indicted two Russian media executives over the secret funding of right-wing Americans to churn out videos to further Moscow interests in “amplifying U.S. domestic divisions in order to weaken U.S. opposition.”

While Russia has been the main country engaging in propaganda and disinformation campaigns, evidence exists that China and Iran have joined in such malign efforts.

What still isn’t known

Despite investments by countries such as Russia in hard soft power techniques, the question of whether these strategies have been successful in shaping the thoughts and behaviors of people needs further exploration.

Measuring the tangible outcomes of hard soft power initiatives is difficult, especially when it comes to social media. Still, our study as well as other research suggests that decentralized social media platforms may be less effective for foreign influence operations than more traditional media platforms.

What’s next

Our research team plans to examine the hard soft power phenomenon within the context of other countries. Moreover, we plan to carry out a deep dive into patterns of hard soft power use and its influences on people in targeted countries through focus groups and experimental studies.

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

Finding Ourselves In A Nigerian War Novel

CHIGOZIE OBIOMA

BY AARON BROWN

What Kunle discovers as he is tossed into a larger conflict is the power of brothers (and sisters) in the face of danger and oppression. He muses: “In war, every soldier comes to understand that faced with the possibility of cruel and sudden death, what they fear most is being alone.” The brotherhood of war friends that emerges includes a poetry-spouting soldier named Felix and a pious, reserved comrade nicknamed Fada, and this varied fellowship ushers a half-hearted and awkward Kunle into the maturing environs of war. Ultimately, the novel expands beyond Kunle’s ill-planned search and rescue mission to a broader meditation on war and friendship, loss and lament for a country that would never be.

To fans of Obioma’s first two novels, both long-listed for the Booker Prize, some features of The Road to the Country will seem familiar. Among these is a framing device that recalls Orchestra: a seer named Igbala becomes prophetically invested in Kunle’s life, seeing it play out in a storytelling frame that starts awkwardly but gains momentum throughout the novel. Additionally, Kunle’s romance with a fellow soldier is intriguing in its exploration of how love can help wounded people live through grief, but the relationship is disrupted enough at several points in the novel to leave readers wondering what might have been. A similarly tragic and frustrated love story lies at the heart of Orchestra.

This new novel’s strength is Obioma’s willingness to take the war novel to unexpected places, offering a narrative that transcends bullets and politics to ask us about our own narratives: What are the stories we tell about death? And why are we so eager to wedge ourselves against each other, focusing on the stories of borders, ethnicity, and geopolitics that perpetuate division? It occurs to Kunle at one point that “the only true thing about mankind can be found in the stories it tells, and some of the truest of these stories cannot be told by the living. Only the dead can tell them.” (Obioma notes in his acknowledgments that these words are a translation of an Igbo proverb he learned from his mother.) There is much wisdom in this novel.

You’ll find elements of classic war stories like The Things They Carried and The Red Badge of Courage here, and thanks to Obioma’s exquisite research you’ll learn much about the Biafran War and Europeans’ fetishization of it. But your expectations are likely to be quickly expanded as Obioma’s narrative becomes infused with the spiritual tendencies of his Igbo heritage, conveying an imagination that spans time and materiality in a way that only the greats—writers like Gabriel García Márquez, Jorge Luis Borges, and Ursula K. Le Guin—can accomplish. We need novelists like Obioma to remind us that the barriers between the physical and metaphysical are not as rigid as we may think—and that our narratives of pain and loss are not the final story.

 

READ ORIGINAL STORY HERE

ECOWAS Partners Media To Combat Disinformation About West Africa

Abdou Kolley (Facebook)

BY MICHAEL OLUGBODE

ABUJA, NIGERIA (THIS DAY) -- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in order to enhance its image and showcase its contributions to the socioeconomic development of West Africa has launched a collaboration with media across the region.

Speaking at the inaugural session which brought government-owned media outfits across the region together in Abuja on Thursday, the Chief of Staff in the Office of the President of ECOWAS Commission, Hon. Abdou Kolley, said the initiative was created in order to promote an accurate reporting of ECOWAS activities and tackling the growing issue of disinformation.

Kolley said the event themed: ‘Strategic Engagement with Public Media Actors in Our Member States to Strengthen Collaboration and Positive Coverage of ECOWAS Programmes and to Combat Disinformation in West Africa’ is also timed to prepare ground for the forthcoming ECOWAS’s 50th-anniversary celebrations and to bring information to the people of the region on the contributions of the bloc to the socioeconomic well-being and humanitarian interventions in the last half century.

He said that the programme was organised in partnership with the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), noting that the two-day event is part of a broader push to ensure media outlets serve as key partners in promoting ECOWAS’s mission of regional integration, peace and development.
ECOWAS President, Dr. Omar Touray, whose address was delivered by Kolley, stressed the critical role that media plays in shaping public opinion and influencing the socio-political landscape.
Touray noted that misinformation, particularly on social media, remains a significant challenge for the organisation, maintaining that accurate media coverage is essential.

“The ECOWAS Commission recognises the media as one of our indispensable and critical stakeholders.

“As gatekeepers and purveyors of information, we are fully aware of the important role of the media in creating and maintaining goodwill and mutual understanding between the commission and its people.

“This explains why the commission has convened this important stakeholders’ meeting with the heads of government-owned broadcast stations as part of our ongoing efforts to proactively broaden our engagement and strengthen our collaboration with the media towards achieving our common and shared vision as encapsulated by our vision 2050, this on the eve of the celebration of 50 years of existence of our institution.”

He noted that the media’s role in countering false narratives and raising awareness about ECOWAS’s achievements is crucial for fostering regional unity and public trust.

According to him, the meeting is coming up at a time when West Africa is facing multiple challenges, including political instability, economic pressures, and a surge in misinformation across digital platforms.

He revealed that the partnership between ECOWAS and the MFWA, formalised in December 2023, aims to build media capacity in tackling these challenges, adding that the collaboration will focus on promoting democratic values, countering disinformation, and fostering peace in the region.

He shared highlights from the 2024 Interim Report on the state of ECOWAS institutions, pointing out progress made in economic integration, peacebuilding efforts, and humanitarian responses.

He however noted that misinformation often overshadows these achievements, which is why ECOWAS is keen to deepen its media partnerships.

“The summary presentation of the results recorded during the first half of 2024 shows that ECOWAS is making a definite effort to support its Member States.

“Unfortunately, however, our populations are not very well informed about these efforts. Instead, they are inundated with false information deliberately disseminated by certain vile individuals via social media with the aim of destroying our common institution.

“Indeed, as is often said, the absence of credible information is a breeding ground for disinformation.”

READ ORINAL STORY HERE